

# PAPERS

RELATING TO

## THE RE-ORGANISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE.

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Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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LONDON:  
PRINTED BY GEORGE F. EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,  
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,  
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1855.

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
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## PAPERS, &amp;c.

JOHN G. SHAW LEFEVRE, Esq., C.B.,

Clerk Assistant to the House of Peers.

January 20, 1854.

So far as respects the examination for the higher class of appointments, my former connexion with Cambridge, and my present connexion with the University of London, enable me to state with considerable confidence, that there would be no serious difficulty in examining 400 or more candidates simultaneously in spacious and convenient halls; that it is easy to find competent, impartial, and honourable examiners, at moderate salaries or remuneration; that the subjects and course of examinations may be so arranged as to test not merely the amount of knowledge possessed by candidates in such subjects, but to distinguish between the results of cramming, and those of industry and talent; and that the relative merit of candidates may be tested with a sufficient degree of accuracy by means of marks, presuming that the examination be by printed papers (with a limited amount of vivâ voce).

The mode suggested of giving appointments, (and not merely capacity or eligibility for appointments,) according to the order of merit ascertained by examination, appears to me to be calculated to call forth an extraordinary amount of talent and industry. I am most sanguine as to its results, not only in that respect, but also as a powerful stimulus to all educational institutions.

I do not disguise from myself that there may be important defects in the character of a candidate for public office, not ascertainable by an examination into his intellectual attainments.

This may be guarded against, not by reliance on ordinary testimonials as to character, which are too easily given, but by careful preliminary inquiries, addressed personally and confidentially to parties to whom the intended candidate is known, especially to the authorities of the school or college where he may have been educated.

Upon the satisfactory result of these inquiries must depend the admission of the candidates to the examination.

With this precaution, and subject to the qualificatory remark which I shall presently offer, I believe that the proposed measure, both as to the character and intellectual qualifications of those whom it will introduce into the public service, will fully realize the expectations of those who have proposed it to Her Majesty's Government.

The qualificatory remark which I wish to submit to you is this,—that however satisfactory may be the regulations for the admission of parties into the Civil Service, you will not succeed in obtaining the same amount of talent and industry which is to be found in the learned professions, especially in the Law, unless the status and emoluments of the Civil Service are made *equivalent* to those of the learned professions.

I say *equivalent*, and not *equal*, because in comparing the emoluments and prizes of the Civil Service, with those of the professions alluded to, ample allowance must be made for the absence of risk, the early acquisition of income, the prospect of retiring allowances, and the less harassing nature of the duties of the Civil Service as compared with the professions alluded to. Whether these considerations have been fully entered into, in the recent changes in the establishments, I do not know, but I entertain the strongest conviction, that the proper adjustment of these points is essential to the success of the measure.

January 21, 1854.

The objections which have hitherto been made to the suggested arrangements for the re-organization of the Civil Service, appear mainly to be,—

1st. That they will not secure the appointment into the Public Service of gentlemen having the high sense of honour requisite for the satisfactory discharge of confidential duties.

2nd. That it will be impossible to secure absolute fairness in the examination:

1. Upon the first, I would observe, that such a high sense of honour is not confined to those who are engaged in the Public Service, but exists also in the members of other professions.

If we consider the vastly numerous body of apothecaries and surgeons dispersed throughout the country, and the confidence which must of necessity be reposed in them, the slightest breach of which might endanger the peace and happiness of families, we shall find that there exists amongst these large classes, the strongest sense of professional honour, and that the betrayal of any information which they have obtained professionally, is of very rare occurrence.

The same may be said of attornies and solicitors, taken as a class, upon whose honour and integrity the fortunes of almost every one, and the characters of many, entirely depend.

I think it very unlikely that, with respect to the upper class of appointments, to which a high standard of examination is applicable, the competitors would not be equal in position and character to these two honourable classes to which I have adverted.

I concur, moreover, in Sir Stafford Northcote's observation on the advantage which university training would give in the competition, and in the efficacy of that training, not only in improving the intellect, but in elevating the character.

2. I am not staggered by doubts which have been suggested as to the practicability of securing fairness in the examination.

The possible dangers are,—

I. Unfairness in the examiners.

II. The obtaining previously the printed questions, by tampering with the printer.

III. Copying or prompting.

I. I have already stated to you my conviction, that there will be no difficulty in securing the services of examiners of entire impartiality. I cannot call to mind that suspicion has ever attached to any one, either at Cambridge or at the University of London.

II. Both you and myself have had sufficient experience of confidential printing, to know that there are many printers whose sense of honour and of responsibility is proof against tampering.

III. Copying and prompting are occasionally resorted to in some examinations, but they may be prevented by having *rooms of adequate size* and proper superintendence.

These evils, however, do not occur in *competing* examinations, not only because of the competition itself, which naturally prevents candidates from assisting each other, but also because we here find the sense of honour strongly operating on such of the candidates as might require that assistance.

It has been suggested that a mixed system of nomination and competition might be adopted.

One system of this nature, namely, that several have been nominated who have competed with each other for the appointment, has been tried at the Treasury, and has, I understand, been unsuccessful.

Another modification might be proposed, namely, that the competition should determine the eligibility only, and selection should be made afterwards. In this case, the hardship on the non-selected party would be extreme, if he were the victor in the competition; and the chance of disappointment of this kind would operate, of course, as a great discouragement to candidates.

There remains a third plan, i.e., that a certain number of appointments should be given to competition, and the remainder given as at present.

This, however, would introduce a distinction between public officers too invidious to be tolerated.

I confine myself throughout to the higher examinations. I have no experience of such as would be carried on in reference to the lower class of officers.

The REV. W. H. THOMPSON,

Regius Professor of Greek.

*Trinity College, Cambridge,  
January 23, 1854.*

THE arguments contained in the papers which you have done me the honour to put in my hands appear to me to prove conclusively that the plan for the organization of the Civil Service to which they relate will, if carried out, effect a very great improvement in the working of the public offices, and in the general tone of political morality throughout the country. I think also, that the system of

examination indicated in Mr. Jowett's letter would contribute materially to the well-being, efficiency, and good management of the universities; by increasing the number of students, diminishing the relative proportion of the idle and dissolute, and adding to the social importance of these bodies in the eyes of the public: A great stimulus would also be given to studies, which the universities do not possess the power of adequately encouraging, or to which at any rate they find it difficult to attract the attention of earnest students. The plan of examination proposed by Mr. Jowett appears to me to be open to no important objection; and I most particularly approve of the 2nd Regulation, which directs that "two schools be required of all candidates, and that none be allowed to try in more than two."

In reference to this second rule, I would, however, suggest for consideration the propriety of making School I. or II. compulsory on all, forbidding any candidates to present themselves in both. This suggestion has reference to an objection to which you have invited my attention: that there would be danger in admitting into the higher branches of the Civil Service persons whose birth or training may not have been favourable to the development of those sentiments which characterize the class of gentlemen. Classical and mathematical studies are at present prosecuted in all our superior schools, and in all the universities of the three kingdoms. Proficiency in either would seem, therefore, to afford a sufficient test of the social rank of the candidate, or at any rate to prove that he had been brought into contact with influences conducive to the growth of sentiments of the kind referred to in the objection.

On other grounds too, I think this additional regulation desirable. Pretty long experience has convinced me, that on the whole, and speaking of young men only, the most conclusive criteria of real intellectual power which an examination can supply, are afforded by the answers to questions on exact science, or by the mode in which classical exercises are performed. In judging of the answers to questions on moral science, it is more difficult to discern between the pretence of knowledge and its reality: between the power of talking and the power of thinking. The most showy exercises are frequently sent up by persons who have gained all they know from histories or handbooks of philosophy, and who have never



grappled with the difficulties of the great original writers. At the same time, answers to questions of this description are very valuable, not only as tests of general intelligence and habits of inquiry, but also because no student can be deemed thoroughly educated who has not learned to feel a lively interest in the solution of the great problems of moral and social science.

In all four schools, it would be well if the examiners were especially invited so to frame the examination as to ascertain the natural capacity of the candidates, as well as the extent of their reading and information.

In School I. this end might be conveniently attained by requiring a Latin essay on some subject of ancient history, literature, or philosophy. Too much space should not be allowed to general questions in archaeology, chronology, or biography, for all such may and generally will be answered out of unedifying compendiums and books of reference. If questions are asked on such subjects, they should be of a comprehensive nature, and adapted to call forth the powers of reflection and comparison rather than of memory. Great importance should attach to the accuracy and elegance of translations from the classical writers; for no exercises afford a better test of natural acuteness and refinement of mind than these. Verse composition, I think, should be dispensed with.

To introduce essays in School II. may be less advantageous; but they ought undoubtedly to be required in III. and IV., not less than two perhaps, in each of these schools; while in School I. an English may be required as well as a Latin essay.

The objection relating to possible fraud on the part of candidates or examiners does not seem to me to carry much weight. If the latter were carefully chosen from the proper classes, I should think favouritism would be as uncommon as it notoriously is in my own university; and if dishonest practices should exist among the candidates, an examination framed on the principles laid down by Mr. Jowett, would afford the means of easily detecting them. The experience of Cambridge tends to show, that while it is difficult wholly to prevent underhand proceedings in what are technically termed "Pass Examinations," or those in which a minimum of acquirement is demanded as a passport to an ordinary degree, such practices are of excessively rare occurrence in examinations for honours, or for the more important college emoluments. When

they do occur, they invariably excite the indignation of the competing candidates, who, in such cases, would not scruple to give information to the examiners. The standard of feeling among the better class of students is indeed as high in this respect as the most high-minded examiner could desire. I have only to add, on this head, that a larger number of examiners than that proposed by Mr. Jowett appears to me to be requisite. I should suggest *four* in each school.

With regard to the comparative advantage of a mixed system of patronage and examination, and one of pure examination, I am afraid that my Cambridge prejudices prevent me from forming a wholly impartial judgment. We are so accustomed to disregard every consideration but that of the merits of the papers submitted to our examination, as, perhaps, to have lost the power of appreciating the advantages of any other mode of selection.

These who have had experience of the working of the public departments know best whether the aristocratic descent of an employé does in practice afford a criterion of his honourable conduct and general trustworthiness. Certainly my own experience as tutor of Trinity did not lead me to the conclusion that the aristocracy enjoys any monopoly of right feeling and delicate moral perceptions. Some difference does undoubtedly exist between school and school in this respect, but such difference may generally be traced either to the character of the head master, or to some similar cause,—never, I think, to the greater proportion of aristocratic pupils in one school as compared with another.

I think, with Mr. Jowett, that "in more than nineteen cases out of twenty, men of attainments are also men of character," and with the author of Philip van Artevelde, that "Stupidity is seldom perfect honesty."

On the whole, the merits of the scheme you have laid before me seem so immensely to outweigh the inconveniences to which it can with any probability be imagined to lead, that I cannot but express in conclusion my fervent hope that it may ere long receive the sanction of the legislature.

WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE, Esq., F.R.S.,  
Queen's Printer.

*East Harding Street,  
February 3, 1854.*

I AM much interested with your proposed system of examinations preparatory to appointments in Government Offices, and am disposed to anticipate very favourable results from its adoption. While on the one hand intellectual proficiency is the only quality (besides physical power) which can be brought to the test of competition, still on the other, when so tested, it becomes itself a test of many other important qualities. Of those who, after attaining distinction at the universities, have come out into active life, few, I believe, have sunk down into mediocrity, and you will yourself be better aware than I can be of the success attending some recent appointments made on the ground of university attainments. Nor is this principle limited in its application; in every mercantile office and manufactory it is the custom to appoint men to various posts, and to promote them from one post to another, according to their aptitude, in estimating which, general information, and even literary qualifications, are taken into account. I allude to this partly because, on a very small scale, it affords a parallel to the case of public offices by comprising a great variety of posts, each with its own class of requirements, and partly because it has come under my own personal observation.

The object to be attained by the new method of appointment appears to me to be twofold: First, to attract to Government Offices young men of first-rate talent, and, secondly, to raise the tone and standard of persons whose capacities are moderate, and who in all large establishments form the majority. With a view to the former, the examination should have as wide a range of subjects as possible, in order that talent may exhibit itself in the subjects most congenial to its natural bent. And for this purpose perhaps no better general scheme could be suggested than that given by Mr. Jowett in his letter, and founded upon the present system of examination at Oxford. The relative importance of the various branches would of course be different in the present case from that at an university; but this would require no formal or declared statement, as each branch would soon find its natural level by the mutual action of demand and supply.

With a view to the second object, it would be necessary to have certain qualifications, or branches of information, as absolutely necessary and indispensable for various classes of clerks, &c. respectively; and on all these points the examination should be as elementary and searching as possible. To a person who has made no inquiries it would be difficult to conceive the ignorance of the majority in some things of the commonest occurrence and the commonest use in every day life; and I can well imagine the astonishment of some of the examiners at the revelations made by the first examination under the new system. Still it would be unfair to set down a man who writes a bad hand, who knows but little of arithmetic, who cannot express himself on paper, or who is ignorant of the commercial resources or perhaps of the geography of his country, as uneducated, or as incapable of being made useful in a Public Office. His own turn of mind, or that of his teachers, may have caused him to overlook one or more of these points, and nothing may have occurred in his own experience to show him his deficiency or to require him to supply it. But in almost all these cases a provoking cause is all that is necessary; and to act as that cause is, if I understand rightly, the second object of the proposed examination.

It is, I think, likely to be objected, amongst other things, that in both these cases the examination will be either superfluous or nugatory; superfluous if the candidates are already masters of the various subjects, for it will merely rediscover what was known before,—nugatory if they are not, for in that case they will “cram up” just sufficient for the purpose, and straightway forgetting it again become in no way the better for what they have done.

The first of these objections refers especially to the higher subjects, for it can hardly be called superfluous to ascertain whether a man really does or does not understand common useful things. But although it may be fairly said in general terms that any considerable advance in historical research, in the study of the law, in scientific subjects, in literary labours, is always sufficiently well known to bring forward any young man who may exhibit it; yet that young man does not know that his individual case is sure to be weighed, nor indeed that weight will be given to it if estimated at all. There is at present no sure channel for even bringing his case forward, but the objec-

tionable one of private interest; and so he begins to think his talent useless, his labours vain, and a good foundation well laid with long and painful study is often left to decay for lack of a superstructure, which alone would make it useful. I think that a great impetus will be given by the adoption of your recommendation, not merely to the universities, but to the talent generally which lies scattered up and down the country.

In the second objection there is rather more truth, but the extent of its truth weakens its force. It is an objection which may be made against all examinations whatever. But still it has no reality or weight in the case of university examinations, nor, as it seems to me, need it have any in the present case. On the contrary, I think that if the new examination be properly carried out there will be less room for the objection here than in any other instance. For one principal difficulty in examining young men fresh from the technical part of their education, i.e. from school or from college lectures, arises from their inability to realize and apply the information which they have gained in their studies. This is observable especially in mathematical and scientific (as contrasted with classical) subjects, or, more generally speaking, in subjects which have most connexion with practical life. The result is that at the universities it is necessary to steer as well as may be between two extremes; viz. of making the examination either on the one hand too technical and liable to cram, or on the other too popular, and divesting it of the strict and exact character which alone can be a satisfactory test of a young man's attainments at that period of life. But at the stage where the candidates will offer themselves for Government offices this difficulty will in some degree have removed itself, for the mind will have had an opportunity of advancing beyond the formalities of its education. The interval may indeed be short, between leaving school or college and the new examination, but a short time will do much; the mind is released from the state of tension in which it has been for a time kept, and the candidate is thrown at once among the realities of life. He is very (perhaps too) susceptible of such impressions, and needs the balance of common sense (i.e. of a mind in its natural state) to enable him to make use of his information, and it is this very point which it should be the aim of the examiners to draw out. In a word, there seems to be an opportunity of making this examination more practical,

and consequently more free from cram than any other, and the objection in question falls to the ground.

It is not unlikely that the following additional objection may be made from the side of those who would probably be subjected to the examination,—that some of the best men will be deterred from offering themselves by the (well grounded) consciousness of their own superiority, and the chance of being outdone among the casualties of an examination (e.g. nervousness, unlucky questions, &c.) by men decidedly inferior to themselves; and further, that the disappointment of failure would be so great as to preclude their standing a second time; that this disappointment would be incalculably greater in their case than in that of a lad at an university, and that the tone of mind which would render it so grievous is one which is far from objectionable, on the contrary, is one admirably calculated to produce energy, self respect, and faithful service in the possessor; finally, if these things be so, the public is likely to be deprived of many valuable men who might very properly be introduced direct and without examination by a strong recommendation from a private person, in whose employ they had given evidence of these various qualities. Thus, for instance, if an office of confidence in the Exchequer fell vacant, and one of the principal City Bankers were to recommend strongly a confidential and well-trying clerk, it would (it is urged) be ridiculous to propose submitting him to the ordeal of an examination, which could be no real test of his abilities, and which might deter him from coming forward at all, or might cover him with disgrace in case of rejection, from which he would, perhaps, never recover. I have stated this objection thus at length, because it is no mere supposition, but one which has been actually suggested from the quarter alluded to. There is truth in it, and some persons will no doubt be so deterred; but the answer seems to me simple. In the first place there is no *via media* for the Government; they must either adopt or reject the system of examination; if one person be admitted free, why not another? The only plan is to have one simple intelligible rule, otherwise we revert to private recommendation. In the second place, the number of good men so kept back would, I conceive, be small in comparison with those brought forward by the system, and very small in comparison with the whole number of good men in the list of candidates; and this opinion is grounded upon the experience of the examina-

tion of another but large and varied class of persons (schoolmasters and mistresses) in the educational department of the Privy Council Office. Lastly, the experience of the universities and of the last-mentioned class (and in this case age has nothing to do with the matter) shows that a reasonably low standard may be fixed as a minimum which shall be a safeguard against the introduction of incompetent persons, and yet a barrier to none of even ordinary capacity. It may also be added that the opportunity given in the higher class to show any unusual capacity or attainment would be a corrective to any accidental deficiency in the necessary part of the examination, and itself an inducement to persons to make known their powers.

These last remarks refer especially to the higher class examination; but there is as good ground for anticipating success in the lower. The examinations held in the educational department of the Privy Council Office show how much may be drawn out of a class which showed little promise beforehand. And to this I can add the testimony of my own experience in a narrow, perhaps, but still very practical sphere of observation. It is quite possible to induce the class of persons from whom many inferior officers are selected to inform themselves upon general and useful subjects, and, indeed, to go beyond what immediately touches their daily business; and, as a general rule, a man who shows energy and intelligence in the one shows it also in the other. It is quite true that some of the most valuable people are ignorant of everything but what they deal with from hour to hour, but these are *the exceptions*; and it always happens that general intelligence and information come in useful at times when a pressure of business renders the services of every one the most important. I should not have troubled you with this, which you will know well beforehand, had I not, in the employment of nearly 600 people, found them perpetually verified. And I will only add that, in connexion with some attempts which we have made during the last year for the education and improvement of the persons in our employ, we have recently made an examination a necessary preliminary to apprenticeship in our establishment.

It will of course have occurred to you that not only must the examination be divided into two distinct branches, the superior and the inferior, but also that in each, and

especially in the latter, different classes of subjects should have the principal weight for different offices; thus, the qualifications for a subordinate place in the Treasury would be very different from those for one in the Excise Office. While competition for particular appointments is undesirable, and the whole is kept as general and comprehensive as possible, there will still be some leading divisions which must necessarily be maintained.

The examiners should consist principally, if not entirely, of university men, for they are accustomed, not only to examinations, but to the general testing and classification of intellectual proficiency; they know how to draw out what is in a candidate; they know how much may reasonably be expected; and their decisions are regarded as unimpeachable in point of justice. I do not mean to say that those of any other class of men would be less so; but no keenness of university competition, no jealousy, good or bad, between individuals and colleges, has thrown the slightest suspicion upon the uprightness of the examiners; and it will be very desirable that the public should have no opening for insinuations in this respect, especially at the commencement of the system.

In connexion with, or as a constituent part of the college of examiners, there should perhaps be one person from each of the principal departments of the public service to represent that department, and to see that the qualifications necessary for it are understood and tested.

The question of the permanency of appointments to examinerships will depend mainly upon the amount of time occupied in the work; this can in some measure be calculated beforehand, but not completely. Thus, on the supposition that the number of places of all kinds to be filled up annually is 700, there would probably be in the first year not much fewer than 2,500 candidates to be examined; but the number would, doubtless, rapidly increase. It would, perhaps, be worth consideration, whether a mixed board, some members being appointed for life, and others for three or five years, should not be tried. While it is important to attract first-rate men to the appointment, it is also desirable to guard against the perpetuation of a certain class of ideas, and to insure the introduction of what is useful against what is new, and, in short, to keep up with the advancement of the age. This would also meet the case of persons whose services it would be well to engage, but who might be indisposed to

undertake a permanent duty. The appointment of examiners would probably be best in the hands of the Crown, and it would not be difficult, either by formal or other means of consultation, to ascertain the names of a large number of eminent and suitable persons settled either in London or elsewhere. The universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Dublin, and London with its colleges spread over the whole country, would both furnish an ample supply, and would insure that no person eminently qualified for the office escaped notice.

A certain number of annual appointments to the office of examinership would itself be an opening calculated to have its influence on a large number of talented persons. An appointment of this kind, although not in itself permanent, would bring a person into notice, and give him a chance of something else in either a public or a private department. In any case the remuneration must be liberal, as that is the only certain way of procuring the best men.

Finally, it might also be considered, whether in every instance of the examination being passed, a certificate should not be given. This might tend still further to increase the number of candidates for examination, and thereby render the amount of work greater. But the production of such certificate would be a *prima facie* recommendation wherever the holder might apply for employment; and although it is not incumbent upon the Government to examine the qualifications of the population generally, it might still be desirable so far to assist private employers as to give them the benefit of a system so well calculated to produce really useful men of business, and to encourage self-improvement among all classes of society.

The Rev. HENRY G. LIDDELL,

Head Master of Westminster School, and late  
Student of Christchurch, Oxford.

*February 16, 1854.*

In admitting young men to competition for places in the Public Service, some difficulty will, no doubt, be found in obtaining trustworthy certificates of character. Written testimonials have become a bye-word: so careless are persons of exactness or even truth in comparison with their

desire to avoid trouble or offence. A gentleman who has had much experience in selecting clerks for important work in private offices more than confirms this statement, and tells me that he always makes a point of having a personal interview with the patron of the youth who is seeking place. This might be difficult, perhaps impossible, with the large number of candidates who are likely to aspire to offices in the public service. Much might be done, however, by care and circumspection, in the matter of written testimonials; and, perhaps, attention to the subject in the Public Offices might be followed by a general improvement in this matter of minor morality.

Whenever any evasive language is noted, a confidential letter might be addressed to the giver of the testimonials; and, if the result proved unfavourable to the youth's character, he might be rejected in the mass without any betrayal of the confidential communication.

A register might be kept of the names of all accepted candidates, with an abstract of the characters given them, and the names of the schoolmasters, clergymen, or others, who gave the testimonials. If any such testimonial proved false, or even evasive, the testifier might be informed that his certificate would not be accepted hereafter, or only accepted with reserve, according to the amount of his falsification. And to a schoolmaster such a notice from a public officer would be a heavy blow.

The securities thus taken would be greatly increased by the probation which it is proposed to enforce. But the same gentleman, whom I have before quoted, tells me that from his experience he judges that here great circumspection is necessary. A youth's character should be inquired into frequently after admission into the office. If reports are unfavourable, he ought to be removed and placed under another chief. If the reports continue bad, he should still be allowed a further change of masters: for ill-conduct, as he has found, not unfrequently results from want of sympathy between the chief and his clerks, rather than from positive faults in the clerks. Of course, these indulgences are claimed for want of diligence and regularity, not for actual delinquencies.

A strict supervision of character must produce a wide and excellent effect on the moral condition of schools and colleges—one of the many incidental advantages which the system now proposed would produce, independent of its first and direct object.

The principles laid down in the paper for the conduct of the examinations seem to me admirable.

The popular objections to an examination would, I apprehend, assume a form somewhat of this kind.

When once an examination is established, it may be said, it follows that all who are approved as candidates, and pass the examination best, must be allowed to have a positive claim to the places offered for competition. If once the report of the examiners be set aside, and any young man is preferred to a place over the head of any of those who have beaten him in the examination, all confidence in the impartiality of the distributors of office will be shaken, and no one will enter the examination room feeling that his fortunes are in his own hand.

If this be granted, it may be urged that many lads of spirit and energy and practical ability may be set aside in favour of studious youths, whose very habits of study may have impaired the prompt intelligence, clear head, and natural sagacity, which in business are among the first and most valuable qualifications. If there had been an examination in the army, it has been said, when the Duke of Wellington was a boy, he would not have obtained his commission.

I conceive that such objections are in a great degree obviated by the judicious remarks on the subjects to be proposed for examination (p. 12). It may, however, be conceded, that even with this latitude of subjects a bright but idle lad might be beaten by one certainly his inferior in all active qualities of mind, if the examinations were to take place at irregular intervals and without notice. But when it is universally known that the examinations will take place at specified times, and in a great variety of subjects, it will be one excellent result of the proposed system, that these idle lads will have an object set before them; and, if they be capable, their faculties will be set to work with a view to gaining this object, and the victory will be insured to them. Such examples as the boyhood of the Duke of Wellington affords refer to times—not indeed passed away—when all youths of the higher classes, if educated in our grammar schools and universities, were compelled to give their whole time, from the age of seven or eight to that of one or two and twenty, to a routine of studies, which to a young boy are not perhaps more distasteful than other subjects that require his enforced attention, but which to many young men become positively and

incurably irksome. It may be hoped that a great corrective of idle and even profligate habits may be applied to our youth by what has been done and is doing to amend the education of the higher classes. With a more generous course of studies open to them, and with an immediate incentive to exertion before their eyes, such as the proposed system will supply, it is not to be feared that the public service will, by a strict examination *properly conducted*, lose many of those quick-witted and energetic, but hitherto idle, youths, who are likely to make good public servants.

But the *proper conduct of the examinations* is, after all, the vital question of the whole. Unless the Board of Examiners be men of experience, not only in books but in human character, unless they be unimpeachably upright, honest and diligent, thorough masters of their subjects, able by natural sagacity and acquired habits so to frame their questions as to distinguish accurately between mere knowledge “crammed” for the occasion, and a free, generous intelligence,—they will not dare to exercise a clear, independent judgment without fear or regard, and their decisions will not command the respect of the public.\*

It would be advisable that the examiners on whom would rest the duty of examining for the higher places at least, should not be overburdened with constant routine business, or they will lose interest in their work. I mention this because it is not clearly indicated (p. 13) to whom the task of examining for the lower offices is to be confided.

\* I have here only adapted to the present purpose a passage from the evidence furnished to the Oxford University Commission by Professor Vaughan (p. 87):—“Examinations have been instituted, but measures to provide thoroughly good examinations have not been taken at the same time. In some few instances the examiners are not paid at all; their work is given gratuitously. In few cases are they selected in a manner quite satisfactory; at least there is no guarantee given that very able men will be appointed, so that, what with underpaid services and hap-hazard appointments, this function in the University has been imperfectly discharged. Yet I feel that there is none upon which the success of the university system more materially depends. To exclude, so far as possible, the favours or injuries of chance, to foil the arts of ‘cram,’ to apportion the success to the industry, the talent, and the good sense of the students—is, in effect and indirectly, to secure good teaching, and good, energetic, honest learning. Good examinations can help to effect all this; and good examiners only can produce good examinations; and masterly knowledge, aided by high talent and discretion, alone can make good examiners.”

I do not know that I have any special suggestions to add. It has indeed occurred to me that the requirements of a clear and definite knowledge of some portion of geometry, as well as of arithmetic and the correct use of the English language, would be a good eliminating test. Those who *will* not master the elements of geometry show an impatience of close attention, which must be an ill quality in a public office. Those who *can* not master them must be too deficient in reasoning power to be of use hereafter.

Such a system as is now proposed, carefully framed and honestly carried out, will be of infinite profit, not only to the public service but to the cause of education generally, in the lower as well as in the higher classes—where, perhaps, improvement is almost more needed than in the lower. And there is this advantage attending the proposals, that youths who have gone through a preparation for this examination will not have spent their labour in vain. It was, I think, a valid objection to the proposal of throwing open the *Indian* service to all schools and universities, that thus (for a time at least) youths would have been encouraged to devote themselves for the best years of their lives to many subjects which (if they failed) could have been of very little use to them. Here it would be quite otherwise. All that would be required in examination would be directly serviceable for any profession to which the disappointed candidates might turn. It may be added that a *single* examination, passed so early, would leave the unsuccessful candidates free for a new choice before it was too late, and would avoid the other evils of protracted self-preparation and delayed expectations consequent on the *triple* examination necessary for those who enter the service of the Prussian Crown.

I feel doubts with respect to many of the details suggested in the clear and able letter of Mr. Jowett, especially with regard to his plan for arranging all the candidates in order of merit. This, of course, may be done; but the result will not, as I conceive, be so satisfactory or so useful as if the arrangement was made under many different heads. It is evident that a young man who passes a tolerable examination in a number of subjects may obtain a greater aggregate of marks than one who does very well in one subject, tolerably in several, and very ill in some; yet, in reality, it is possible, perhaps probable, that the latter may be the more able man, and likely to make the more valuable servant. If it is desirable to make an

arrangement according to merit, subjects should be freely divided, facility should be allowed for passing examination in any of these subjects, and those who have been examined should be classed separately under each subject in which they have been examined, so that it may be seen at a glance in what branch of knowledge each candidate has shown himself deserving. Then the various public officers will be able to select the young men who have done best in that particular department which is most suited to their particular requirements.

REV. CHARLES GRAVES, D.D.,

Professor of Mathematics in Trinity College, Dublin.

February 21, 1854.

THOUGH I fear you will hardly find time to read so long a letter, I have thought it right, in compliance with your own request, to set down at length the views which I have formed of the Government scheme for the organization of the Permanent Civil Service; and I have endeavoured to give distinct answers to the various questions which you have proposed respecting it. You may, perhaps, question some of my premises, but I trust you will agree in most of my conclusions.

Your first question, is "Whether the scheme is practicable." By this I understand that you doubt whether it would be possible to conduct an examination in so many subjects as would be required, and to deal with such a host of candidates as would present themselves for examination. What Mr. Jowett has said on this topic in his letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan appears to me to be perfectly satisfactory. He has proposed a mode of conducting the examinations which is founded on university experience, and from which I dissent only on some minor points which are scarcely worth mentioning.

There can be no reason to doubt the power of the Government to obtain an Act of Parliament sanctioning their project. This they are surely able to do, if they are willing to abandon the system of patronage, and trust to the increase of moral influence which must accrue to them in consequence of their establishing a system at once more just and more efficient. I am firmly persuaded

The Govern-  
ment Scheme  
is not imprac-  
ticable.

Is not likely to  
meet with any  
formidable op-  
position.

that if governments were more courageous in effecting reforms tending to the benefit of the community, we should hear fewer complaints of the difficulties arising out of the conflict of party interests. After a few quiverings of the balance, the scale would sink down on the side of those whose wisdom and energy were steadily directed towards the promotion of the common weal. I think the members of the House of Commons would in general support this scheme. Many of them would gladly be relieved from the importunities to which they are now exposed. Many more would advocate the new arrangement from a sincere conviction of its advantages. Of those who were inclined to oppose it, some would dissemble their aversion, through unwillingness to come forward at all as the champions of a system which they knew to be corrupt; and others would be unable to offer more than a feeble resistance, being obliged to rest their arguments upon grounds different from those on which their views were really founded. They would raise objections on small points of detail, or would assert in a sweeping way that the plan was complicated, expensive, impracticable, and so forth. There is a large class of persons in whose minds the notion of reform is associated with dismal prospects of revolution. They regard every change in law or administration, unless it be a reactionary one, as a downward step towards the abyss of democracy. These persons will oppose the Government plan for the organization of the Permanent Civil Service, but they will hardly venture to put forward their true reasons.

Is not democratic in its tendency.

But it is right that we should consider whether this scheme is actually democratic or otherwise in its tendency. And, lest we should attach different senses to the word democracy, I will endeavour to explain what I mean by it. I take it to signify the preponderance of mere numbers over virtue, intelligence, property, and all the other elements of political power. But I do not call a measure democratic because it improves the condition, and therefore increases the influence, of the intelligent and well-conducted portion of the middle and working classes. Measures of that kind, according to my way of thinking, are essentially conducive to the stability of our social state; as they increase the contentment of the people, and strengthen their confidence in the Government.

Will give satisfaction to the middle classes.

Now it appears to me self-evident that the Government scheme for regulating the appointments and promotions

in the Civil Service will directly tend to these results. Parents in the middle classes will hail the prospect opened to their sons of obtaining an honourable provision by the exercise of their own diligence and ability, apart from all circumstances of connexion and patronage. I can answer for myself. Having three sons, and little interest to push them forward in the world, I resolved, as soon as ever the Government plan was announced, to direct their education in such a way that they might be fitted for the proposed competition. One of them seems to give a promise of talents above the average. I shall tell him, if this plan is carried into effect, that a fine career lies before him, and that I will do my part in helping him to qualify himself for employment as a public servant in the Foreign Office or the Civil Service in India. His own diligence must accomplish the rest. Such a prospect is a happy one for me. It diminishes my anxieties about providing for my family as much as if I had received an accession of fortune. And if I view the matter in this light, how much greater satisfaction will be felt by many persons whose position is less advantageous than mine, and who yet have sons as well educated and qualified for public employments. Take the case of a widow with a clever son, whom she is just able to rear, and for whom a gratuitous education is provided by one of the princely endowments of England. As matters stand at present, her difficulties only commence when the boy's schooling is ended. She is then at her wits' end, casting about for employment for him. But if the design of the report be realized, you will make this widow's heart to sing for joy. She will see her child's advancement made to depend upon conditions involving no uncertainty beyond that which attends the life and health and well-doing of all of us, frail human creatures as we are.

When we are counting up the political advantages likely to flow from the adoption of the new plan, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that the trade in political agitation is less easily carried on when merit ensures admission into and promotion in the public service. Under such a state of things democrats and socialists will be deprived of a staple grievance.

The establishment of a system of appointment and promotion by merit will interfere with the trade of political agitators.

The following result is also deserving of notice. The new system must necessarily increase the efficiency of the public servants. This would in the same proportion increase the respect in which the Government is held, and therefore contribute to its stability. The tardiness, idle-

It will increase the efficiency of the public servants, and so procure respect for the Government.



ness, and carelessness of a single clerk in a public office, his attempts to evade difficulties which arise, and, finally, his bungling mode of disposing of them, do more harm than is commonly supposed. The individuals whom he aggrieves, making a hasty generalization, conclude that they have had a fair specimen of the way in which the business of the country is managed, and thenceforth go about communicating to others their own dissatisfaction and distrust.

Which will thus be strengthened rather than weakened by the abolition of the system of patronage.

If this view be correct, there will be no reason to fear lest the abolition of the patronage system should diminish the total power of the Government. Old means of influence may doubtless be lost: but what matter, if their place be taken and their work done by new and better ones. When the boroughs in schedule A. were disfranchised by the Reform Bill, we were told that the House of Commons would be reduced to a chaos which no Government could bring into order. But the prediction has been falsified, and so will all others whose object it is to convince people that it is better to acquiesce in systems known to be bad than to undergo some trouble and risk in reforming them.

Its social effects.

The social effects of this measure must be very extensive, and we have touched on some of them when pointing out its political tendencies. In fact it would be impossible to treat these two parts of the subject as distinct; since politics ought to have the improvement of our social state for their great end. However, there are some results of the contemplated reform which will more particularly affect the condition of the people at large, and on these I will venture to make one or two remarks.

On education in general.

In the first place, we may expect to see it operate widely and deeply on the education of the country. Parents, even down to those of the lowest class, will be more solicitous than they are to secure the benefits of instruction for their children, when they see its direct bearing upon their prospects of advancement in life. Thus the cause of education in general will be promoted. Men will value learning more for the sake of what is to be gained by its means, when the rewards are more definite and less remote. As for the love of learning for its own sake, that is a passion by which the masses of the people are not likely to be carried away in our time.

Upon schools.

Again, the competing examinations recommended in the Report will have the effect of stimulating all the schoolmasters throughout the country to exert themselves to the utmost. At present we have a brisk competition

kept up between the leading schools both in England and Ireland. The open scholarships in our universities are prizes for the attainment of which their best pupils put forth all their strength, and the winner's success is no barren triumph to the master of the school which sent him into the lists. I suspect that one of the reasons why the business of our inferior schools is carried on so languidly is just this,—that the influence of competition is unfelt by the masters.

Even in the universities themselves the effects of this measure would be manifested before long. The diligence of students would be quickened when they saw a new and definite object for it. A young man intended for one of the learned professions is sometimes deliberately idle whilst he is an under-graduate, thinking that he can make up for lost time by studying his business after he has entered on the practice of it. A candidate for a situation in a public office under the new system must pursue a different course; he must qualify himself for his avocation by diligence in early life.

Upon the universities.

I think it might be arranged that students taking honours of a certain class at the degree examination in each of the universities should be thereby qualified to hold situations in the public Civil Service, provided they satisfied the other requisitions as to age, health, and moral fitness. Such a regulation would enable the Government to bring a powerful influence to bear upon the question of reform in university studies. It would also be convenient thus to make use of existing agencies, so as to diminish the portentous amount of work to be got through by the proposed Board of Examiners.

Suggestion as to persons taking high degrees in the universities.

I can imagine this system capable of producing as beneficial effects upon the community through the unsuccessful as through the successful candidates. The former will be vastly more numerous than the latter, and they will go forth into the world to fill other situations, stored with more knowledge, and fortified with a better character, than if they had not been acted on by the hope of gaining an appointment in the Civil Service.

Effect upon the community through the medium of the unsuccessful candidates.

It is in Ireland that we may hope to see the best fruits produced by an improved system of appointment in the public offices, as it is there that patronage has caused some of the worst social evils. The practice of governing with a regard to existing parties and religions has been carried to a far greater excess in Ireland than in England; so that the Irishman of the present day is in a great measure

Upon society in Ireland.

the product of a system which has been operating for centuries. Something also must be ascribed to the native character of the Celt, which, though it may have more genius and versatility, is not as rich in the elements of industry and resolution as that of the Saxon. To these causes it is owing that our countrymen are exposed to the charge of wanting self-reliance. I am convinced that the occasion for this reproach would cease if patient labour and steadiness of conduct were better encouraged, as they would be if the plan of throwing public appointments open to competition were carried into execution. If the Irishman saw that the path to fortune was open to merit only; that, on the one hand, no hindrances arose from political or religious disqualifications; and, on the other, that no help was to be obtained by jobbing or favouritism; instead of writing memorials to "the Castle," and importuning members of Parliament to do something for him, he would try to do something for himself by a course of self-denying diligence.

by generating  
a spirit of self  
reliance,

and raising up  
a class of per-  
sons fitted to  
engage in  
industrial pur-  
suits.

Our national character and prosperity would be materially affected by the general diffusion amongst the middle and lower classes of that kind of education which would be available to the candidate for an inferior clerkship in a public office. A good knowledge of the English language and arithmetic, together with the accomplishment of writing a good hand, are qualifications which, taken along with adequate recommendations on the score of character, would enable many a man to earn a comfortable livelihood. Now I maintain that these qualifications will be more frequently met with when a better market for them is created. Until lately, the sons of persons in the middle class in Ireland have been taught to look to the clerical, military, legal, and medical professions as their only fields of exertion; whilst agriculture, manufacture, and trade have been at a discount. Amongst the persons who are unsuccessful in competing for appointments in the Civil Service there will be many well prepared for the pursuits I have just mentioned.

The system of  
appointment by  
competition  
would abate  
national jea-  
lousies.

The Irishman sometimes suspects that, owing to his remoteness from the head-quarters of Government, or to the existence of a prejudice against him, he has not a fair chance of employment in the Public Service. He alleges that English and Scotch men, as such, and without regard to their qualifications, are generally preferred to him. Whether his apprehensions be well or ill founded, it would be desirable to remove all grounds for them. But when

appointments can be obtained as the rewards of merit evinced at examinations where all are free to compete, we shall hear no more complaints about the unequal distribution of patronage amongst the natives of different parts of the empire. English, Scotch, and Irish will respectively obtain as many appointments as they deserve; neither more nor fewer. Those who are most successful may have some reason to exult, but none will have any just cause to complain; and the consequence of this would be a more real union of the three kingdoms.

I must notice another point in connexion with the working of this scheme in Ireland, which you will agree with me in saying is an important one. We find that the animosities which arise from religious differences are greatly embittered by the patronage system. Every appointment of a Roman Catholic, obtained in the usual way by the exercise of parliamentary influence, is doubly vexatious to disappointed Protestants, and vice versa. These feelings are strongest among the lower classes, whose bigotry is commonly proportional to their ignorance; but they pervade Irish society at large, and do considerable mischief,—as the friction of the parts of a machine interferes with its easy and effective working.

The patronage  
system aggra-  
vates the ani-  
mosities arising  
from differences  
in religion.

I presume it is an object with the Government to bring the various departments of the Public Service into harmonious connexion, and to turn existing organizations to account as much as possible, whenever new arrangements are made. In accordance with this view, I would say, that the Board of Examiners ought to have relations with the National Board in Ireland as well as with the Education Committee of the Privy Council in England. It would be presumptuous in me to suggest the details of such an arrangement, as I have little or no acquaintance with the internal administration of those departments. But, as regards the National Board in this country, I see more ways than one in which its agency might be employed, at the same time that its efficiency was increased.

Connexion of  
this scheme  
with the Na-  
tional System  
of Education in  
Ireland.

The inspectors of the national schools, acting under the direction and superintendence of the Board of Examiners, might be employed to assist in conducting the examinations for subordinate places. Against this arrangement objections will be made by those who oppose the National Board. But if it be the intention of the Government to maintain a national system of education, I think that the Government inspectors of schools might very well be employed in doing business of such a national character as

The inspectors  
of schools under  
the National  
Board might be  
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assist in the  
examination for  
subordinate  
clerkships.

the conduct of these examinations would be. Perhaps it will be urged that the inspectors are not competent to discharge so important a duty; but if this be the case, the sooner we get a new staff of inspectors the better. If the present ones are not competent to assist in holding examinations in the course of instruction specified in Mr. Jowett's letter, (Report, p. 28,) they are not fit to be trusted with the duty of inspecting the national schools.

Suggestion that a few appointments in the Civil Service should be given as the rewards of special merit shown by the pupils in the national schools.

In the universities it has been usual to encourage school education, by founding scholarships and exhibitions in connexion with particular schools. I do not see why a similar course might not be advantageously pursued with respect to the schools under the management of the National Board. The distribution of a few cadetships in the Civil Service as the rewards of remarkable diligence and good conduct would be a salutary lesson to the mass of the scholars. That the boys should see with their own eyes a striking example of the advantages to be gained by industry, would be more instructive than a thousand homilies on the subject.

Moral effects of the new system.

It only remains now that I should reply to your last and most important questions. What will be the moral tendency of this system of competition for public employments? Will it give an undue preponderance to intellectual qualifications, and discourage the less obtrusive claims of industry and trustworthiness? In what Mr. Jowett has said on this topic I fully concur; for my college experience has led me to precisely the same conclusion that he has arrived at. I have found that, with scarcely an exception, the students who have been successful in competing for the highest honours at our university examinations have been as much distinguished for good conduct as for ability and learning. The truth is, that success at a well-conducted examination affords a strong presumption of good moral habits in the person who is thus distinguished. A judicious examiner will endeavour to test the extent of information possessed by the competitors as well as their mere talent. But without steady application a long course of study cannot be mastered; and nothing is more certain than that habitual diligence brings other virtues in its train; for instance, temperance and self-control, to say nothing of punctuality and accuracy; yet even these latter have a real connexion with truth and honesty.

Mr. Jowett's method of inquiring into the character of applicants.

Whatever means are made available at present to determine the moral fitness of candidates for public employments, might be applied under the new system. And in

addition to these, Mr. Jowett suggests a very practicable method of inquiring into the character of applicants. I have no amendment on his plan to propose. It seems as perfect as any system of the kind can be. I confess, however, that I have become so painfully sceptical as to the value of testimonials that I should be disposed to trust as much to the result of the examination as to any certificates. Certainly, if it were known that the Government, with all its means of information, would institute a strict scrutiny into the character of each candidate in the mode proposed by Mr. Jowett, there is reason to believe that it would have the effect of making some of the persons referred to more scrupulous than they usually are in dispensing their recommendations.

The prospect of promotion according to merit would lead to the maintenance of those habits of order and diligence which had been formed previous to a man's appointment, and so would raise the moral tone of all the Civil Servants. Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan recommend that reports should be made from time to time\* on the qualifications and services of the clerks employed in all the Public Offices. These reports ought, I think, to include special mention of the moral character of each individual, so far as it is possible for his superiors to ascertain it. I believe that the morality and trustworthiness of officers may be estimated pretty exactly by their carefulness to perform *all* parts of their duty, the least as well as the greatest.

The system of promotion by merit would raise the moral tone of the civil servants.

I intimated in the commencement of this letter that I did not agree in all the details of Mr. Jowett's plan for conducting the examinations. Lest you should suppose that my objections are more numerous or more weighty than they really are, I will set them down here.

Observations on Mr. Jowett's plan for conducting the examinations.

1. He divides the subjects of examination into four "schools," of which the second comprehends "mathematical, physical, and natural science, with practical appli-

\* The recommendation is rather for a permanent record than for periodical reports. The passage will be found at page 20, "A book should be kept in every office, in which should be entered the name and age of each clerk or other officer at the time of his appointment, the dates of his examination, first appointment, and subsequent promotions, together with notes of all the reports made upon him from time to time, either on the occasions afforded by the occurrence of vacancies, or at other times in consequence of some special instance either of good or ill behaviour. A reference to this book on the occasion of promoting to vacancies, will enable the head of the department to form a tolerably correct estimate of the merits of each individual."

"cations." This course appears to me to be quite too extensive. Pure and applied mathematics constitute one tripos in our university degree examinations; experimental physics, as light, heat, electricity, &c., a second; whilst the natural sciences, zoology, botany, geology, &c., form a third and distinct group. It rarely happens that the same individual has a taste for the cultivation of abstract science as well as for the pursuit of the sciences of observation and experiment. Thus we should have but few candidates capable of standing an examination in the entire course appointed for this second school; and, moreover, it would not be easy to find examiners capable of conducting an examination in subjects so varied and important.

2. To the subjects named in Mr. Jowett's third "school" I would add mental philosophy. The study of some of the works of the great writers in logic would certainly be a useful discipline for persons intended to take part in the Public Service.

3. I do not understand why Mr. Jowett refuses to allow a candidate to compete in more than two "schools." Make, if you please, a positive amount of merit in each of two courses indispensable, but still leave the man of varied acquirements an opportunity of manifesting them, and that for the very same reason that you conduct the examination in such a way as to elicit proofs of the highest degree of proficiency in the several departments of study.

Whatever subjects are proposed, they ought to be so examined in as to test the intelligence of the candidates as well as their absolute knowledge. Penetration and sagacity are qualities at times more useful than any acquaintance with facts, no matter how extensive. With a special view to this, I would recommend that sets of official papers, containing applications, supported and opposed by statements and counter-statements, should be laid before the candidates, and that they should be called upon to draw up reports upon these cases, embodying the views which they take of the facts of each, and containing suggestions as to the manner in which they should be treated. There are many very simple modes of testing the intelligence of men which might be resorted to with advantage in these examinations. A man might be asked to supply by conjecture the words lost by making a hole in a document or tearing a piece off it. The reading of difficult or old handwritings is another useful test of ingenuity.

Great care ought to be taken to make the examination

The intelligence of the candidates ought to be carefully tested.

The examinations for in-

for the subordinate situations of a sufficiently common-sense character. If this caution be disregarded, the system might produce injurious effects everywhere, but especially in this country. The Irishman is essentially partial to what is abstract and speculative, to the comparative neglect of things definite and practical. If, therefore, you should establish a system of examination which should give undue development to this tendency, the result would be that hundreds of persons in the lower class would be withdrawn from and unfitted for industrial pursuits, whilst they were endeavouring to qualify themselves for admission into the Civil Service.

The scheme proposed in the Report applies more easily to the attainment of appointment by merit than to the ensuring of promotion by merit. Examinations are more readily made available for the former than for the latter end. I see no reason, however, why remarkable proficiency shown at the examination previous to appointment might not be registered, and made the ground of future promotion, if the career of the individual has been marked by diligence and fidelity in the discharge of the duties he has been entrusted with. And further, I would suggest that Civil Servants, after their appointment, should be allowed opportunities of presenting themselves from time to time at voluntary examinations, so as to give public proof of their ability and acquirements. This would induce them to keep up the habits of study which they had formed in early life. In the present state of things it happens too often that men abandon the practice of learning, as soon as ever they have secured a provision for themselves.

However well the examinations may be ordered, the successful conduct of them will mainly depend on the ability and judgment of the examiners. The Board ought to consist of men of great learning, diligence, integrity, and common sense. Happily there are many to be found who possess these qualifications. But I would wish to see other elements represented. The Board ought to include some members who have had the advantages of official experience, and acquired a practical knowledge of the affairs of State. I have not the slightest personal acquaintance with the gentlemen who compose the staff of the Foreign and Colonial Offices; but I have heard that among the civil servants in those departments are to be found gentlemen who unite all the qualifications which I have enumerated.

ferior appointments ought to be practical.

Proficiency shown at examinations might be made the ground of promotion as well as of appointment.

Qualifications of the examiners.

Their duties,  
and the con-  
stitution of the  
Board.

There is reason to fear that eight examiners could scarcely discharge the entire duty of examining. If this should prove to be the case, they ought to be given the power of procuring the aid of assistant examiners employed for the occasion, and acting under their direction; but the whole responsibility of the decisions ought to rest with themselves. It is also worth considering, whether it might not be advisable to give a higher rank to a certain number of the Board, who should have a distinct title, a controlling power, and higher salaries; whilst the rest were merely named "Examiners;" the constitution of the Board would then resemble that of other great public departments.

Here I may well bring my observations to a close. They have run to a greater length than I had anticipated, but the interest and importance of the subject will justify my prolixity.

REV. F. TEMPLE,

Principal of Kneller Hall Training School.

*Kneller Hall, March 6, 1854.*

I HAVE read the Report and Mr. Jowett's Letter on the Organization of the Public Service with very great interest. I do not believe that any proposal could be made which would be more likely, if adopted, to raise the Service, and indirectly to promote the best kinds of education.

There can be no doubt that, in filling up any one appointment, an examination may pass over the best man, or even the four or five best men, and select one somewhat inferior to them all. But this possibility is diminished as the number of appointments to be conferred after the same examination increases, and disappears entirely when the service to be supplied is as large as the Civil Service of this country. One man selected as the best may possibly not be better than, perhaps not quite so good as, one or two others. Twenty selected as the best are quite certain to be better than any other twenty.

And by better I do not mean merely better scholars or better informed, but more efficient for all purposes required in the Civil Service. No one who is at all acquainted with the examinations at the universities, can doubt for a moment that those who stand highest in the class list

would, on the whole, make decidedly better public servants than those who stand below them; and that, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, attainments are a proof of practical powers. The same is, of course, also the case with other systems of education than those pursued at the universities. It is true, that in maturer years the best informed are not always the most practically efficient. But young men fresh from their books have been applying whatever practical powers they possess to the mastery of what they have been reading, and to examine them in their knowledge is the surest way to test their capacity, not only for reading but for every other exercise of intellect.

The great, indeed the insuperable, difficulty in most examinations which propose to test the qualifications of candidates for appointments, is how to fix the standard. But by the method proposed in the Report this difficulty is entirely obviated; for when it is determined to select the best, whoever he may be, it becomes needless to fix any standard at all. I think it would be worth while to take pains to explain this point in the scheme, and to exhibit its working; for I perceive by the newspapers that much misapprehension has already arisen from the number of subjects proposed in Mr. Jowett's letter. It is said to be ridiculous to fix so high a standard; and such an examination, embracing such a variety of knowledge, is said to be out of the reach of many persons who are, nevertheless, well qualified for public employment. Now it is true that, in a negative examination which rejects those who do not fulfil certain conditions, every new subject of examination makes admission harder by adding a new condition. But in a competition, every new subject makes admission easier by opening another entrance. The variety of the examination enables every man to choose that mode of distinguishing himself which best suits his own tastes, powers, and circumstances. The scholar or mathematician from the university has his chance; and so also has the youth whose education has chiefly consisted in the study of English literature, of the modern languages, or of physical science. The question will not be so much what a man has learnt, as whether he has learned it well, and cultivated his mind in learning it. And if the examiners are well selected, there is no reason whatever to fear that they will prefer mere quantity to quality of knowledge, or that, because they examine in many subjects, they will therefore select those who show

acquaintance with many, rather than those who can handle a few with real mastery.

It will be seen that I regard the competition as the cardinal point in the plan. A merely negative examination, to reject incompetent candidates, would be soon found either useless or impracticable. The standard would, in all probability, either be so low that the increased efficiency of the Service would not be worth the expense of the examination, or so high as to be practically untenable. In a few years it would be pronounced a failure, and given up.

If the scheme is adopted as it stands, I have no doubt, from my knowledge of the Universities, that a very large number of young men of superior attainments would gladly choose the Public Service as the employment of their life. The open professions offer higher prizes as the reward of success, but such success can only be attained in most cases after passing through a lottery of chances and years of painful struggles. There are not a few who would gladly accept, in preference, the offer of certain and honourable employment for the present, and steady promotion, if deserved, hereafter.

There are, of course, qualities of the greatest value to the Public Service, such as zeal, discretion, and promptness in decision, which no examination can directly test, although even these are so intimately connected with intellectual superiority, that competing examination is second only to personal knowledge as a means of ascertaining them. But it must be remembered that at present these qualities are not tested at all until the appointment has been made. That the head of a department should select by personal knowledge, is simply impossible, however much he might desire it; and the possession of such qualifications is of value to the possessor, not in obtaining entrance to the Public Service, but in obtaining promotion after having entered it. This the Report wisely leaves unchanged. Once admitted, the clerk will understand that efficient discharge of duty, not intellectual capacity, will be his only title to rapid advancement; and that, in spite of all his attainments, proved inefficiency will still be a sufficient ground of dismissal, or at least of disqualification for superior rank.

It would certainly not be right to close the Service entirely to men who, having distinguished themselves in the open professions, desire to give their labour to the public. But the Report provides for the introduction of

such men just at the point, and in the way, best suited to their case. It would be absurd to bring them in unless they had already shown proof of their ability. It would be absurd, after they had done so, to make them no more than clerks even of the superior grade. It would be absurd to propose to test them by examination when they had already satisfied the best possible test by their success in practical life. The Report proposes that staff appointments should still be open to them as they are at present; and that these appointments should be protected, not by a preliminary examination, but by a producible record of the reasons for which they were made. This is, in fact, the only part of the Public Service where patronage can safely be allowed to enter; for the situations are too important to permit improper appointments to be passed over without notice.

There is one result of the proposed scheme on which the Report says nothing, but which is nevertheless of considerable importance. I have no doubt that the increased efficiency of the public service would soon cause a considerable decrease in its expensiveness. The gain would not consist merely in the better discharge of the duties required, but in the possibility of discharging them with a smaller staff. I should think that the experience of all public offices would confirm what all private establishments go to prove, that there is nothing which costs more than inefficient servants. The first introduction of the proposed plan would not, of course, immediately produce any change in this respect. But all offices are subject to slight perpetual modifications, by which their staff is re-arranged, consolidated, contracted, or increased. And in the course of these changes, as men of superior capacity were admitted, the possibility of much economy would be apparent which at present can neither be perceived nor anticipated. Before the end of twenty years I should confidently expect that the saving, not merely in the value of the work done, but in the cash drawn from the public purse, would much more than counterbalance the expense of the "Board of Examiners."

Much, of course, must depend in a plan of this kind upon the mode in which it is worked. But I see no difficulties in it not capable of being soon overcome, and if the execution be undertaken with the same honest determination as is shown in the conception, it is certain of success.

THE REV. CANON MOSELEY,

One of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools.

*Council Office, March 9, 1854.*

You will find but little difference of opinion, I apprehend, as to the expediency of filling up appointments in the Civil Service otherwise than they are at present filled up.

Among the highest qualifications to be sought in the candidates for such appointments are undoubtedly those of which the successful pursuit of knowledge in early life affords the evidence. The claims of persons seeking to be employed in the Civil Service may, I think, therefore with great advantage be referred, as a general rule, to an educational standard, and the majority of the appointments filled up, from among young men, by examination.

In expressing, however, my entire adhesion to the principle which lies at the foundation of the scheme proposed by yourself and Sir Stafford Northcote, I cannot but object to some of its details.

My objections may arise from a misapprehension of your meaning, or they may, in themselves, be unfounded; but if they are not, it is a satisfaction to me to know that, without affecting its principles, they may be removed.

1st. I do not think appointments to the Civil Service should be made exclusively from among young men; or all appointments to the higher grades, made from among men who have risen from the lower.

2dly. I do not think the scheme of examination proposed, sufficiently *comprehensive*.

It is not *fair* to distribute all the prizes of life among men *too early*. It is the conspicuous defect of the university system that it does this. The prizes are won at the beginning of the race. If two men who competed at the age of twenty-one were examined again at five-and-thirty, the winner in the former contest would often be the loser in the latter. The second examination would, however, I apprehend, be that which bore testimony to the higher qualities.

Some men's minds admit of being stimulated into so early a maturity that at twenty-five they have reached their full stature. Other men's minds *grow on* until they are sixty or seventy.

But yet, more important than this *native* difference of minds in respect to their growth, is the influence upon them of the different *circumstances* in which they are placed, of which difference there can be no more remarkable example than is offered by the case of two men, of whom one should succeed at such an examination as you propose, and enter, directly from college, on the routine of a Public Office, with honours which render any further evidence of his ability to promote the Public Service unnecessary; and the other of whom—with the consciousness of powers yet remaining to be matured, and a prize yet to be won—should engage in the wide competition of life, and have a long experience of its discouragements and its difficulties. Place these men—I repeat it—side by side ten or fifteen years after their first trial, and it would, not unfrequently, be evident, that if they could change places, the interests of the public service would thereby be promoted.

I would suggest, then, that an *opening* should be left in the system of promotion you have proposed, for the admission, in its higher stages, of men whose experience is not limited to official life.\* Born at school, nurtured at college, and matured within the four walls of an office, it will, otherwise, know nothing of the world outside.

In this respect it will have all the recognized defects of a bureaucracy. It wants a freer air and a wider breathing space than you have allowed it.

Many means of giving it this, of course, suggest themselves. The following is *one*.

The different offices being classed in the order of promotion, the *lower* might be filled by young men as you propose; but the course of their promotion through the *higher* classes might be liable to be *interrupted* by the admission of men not hitherto employed as Public Servants,—such admissions not being made, as the first were, upon examination, but on the evidence of fitness for the Public Service afforded by services actually rendered to the public. Such Public Services might be made the subject of a special report by the examiners, and as the

\* The principle here contended for is fully admitted in the Report (pages 7 and 15), as has been noticed with approbation in the preceding paper by Mr. Temple (page 35).

information on which the report was founded would be, in some degree, before the public, the report might perhaps with advantage be published, whenever it was favourable to the applicants. The recommendation of the examiners would be based on a consideration whether or not, an interruption of the ordinary course of promotion, in favour of the candidate, was justified by the public services he had rendered and the administrative capacity of which they afforded the evidence.

This competition, admitted from *without*, would ensure *within* the Civil Service that condition of *progress* with the general progress of knowledge and public opinion which is necessary to the successful administration of public affairs. It would not deprive the public of those services (in the aggregate very great in their amount) which are rendered gratuitously by men who seek as their reward public employment—services which your plan would, without some such provision, I fear annihilate; and it would satisfy the claims of such men—claims which have always been considered just, and which cannot without a sense of public wrong, be passed over.

I come now to the *subjects* of examination. At page 11 of your Report you express an opinion that the examination should be “a competing *literary* examination,” but (p. 12) that “*in regard to subordinate grades*,”\* it should be “adapted to the object of securing the *scientific* and “other attainments which are important to the efficiency of great public establishments.”

And in accordance with this opinion, as to the relative importance to the Public Service of literary and scientific attainments, Mr. Jowett has proposed a scheme of examination in four schools, of which *one* only is a school of science.

You very justly lay down in your Report as a principle, that the proposed examination should not *prescribe to*, but *accept* the existing education of the country. But any

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\* The passage in the Report is—“In the case, for example, of the “subordinate grades from which collectors, surveyors, secretaries, “junior commissioners, and other superior officers of the revenue “departments are usually selected, the nature of the examination “should be adapted to the object of securing the scientific and other “attainments which are so important to the efficiency of these great “national establishments.”

one who looks around him will, I think, see that the public mind is now educating itself rather according to a scientific than a literary type, and that the great element in the social progress which is going on around us is not literature but science. To place all that goes by the name of science in one (so-called) school out of four, and to rank it, in comparison with the other subjects which enter into the proposed examination of candidates for the Public Service, in the proportion of one to three, is not therefore, to accept *the present* of human knowledge, or to look to *the future*, but to hark back into *the past*.

There is an objection to your plan, which it is very desirable to obviate, and which gives to this consideration a great importance. It is, that the promoters of the plan, the more earnest, the more able, and the more conscientious they may be, and the more deserving on these accounts of the public confidence, will be the more likely to give it, from the first, that particular direction which they conscientiously believe to be most for the interests of the Public Service; a direction which cannot fail to be influenced by their own education, to partake of their own views, and to be, in short, that of their minds. Thus *one type* of education will come to be represented in the administration of public affairs; the idiosyncrasy of *one class* of minds will pass upon it, and (to use an engineering phrase) it will, eventually, be shunted upon the rail of *one class of thinkers*.

To test the truth of these considerations, I have called to mind the names of six men in London, who by their labours for the advancement of science have, it appears to me, exercised a greater influence on the popular scientific mind, and through it on the material welfare of the country, than any other six Englishmen now living whom I can remember. Each of these men has devoted himself specially from early life to the pursuit of *one* department of knowledge, and yet, through the means of that *one study*, his mind (educated by that *one phase of it*) has received a *large* and *liberal* development as to other forms of knowledge. Each has, moreover, had a wide experience of the world, and appears to possess, in a remarkable degree, that knowledge of it which is by no means the least important qualification of a public servant.

Yet, looking at the antecedents of these men, (now men of a European reputation,) it is obvious that, by an ex-



amination within the limitations proposed by Mr. Jowett, they would all have been excluded from the Public Service.

It is no answer to this, that such men might, under the new regulations, hold staff appointments. They do not hold them *now*; and they would be less likely to hold them under a system which, for every vacant staff appointment, would provide a candidate, qualified in other respects, and who had many years of official experience. Nor can it be considered just to this class of men to refuse to them in early life a competition for public employment, to which men pursuing other studies—not better adapted to fit them for the Public Service—are admitted.

Calling to mind, in like manner, six men employed in different public departments, who, by the improvements they have introduced in those departments, have rendered to the public services which are universally recognized and acknowledged,—services which we owe not less to the largeness and liberality of their views, to the enterprise and energy of their characters, to their practical knowledge of life, and to the sagacity which is the fruit of that knowledge, than to their scientific or literary attainments,—I find that *those* six men also, could never, on the proposed plan, (restricted as it appears in your report,) have hoped to enter the Civil Service of the State.

I have said nothing here concerning the great and influential body of engineers,—a class of men who seem to be taking the world into their own hands. Your examination offers no opening whatever to them, notwithstanding that there are departments of the Civil Service which are dependent on a practical knowledge of their profession, and for which in other countries a special education is provided.

The remedy I would propose (in addition to the admission of others to the higher grades of the Service, than those who have risen from the lowest), is a *considerable extension of the subjects of examination out of which the candidate is to make his option.*

To the four schools enumerated by Mr. Jowett there might be added the following :

- 5th. The experimental sciences.
- 6th. The mechanical sciences.
- 7th. The sciences of observation.

Under these three additional heads would range themselves a variety of subjects, having a direct relation to the manufacturing and the commercial interests of the country; and therefore, *of necessity*, connecting themselves with the Civil Service of the State.

Such additional heads of examination are not rendered unnecessary by the fact that they are branches of mathematical and natural science, which two great and widely dissimilar subjects are included in one of Mr. Jowett's schools. Whatever may be the object of the division into schools, it could not, with reference to that object, have been more anomalous, to include all the subjects in the first, third, and fourth schools, under the head of literature, and make of them a single school, than it is to include all the natural and all the mathematical sciences in one school.

It would probably be found unnecessary to examine students from the *universities* a second time in *classics* or *mathematics*. If they had not taken *university honours*, they might be assumed *in respect to those subjects*, to have failed.

This would render the labours of the classical and mathematical examiners comparatively light. Nor would the labours of the others be, I apprehend, so great as to occupy *all their time*; a condition the more likely to secure, in the office of examiner, the services of eminent men. The addition of three examiners to the list does not therefore probably involve such an additional expense, as (considering the object in view) is to be viewed in the light of a serious obstacle; whilst, by increasing the number of schools, out of which the candidate may select two to be examined in, the *surface* over which the selection is to be made would be greatly increased, and the forms of knowledge and qualities of mind brought into the Public Service would be greatly varied.

Operating with the improvements which are in progress in the Universities, and in our elementary schools, the proposed measure could not, I think, fail greatly to stimulate the general education of the country; and, if cautiously administered, permanently to improve and advance it. A competition of public elementary schools, and of private commercial schools, would be created, greatly to the advantage of both, by the local examinations. A public opinion favourable to the elementary school would spring up, in

the humbler classes of society, from this public recognition and sanction of it, as the means of qualifying men for responsible stations in life; and with this sense of its usefulness, there would not fail to come the desire, on the part of parents, that their children should profit longer by the school than they now do, and the disposition to make some sacrifices for that end. I can indeed speak in this matter from experience. I remember well how great an impulse was given to elementary education in the dockyard towns, when the Admiralty announced its intention (unfortunately not persevered in) to enter apprentices in Her Majesty's dockyards, strictly according to the results of the dockyard school-masters examination. The town schools were forthwith attended by more than their usual number of scholars, and with more than the usual punctuality; an influence which extended even to those whose scholars could not profit directly by the examination. A public opinion favourable to education was obviously created by it, generally, among the surrounding poor.

One other observation, and I will bring this letter to a close.

It is, I think, of the first importance that no greater number of candidates should be passed at the annual examinations than the annual average vacancies will take up.

I know of no greater calamity which can be visited upon a young man, nor any other greater injustice which can be done to him, than to make him, *for a long series of years*, an expectant of public employment; except it be afterwards to disappoint him.

If your scheme should, as I trust it will, take effect, it will, (by a cautious administration in this respect,) be the means, I believe, of diverting from a hopeless candidature for public employment many a man who now wastes his life upon it, and dates from it his ruin, of making him a useful member of society, and of securing to him in a less ambitious career, more independence and a better remuneration than he can hope for in the Public Service.

I have no doubt that the examinations may be so conducted as to be strictly impartial, and to create in the public mind a confidence that they are so.

THE VERY REV. THE DEAN OF CARLISLE.

March 12, 1854.

I BEG to acknowledge your letter of the 2d, in which you are kind enough to request my opinion on the scheme contained in your Report. As I have no practical acquaintance with the working of the system pursued in the Public Offices, any remarks I might make on the proposed changes with reference to their bearing on the efficiency of the Civil Service are not likely to be of use. But the subject is certainly one of great importance in another aspect, with reference to which I may fairly consider myself qualified to offer an opinion; I mean in its bearing on the improvement of education in the country.

During the period of my being engaged practically in the education of the upper classes, first as Tutor of Baliol College, and afterwards as Head Master of Rugby, one of the greatest difficulties which I found was this, that the number of young persons who had a taste for classics, or the requisite powers for enabling them to prosecute classical studies with a real prospect of attaining to eminence as scholars, was very limited, while all the immediate and obvious rewards of much value, in the shape of scholarships and fellowships, were at Oxford entirely, and at Cambridge in a very great degree, confined to those who were successful in the study of the classics. It was therefore very difficult to find adequate inducements for the great mass of our pupils, who felt that they had no chance of advancing their interests by their classical attainments, and who were apt quietly to acquiesce in a conviction, that in the sort of pursuits to which their lives were to be given, advancement depended very greatly on interest, and very little indeed on the intellectual exertions they might make at school or college. The substantial rewards held out to mathematical eminence at Cambridge, operated of course to a certain extent on boys at school; but both at Rugby and at Oxford, it is certain that there were many, eminent neither in classics nor mathematics, yet possessed of good

abilities, who might have been stimulated to great exertions, in the study, for example, of modern languages, of history, or of physical science, had they known, that between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five they would have an opportunity of securing for themselves employment and independence, by passing a creditable examination in subjects congenial to their tastes.

I am decidedly of opinion that it would not do to make the basis of education for boys embrace too wide a range of subjects; and I believe an acquaintance with the classics as good a basis of intellectual training for the higher orders as can be found. But this in no way militates against opening a wider sphere in which the elder boys might follow their natural tastes even at school; while, at the university, the great changes which have been recently introduced have, as I think, been most wise, in as far as they have provided some encouragement for a wider range of study than the old system allowed. It was strongly pointed out in the evidence laid before the Oxford University Commission, of which I was a member, that what is wanted to give the studies recently introduced in the universities a fair chance is, that there shall be direct encouragement to boys and young men to look to their success in such studies as a means of obtaining independence. In our University Report we recommended that this should be done by bestowing fellowships for other than classical and mathematical eminence. And in a similar point of view, I consider the plan which your Report proposes, holding out as it does substantial encouragement to ability and industry in all the most important branches of study, as likely, if adopted, to have a most salutary effect on the education of the upper classes.

The principal objection which I have heard urged against such a system of promotion by merit as your Report advises, is, that appointments now conferred on young men of aristocratic connexion will fall into the hands of persons in a much lower grade in society; and that the tone of honourable feeling, and the like, which at present exists amongst those holding such appointments, will be endangered. To this argument I attach no importance whatever. I feel certain, from my experience of open fellowships and scholarships at the university, that the highest classes in the country are quite capable

of maintaining their own in any open competition in which they may have to contend; and I cannot think that any real favour is done to young men of these classes by putting them out of the reach of such stimulants to exertion and good conduct as might exercise a most beneficial influence on their whole character.

I should wish also to make one or two remarks on the connexion of the contemplated changes with education in another aspect.

It is proposed to throw the lower as well as the higher offices in the Civil Service open to competition. Into the exact details, as to how the change you propose is to be effected, either with reference to the higher or the lower offices, I should hardly like to enter; but, if proper arrangements for such a competition as you propose can be made, I am certain that a great and beneficial influence may be exercised over the education of the lower and middle, as well as the higher classes; and I have had some practical acquaintance during the last few years with the education of the lower and middle classes.

Every one who knows what has been going on in the country must have been struck with the extraordinary change produced in a short time by the introduction of the pupil-teacher system in schools for the poor. I do not now allude to the assistance which pupil teachers have given in teaching schools, but to the fact of a large class of intelligent persons having been, as it were, called into existence by the system. Now, this change has been effected by means of strict examinations and promotion by merit under the Committee of Council for Education. There can be little doubt that similar results would follow a well-considered scheme for promotion in other departments of the Civil Service, besides that under the superintendence of the Education Committee. Now, I conceive it to be a most important element in the present case, that by such a system as is proposed, a stimulus to intellectual exertion might be held out to the middle class, similar to that which has already, in the case of pupil teachers, acted with such effect on the lower orders.

The education of the middle class seems to me at present in a very unsatisfactory state, and young men of this class are at present scarcely at all operated on by such inducements to intellectual competition and exertion as have been brought to bear of late with so great force on the higher

classes by opening scholarships and fellowships, and on the lower by the system of pupil teachers. I look, therefore, for a very salutary effect on the education of the middle classes, if such a scheme as has been proposed can be carried out; especially if, in any arrangements adopted, middle-class schools were encouraged to put themselves under such rules as the Government examiners appointed under the proposed scheme might suggest, and if these examiners thus obtained some control over such schools. Incidentally this advantage also might result, that persons in the middle class, in the hope of obtaining Government situations, might remain a much longer time at school than they do at present.

With regard to schools for the lower orders, the scheme proposed seems here also likely to be productive of much good. Of course, such schools will share in the general good effects of the system, having an additional stimulus to exertion held out to them in so far as many promising pupils of these schools may be expected to obtain Government employment by their merits. But more particularly I should wish to point out, that I conceive the scheme may be of great use in obviating a difficulty much felt with regard to pupil teachers and certificated schoolmasters.

One of the greatest difficulties connected with the creation by the Privy Council system of so large a body of intelligent pupil teachers and schoolmasters is this, that such persons ought to have before them the safe outlet of some other honourable profession in which to employ their energies, in case they do not wish ultimately to devote their lives to the work of a schoolmaster. Otherwise, it may be found, that we are training up a large and important class of discontented and dangerous men, to whom we have given an education far superior to that of the generality of their equals, and whom we have encouraged to cut themselves off from the prospect of wealth and eminence through the ordinary avenues of trade. With this view I should be strongly disposed, if possible, to extend the limits of age for competition for the lower Government offices, suggested at page 17 of the Report. If it were possible, it would be most desirable, that not pupil teachers only, but such certificated masters as found on trial that their school work was not congenial to their tastes, should have as many openings as possible to independence and distinction offered them, and amongst

others, such openings as are offered by the ordinary Civil Service of the Government.

In conclusion, I would remark, that some persons are apprehensive lest the system of testing every one's merits by examination, as it has hitherto been too much overlooked in this country, may be likely now to be made too much of; and many point ominously to China as the best examined country in the world. I quite agree, that a system of deciding merits by examination may be carried too far, but I do not think there is much danger of our falling into this fault as yet. To continue examinations as a test of merit, after men have entered fully on the practical business of life, and have had far better opportunities of showing their powers in a practical way than any which can be afforded by examinations, would be absurd. But no such objection seems to me to lie against the preliminary step of ascertaining a man's fitness, when he first enters on his profession, by what, as far as I can see, is the only fair test of which the nature of the case admits.

These remarks are hardly worthy of your attention, but they refer to points on which I feel strongly and have thought a good deal.

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The REV. E. H. GIFFORD,

Head Master of King Edward's School, Birmingham.

*March 13, 1854.*

AFTER considering the system proposed in the Report on the Organisation of the Civil Service, I beg leave to offer the following observations on its probable effects upon such a school as this.

Our foundation includes three distinct departments adapted to the wants of three grades of the community, and it will be convenient to consider the effect on each of these separately.

(A.) The classical department contains 250 boys, between the ages of eight and nineteen years, sons of independent and professional gentlemen, merchants, manufacturers, and tradesmen mostly of the higher class. Of these a small proportion proceed to the universities; the majority leave school at sixteen or seventeen years of age, to enter upon professional or commercial pursuits.

The proposed examination for the superior class of appointments would affect this department of the school in two ways,—

(1.) Indirectly through the universities; for it is reasonable to expect that many, who do not now seek a university education, would do so when it would open a ready access to superior appointments in the Civil Service:

(2.) Directly, in consequence of the examination being open to all wherever educated.

Candidates from the classical department would be likely to prepare themselves for examination in the first and second, or in the first and fourth, of the schools suggested in Mr. Jowett's letter.

It is obvious that youths coming direct from school at the age of nineteen could not compete successfully with *first-rate* men from the universities three or four years older; but the annual supply of *first-rate* men from the universities would fall very far short of 250, the assumed annual average of appointments; and thus clever and well-trained youths of nineteen would have a reasonable chance of obtaining some appointments of the superior class.

I believe therefore that the proposed system would exercise a beneficial influence upon our classical school by lengthening in many cases the period of education, and giving increased stimulus to exertion, while no material change or extension of the course of instruction would be required.

(B.) The English or commercial department contains 215 boys, sons of manufacturers, tradesmen, and superior artisans. The course of instruction includes, among other things, Latin, modern languages, history, mathematics, book-keeping, surveying, and the elements of natural science. In many of these subjects it is difficult to attain a high standard of proficiency, simply because the boys leave school at very early ages, generally under fourteen; the prospect of immediate remuneration from commercial employment is not counteracted by the offer of direct pecuniary advantages, as in the classical school by exhibitions to the universities, nor by any honourable distinctions to be gained after leaving the school: and parents are thus too often tempted to regard the acquisition of a mechanical facility in reading, writing, and the ordinary operations of arithmetic as the chief purpose and sufficient result of education.

I have long been seeking for means to overcome this difficulty; it would be in great measure removed by an open competition for appointments in the Civil Service. There must be a very large proportion of such appointments intermediate between the highest and lowest, for which accuracy and facility in English composition, and a knowledge of certain branches of science, or of one or more modern languages, would be very important qualifications. An examination embracing such subjects would at once set up a higher and more definite standard for the education of the middle classes, while the advantages held out to successful competitors would afford the same kind of stimulus to exertion as that which is supplied among the upper classes by competition for the honours and emoluments awarded at the universities.

(C.) The third department includes (besides girls' schools) *four* elementary schools, containing together 500 boys. The same difficulty that exists in the commercial department is found here in an aggravated form; the boys leave school at a still earlier age, and even a sufficient number of monitors can scarcely be retained by moderate payments. The proposed local examination, with its substantial rewards, would retain many boys much longer under instruction, and thereby greatly tend to improve these schools.

On the whole then, I confidently believe that the proposed plan, if fully carried out, would give a powerful impulse to the education of all classes, and that in a manner least of all open to objection, viz., by rewarding the *results* without interfering with the *methods* of education. Not the least important effect of such examinations, conducted, as of course they would be; with strict impartiality, would be their *moral* influence. I believe that those who are familiar with university examinations never lose the impression produced by their well-known fairness and justice. By the wide extension of a similar feeling the proposed examinations would have a salutary effect on public morality, and would give especially to the lower classes a more direct interest and more intelligent confidence in the institutions of the country.

THE REV. DR. JEUNE,

Master of Pembroke College, Oxford.

March 14, 1854.

I HAVE to thank you for a copy of your important Report on the Organization of the Civil Service.

Public opinion may be startled at the first by the momentous changes which you propose, and the instincts of political partizans may strive to thwart your generous views, but I cannot but think that they will before long be carried substantially into effect.

The beneficial consequences of such a system as you propose will be felt much beyond our Public Offices.

We have learnt here, from the great results which have followed from what is at best but a scanty opening of collegiate emoluments, that a vast power over the higher education of the country lies dormant in our hands. Parliament is, I believe, about to enable us to apply it vigorously. The experience of the universities has further influenced the legislature to such an extent that the magnificent Civil Service in the East Indies will soon be thrown open to competition.

If the universities and the Indian empire are to absorb the ablest young men in the country, it will become matter of necessity to protect the Civil Service, which is even now, as you state, but scantily provided with superior officers; nor will political interests long stand in the way.

Ministries, now that the country has ceased to be governed for the benefit of particular classes, will find their surest support in good administration, and the satisfaction of the public; not in patronage and the purchase of individuals.

Supposing your project carried out, you will, in point of fact, have established an Imperial University, which will mould every college and school in the land.

What really gives unity to the colleges and halls locally aggregated in Oxford,—what really constitutes the university,—is the system of examinations and honours. It is this, too, which has made the grammar and public schools what they are. A great Board of Examiners in London, known to be able and impartial, and virtually dispensing emoluments and distinctions, will affect the studies, not only of the candidates whom it selects, and

those whom it passes over (who will be far more numerous), but of all their fellows who are trained in the same schools.

Indeed, as you must necessarily confer honours, and report on special merits, and as you will doubtless find many besides those wanted for the Civil Service to be fit for that Service, and cannot suffer them to be confounded (as they must be if passed over without notice), among those who are rejected, it will become a valuable thing to pass the examinations successfully as regards almost every career in life. We know that degrees in the universities were originally nothing but licences to teach, which, as soon as they were found to confer credit on those who obtained them, became sought for by persons who had no intention whatever of becoming teachers.

The effect will not be limited to the higher schools. From the nature of the employments to be bestowed, the national schools must supply many candidates, and thus you will contribute to the improvement of every village in the country.

As to details, I have little to offer. I think that a permanent Board of Examiners is indeed indispensable; but that the examination should be conducted in part by temporary examiners also. There should be an element to insure freshness and zeal, as well as one to insure experience and permanency of system.

While I would secure for the superior candidates under this state of things a tolerable certainty of public employment, if in other respects they were qualified, I would also leave it to the head of each department to fix on the individuals to succeed in each particular instance. He would discharge this duty under responsibility to a jealous public opinion enlightened by the report of the examiners. Nor would I absolutely restrict his choice to examined candidates. Nothing but extraordinary merit would justify a deviation from the regular course, but extraordinary merit would fully justify it.

R. M. BROMLEY, Esq., C.B.,

Accountant-General of the Navy.

*Admiralty, March 15, 1854.*

THE importance of the Civil Service of the country having been recognized in Her Majesty's Speech from the

Throne, it behoves all who have the interest of that Service at heart, and who are practically acquainted with the manner in which the business of public departments is conducted, to assist the minister, of whatever party he may be, who embraces the opportunity of remedying the defects of the Civil Service.

My humble apology for the following remarks is, that I have been bred in the Civil Service, having passed through the various gradations of a clerk's career, and risen, without interest or in any way seeking it, to the highest appointment in the department in which I commenced that career. Moreover, I have been repeatedly employed on special commissions within the last nine years by the successive governments of Lord John Russell, Lord Derby, and Lord Aberdeen, in inquiring into the practice of public departments.

The interest of the Public Service has been paramount with me; I must, therefore, beg your forgiveness should I appear to express myself too openly.

The existing defect of the Civil Service is, in my opinion, its want of that high moral tone which is so essential in conducting the common affairs of life.

To remedy that defect, the following are the most important points for consideration:—

- 1st. That a better educated class of men should be introduced into the Service.
- 2d. That heads of departments should encourage a gentlemanly independent feeling throughout the Service, and promote by merit. And,
- 3d. That the heads of departments should make the knowledge of character their particular study in selecting their instruments.

With respect to the first, I believe the Service as a body to be fairly educated for the common run of men; certainly better than the body of merchants,—better than the Naval Service,—equal to some of the open professions, but perhaps inferior to the army. Nevertheless, the Civil Service is wanting in brilliant talent; it is now too much on a level throughout.

There are many men in the revenue departments, and in the lower class of offices, who are far more valuable public servants than many men in the highest class of offices; yet they have no power of distinguishing themselves, there being no prizes to contend for, nor any

prospect, owing to the character of their duties, of being brought into notice.

The Civil Service has much of such talent lying waste and going to decay. The public interest suffers, and individuals become discontented.

These unknown men of talent witness daily their inferiors advancing before them, who may have been put into the Service through interest, and who probably passed what is termed an examination, but such as a charity boy would smile at.

If a clerk is rejected, the chances are he will be returned to the examiner, (who is usually another clerk in the office) having been crammed for a few weeks to prepare him for another jump at the leaping-bar test, which on this occasion is not unlikely to be lowered, the examiner not feeling disposed perhaps to run the risk of further rebuke or of making an enemy of some person of consideration.

In this way the Public Service is injured, and ever will be so long as the present system of entry is permitted to exist; that is, as long as there are no *proper rules* by which the present system is carried out.

The most feeble sons in families which have been so fortunate as to obtain an appointment, yes, and others too, either mentally or physically incapacitated, enter the Service. I could quote several instances. The more able and ambitious sons seek the open professions.

There is scarcely a department of the Government in which you will not find some unambitious, indolent, and incapable men, who have been got into the Service—not because they were indolent or unambitious, but because their parents or guardians could get them off their hands without difficulty or expense of education.

The heads of departments are much troubled with these characters, and although they are the exceptions, they are numerous, and never ought to have entered the Service; nor would they have done so had there been a competing, instead of a fixed, test on entry; or if the fixed test were a *real* test—the examinations *bonâ fide* ones.

The heads of departments being now more active and energetic than formerly, this "fungus" upon the Service is being eradicated by slow degrees; but it may return, as it now depends upon an individual to keep it in check. Eye, and not heart, service was formerly the rule, and I

have known many instances of individuals boldly stating they were not put into the Service by their patrons to work. It is unfair to cast this anxiety of tutoring upon the heads of departments who are already overworked. I felt this so much myself that I submitted to my late Board (of Audit) a plan for the examination of persons entering the Audit Office, which was established. Three nominations were soon rejected under that system, although one of them was returned after being crammed to the fixed test. Possibly, as an individual, I might have had the nerve to have rejected all three, but the Committee of Examiners who rejected them could not be attacked individually, and therefore acted with greater firmness. Many cases also I could instance in which senior clerks have got their juniors to draft reports and letters, feeling unequal to the task themselves. This is again owing to the absence of a competing test upon entry into the Public Service, and promotion by seniority instead of by merit.

I am as jealous of the character of the Civil Service as any man, nor will I bend to any man in anxiety for its welfare. I know that the public are much indebted to Civil Servants for the manner in which the public business is conducted. I know also that they are faithful and devoted to their calling, as they are bound to be, but that feeling does not blind me to the defects of that Service to which I am so warmly attached.

The scheme propounded in the Report on the Organization of the Civil Service as laid before Parliament is not exactly what I hope to see carried into effect.

A competing test is, in my opinion, far better than a fixed one, but the same difficulty experienced under Lord Melbourne's plan at the Treasury will present itself and possibly in an aggravated form, should the appointments be thrown open to the United Kingdom. You will have youths at seventeen years of age competing with young men at twenty-three; the latter, therefore, must put the former in the shade. This might be fair in nomination cases, but is unfair in general voluntary competition. The disparity is not so great in academical struggles, and I doubt the policy of excluding youth from the Public Service under twenty years of age, which I believe the *general* competing test as proposed would do.

The object, I apprehend, is to secure the welfare of the Public Service by the admission of a more highly educated

class, securing at the same time men equally desirable in point of morality and gentlemanly demeanour with those now in the Service; that the present system of patronage should be put an end to, and a general competition throughout the country established.

I have long felt that the concentration of the whole, or nearly so, of the patronage of the Public Service, at the Treasury, was proving detrimental to the public interest. Instead of improving the former system, which existed even before the publication of the valuable reports of Lane and Mollison in 1783, up to the period of the great reductions and consequent alterations attending the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832, the patronage which then rested with the heads of departments became absorbed in the general department at the Treasury. By reverting to the former system of nominations and establishing a board of examiners, who should be independent of Government influence, but responsible for the fitness, upon an improved competing test, of the individuals admitted into the Service, I have some confidence that a more educated class will be secured, and certainly more reliable in point of character, than even under the existing system, or under open competition.

The Treasury could still exercise its control over the increase of establishments so as to prevent the heads of departments improperly increasing their patronage.

The Service, however, must be made more attractive for superior talent, by throwing open the prizes to the Service at large.

The elevation of men to the heads of departments who have passed through the ranks of the Service will still further help to keep patronage in its true position, and merit will be more likely to meet with its reward.

The improvement in the education of public employes will, I firmly believe, introduce a more gentlemanly and independent class of men in all the departments of Government, and the heads of departments will have better opportunities of judging of the character, temper, and qualifications of those employed under them for staff appointments than they have under the existing system.

Moreover, the distrust the Government has shown in the heads of departments, by removing from them all patronage, has extended itself throughout the various



grades of the Service, until one check after another has accumulated, to the detriment of efficiency, and the loss of all trace of economy.

Mr. Jowett, in his letter, has shown the possibility of setting up a machinery for conducting the examinations upon the principle set forth in the Report; but in his desire to uphold the universities, he has omitted an intermediate class, the class most wanted in the Public Service. His first class would be purely exceptional, and might with advantage be trained in the Public Service for the House of Commons. His second class of candidates, which should in my opinion be the third, consisting of tide-waiters, letter-carriers, &c., I have long thought should be excluded altogether from the category of Civil Servants, by being placed on day pay instead of being paid by salary. The second class should, in my opinion, consist of gentlemen who are educated for the common business of life. Should the third class be excluded, the number of Civil Servants would be reduced to about eight thousand, or one-half.

The only advantage in canvassing the country at large for candidates which has occurred to me is, that sons of country gentleman who may be well educated, but who have no connexion with members of a government, would have opportunities afforded them of embarking in public life, and becoming useful members of society. My feeling is against an indiscriminate admission upon certificates, and I would rely upon heads of departments selecting fit and proper persons, who should be submitted to a competing test prior to entry.

There is one other point I wish to observe upon, which is that of promotion. There cannot be the slightest doubt that promotion by merit is the very essence of good service; but *that merit* should be *generally admitted* before it is allowed to interfere with seniority.

I do not think a board of examiners should be judges of that merit; nor can a black or any other book detect it. Confidence must be placed in the heads of departments, if the Public Service is to be well conducted; and nothing is more essential than that they should have the selection of their instruments upon whom they must materially rely; but in every case of promotion, the heads of departments should declare *in writing*, that, in their firm belief, the selection they had made was "the person best qualified for the situation, and whose promotion was best for the Public Service."

I have allowed my paper to run to a greater length than I intended; but the importance of the subject must plead my apology.

I beg to append a list of Public Offices, with the number of employes in each, which was carefully prepared when working up our data for the superannuation question.

SITUATIONS liable to Assessment for Superannuation Fund.

Class.	Office.	Clerks	Mes-sengers &c.	Total.		No. liable to Assessment by Mr. Farr's Pamphlet, p. 15.
				Clerks.	Mes-sengers	
1	Treasury - - - -	63	29	1855	390	92
	Home - - - -	25	9			34
	Foreign - - - -	36	3			39
	Colonial - - - -	24	4			28
	Privy Council, Board of Trade, and Railway Board - - - -	55	20			75
	Admiralty - - - -	470	165			635
	War - - - -	251	48			299
	Ordnance - - - -	700	79			779
	Paymaster General - - - -	85	12			97
	Exchequer - - - -	6	5			11
	Woods, Forests, and Works - - - -	28	5			33
	Audit - - - -	112	11			123
	National Debt - - - -	10	2			12
	General Register Office - - - -	50	8			58
	State Paper Office - - - -	3	3			6
2	Record Office - - - -	29	2	31		
	Stationery Office - - - -	27	18	45		
	Public Works Loan - - - -	3	-	3		
	Customs - - - -	2,440	2,460	4,900		
	Coast Guard - - - -	30	2,470	2,500		
	Excise - - - -	2,637	2,600	5,237		
	Stamps and Taxes - - - -	407	200	607		
3	Post Office - - - -	694	-	694		
	Messengers, &c. - - - -	-	-	8,153	27 magistrates. 21 clerks, &c.	
				16,338		16,353
Class 1. - - - -				-	-	1,855
" 2. - - - -				-	-	6,330
" 3. - - - -				-	-	8,153
Total				-	-	16,338

In this Return the following officers are not given, viz. Magistrates, Consuls, Metropolitan Police, Mint, Chief Secretary for Ireland.

THE REV. G. E. L. COTTON,

Master of Marlborough College.

*The College, Marlborough,  
March 18, 1854.*

I RECEIVED last week a copy of the Report on the Organisation of the Civil Service, with a request that I would send you any remarks which might occur to me as to its bearing on the education of our large schools.

I cannot imagine any one at all connected with them, entertaining any other feeling except the greatest thankfulness and satisfaction at the Report. The scheme at once commends itself to common sense and right feeling; and, besides its many social and political advantages, in opening a new profession at the time the old ones are overstocked, and in abolishing the evils of patronage, it would, I am sure, have a direct influence on the universities, and also on the schools of England. The latter would probably be affected chiefly through the former, for as the proposed limits of competition are the ages of 19 and 25 (for the higher class of appointments), I should think that the majority of candidates from the public schools would first go to the university.

With regard to the scheme itself, I am quite satisfied with the proposals of Mr. Jowett's letter, which I am convinced are perfectly practicable. There are a few points connected with them, on which I may be allowed to say a few words, though chiefly in the way of confirmation.

1. I think that persons of a higher grade than Mr. Jowett anticipates, will be ready to accept appointments under head B of his letter (p. 29 of the Report). If the sons of clergymen, and others in the rank of gentlemen, emigrate to Australia and accept situations involving hard manual labour, I should think that many highly respectable boys, not likely to succeed in what are called the learned professions, would be thankful for such appointments, of which the importance and estimation would be increased by their becoming rewards of merit. I should, therefore, be in favour of raising, to some extent, the standard suggested by Mr. Jowett. I should certainly add English history, Euclid, and one of the natural sciences, to the subjects which he mentions. The latter is particularly important, as calling out the faculty

of observation, which is scarcely done either by a training in literature, or in abstract science. Of course such boys as I have mentioned would be exposed to free competition with those of a lower grade than themselves, but that I should think a very good thing for both parties.

2. I wish to add my scholastic to Mr. Jowett's academical experience as evidence to the assertion, that in "more than 19 cases out of 20, men of attainments are also men of character." In thinking over the present condition of this school, and of another still larger and more important, with which I was formerly connected, I feel sure that if I were required to select the boys who were most likely to make useful, practical, and conscientious Public Servants, I should almost always choose those who were also most distinguished for ability and industry. I do not mean that this is invariably the case; but if there is any real meaning or advantage in education, it must refine the taste, elevate the moral standard, and give habits of perseverance, self-discipline, and active exertion, which, next to real Christian principle, are the best safeguards against a low or vicious course of conduct. And the result which we should expect, is abundantly confirmed by facts.

3. As Mr. Jowett's proposal for making classical literature a test of fitness for the Civil Service is not noticed in the Report, I have some fear that it may be disapproved, especially as it is not altogether in accordance with the tendency of present popular feeling. Lest I should be thought to speak merely under the influence of the old classical prejudice, I may venture to mention that I do not at all advocate a universal and compulsory classical education, that I am now trying to organize a more general scheme of instruction here for boys who are not likely to make much progress in scholarship, and that I consider the present outcry against classics to be a natural reaction from the unjust and exclusive prominence hitherto given to that branch of learning. But I should think it a great misfortune, if any such public discouragement were given to classical studies, as would prevent those from pursuing them who are really able to profit by them. If the examination for the Civil Service were exclusively on subjects more apparently useful, such as physical science, modern history, modern languages, &c., the effect on our great schools would be disastrous, and classics would at last come to be considered an intro-

duction to the clerical profession alone, or be followed as a merely curious branch of learning, like Sanscrit, or the study of hieroglyphics. It would of course be quite out of place for me to discuss here the peculiar advantages of classical study, or the effect of ancient literature on the taste and judgment, and of philology and grammar on the reasoning powers. Yet I may just observe, that even the most determined advocate of a utilitarian education must allow the advantage of studying ancient history generally, as a picture of a political and social drama of which we can see the beginning, the course, and the catastrophe; and of Roman history in particular, as that in which the history of all ancient nations ended, and from which all modern history has sprung. The writings of Thucydides and Tacitus on the one hand, and of Niebuhr, Arnold, Thirlwall, and Grote on the other, are no mere magazines of antiquarian information, but contain political and social lessons applicable to all times. Besides this, I should urge, in defence of classical study as a preparation for public life, that the Government will require to ascertain not only the actual information which a candidate may have on some particular subject, but far more, his general ability. If a man's understanding has been strengthened by a careful training in the course now followed by the most successful students at universities and public schools, the acquisition of technical knowledge necessary for his peculiar office will be speedily accomplished. Indeed, we generally find that good classical scholars are also conversant with general literature, and keenly interested in the events which are passing around them. Similar arguments will apply in some degree to the admission of abstract mathematics (distinct from their practical applications) as a test of fitness for public employments, which also I should strongly advocate.

4. I also earnestly hope that too many subjects will not be required; but that Mr. Jowett's proposal of each candidate choosing two schools, and only two, may be adopted; otherwise the preliminary education will be frittered away, and habits of accuracy not acquired. It might, perhaps, be desirable that the same candidate should not be allowed to offer himself for examination both in classics and mathematics. If a man who chose one of these schools were compelled to select, in addition, either the school of law and political economy, or that of modern history and modern languages, the one school

would serve as a test of mental discipline, the other of general information.

5. I observe, among the arguments-urged against this most beneficial and disinterested proposal, the statement, that well-educated men, and especially graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, would think themselves underpaid, and would be too *conceited* for the duties required of them. Surely a moderate salary at starting, a prospect of increase, comparatively light work, a good social position, and the hope of advancement in public life, would more than counterbalance the attractions of law and medicine, with their expensive and often uninteresting special training, and their long years of poverty and obscurity. That the difficulty of making a start in life increases every year, is painfully apparent to every schoolmaster and tutor, who watches with any interest the career of those among his pupils who do not wish to enter Holy Orders, and have no private friends or connexions to bring them forward. Hundreds of young men, in every way qualified and deserving, would gladly accept such remuneration as the Government bestows on its Civil Servants. As to the assertion that vanity and conceit increase with knowledge and industry, one would only have expected it to be made by persons either wilfully blind to the real effects of a good education, or who have had no experience of it themselves. If it be true, it furnishes a strong argument against education altogether.

I feel that I owe an apology for the length of this letter, of which but for the omission which I have noticed in the Report, I should have thought a great deal superfluous.

I will only further express my conviction, that the adoption of Mr. Jowett's proposals in their essential features would not only give a great impetus to the present classical and mathematical studies of our public schools, but would also tend to the introduction of more general subjects, and would help to place those which now occupy a position more or less subordinate, on a firm and satisfactory footing.

THE REVEREND DR. JELF,

Principal of King's College, London; formerly  
Fellow and Tutor of Oriel College.

March 21, 1854.

I HAVE already assured you verbally of my cordial concurrence in the general outline, as well as the design, of your recommendations for securing by competition the efficiency of candidates for employment in the Civil Service; and I had the honour, during the same conference, to mention to you a scheme, which I have long had it in contemplation to propose to the Council, for instituting a "Civil Service Department" in this college. I now beg leave to lay before you in writing a more detailed and accurate statement of my views upon the subject than was possible in our short interview.

I desire to place upon record my conviction, that the proposals in the Report are based on large and enlightened views of public policy, as well as of education. It is not for me to consider whether they are likely to be carried into effect at present; but I feel persuaded that a time will come when they will be generally recognised as wise, and adopted as practicable. And I believe, moreover, that no class of persons will have more cause to rejoice ultimately in the change than Civil Servants themselves; for they will feel that their calling, hitherto an undefined, almost an obscure one, has been raised to the dignity of a profession. I cannot give a greater proof of my sincerity than by assuring you that, whatever may be the parliamentary fate of your measure, I shall persevere in laying my scheme before the council of this college. The time may or may not be come for establishing an official *examination*, but sound public opinion will shortly demand an *education* for the Civil Servants of the Crown commensurate with the wants of the age.

It is evident that (apart from political considerations) the main obstacle to your success is the presumed difficulty of organising a satisfactory and comprehensive system of examination. The *measure* itself will command more or less assent, in proportion as the *mode of procedure* is understood and practically appreciated. On this subject, therefore, I venture with sincere diffidence to throw out a few suggestions, rather in the way of a *tentamen* towards

what is desired, than as a *formal scheme* of examination. You will receive my attempt kindly, as one of the multitudinous appendices which the text of your proposals is sure to draw forth.

Since Mr. Jowett's plan is incorporated in your octavo Report, I am obliged to say, with all deference, that, fully entitled as it is to the most respectful attention, as the result of much ability and experience, it does not commend itself to my mind, as well adapted to the purposes which you have in view. I do not think that it would *work*, when applied to a miscellaneous body of candidates. It appears to me that Mr. Jowett attempts to square studies and pursuits which are incommensurable, to establish a common standard of value for all the varied qualifications which are required in different offices, to ascertain, with respect to each candidate, no matter what his destination may be, the exact amount of his merits relatively to all and each of the other candidates, who may be examined in *any two* of the schools, and *then* to apportion each man to the office for which, upon the ground of this trial, he seems to be especially fitted. My meaning will perhaps become clearer, if you will allow me to submit a different mode of procedure, such as in the main would have occurred to me, if your Report had reached me apart from Mr. Jowett's letter. Incidentally, I am obliged to advert to the points in which I do not concur with him.

1. Instead of throwing all the Government Offices into *hotch-pot*, I would consider each of the offices in the first instance separately; as a portion, indeed, of one entire organisation, and in many respects demanding uniform treatment; yet at the same time distinguished by peculiarities of its own, requiring some modifications.

2. I would assume the probability that every candidate would be inclined, or might be induced, to select beforehand the office in which he would more particularly desire to obtain employment.

3. At certain fixed periods, notice should be given that examinations would be held on behalf of the several Government Offices. The notice should state the probable number of vacancies in each office, and specify the subjects of examination assigned respectively.

4. I think it would be feasible to draw up on one large sheet, in parallel columns, a scheme for each office, distinguishing the subjects common to all from those which

are peculiar to each. I subjoin a specimen roughly drawn (Appendix A).

The mere inspection of this general scheme of offices in parallel columns will show that many of the *subjects* are *common to all*; and, consequently, that many of the *examiners* may be in those subjects common to all. In some subjects (French for instance) it may be necessary to have two or three examiners of the same kind, in order that the examinations in each subject may for all classes be simultaneous. The kind and number of *special subjects* and *examiners* would soon be ascertained.

6. I do not think that a *permanent* "board of examiners" would be advisable, and at all events eight examiners would not be sufficient. The charge should be confided to *one* commissioner of the rank of a privy councillor, with a secretary and clerks. The examiners should have *fees*, liberal, but proportioned to their work; they should be appointed for a year, available for the period of each examination, but in the intervals entrusted with no power or official character. There are reasons why it might be expedient to have a number of examiners for each subject *with a retaining fee*, liable to serve, but called upon to act (*not in a fixed rotation* but) only when the commissioner may summon any one at a short notice. At all events it is indispensable that no examiner should be permitted to examine his own pupil, or out of any work written by himself.

7. A preliminary examination for all, in writing, arithmetic, and English, including correct spelling, which is sadly neglected at present.

8. All candidates, for whatever office, to whom the same subject is assigned, to be examined at the same time, by the same set of examiners, in that particular subject. All being then classed in one list in order of merit, the relative merit *quoad hoc* of each with respect to his immediate object, would be easily ascertainable. A certain number of marks being assigned to each subject, and awarded either in full or in part, according to the candidate's merit *quoad hoc*, the commissioner would cause the aggregate number of marks gained in all the subjects to be counted up, and would make his final award respecting each candidate accordingly.

9. The general tabular view should be submitted to the heads of Government departments, so as to bring the choice of subjects into harmony with their special require-

ments. I think the principle should be to require something over and above what the full exercise of the functions specially required would demand. The same department would require also different degrees of qualification in its employés. I have sketched out the Foreign Office at its maximum. I have added a column for "Chinese interpreterships," because this college has been recently called upon by the Earl of Clarendon to consider the subject practically.

10. It should be added, that the tabular view, if published periodically, would serve to suggest to young men, at a glance, the sort of office for which they seem best suited.

11. The preceding observations relate only to two out of the three classes of candidates suggested in your Report. The third, or *lowest* class, I have not taken into consideration. For *these*, Mr. Jowett's suggestion seems very satisfactory.

[N.B. The tabular view would facilitate the transference of clerks from one office to another.]

Thus far with respect to *examination*,—my plan for *education* corresponds. This college will be able to furnish instruction in all the subjects which are specified in the *tabular view*. For the *highest and oldest* candidates there will be lectures delivered, if they choose to attend them, whether they are already students in the department of General Literature and Science, or not; but I have abandoned the idea of placing *them* as "Civil Service students" *in statu pupillari*. The regular Civil Service department "*in statu pupillari*" will now consist only of those, *not of the highest order of clerks*, between the ages of 15 and 20.

I hope the Council will, on Friday next, pass the amended plan entire. If they do, I will send you a copy as soon as possible.

Let me conclude by saying, that no one is responsible for this letter but myself; but you will be glad to hear that the Bishop of London and Mr. Cotton both highly approve of the new "department" in this college.

APPENDIX (A).

N.B.—This Table would also include the East India Service *additis addendis*.

	Foreign Office.	Home Office.	Treasury.	Board of Trade.	Commissariat.	Colonial Office.	Chinese Interpreters, Future Consuls, in China.
Number of vacancies expected	Ten.	Eighteen.	17 to 21.	&c.	&c.	&c.	
Age of candidates	19 to 25.	17 to 21.	17 to 21.	17 to 21.	&c.	&c.	
Preliminary examination:—							
Writing							
Arithmetic, &c.							
English—Composition (spelling)							
French—Speaking							
Pronunciation							
Original composition							
History and geography (general)							
of Europe							
of England							
of the Colonies							
Law—General view (municipal)							
Later-national							
Commercial							
Political Economy							
Principles of taxation							
Higher English composition, despatches, &c.							
Proofs of classical education							
One extra foreign language, German, Italian, Spanish, Chinese							
Writing in cypher—decyphering							

Lieut.-Col. LARCOM, R.E.,

Under Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

Dublin, April 11, 1854.

I was reluctant to express any opinion on the Civil Service plan, till you told me the Chancellor of the Exchequer wished me to do so, lest it should be deemed presumptuous; and I should now write with even more diffidence than I do if there were anything in the principles of that plan applicable exclusively to the Civil Service, because my knowledge of it in the great offices of the State is very limited. But there is really nothing more in the plan than every one admits, viz., that it is desirable to obtain the best man for every office, and to test his fitness for his duty before he is entrusted with it, which is equally applicable to every service and duty in life.

I suppose no one now advocates pure nomination. Examinations are required even in the navy and the army. For some branches indeed there have long been training colleges, with an examination at entrance, and subsequent final examination before entering the service. The principle, therefore, of qualification, and examination as a test of it, is already adopted; the only question is, whether candidates shall be selected for examination by previous favour, or whether the examination shall be open to all. I think there are not many who will deliberately advocate the former, except on the ground of its being more easily worked; nor will the advocates of the latter deny some practical difficulty in carrying out the plan.

But to introduce and work the whole plan now, is not more difficult than to introduce the present practice of examination was twenty or thirty years ago. The greater perfection of educational establishments, and their more combined and uniform administration, afford facilities for examining as well as for imparting knowledge; while the greater diffusion of instruction renders the open examination not in reality a more exclusive test than examination of nominees would be if fully carried out. I mean, that of a given number of nominees there would be nearly as many in proportion rejected by fair examination as there would be of self-presenting candidates, after some time has elapsed and the thing begins to be understood.

I have seen the *carrière ouverte* in operation in Ireland on the Ordnance Survey. When that work was undertaken in 1825, on the recommendation of a Committee of the House of Commons, it was at first proposed that all the appointments should vest in the Master-General and Board; but on the representation of Colonel Colby, this was entirely set aside, by the Duke of Wellington, with his usual promptitude, ordering that the appointments should be made by the person with whom the responsibility for the work rested; and all appointments and removals in that large organisation, thenceforward for twenty years till the work was completed, vested wholly in the superintendent. No complaint of partiality or incompetence was ever made. Every one was tried, first in the lower grades, and afterwards advanced, if continued in the service, on the recommendation of the officer under whom he was placed, and no other,—all recommendations being supported by returns of character and of work performed. In several other services in which I have been from time to time engaged in Ireland, I have observed the same practice with the same results; and though the duties to which I have adverted were more or less temporary and occasional, I see no reason why the open system should be less applicable or less beneficial in permanent services, provided the power of removal is replaced by a real period of probation. I think that indispensable, because there are qualities which nothing but actual trial can test. This is virtually supplied in those branches of the military service which have preliminary colleges, by those colleges, because they ascertain moral and physical fitness, while they communicate the special or professional instruction. Of the military services generally, it is to be observed, that the nominations, whether to commissions or to the colleges, are vested in military men; and in those services the subsequent career is open to exertion to the fullest extent, offering numerous and various channels of advancement as the reward of such exertion. In the Civil Service, on the contrary, the appointments are for the most part made by members of the Government for the time being, either on their own volition, or at the instance of Members of Parliament; and, except in a few offices, there is but slender inducement to further exertion. The examination, being *fixed* for each branch, is of course, from that circumstance, a minimum examination. There is seldom any real probation, and promotion is generally by gradation, with few

openings outwards for advancement. The open system would reverse all these conditions. Members of the Government would be freed from the burden of patronage, which most of them would be very glad of. The examination would be for a maximum of qualification. Probation, as the test of special or departmental fitness, would be a natural sequence, and therefore easily worked; and the habit of exertion and self-dependence, once established, would lead every one to look onwards, and advance himself by a continuance of the same exertion.

I think, with all these desirable objects in view, few will be disposed to forego them from the apprehension of difficulties in the examination. I know but little of what has been proposed on this subject. There may be certain judges—a board, on which perhaps the great departments, home, foreign, &c. will be represented. They may employ examiners. Much of the preliminary examination may be by written questions, or a local examination in the nearest branch office of the department the candidate desires to enter, and only a selection of names, answers, and testimonials be forwarded to the central board for further examination and scrutiny, from which an approved list may be formed. It need not even follow that every one on the list shall be employed. Some may provide for themselves elsewhere. But it would be a distinction to have attained a place on it. The Government need not even undertake absolutely to choose from it, but there would be such a list to choose from. I cannot but think the difficulties on this head are of a nature to be overcome by experience, if the principle is conceded and the experiment fairly tried.

It may be worth remarking, that we have already a class of officers in Ireland, who are appointed somewhat on this principle—the county surveyors, an office much esteemed, more for the professional status it gives, than for the salary, which is only 300*l.* a year, with an allowance for an office and clerk. These officers are paid by the counties, but the appointment is vested in the Lord Lieutenant, who is required to nominate a fit and proper person. For this purpose a board of examiners is constituted, who from time to time hold an examination, open to all who present themselves, and return to the Lord Lieutenant the names of those found to be duly qualified, in a list ranged in order of merit. From such a list the original appointments were made in 1833, and from such

a list, kept up by successive examinations, vacancies are filled as they occur. The Lord Lieutenant may of course select any name from the list, as all are qualified; but in the whole twenty years, the order of seniority, which in this case is also the order of merit, has been departed from only on two occasions, when there were particular reasons for doing so.

I know, however, that there are people, and very good people, who, admitting fully the necessity of examination and fitness, yet think nomination first, and examination afterwards, are better than the more open system. But I think, in addition to the difficulty they apprehend in working the open system, they insensibly have in their minds nomination by persons interested in the success and well-being of the departments to which they nominate, such as the Commander-in-Chief to commissions in the army; not nomination by the patronage secretary of the Treasury for the time being, to departments with most of which he has little connexion, at the instance of Members of Parliament, who have still less. I have heard it said indeed, that as Parliament governs, it is the body which ought to name all the officers of the government; and as it represents all classes of the people, it virtually preserves the nomination in the people themselves through their representatives. But I think this is too fine-drawn a fiction to have much weight against the open examination which appeals to the people direct. One hears too of democracy and bureaucracy, and chimæras of all sorts: some of them can scarcely be serious, and none called for; that I can see, by so simple a plan as this really is. It has been said, too, that the disturbance of patronage will disturb the working of our multiform Constitution; but really all this is investing the subject with an importance that does not belong to it.

My chief interest in this plan has arisen from the good effects I anticipate to result from it in Ireland. Every thing here was in former days so soiled with politics and religious difference, that people thought it the natural state of things. Every appointment or promotion was, and is still too often, expected to yield to favour, because it used to do so; and when things are fairly done, they are generally attributed to one or other of those causes. It will take a long time to remove this. Industry and self-reliance begin to be felt. But they are still only beginning; and every movement having that tendency

operates in a thousand channels. I do not think it is too much to say, that the movement was begun by the Government; for every Government I have seen for the last thirty years has been sincerely anxious to benefit the country, and their efforts have been in this direction. Begin with Lord Wellesley's establishment of petty sessions; the opening of the grand juries; the great institutions for education, from the national schools to the Queen's colleges; the provision for the poor, and the various medical charities administered by boards of guardians and governors; the police acting under the magistrates, through their own officers; and many others you will think of. These all inculcate exertion and self-reliance—local action with central unity. Opening the Public Service is only a step in the same direction, and, like the others, taken (as I hope it will be) by the Government. This is the true way, at least I think so, to make government popular; for however obliquely people see things at first, and however slowly they read causes in effects, and attribute movements to their true origin, they generally see them clearly enough at last, and the re-action is all the stronger when it comes. This is the way government will gradually become strong in Ireland, and respected for the good it does.

The Right Honble. Sir JAMES STEPHEN, K.C.B.,

Late Under Secretary of State for the Colonial  
Department.

29, Westbourne Terrace,  
April 12, 1854.

HAVING had the honour to receive your letter of the 8th instant, calling on me for a statement of my opinion on the plan proposed by Sir Stafford Northcote and by Sir Charles Trevelyan, for the better organisation of the Civil Service of the Crown, I transmit to you the following answer. It is a subject on which, for obvious reasons, I should gladly have been silent; but I am of course bound to obey any demand of Her Majesty's Government for any information which I may have acquired in the service of their predecessors in office.

My means of knowledge on the question on which you are pleased to consult me, are as follows: I passed thirty-



five years in the Public Service. During the eleven earliest of those years, I was at once counsel to the Colonial Department and a barrister in extensive practice in the Court of Chancery. I then retired from the bar, and became at the same time both counsel to the Colonial Department, and counsel to the Board of Trade. After passing ten years in these joint offices, I quitted the Board of Trade, to become, at first, Assistant Under Secretary, and afterwards, Under Secretary, of State, in the Colonial Department. In the close of the year 1847 I left the Public Service altogether. Since July 1849 I have been Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge.

During my long connexion with the Colonial Department, so many were the personal changes there, that, I think, two only of the members of that office, who belonged to it on my arrival among them, remained there at the time of my departure. I thus became acquainted with a number of clerks on that establishment, very far exceeding the number borne on its roll at the present, or at any other given time. What I am about to say relates to the whole succession, and not exclusively to the body of which I took my leave seven years ago.

They were clearly distinguishable into three classes: the first, a very small minority; the second, being more numerous than the first; and the third, exceeding the numbers of the other two united. With an occasional exception, they all had the education, the manners, the feelings, and the characteristic principles of gentlemen. But in respect of their fitness for the duties assigned to them, they differed as, in our annual "Tripos" at Cambridge, the "Wranglers" differ from the "Senior and Junior Optimes," and these last from "the *οὐ πολλοί*:" the first class having been so composed that it is difficult to speak of them truly without the appearance of exaggeration; the members of the second class having been meritorious Public Servants; and the third, or most numerous class, having been made up of persons of whose official characters nothing but the obligation which you have imposed upon me, would induce me to speak at all.

In the narrow circle of the first of these classes were to be found, not indeed combined in any one of the members of it, but variously distributed among them all, qualities of which I can still never think without the highest

admiration and respect—such as large capacity of mind, literary powers of rare excellence, sound scholarship, indomitable energy, mature experience in public affairs, and an absolute self-devotion to the Public Service. It comprised some men who must have risen to eminence in any field of open competition, and who, if born to more ample fortunes, might reasonably have aspired to hold the seals of the office in which they were serving as subordinates.

The second of the three classes which I have mentioned, was composed of men who performed diligently, faithfully, and judiciously the duties to which they were called; and those duties were, not rarely, such as belonged rather to ministers of state, than to the clerks in the office of such a minister.

The members of the third class, that is, the majority of the members of the Colonial Department in my time, possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost incredibly low, either the talents or the habits of men of business, or the industry, the zeal, or the knowledge required for the effective performance of their appropriate functions. In many cases ample and valid excuses might be made for these defects; but of the existence of them it is impossible for me to doubt.

Neither have I any doubt as to the cause of these extreme disparities between the persons of whom the establishment of the office was composed. The members of that which I have designated the "first class" were, nearly all, men who had been sought out and appointed on account of their well-ascertained fitness for the Public Service. The members of that to which I have given the designation of the "third class" were, without exception, men who had been appointed to gratify the political, the domestic, or the personal feelings of their patrons; that is, of successive Secretaries of State. The members of the so-called "second class" were chiefly, though not exclusively, indebted to such nepotism for their introduction into the department. It will of course be understood that this classification is wholly distinct from that which prevails there, under the same names, to indicate the seniority of the clerks to each other.

The members of the "first," and, in some cases, of the "second class" also, joined us not as schoolboys, but in their early manhood, with their intellectual habits formed, and with a fund, more or less considerable, of literary or

scientific knowledge. The members of what I have described as the "third class," usually entered the office at the age of 18 or 19, coming directly from school, and bringing with them no greater store of information, or maturity of mind, than usually belongs to a boy in the fifth form at Eton, Westminster, or Rugby. What they so brought they never afterwards increased by any private study. Finding themselves engaged in the actual business of life, they assumed that their preparation for it was complete; and (as far as I could judge), they never afterwards made or attempted any mental self-improvement.

It would be superfluous to point out in detail the injurious results of such a composition of one of the highest departments of the State. Among the less obvious consequences of it, were—the necessity it imposed on the heads of the office of undertaking, in their own persons, an amount of labour to which neither their mental or their bodily powers were really adequate—the needless and very inconvenient increase of the numbers borne on the clerical list—the frequent transfer of many of their appropriate duties to ill-educated and ill-paid supernumeraries—and the not infrequent occurrence of mistakes and oversights so serious as occasionally to imperil interests of high national importance.

When thus pointing out the mischievous effects of nepotism in the Colonial Department, it would be disingenuous in me not to avow that I myself sustain some personal responsibility on that account. My own son, and afterwards my own nephew, were both admitted there as clerks at my request; but I must add, in my own defence, that I withdrew my son on finding, after a probation of a few months, that he was not qualified for such a position. My nephew was a graduate of the University of Cambridge, and a man of learning and ability; but, becoming dissatisfied with his employment and his prospects, he, after no long trial, withdrew himself.

In reliance on much uniform, concurrent, and credible evidence from others, and in reliance of what I myself knew and observed at the Board of Trade, I believe that the state of the Colonial Department, as I have described it, is no unfair example and illustration of the state of the other great departments of the Government, as they existed during my personal connexion with the Public Service.

I conclude, therefore, that there is in our Public Offices

a nepotism which generates many serious abuses in the conduct of them.

I totally dissent from the objections, which I have seen in print, to the plan which has been proposed for the correction of those abuses, so far as such objections relate to the alleged impracticability of it. My experience at Cambridge assures me that there would be no real difficulty either in finding fit examiners, or in carrying on the examinations, or in securing the implicit confidence of the world at large in the impartiality and justice of the final awards; but that, in all these respects, the scheme would be found to work with precision and facility. Yet there are other objections to it which, to myself at least, seem to be unanswerable.

1st. The prizes to be won are not worthy of the pursuit of such young men as I am constantly observing among the foremost of the competitors for academical honours. A bachelor of arts is seldom much less than twenty-two years of age. He would be seldom less than twenty-three, before a successful contest had placed him as the junior clerk, and at the bottom of the list, in the office of one of the Secretaries of State. During the next twenty-seven years his official income would not average more than 250*l.* per annum. He would be in his fiftieth year before it rose to 550*l.*, and a sexagenarian by the time he came into the annual receipt of 1,000*l.* Such at least is the result of my experience on the actual rates of salary, and the actual frequency of promotions. Now, during all this slow advance to competency and independence, the supposed graduate must have been living in London, and maintaining the appearance of a gentleman. Why expect to attract, by such inducements as these, any men of eminent ability to whom any other path in life is open? For,

2d. The money to be earned is the solitary attraction. A clerk in a Public Office may not even dream of fame to be acquired in that capacity. He labours in an obscurity as profound as it is unavoidable. His official character is absorbed in that of his superior. He must devote all his talents, and all his learning, to measures, some of which he will assuredly disapprove, without having the slightest power to prevent them; and to some of which he will most essentially contribute, without having any share whatever in the credit of them. He must listen silently

to praises bestowed on others, which his pen has earned for them; and if any accident should make him notorious enough to become the suspected author of any unpopular act, he must silently submit to the reproach, even though it be totally unmerited by him. These are indeed the indispensable disadvantages of the position of a clerk in a Public Office, and no man of sense and temper will complain of them. But neither will any man of real mental power, to whom the truth is known beforehand, subject himself to an arduous examination in order to win a post so ill paid, so obscure, and so subordinate. Or should he win it, no such man would long retain it. Of the six clerks in the Colonial Office in my time, whom I should select as the most able of the whole body, three quitted it altogether, after a sufficient, though comparatively short, experience of it; two (by an otherwise unexampled good fortune) were able, by serving in Canada, to obtain distinction, and consequent advancement to a higher rank in the Public Service at home; and one has found in his literary reputation a more than ample atonement for the obscurity of his official life and labours.

3d. The successful candidate in such an examination would not usually be the kind of man wanted. You stand in need, not of statesmen in disguise, but of intelligent, steady, methodical men of business. He whose name shall stand at the head of the examination list, will, I admit, usually possess these humbler virtues; because, in youth, good scholarship for the most part implies good character. But he will also be generally found to be a man of more than average self-reliance, self-possession, promptitude, address, resource, hopefulness, and courage. Such, at least, are the characteristics of those who gain the highest places in our annual examinations at Cambridge. Excellent gifts for a combatant in the open fields of professional competition, but gifts ill suited, and even inconvenient, to one who is to be entombed for life as a clerk in a Public Office in Downing Street. Why invite an athlete into a theatre, where no combat, and no applause, and no reward, awaits him? In all seriousness, I think that the man whose name stood half way down the examination list of merit would probably make a better clerk than he whose name stood first. But,

4th. It is answered, that eminent merit would be rewarded, and that an aspiring spirit would be encouraged

by the hope of promotion over official associates and competitors. I would reply—that by holding out such a stimulant in so very narrow a circle of men, all pent up in the same contracted building or chamber, you would insure bitter jealousies and enduring quarrels, and would render impossible all cordial co-operation among them in the discharge of their common duties—that the encouragement you would minister to a few able and enterprising men would be counterbalanced by the discouragement you would inflict on many more who had neither ability nor enterprise—that it would be impossible to manage, to any good purpose, an office, the majority of the members of which were depressed, disappointed, and offended—and that they would know how to avenge such unpopular promotions by a passive resistance which could neither be punished, nor prevented, nor subdued. And further, my own experience teaches me that a Secretary of State who should promote any one of his clerks over the heads of his seniors, must arm himself with the fortitude of a martyr. The inflictions he would have to undergo from the tongues or the pens of the kinsmen and kinswomen, of the patrons and the patronesses, of the private and the political connexions, of the many he had passed over, would leave him no rest day or night. And why is he to incur and brave all this animosity? Just in order that he may hand over his office to his future successor (some political antagonist) in the highest attainable state of perfection. I have no faith in the frequency of such martyrdoms.

5th. But the basis of the whole scheme—that of governing on principles of the strictest purity, even so as to exclude all patronage whatever—is it as sound a principle as, at first sight, it appears to be? Is the rule, “*detur digniori*,” founded on a truth so evident, and on maxims of such universal application, that we ought to apply it to 16,000 Public Offices at once? It is, at least, a perfect novelty. It is a rule never hitherto enforced in any commonwealth except that of Utopia. It does not prevail in the legal, or medical, or sacerdotal, or naval, or military, or mercantile professions. It is unknown to the great commercial and municipal corporations among us. In every age, and land, and calling, a large share of success has hitherto always been awarded to the possessors of interest, of connexion, of favour, and of what we call good luck. Can it be that all the world is and has always been wrong

about a matter so level, as it might seem, to the capacity of the least wise, as well as of the wisest? Or if such an error has become thus inveterate in our thoughts and habits, is not the very fact of the inveteracy of it a serious obstacle to this plan? The lawgiver may keep ahead of the public virtue, but he cannot shoot out of sight of the moral standard of his age and country. The world we live in is not, I think, half moralised enough for the acceptance of a scheme of such stern morality as this.

6th. But is the morality as sound as it is stern? "Detur digniori" means, give to the most learned, the most able, and therefore, presumably, the most virtuous of your candidates. Nothing more reasonable, if you are about to appoint an Archbishop, a General, or a Chief Justice. But why, in the choice of clerks, are learning and ability, and whatever else they imply, to have this invariable precedence? In the dull details of public office, there are many which the learned and able A will not accomplish a whit better than the ill-informed and common-place B—nor perhaps so well. Surely, mediocrity and even dullness—the lot of the vast majority—have *some* claims, which are as well entitled to regard as are those of learning and ability. It is not without *some* reason that, in all other pursuits in life, patronage exercised in the spirit of nepotism, is made the shelter of the weak and otherwise helpless. Those whom nature or training have made strong, can usually help themselves. A "detur digniori" world, would, I imagine, be a world made up of despots and of slaves. Things as they are, out of our Public Offices (in Westminster Hall, or at the Royal Exchange, for example,) would seem to be the model for things as they ought to be, within our public Offices—wit forcing itself upwards by its own buoyancy, and mediocrity rescued from depression and wrong by domestic and other alliances.

7th. Or, if the Government will thus absolutely proclaim the abstract principle, that nepotism is not to be endured, what will they say of nepotism in the Church? There it is not an accident but a system. It is an abuse not furtively perpetrated, but ostentatiously avowed. If you will not allow a man to enter a bale of goods at the Custom House till you have ascertained, by examinations, that he is the best of all attainable men for that purpose, will you entrust the instruction of whole parishes, and the care of thousands or tens of thousands of immortal souls,

to any man whatever who (having passed an Episcopal examination for Holy Orders) can give himself a presentation, or can obtain one from any friend, or kinsman, or political patron, even though the nominee be (as assuredly such nominees sometimes are) egregiously and notoriously unfit for such a charge?

8th. The patrons of these clerkships—that is, the principal ministers of the Crown—are themselves so ill remunerated, that those high trusts are practically confined to persons born to ample fortunes. No one else can afford to undertake them. The consequent narrowness of the range of choice is, I apprehend, a serious evil. But the range of choice will become still more narrow, and the evil yet more serious, if the remuneration of these great offices be further reduced, by depriving the holders of them of all their most valuable patronage. It is said, indeed, that they regard it as a burden, not as an advantage. I can only answer that I never yet served under any Secretary of State who did not, at least, appear to attach a very high interest indeed to the power of giving such places to his dependents and his friends.

9th. If, however, the measure is to be adopted, I should still object to the mode in which it is proposed to carry it into effect. From time immemorial the constitution of the Civil Service of the Crown has been regulated by Royal Orders in Council. Why should not the proposed regulations be established in that manner? Why add yet another to the many recent sacrifices of the royal prerogative? Why advise the Queen to ask Parliament to aid her to do that which she can do as effectually without their aid? It is answered, because otherwise Her Majesty may be induced, by future ill advice, to revoke her own act; and because it is therefore desirable that Parliament should place an insuperable obstacle in the way of any such mutability of purpose. The Queen is, consequently, to propose to them to fetter her own hands, and to take from her the power of doing this mischief. A strange proposal (as it seems to me) from the Queen of England to the Parliament of England! And why should Her Majesty submit to such an indecorum? If the requisite order were made, it might be communicated to Parliament in such terms as should, either expressly or virtually, pledge the Crown to make no change in it, until after the expiration of a certain time from the communication to Parliament of the design to make that

change. By this method, the end of preventing ill-advised alterations would be quite as effectually accomplished, and the Queen would be rescued from the impropriety of addressing the Lords and Commons in terms which the least worthy of her predecessors would have thought humiliating.

For these reasons, I am of opinion that the contemplated Act of Parliament ought not to be passed, and that the plan of electing to all vacancies in the Public Service the candidates who shall pass the best examinations ought not to take effect. In order to provide a remedy for the evils which did exist in my time, and which, as I suppose, exist still, it would, I apprehend, be sufficient to subject each nominee to an examination to be conducted by strangers to the Government—by men of indisputable learning and integrity—who should admit every candidate who attained the standard of skill and knowledge prescribed for this particular branch of the Service, and who should reject every candidate who fell below that standard.

On reading over what I have written, I see that I have omitted to call your attention to the almost incalculable magnitude of the political changes which the proposed abdication of all the patronage of the Crown in the Public Offices must invoke, and to the seeming rashness of plunging at once into such deep and dark waters, without first making a tentative, experimental, and partial entrance into them. But this is a topic on which it would be presumptuous for me to suppose that I can have anything to say which has escaped yourself.

ALFRED POWER, Esq.,

Chief Commissioner of Poor Laws in Ireland.

Dublin, April 15, 1854.

Central Board  
of Examiners.

So far as the want of efficiency in any branch of the Permanent Civil Service may be caused by want of proper qualifications in the persons employed in it, the proposed plan of a Central Board of Examiners seems well calculated to remedy the evil by securing a selection on the single ground of personal merit.

Faults of the  
present system.

The fault of the present system lies principally in the fact that almost every branch of the Permanent Civil

Service is connected more or less with politics through the heads of the respective department, and that the selection of officers generally proceeds on political grounds and for political purposes; or under more favourable circumstances, is dealt with as the private patronage of the heads of the department.

Political bias  
and personal  
favour.

It is not, however, through political influences or personal favour alone that ill-qualified persons are introduced into the Civil Service. Great mistakes are apt to be committed in making public appointments where no political bias or private favour exists, and where the only motive has been to procure a competent officer. This arises in some measure from a dearth of competent candidates, and sometimes wholly from an error of judgment in making the selection. Both these causes are connected with the absence of a regular process for ascertaining the comparative merits of candidates. Without such an established process it is both difficult and invidious to weigh the qualifications of individuals effectively; and as to the candidates themselves, many of the most deserving of those who would desire office do not apply, because they infer from the non-application of any test, that merit unsupported will not succeed.

Also error of  
judgment and  
dearth of good  
candidates.

If the proposed reform of these evils were to be limited to the selection of proper persons for *introduction* into the Civil Service, the simplest way would be, not to consolidate the various sources of appointment in a Central Board, but to require a *competing* examination of candidates, to be conducted on the responsibility of the principal officers of each department. A *competing* examination is the one thing necessary; a merely *qualifying* examination would be next to useless, and perhaps worse than useless, inasmuch as one of its tendencies is to give greater scope and opportunity for nomination on political grounds, or on the ground of personal favour. If the favourites nominated pass the qualifying examination, the purpose is served without hurt to the conscience of the party nominating; if they are rejected, he has done all that in him lies to serve the parties who are seeking favours at his hands.

A *competing*  
examination  
the one thing  
needful;

These observations are based on experience acquired in a single department; and in reference to that department the opinion of the writer is, that a competing examination conducted within the office itself is all that is absolutely necessary to cure so much evil as may arise

and might be  
effected without  
a Central  
Board.

from *the introduction* into the Service of persons less qualified than others who might be obtained.

A Central Board the better plan.

The creation, however, of a General Board of Examiners (unconnected by any link with the Government for the time being) forms a great additional security for the selection of the most competent officers in all departments; relieving each department at the same time from all suspicion of unfairness, from expenditure of time, and from all other trouble and unpleasantness which might arise in the conduct of the examinations.

But its functions should go beyond the examination of candidates for introduction to the Service, and extend to new appointments of persons already in the Service.

Such a board, however, if once constituted, ought to exercise control over the superior as well as the subordinate appointments. It would be of little avail to provide a better standard for the rank and file of the Service, if the selection of the higher rank of officers should continue to be conducted under the influences which at present prevail. Assuming the staff appointments to be generally filled by promotion of those already in the Public Service, so as not to involve the introduction of untried men, a competing examination may be combined with a comparison of previous services to the public; or it might be wholly superseded by adopting such comparison as the sole test.

In the latter case, the opinions of the heads of departments, under whom the previous service had been performed, would form the principal materials for the consideration of the Board of Examiners. Even where the choice is made from within the department itself, and when probably the opinion of the chief officer or officers would, almost as a matter of course, prevail, it would be eminently useful and satisfactory that the considerations on which the promotion took place should be put on record, in the shape of correspondence with the Central Board of Examiners, and be accepted by them as the ground for their making the appointment.

Necessity of a defined limit to its authority, to prevent its becoming a Tribunal of Appeal from heads of departments, and so weakening the allegiance of subordinates.

A line, however, is necessary to be drawn between what should be submitted to the control or ratification of the Central Board, and what should be done absolutely at the discretion of the heads of departments, so as to secure to the latter the full possession of that allegiance from their subordinates without which an office could not be effectively governed. On the one side of this line, the Central Board should have power; on the other side, the decisions of the heads of departments should be absolute and without appeal. The line might be drawn as fol-

Proposed line of limitation an

lows:—"The introduction of an untried person into the Civil Service, and also the appointment of a tried Public Servant to service *in a new capacity* shall be the act of the Central Board; all other promotion to be absolutely and entirely at the discretion of the heads of departments."

To exemplify the proposed line: there are in the Irish Poor Law Department the following sets of officers, serving in what may be called "*different capacities*."

Exemplification of proposed line, Irish Poor Law Department.

1. Commissioner.
2. Secretary.
3. Inspector.
4. Assistant Secretary.
5. Auditor.
6. Clerk.

There ought to be no bar to promotion from the lowest of these grades to the highest; and, in point of fact, during the period of seven years since the present Commission was established, vacancies in the office of Commissioner have always been filled up from the body of Inspectors. It has also happened that in two instances office clerks have been promoted to the offices of Inspector and Assistant Secretary; although generally inspectors, as well as auditors, have been appointed from without. It is clear, that in this case a Central Board of Examiners would be able to do comparatively very little for the improvement of the personal qualifications of the more important classes of officers if the internal promotion were placed wholly beyond their power; as a person introduced into the body of the clerks would be held qualified, without further control, to become Auditor, Assistant Secretary, Secretary or Inspector; and a person introduced into the body of inspectors would be held qualified, without further control, to become a Commissioner.

Unless, therefore, the fiat of the Central Board of Examiners be extended to every appointment to serve *in a new capacity*, such appointments would be liable to be influenced by political bias, or by personal favour; and although, with regard to the lower of the staff appointments, there is little danger of such internal promotion being improperly conducted, that danger increases very much as you approach the highest and most important offices.

Other important functions of a Central Board to regulate organization and internal discipline.

The functions of a Central Board for Reform of the Civil Service ought not to be confined to the object of securing the introduction and promotion of the best qualified persons, but should extend to the organization and internal discipline of each Public Department, as being of more importance to the efficiency of the Service, than any difference of personal qualification which may be obtained between officers appointed under one system and officers appointed under another.

Present authorities concerned; Parliament, Treasury, and respective heads of departments, would benefit by recommendations of Central Board.

The authorities at present concerned with the organization and discipline of departments are, firstly, the Legislature; secondly, the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury; and, thirdly, the respective heads of departments. One of the functions of the Central Board should be to influence the Legislature and the Treasury by recommendations as to organization; and, secondly, to exercise some limited and well-defined control over the heads of departments in regard to internal discipline and management of the business.

Objects for interference.

The objects to which such an interference might be usefully directed are various: the following appear to be among the more important objects.

To secure unity of direction, and make it compatible with due division of labour.

Firstly. To secure an arrangement under which, as far as practicable, unity of direction is made compatible with a due division of labour. This point is mainly dependent on the original constitution of a department, and involves the question, whether, under a given state of circumstances, the plan of a single chief or that of a board of management is the most advantageous. It is possible that one mode may be most applicable to the business of one department, and the other to that of another; but the Legislature has sometimes, in dealing with a department, adopted at different periods one of these systems in exchange for the other, without discussion, and as if it were a matter of indifference which of them existed. The Central Civil Service Board would do much good by inquiring, considering, and recommending what might appear the more advisable system in each case; and possibly it might arrive at a conclusion in favour of one of the two systems as the most desirable under any state of circumstances.

To secure definite personal responsibility in the heads of departments.

Secondly. To secure a definite personal responsibility in the chief or chiefs, as the case may be, for every functional act or proceeding of the department. This can only be done by providing that every act, however

unimportant, shall be, in substance as well as in form, the act of the chief or chiefs, and not of any of the subordinates. The latter would then be responsible only within the department; and the chief or chiefs alone responsible externally, that is, to Parliament or to a superior department of State. In a very large department this is more easily accomplished under a single chief than under several chiefs constituting a Board, a due division of labour being effected by the employment of a sufficiently large number of officers in preparing the business for dispatch in the promptest manner, but so that everything shall be submitted for the final direction of one person.

Where the business is limited there may be time to obtain the concurrence of a board on every act of a department without sacrificing the essential point, *unity of direction*; and this may perhaps be the best system where most of the current business, though limited in extent, is of extreme importance. Where, however, the business is so extensive that a board must divide itself into parts for the purpose of giving final direction separately upon different portions of the business, not only unity of direction but definite personal responsibility is lost; and experience has shown such a state of things to be pregnant with materials for disaster.

Thirdly. To secure a complete record of all the information and all the considerations on which the acts and proceedings of the department have been founded. This is necessary to make the system of definite responsibility to Parliament or other authority work easily, inasmuch as by such means a mere transcript of documents places those who scrutinize the proceedings in precisely the same position as the original actors in them, so that a judgment is readily formed without further inquiry and without interpellations in Parliament. Any rules directed to secure this important object would necessarily discourage the transaction of public business at personal interviews, or by private correspondence.

A perfect record of proceedings.

Fourthly. To secure such a record on the above principle as may make all the past acts and proceedings of the department, and the considerations on which they were founded, accessible on the shortest notice, and without either difficulty or delay.

Such record to be promptly accessible.

Fifthly. To secure such an organization and state of discipline, that the business shall never be obstructed by

Vicarious service always to be available, so

that no one's  
absence may  
obstruct the  
public business.

the absence of any individual officer, and that in the absence of any officer from his post the means should exist of supplying another to take the duties of the post with all its responsibilities. This condition as it regards the superior officers, depends on the constitution of the Department provided by the Legislature; as regards the rest of the Department, it depends merely on internal discipline; and in large departments, where its importance is greatest, it is the most feasible, without waste of force. The simple principle is, to give every officer concerned with the direction of the business so much to do that he requires, under ordinary circumstances, one or more assistants; by which means the latter become intimately acquainted with the functions of their superior, and the proper mode of discharging them. This arrangement provides, at the same time, the means of expansion to meet a sudden increase of business. The previous conditions, (third and fourth,) will be seen to be auxiliary to the present one, especially as it affects the highest officers in the department.

Further limit  
to authority of  
Central Board.

The above are some of the leading principles which might be usefully inculcated by a Central Civil Service Board. Subject, however, to these and a few similar conditions, the actual internal arrangements of a department, such as the distribution of the business (the nature of which differs so much in different departments), the assignment of particular duties to particular officers or classes of officers, as well as the promotion within classes, or from class to class, of those serving *in the same capacity*, as likewise the power of removal for insubordination or other misconduct, ought to be left absolutely and without appeal in the hands of those who are responsible for the conduct of the business, (that is to say,) the heads of the Department.

Modes of Examination and application of other Tests should be left for arrangement by the Board itself when created.

No allusion has yet been made in this memorandum to the way in which a competing examination of candidates, and the application of other tests of personal merit may be conducted with most advantage by a Central Board. The final arrangement of the best processes for securing good selections is, in fact, peculiarly within the province of the Board itself, when created; at all events, it seems desirable that no positive restraint should be placed on its discretion in this respect by the Legislature.

Previously  
acquired Dis-

Without doubt, one of the considerations which ought

to be permitted to influence the Board in the selection of Civil Servants is the circumstance of any candidate having previously obtained distinction in Schools and Universities; such a criterion being safer, perhaps, in some respects than the result of a single course of examination. In Ireland, especially, it would be easy for the Civil Service Board to give a very powerful stimulus to the systems of popular Education lately organized in that country—on the success of which its future prosperity so much depends—by placing appointments to the Civil Service among the rewards of successful study in the Schools of the National Board and the Queen's Colleges.

function in  
Schools and  
Universities  
ought to have  
weight;

especially in  
Ireland.

Peculiar appli-  
cability of pro-  
posed Reform  
to Ireland.

There are other considerations, to which it is hardly necessary to allude, which make the proposed Reform of the Civil Service peculiarly applicable to Ireland. It is enough to say that a desire to appoint or promote on the ground of superior merit has peculiar difficulties to contend with in that country; and that, beside the improvement to be expected from the proposed measure of Reform in the *personnel* of the Civil Service in Ireland, a great source of public discontent, as well as of inconvenience and annoyance to members of the Government and to other dispensers of public patronage would be removed, if political partisanship or private favour were no longer to be looked to by expectants and their friends as the means of introduction to the Public Service.

THE REV. DR. VAUGHAN,

Head Master of Harrow School.

May 13, 1854.

It is impossible not to admire the noble project detailed in the Report on the Civil Service. Every one's sympathies must go along with the endeavour to substitute a system of free competition for one of patronage, and to carry the change into the humblest branches of the State Service. Politicians may see difficulties—no doubt there are great difficulties—in the way of its accomplishment; but I can scarcely understand the existence of two opinions as to its abstract desirableness, or as to the possibility of its realization if personal and interested motives could be ignored or overborne.



If I have any regrets with reference to the Report and its accompaniments, they are, first, that I could have desired a somewhat ampler and more respectful consideration of the working, for good and for evil, of a system of patronage, which so many persons maintain to be an essential condition of parliamentary activity and ministerial efficiency; and, secondly, that I fear lest Mr. Jowett's letter, able and vigorous as it unquestionably is, should have given a somewhat too academical character to the scheme proposed. The Oxford nomenclature, and elaborate minuteness, of that very masterly letter, will tend, I fear, to the prejudice of the measure in the minds of some who are more anxious to be assured of the good sense and practical habits of the new Civil Servants than of their knowledge of classics and mathematics, or even of political economy and international law.

For my own part, I should have been disposed to leave the scheme of examination almost entirely to the discretion of a board of examiners, with a general direction that they should endeavour, in any manner that approved itself to their judgment, to ascertain the character, ability, and attainments of those who presented themselves as candidates for Civil appointments, without tying them down too rigidly to certain subjects and days of examination.

I feel very strongly the objection that has been sometimes expressed to mere examinations—especially *written* examinations—as the one test of capacity for public business. I know that it may justly be urged, on the other hand, that any sort of merit is better than none—the worst examination than favour or accident; only I would suggest the extreme importance of *vivâ voce* communication and ocular inspection, as not only an essential but a principal portion of the new test of qualification.

I hope also, that a supplemental report may be drawn up in answer to some serious and sensible objections expressed in communications commenting upon the former, and more especially, to the very effective, but I trust not irresistible, attack contained in the letter of Sir James Stephen.

More particularly, I think it important that his argument in favour of a system of nomination merely *checked* by examination, should be fairly and fully met. It is at least specious enough to find many advocates.

In the absence of a more authoritative reply to that

argument, I venture to suppose that it would be with the Civil Service as it is notoriously with other professions; first, that a *minimum* of requisite knowledge would soon be avowedly or practically defined, and a system of special "cramming" for it established; and next, that an examiner would be greatly indisposed to ruin a young man's prospects by applying a severe test of fitness; that, just as a graduate nominated to a curacy is sure, in nine cases out of ten, or ninety-nine out of a hundred, to pass his examination for Orders, so, and much more, might the nominee of a Secretary of State calculate upon his approval by his examiners. There is a sort of humanity in such cases which forbids a stern censorship over appointments once made. And it would require some courage in an examiner to face the summons of a Minister of the Crown to show cause for the rejection of his protégé. I should imagine that there was no real standing ground between an entirely close and an entirely open system.

The great benefit which I anticipate from the projected change is, the opening of a new profession to young men of liberal education. Every one who has had to advise, whether as parent, tutor, or friend, upon the choice of professions, knows how extremely and increasingly common is the case of those young men who scruple to take Orders, have no chance at the bar, and yet possess that kind of ability, and that amount of attainment, which would be inapplicable to engineering, and thrown away upon farming. My own experience has made me acquainted with instances precisely of this kind. I have known young men, neither ignorant, nor dull, nor idle, nor dissipated, who yet, for want of one more profession to choose from, have been condemned to years of inactivity, with little or no fault of theirs. They would have hailed gladly an opening such as I trust this measure will present, and thankfully encountered any amount of exertion which might be necessary to prepare them for it.

But when I am asked whether in my opinion the re-organised Civil Service will attract towards it young men of ability in that rank of life with which my professional duties are concerned, I must confess that I greatly doubt it, *on the supposition* of the correctness of Sir James Stephen's description of the duties to be discharged and the remuneration offered.

If mere copying or other simply mechanical work is to occupy the best years of life, and a salary insufficient (at best) to marry upon, be the reward, I do not think—and I have made some inquiries—that the new examination will elicit many competitors from amongst the more eminent members of our public schools or universities. Whereas the same men would submit to long obscurity, tedious work, and poor pay, if they had a reasonable hope of making their way, however late, through this or any other profession, into a position of intellectual interest or political responsibility.

Many a young man of some ability, in choosing his profession, will accept either dull work or poor pay—but not both. In consideration of the large salary attached to an Indian writership, he will submit to its dreary banishment and generally obscure duties. From his love of the profession of a soldier, he will endure the small stipend and slow promotion of an Indian cadet. But if the soldier's pay were assigned to the writer's work, the result is not doubtful. Sir James Stephen represents that the Civil Service at home offers a union of disadvantages not less repulsive.

Possibly the hope expressed (I think) by Mr. Temple, that a system of meritorious appointment may lead to economical results in diminishing the number of officials, might reconcile the country to a more liberal remuneration of those whose services are retained. Without this, I can scarcely hope that the new scheme will act widely or powerfully upon that class of young men, or that department of education, with which I am best acquainted.

Its influence upon the education of the lower orders of the country would doubtless be great and salutary. The connexion, however slight, which might be created between the newly opened offices and the educational aids of the Privy Council Office, might prove incalculably serviceable in giving an impulse to the spirit of self-improvement in the humbler classes. But this, I should imagine, would be a later step. I should be well satisfied if the experiment proposed in the Report were tried in the first instance upon a smaller scale; if it were made the distinction of the highest and most eligible of the Public Offices—those, for example, presided over by the Secretaries of State—to be entered by merit only, by a free and open competition amongst all those young men who desire to devote themselves in this most direct manner to their country's work.

I do not fear any disparagement of the high tone and honourable character of the Public Service. I fully believe, that in any examination in which a sound and liberal education was the merit to be discovered—still more, in which ability as writers, or adroitness in business, was made a condition of success—the higher orders of society would easily hold their own, would gain largely by the new stimulus to exertion, and would speedily impart their own higher tone of principles and manners to the few whose distinguished talents might occasionally raise them from a lower level.

I have no doubt that the experiment thus tried would soon commend itself to public approval, and lead by sure steps to an extension of the same system into every department of the Service.

I am persuaded that, however long delayed by the force of self-interest, prescription, or caution, the project developed in the Report must eventually be realized; and I am only anxious that its success should not be retarded by a needless parade of scholastic details in the schedule of its intended operations. I cannot think that (in the case of the higher offices at least) two or three wisely selected examiners, directed to pick out from amongst thirty or fifty candidates the ten or the five best educated and most available men—and having carte blanche as to the method of forming their judgment—would either find the task one of insuperable difficulty, or fail to give satisfaction as to the impartiality of their decision.

P.S.—Since writing these remarks, my attention has been turned to some "Memoranda on the Division of Labour between Intellectual and Mechanical Work in Public Offices,"\* from which it appears that an essential part of the scheme under review is such a remodelling of the duties to be discharged as might in a great measure obviate one of the principal difficulties which I have urged above.

\* The paper referred to will be found at page 423. The defective organisation of many Public Offices, arising from the absence of a proper division of labour, was fully discussed in the Report upon the Colonial Office, beginning with the paragraph entitled in the margin "Imperfect nature of the arrangements for securing a succession of qualified persons for the situation of senior Clerks," page 49 of the Series of Reports upon Public Offices, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty in the Session 1854. The remarks made upon this subject by Mr. Lingon, page 105; Major Graham, page 107, Mr. Booth, page 128, and Mr. Murdoch, page 299, of the present series are also deserving of attention.

## MR. JOHN STUART MILL.

May 22, 1854.

THE proposal to select candidates for the Civil Service of Government by a competitive examination appears to me to be one of those great public improvements the adoption of which would form an era in history. The effects which it is calculated to produce in raising the character both of the public administration and of the people can scarcely be over-estimated.

It has equal claims to support from the disinterested and impartial among conservatives and among reformers. For its adoption would be the best vindication which could be made of existing political institutions, by showing that the classes who under the present constitution have the greatest influence in the government, do not desire any greater share of the profits derivable from it than their merits entitle them to, but are willing to take the chances of competition with ability in all ranks: while the plan offers to liberals, so far as the plan extends, the realization of the principal object which any honest reformer desires to effect by political changes, namely, that the administration of public affairs should be in the most competent hands; which, as regards the permanent part of the administrative body, would be ensured by the proposed plan, so far as it is possible for any human contrivance to secure it.

When we add to this consideration the extraordinary stimulus which would be given to mental cultivation in its most important branches, not solely by the hope of prizes to be obtained by means of it, but by the effect of the national recognition of it as the exclusive title to participation in the conduct of so large and conspicuous a portion of the national affairs; and when we further think of the great and salutary moral revolution, descending to the minds of almost the lowest classes, which would follow the knowledge that Government (to people in general the most trusted exponent of the ways of the world) would henceforth bestow its gifts according to merit, and not to favour; it is difficult to express in any language which would not appear exaggerated, the benefits which, as it appears to me, would ultimately be the consequences of the successful execution of the scheme.

The objections usually heard, or seen in print, against this great improvement, are either grounded on imperfect apprehension, or, when examined, are found to bear involuntary testimony to the existing need of such a change.

For example, it has been called, in Parliament and elsewhere, a scheme for taking patronage from the Crown and its officers, and giving it to a body of examiners. This objection ignores the whole essence of the plan. As at present conducted, the bestowal of appointments is patronage. But the conferring of certificates of eligibility by the Board of Examiners would not be patronage, but a judicial act. The examiners for honours at the universities of Oxford, Cambridge, or London, have not the patronage of honours; nor has the Lord Chancellor, when he decrees an estate to one person instead of another, the patronage of the estate. If it be meant that the examiners would not be capable and impartial, the objection is intelligible. But capable and impartial examiners are found for university purposes, and for the purposes of the educational department of the Privy Council; and they will be found for the present purpose, supposing that there is a sincere desire to find them. The idea that an examination test is likely to be merely nominal, is grounded on the experience of a different kind of examination from that proposed. It is derived from examinations without competition. When the only object is to ascertain whether the candidate possesses a certain minimum of acquirement, it is usually thought that this minimum should be placed low enough to give a chance to all; and however low it may be placed, good nature interferes to prevent it from being rigidly enforced against any but absolute dunces; whilst the other candidates are willing to encourage and applaud this relaxation of duty, and even to connive at frauds on the part of the incompetent. The feelings of all concerned are very different, when the question to be resolved is, who among the candidates that present themselves are the *most* qualified. Indulgence to one, is then injustice to others, and wears a very different aspect to the conscience from that, falsely thought more venial, laxity, by which the public alone is damaged. In this case, too, the interests and feelings of the other competitors are enlisted in favour of preventing and detecting fraud. With a honest choice of examiners, a competitive examination is as unlikely to fail, as a mere test is unlikely to succeed.

Another objection is, that if appointments are given to talent, the Public Offices will be filled with low people, without the breeding or the feelings of gentlemen. If, as this objection supposes, the sons of gentlemen cannot be expected to have as much ability and instruction as the sons of low people, it would make a strong case for social changes of a more extensive character. If the sons of gentlemen would not, even under the stimulus of competition, maintain themselves on an equality of intellect and attainments with youths of a lower rank, how much more below the mark must they be with their present monopoly; and to how much greater an extent than the friends of the measure allege, must the efficiency of the Public Service be at present sacrificed to their incompetency. And more: if, with advantages and opportunities so vastly superior, the youth of the higher classes have not honour enough, or energy enough, or public spirit enough, to make themselves as well qualified as others for the station which they desire to maintain, they are not fit for that station, and cannot too soon step out of it and give place to better people. I have not this unfavourable opinion of them: I believe that they will fairly earn their full share of every kind of distinction, when they are no longer able to obtain it unearned.

Another objection is, that no examination can test more than a part of the qualities required in a Public Servant; that it is a test of book knowledge, but neither of moral qualities, nor of those which form the foundation of ability in the practical conduct of life. And it is added, that the proposed examination would have excluded Wellington, Nelson, and many more of those who have most distinguished themselves in public functions.

With regard to practical talents, it may be very true that Nelson or Wellington could not have passed a literary examination. But if such an examination had been required in their day for entering the army or navy, can any one suppose that young men of their energy and capacity would not have qualified themselves for it; or that even they would have derived no benefit from it? The assumption, besides, is gratuitous, that the examination would be solely literary. It is proposed that it should be also scientific; and this should include the practical applications of science: and there would be great propriety in allowing persons to offer themselves for a competitive examination in any kind of knowledge

which can be useful in any department whatever of the Public Service, such number of marks being assigned to each of these special acquirements, compared with the more general ones, as in the judgment of the Examining Board might correspond to their value. Above all, however, it ought to be remembered, that the worth of the examination is as a test of powers and habits of mind, still more than of acquirements; for talent and application will be sure to acquire the positive knowledge found necessary for their profession, but acquirements may be little more than a dead weight if there is not ability to turn them to use.

With regard to moral qualities, undoubtedly no examination can directly test them; but indirectly it must do so in no inconsiderable degree; for it is idleness, and not application, which is "the mother of vice;" and a well cultivated intellect will seldom be found unaccompanied by prudence, temperance, and justice, and generally by the virtues which are of importance in our intercourse with others. Whatever means of judging of the moral character of the applicants may be adopted, I will venture to express a hope that they may be of a different kind from those suggested by Mr. Jowett; who would demand from every candidate for examination a certificate of baptism, thus excluding even the Christian sects which do not practise that rite; and would require, among other references, one to a clergyman or a dissenting minister; which, as they would of course give their recommendations only to those whose religious character they approved of, would amount to the severest penalty for non-attendance on some church or minister of religion, and would be in fact a religious test, excluding many highly qualified candidates. If by requiring a statement of the "school or college" where the young man has been educated, it be meant that he must have been educated at a school or college, this is another unjust and injudicious limitation (by which, among others, the writer of this letter would have been excluded, having never been at either school or college). Above all, I would point out the terrible principle brought in by the truly inquisitor-like proceeding recommended by Mr. Jowett, of "confidential" inquiries, and rejection "absolute and without reasons." A youth who has passed all the previous years of his life in fitting himself for examination, is, according to Mr. Jowett's notions of justice, to

find himself, in consequence of a *secret* accusation, rejected, he knows not why, and without the possibility of clearing his character from the unknown imputation! If any young man is rejected on moral grounds, it ought, I conceive, to be on a definite charge, which he has had a full opportunity of answering.\* I would also suggest recon-

\* Mr. Mill has misunderstood the intention of Mr. Jowett's recommendations, as will be seen from the following explanation which Mr. Jowett was invited to furnish. "I should object as strongly as Mr. Mill to the proposals contained in the paper relating to the examinations, if I understood them as he does.

"1. The certificate of baptism was not required as a religious test, but as affording the readiest means of identifying the candidate, and verifying his age. If, from whatever cause, it could not have been obtained, it must have been dispensed with.

"2. The reference to a clergyman or dissenting minister was equally without any religious or party object. They were supposed to be friends of the candidate, chosen by himself. They would not, therefore, have refused testimonials to moral character because they differed from him in religious opinions.

"3. Neither for the same reason would they have brought secret accusations against him. It was not proposed that any inquiries should be made of persons not indicated by the candidate himself. He could surely trust his own references. If he were a man of decent character, he would easily find friends willing to act in that capacity. If he were of bad character, the manner in which the proposal would work would be, by his being unable to find them. But it seemed hardly fair to subject them against their will to an altercation with him about the mode of their answers.

"If, however, such suspicions as Mr. Mill suggests were engendered by any degree of secrecy or confidence, it would be far better that the inquiries should be entirely public. But there would then arise the fresh difficulty of casting a public stigma on the character of a young man for offences of which there would be no legal proof.

"The only reason for fixing on magistrates and ministers of religion, rather than any other known persons as the referees, was the necessity of adopting some general rule in a scheme so large as that proposed by the Report, instead of having to ascertain the respectability of each person who offered his testimony in favour of a candidate. Magistrates and ministers of religion appeared to be the most responsible class which could be selected, and sufficiently numerous not to be exclusive. The form of inquiries rather than testimonials was suggested, not with the view of instituting a minute investigation into the life and habits of the candidate, but only of avoiding the evasive and ambiguous use of language which has made testimonials a byword.

"I have made these remarks in justice to myself, though unwilling to obtrude the subjects discussed in the paper on examinations again on the attention of the public, and still more so to claim any authority for its suggestions as a part of the Report.

"My aim was to meet an objection at one time very strongly felt and strongly urged against the plan of Sir C. Trevelyan and Sir S. Northcote, that 'it would fill the Public Offices with clever scamps.' The various precautions enumerated are intended rather to show how

sideration of the (as it appears to me) very questionable principle of excluding youths otherwise qualified, by requiring a medical examination. It would be easy to find other means of preventing a public appointment from being made a means of obtaining a provision in the form of a pension without having rendered service sufficient to earn it.

In the preceding observations I have assumed, as requiring no proof, that the object proposed is in itself desirable; that it would be a public benefit if the Public Service, or all that part of it the duties of which are of an intellectual character, were composed of the most intelligent and instructed persons who could be attracted to it. If there be any who maintain a contrary doctrine, and say that the world is not made only for persons of ability, and that mediocrity also ought to have a share in it; I answer, certainly, but not in managing the affairs of the State. Mediocrity should betake itself to those things in which few besides itself will be imperilled by its deficiencies,—to mechanical labour, or the mechanical superintendence of labour, occupations as necessary as any others, and which no person of sense considers disparaging. There will be, assuredly, ample space for the mediocrities, in employments which require only mediocrity, when all who are beyond mediocrity have found the employment in which their talents can be of most use.

I do not overlook the fact that the great majority, numerically speaking, of public employments, can be adequately filled by a very moderate amount of ability and knowledge; and I assume, that a proper distinction is made between these and the others. It would be absurd to subject a tide-waiter, a letter-carrier, or a simple copyist, to the same test as the confidential adviser of a Secretary of State; nor would the former situation be an object to any one capable of competing for the latter. The competition for the inferior posts must be practically limited to acquirements which are attainable by the per-

completely such objections might be obviated than as necessary regulations to be precisely observed. Securities of this kind would be useful or mischievous according to the spirit in which they were enforced. In my own judgment a much less amount of precaution would be quite sufficient. The real and great precaution is the examination itself. Experience would probably show that hardly any other was required. I quite agree with Mr. Mill in thinking that any limitation not absolutely necessary would be in the highest degree injurious."

sons who seek such employments; but it is by no means a consequence that it should be confined to such things as have a direct connexion with their duties. The classes which supply these branches of the Public Service are among those on whom it is most important to inculcate the lesson, that mental cultivation is desirable on its own account, and not solely as a means of livelihood or worldly advancement; that whatever tends to enlarge or elevate their minds, adds to their worth as human beings, and that the Government considers the most valuable human being as the worthiest to be a Public Servant, and is guided by that consideration in its choice, even when it does not require his particular attainments or accomplishments for its own use. A man may not be a much better postman for being able to draw, or being acquainted with natural history; but he who in that rank possesses these acquirements, has given evidence of qualities which it is important for the general cultivation of the mass that the State should take every fair opportunity of stamping with its approbation.

R. R. W. LINGEN, Esq.,

Secretary to the Committee of Council for Education.

Council Office, June 26, 1854.

I BELIEVE that you have heard in sundry conversations most of that which I have to say upon the general principles which distinguish the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, from the existing system of making the first appointments, and of promoting afterwards the persons so appointed, in the Civil Service of the Crown. However, in obedience to the wish of Her Majesty's Government conveyed to me in your letter of the 14th inst., I proceed to state my views in writing. As I must in doing so bring my observations together, I consider myself nowise bound by what I may have stated in a more partial manner, if, upon further consideration, I find reasons to change some of my positions.

There are two points at starting on which I find myself not cordially agreed with most of your correspondents.

It appears to me to be quite beside the question to discuss the organization of the Civil Service, as if it existed for the sake of the general education of the country, or for

the sake of the individuals who, for the time being, compose that Service.

It exists, at least it ought to exist, for the sake of the work to be done, just as much as ship building exists for the sake of ships, or shoemaking for the sake of shoes. No one dreams of adapting the common callings of life to education and to individuals. On the contrary, education and individuals must adapt themselves to *them*, as means to ends, and not *vice versa*. Why so?—because these callings grow out of the actual needs of society, and respond to imperative human wants.

I fully admit, in this respect, the importance which, at the opening of your Report, you attach to the Civil Service. But I am also so deeply convinced of the ineradicable nature of many of the defects which beset the Service, that my first corollary from your propositions would be, to leave the central government in the discharge of no administrative functions, for which it is possible, without demonstrable unfitness, to find any other depository.

In the beginning of your Report (p. 3), you advert to the difficulty, but only as if it had been overcome: “the inconveniences,” you say, “which are inseparable from the frequent changes which take place in the responsible administration are matter of sufficient notoriety. It may safely be asserted that, as matters now stand, the Government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist, and, to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them.”

The permanent head of a department is assumed to be conversant with its subject matter, to know the kind of agents that the work requires, and also the merits and capacity of those acting under him. If he were a private employer, engaged about his own business, for his own profit and loss, he would appoint one man, get rid of another, and promote a third, for various reasons, intelligible to himself and material to his balance sheet, but which he would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate to a stranger who was not in his own business, and who knew the men in question either not at all or under quite different relations.

The Civil Service, however, differs from private employment in two material considerations:—

1. The active head is not the supreme head.

2. Neither the active head, nor the supreme head, has his own private fortune or ruin so much staked on the result, as to afford a guarantee against his indulging his own passion or caprice in relation to his subordinates; and, therefore, while justice requires that a certain independence be accorded to the corps in regard to the chiefs, it introduces, nevertheless, a fundamental ground of inferiority in the organization of the public, as contrasted with that of private, service. But the inferiority arising generally from deficient control is peculiarly aggravated by the rapid fluctuation of parliamentary over the heads of the permanent chiefs. It is impossible for the former to place and displace officers only at the suggestions of the latter; and, short of this, there remains little beside either the rule of seniority or the rule of favour—of which the one is fatal to emulation, and the other excites hopes and fears connected with many considerations besides the merit of work.

I attach no importance to registers of good and bad conduct. Good or bad conduct in the Civil Service does not consist in a number of separate exploits capable of being recorded *seriatim*. The entries must, by the nature of the case, be of a general character, referring to considerable periods of time, and no permanent chief ought (in honour) to permit himself to make an unfavourable entry of such a nature, under a stipulation of secrecy with regard to the persons affected; the inevitable consequence of which is, that no such unfavourable entry will ever be made, except in the grossest instances of misconduct or incapacity. It is one thing for a private employer to dismiss a clerk or workman who does not suit him, and quite another for the permanent chief of a public department to turn devil's advocate, and undertake a sort of prosecution, with its chances of failure, before the parliamentary chief, against a colleague whom he must meet daily.

I have dwelt thus strongly on what appear to me to be the inevitable defects of the Civil Service, for two reasons:

1. Because I should be very sorry to see any reform of it made a plea for extending its functions beyond the limit of absolute necessity; and

2. Because, under such circumstances, everything depends upon the men whom you introduce into it. There

is nothing in the system to supply the shortcoming of individuals. It is full at once both of temptation and impunity.

The first and cardinal quality that you want is a deep self-sacrificing sense of duty; not a conventional one, satisfied by doing and avoiding certain prescribed or proscribed things; but such as is only satisfied when it has done its best, whether the sacrifice demanded thereby be that of ease, personal feeling, or private opinion. This sense of duty is one of the quietest and least demonstrative of qualities, because it finds much of its reward in itself. You cannot go into the general market and lay your hand upon it as a visible commodity. If you would select men with direct reference to it, there is no other criterion of it than personal knowledge, no other method of introducing it, *suo nomine*, than that of personal selection. But if, in the Public Service, personal selection cannot be trusted, and you are driven by its abuse into the necessity of discovering some more disinterested method, then you must be content to select men with reference to those palpable qualities in connexion with which a high sense of duty is the most commonly found. And for this purpose, perhaps, no criterion is more generally available than thorough mastery over some one field of knowledge. I would neither favour nor exclude any particular field. What you want is, not the knowledge, but the evidence of qualities which the acquisition of it affords. He who has mastered any one branch of liberal knowledge, must have toiled through details as uninteresting *per se* as the smallest of those in an office, and must have learnt how to measure the worth of parts by that of the whole which each contributes to form.

And here I must say, that I think you lay far too much stress upon the adaptation of previous knowledge to particular offices, and upon the distinction between interesting and uninteresting work.

There are very few of the higher permanent officers who would find themselves much aided in their work by a subordinate who expatiated on the general question, or who became lifeless over the routine of business. The knowledge of a department is picked up quietly within it—much of the work called mechanical has only become so because some good administrator has seen how to stereotype the method; the particular act (of filling up the form, &c.) may be mechanical, but all such things

have their lesson for those who will attend to them; and, in fact, the interest of almost all work depends not so much upon its nature, as upon the degree in which it is mastered and comprehended.

I infer then, that solid education is the best guarantee you can find of a sense of duty and of courageous obedience in a young man. I call to mind several instances, when I say that such men are, less than most others, self-conceited, demonstrative, or unruly in an office. They are the men who are always found equal to doing what is asked of them; who can understand the spirit of directions; who can be trusted to measure, loyally and intelligently, what are the limits of discretion and at what point further instructions should be sought; whose advice and counsel is close, faithful, and to the point—not distracting—not given for the sake of showing off the giver.

Assuming, then, that education shall be the test of admission into the Public Service, it remains to determine whether it is better to trust the old principle of personal selection among certain classes of candidates, or subject to certain examinations; or whether, on the other hand, it is better to do away with personal selection altogether, and to admit applicants (on probation) by competing examinations.

If either of the two first propositions (viz. personal selection from among specified classes of candidates, or personal selection subject to examination,) be measured with the present system, it would effect an immense change for the better. It will only be requisite for any one who has been long conversant with any considerable department, to run over its staff in his mind, in order to recollect bad appointments which would have been prevented by either of these checks. With regard, however, to the first of them, when you come to specify what the classes of admissible candidates shall be, you find insuperable difficulties. Academical graduates in honours? Yes; but from what universities? Can you exclude *any* universities? and do *all* of them give you guarantees for the worth of their diplomas? Besides, many valuable Public Servants can be quoted, in different departments, as men whom this principle of selection would have excluded; and, although such an argument does not prove that equally good, or better, men might not have been forthcoming in their stead, nevertheless, the personal instances, as thus quoted, appear like so many facts against bare probabilities and

presumptions. I abandon, therefore, this proposition; not, however, without regret for the degree in which it combines the undeniable merit of personal selection (when honestly exercised) with the advantage of taking the education of the country, for this purpose, as you find it at its best, instead of meddling with it *ad hoc*.

With regard to the principle of personal selection subject to examination, I do not feel the force of the objection that no standard can be maintained. I think that this would be perfectly easy, if you took the examination out of the departments, and constituted a Board of Examiners, the appointments being for life, on the same terms as those of the judges, and highly remunerated. As to the cost, the country would gain it ten-fold in the increased efficiency of the Service; and as to independence, if the examiners were properly selected, and properly constituted, the most powerful jobber in political patronage would be very careful before he exposed himself to a public contest with such a body, on doubtful, not to say bad, grounds. You do not find much public remonstrance from men plucked at Oxford and Cambridge. Taking Mr. Jowett's division, I should propose to have two examiners at 1,000*l.* per annum in each school; so that, according to the requirements of the case, either two complete boards might be sitting simultaneously, or a part of the examiners might be, from time to time off duty—a material addition to the value, and real efficiency of the appointments, which should be given as rewards to the most eminent men of letters, science, and administration. Before this Board every officer (unless appointed directly from without to the permanent chiefship of a department,) should be brought for examination, on his introduction into the Service, and should be examined according to a prescribed syllabus, containing, *first*, certain indispensable qualifications for all appointments; *secondly*, certain special qualifications for the given department; *thirdly*, certain alternative subjects, whereby to exhibit solid information.

The practical experience of Public Servants, the knowledge of the examiners, and the common sense of society, would combine in gradually defining and perfecting the nature of the tests.

As I have said, I would examine every officer high and low, before the same Board. The number, when confined to appointments, and not extended to candidates, would



be perfectly manageable, with a small addition of subordinate officers (clerks) to the examiners. The Board should sit in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, at stated periods. Every officer would know on what terms he accepted his appointment, and with what necessity of attendance to be examined, and with what chance of refusal. It is in my opinion a great mistake to suppose that the supervision of such men as these examiners would be thrown away in regulating and testing the qualifications needed for the lower appointments as well as the higher.

The persons examined should be either rejected or passed in two classes, viz., 1,—sufficient: 2,—with merit; and a trifling difference in the rate of annual augmentation of the lowest class in each department should be made, accordingly as the new officer entered it from the division No. 1, or the division No. 2.

The Board should keep accurate registers of all persons examined by them—for what department—by whom presented—with what result. The possible production (on Parliamentary notices) of comparative tables, setting forth such particulars, would have its effect upon the dispensers of patronage.

There is force, no doubt, in what Mr. Jowett says, in favour of a competing examination. Public Servants “will have obtained their situations in an independent manner through their own merits. The sense of this cannot but induce self-respect, and diffuse a wholesome spirit among the lower no less than the higher classes of official men. Appointment by merit will relieve public men from the abuses and from the annoyance of patronage: it will raise the Public Service; it will give all classes a common interest in maintaining its rank and efficiency.”

Considering, however, the intimate connexion which must always subsist, in a constitutional Government, between the legislative and executive parts of it; considering that the political inconvenience to be feared in our day is the decrease rather than the increase of power in the hands of the Government (as such) for the time being; considering that, as matter of fact, patronage is one element of power, and not by any means an unreal one; considering the long, and inestimably valuable, habituation of the people of this country to political contests, in which the share of office, not merely for its emoluments, but also for the sake of influencing administration, reckons among

the legitimate prizes of war; considering that socially and in the business of life, as well as in Downing Street, rank and wealth (as a fact, and whether we like it or not) hold the keys of many things, and that our modes of thinking and acting proceed, in a thousand ways, upon this supposition—considering all these things, I should hesitate long before I advised such a revolution of the Civil Service as that proposed by yourself and Sir Stafford Northcote.

I should first try the effect of an independent Board of Examiners, making so much change only in the present system as to terminate the functions of the patronage secretary at the Treasury, and to confide all the appointments in each department to the minister responsible for its management, looking to him and to him only, in case of abuse in nominations. If that failed, it would be time enough to try the rest of the plan.

I very much question whether a competing examination would not exclude, *ipso facto*, many of the best men. Men who have obtained the highest honours and open fellowships at the universities, or who have entered with partial success upon specific callings, have already a career open to them, are in no immediate necessity, and have something to lose by failure. Such men would readily enough submit to an examination as to fitness and merit, but might not be so willing to risk another shake of the dice in competition as to who was best on that particular occasion. If any but mere boys are to enter the Service, such a trial is unfitting. It savours of school more than of the active world.

A main point in the organisation of the Service, in my opinion, is gradually to abolish all the situations under 300*l.* a year which are now held by persons on the superior establishments of offices; to delegate the whole of the work now done by these gentlemen to a class who, beginning at 80*l.* or 100*l.*, shall rise to 300*l.* or 400*l.* as a maximum, being analogous to the clerks of merchants, bankers, or actuaries; to reduce the higher class of offices very greatly in number, and to make the lowest appointment to it begin at not less than 300*l.* per annum. The Board of Examiners would see that the tests were made proportionate to the duties and emoluments of office in each of the two grades.

I agree with your remarks as to the rules of augmentation within each class, and of promotion from class to class, except that I see no practical use in your register, and would merely make it a rule that, on every increase

of salary or promotion, the parliamentary chief of the department should be bound to call for, and to record, the observations of the permanent head of the department, and also those of the officer under whom the one advanced in salary, or promoted to a higher grade had immediately been serving. This would not be worth much as a guarantee for merit, but it would occasionally check any serious abuse.

The Public Offices are, in general, very ill arranged as regards construction. The rooms are far too numerous for the purposes of ready reference and supervision. The principle of construction, in my opinion, should be, to make large halls for the main body of the clerks, with side-rooms opening out of them for a few superior officers. I have seen vast premises of business in the City, where the same principle has been successfully maintained under the necessity of building in many stories. In my own department there are sixty persons (including messengers and copying clerks) scattered on four different floors, throughout twenty-five separate rooms.

MAJOR GRAHAM,  
Registrar-General.

June 30, 1854.

BEING informed that Her Majesty's Government desire to know my opinion of the general principles of the Report of Sir C. E. Trevelyan and Sir S. Northcote, lately laid before Parliament, relating to the organization of the Civil Service, I have the honour to state, that I think the existing arrangements for making the first appointments to the Civil Service, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons nominated, may be improved.

The present system of patronage, in my opinion, requires amendment; and if the plan which has been advocated with much ability by Sir C. E. Trevelyan and Sir S. Northcote be adopted, the Civil Service, I have no doubt, will be much improved, and a greater number of able men be enrolled in its ranks.

Whether Her Majesty's Government should entirely abandon the privilege of nominating candidates for examination, and throw open to all persons of a given age the right of competing before a board of examiners, is a

point much disputed, upon which I cannot say that I have formed a very decided judgment. I rather lean to the opinion that Her Majesty's Government should not abandon the power of nominating, under certain prescribed regulations, to the Civil Service; and I am disposed to think that that privilege should be retained, as in the army, navy, and ordnance.

It is certainly desirable that there should be an examination by a central board, strict inquiry as to character and state of health, and a fixed limit as to age—perhaps from 17 to 25.

I highly approve of the first year after appointment being "*on probation*," the reports of the conduct of the young nominee being placed on record; and the same system should be adopted with respect to annual increase of salary and promotion to a higher class, no advance being given except on formal report, and decision thereon of head of office duly recorded: thus the character of each individual will be known *ab initio*; and upon retiring from the Service, when the amount of superannuation allowance is to be fixed, reference may with advantage be made to these annual reports of conduct. I think that one of the medical men certifying as to the incapacity of the candidate for superannuation allowance should be a medical officer serving under Government—perhaps a staff surgeon—whose duty it should be, at any time, upon receiving a requisition to that effect from the head of a department, to examine and report upon the state of health of any Civil Servant absent from his office on the plea of illness.

I agree in the recommendation of separating intellectual from mechanical labour; and I approve of the system proposed of appointing "supplementary clerks." I am strongly of opinion that promotion should be regulated by merit, not by seniority alone.

I think that the transfer of clerks from one office to another should only take place on rare and special occasions; otherwise I fear the tendency would be to draft from all the inferior offices men of talent, and thus we in subordinate departments would have the mortification of losing those who prove themselves peculiarly meritorious: all the ablest men being congregated in the highest departments of the Government—the Treasury and the offices of the Secretaries of State.

SIR G. C. LEWIS, BART.

*Knightsbridge, July 20, 1854.*

By your letter of the 14th ult. you have communicated to me the wish of Her Majesty's Government that I should lay before them my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself on the organization of the Civil Service, which has been presented to Parliament, and that I should state whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and if any, to what improvements.

In compliance with the wish thus expressed, I proceed to submit to you, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the best opinion which I am able to form upon the subject. At the same time, I think it right to state, that the subject is one on which I should not, unasked, have ventured to offer any opinion to the Government; I fear, moreover, that after the full consideration which it has already received from many competent judges, nothing which I can say is likely to afford any material assistance towards arriving at a practical conclusion on the question.

The following is an outline of the plan for the improvement of the Civil Service of the country, as set forth in the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, upon which my opinion is desired. The plan is confined to the Permanent Civil Service; that is to say, to those Civil Servants of the public who are not in either House of Parliament, and whose tenure of office does not depend upon political changes. A further exclusion is made with respect to those appointments which are designated as "Staff Appointments" (pp. 7, 15); under which term are included all the superior Permanent Civil Officers, such, for instance, as the permanent Under Secretaries of State, the permanent Secretaries of the Admiralty, War Office, and Board of Control, the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, the Commissioners of the Revenue Boards, and other officers of this important class. In substance, therefore, the plan is limited to the clerks of the different Government Offices, and to the numerous class of officers employed for purposes of inspection, custody,

protection, and collection of money, by the revenue departments.

With respect to the original appointment of all the permanent Civil Servants of the class described, it is proposed that the candidate should pass through a preliminary examination, and that he should, if appointed, be afterwards subject to a period of probation. It is further proposed that the examinations should be conducted by a central Board of Examiners, composed of persons holding an independent position, and presided over by an officer of the rank of Privy Councillor. The examination is to be a competing literary examination, which, however, is not to exclude a careful previous inquiry into the age, health, and moral fitness of the candidates. The examination is to be, as far as possible, adapted to the appointment to be made, but it is recommended that the subjects of examination should be as numerous as may be found practicable; and it is remarked, that an important effect would be produced upon the general education of the country if proficiency in history, jurisprudence, political economy, modern languages, political and physical geography, and other matters besides the staple of classics and mathematics, were made directly conducive to the success of young men desirous of entering into the Public Service. All persons from 17 to 21 years of age are to be admissible as candidates for inferior offices; and all persons from 19 to 25 years of age are to be admissible as candidates for superior offices. In order to enlarge the field of competition, and prevent the exclusion of candidates who might be deterred by the expense of a journey to London, it is recommended that an arrangement should be made, either by the appointment of assistant examiners, or by some other method, for holding district examinations all over the country. It is proposed that these examinations should be held at stated periods, that a sufficient number of the best candidates be selected by the examiners for filling the number of vacancies which annually occur, and that the successful candidates be allotted among the different departments. Such is an outline of the proposed plan, so far as the original appointments are concerned. The recommendations respecting promotions within the department will be adverted to presently.

In order to form a judgment upon this plan, it may first be observed, that the Civil Service of this country is not

like a profession, in which there is a general similarity of duties and qualifications for all its different members; but that it is made up of a large number of offices, each of which has a character and functions of its own. A clergyman who performs his duties well in one parish, would probably perform them well in another; a lawyer who succeeded on the northern circuit would probably not fail on the midland or western circuit; a medical man who was skilful at Canterbury would be equally skilful at York; a military officer would serve with equal success in different regiments of the same arm of the Service, and a naval officer in different ships. But different offices have different qualifications; the business of the Foreign Office differs from that of the Treasury; the business of the Colonial Office or of the Home Office differs from that of the Audit Office. Hence the difficulty of finding a common measure for appointments to the several departments, and of reducing them to a uniform rule. Even with respect to the clerks of the principal Government Offices, it would be impossible to throw them into one body, and to constitute them one Civil Service. The permanent officers of a department are the depositories of the official traditions, they are generally referred to by the political head of the office for information upon questions of official practice; and knowledge of this sort acquired in one department would be useless in another. If, for example, the chief clerk of the criminal department of the Home Office were to be transferred to the Foreign Office or to the Admiralty, the special experience which he has acquired in the Home Office, and which is in daily and hourly requisition for the assistance of the Home Secretary, would be utterly valueless to the Foreign Secretary or to the First Lord of the Admiralty. The analogy of the Indian Civil Service is not applicable, for the Indian Civil Servants are all foreigners, for whom a common qualification of knowledge of native languages is requisite, and they are moreover destined for high offices, with large powers, control over subordinates, and extensive districts. They can be transferred with comparative facility from one employment to another, like the political heads of offices in England, who often preside successively over different and unconnected departments of the State, and like colonial governors, who are often transferred from one colony to another. Where a general superintendence is required, and assistance can be obtained from

subordinates, and where the chief qualifications are judgment, sagacity, and enlightened political opinions, such a change of offices is possible; but as you descend lower in the official scale, the speciality of functions increases—the duties must be performed in person, with little or no assistance, and there is consequently a necessity for special knowledge and experience. Hence, the same person may be successively at the head of the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty; he may be successively President of the Board of Trade and Chancellor of the Exchequer; but to transfer an experienced clerk from one office to another would in general be like transferring a skilful naval officer to the army, or appointing a military engineer officer to command a ship of war. A similar distinction may be observed in other branches of practical life; thus, an architect may direct the execution of different classes of buildings; he may give plans for palaces, churches, courts of justice, bridges, private dwellings; but the subordinate workmen whom he employs retain their separate functions unchanged—a carpenter does not become a mason, a painter or glazier does not become an ironmonger or plasterer.

For these reasons, it would be impossible to form the clerks of the different Government Offices into a single Civil Service, regulated by general principles of advancement, without reference to departmental divisions; and to make them mutually transferable from one department to another. Still less would it be possible to incorporate the inferior officers of the revenue departments in such a service. The landing-waiters and tidewaiters, for instance, are out-door officers; their duties are performed in the open air, and consist to a great extent of watching and custody. It is not possible to bring the searchers, the bonded warehouse officers, or the tidewaiters and boatmen of the Customs into the same class, or to place them on a footing of equality with the superior clerks of the Secretary of State's offices, the Treasury, or the Admiralty. In the estimate for the Revenue departments presented this session to the House of Commons, it is stated that there are in the Customs for the port of London alone 220 weighers, with salaries varying from 35*l.* to 25*l.* per annum, with an allowance of 2*s.* 6*d.* a day when employed; 600 tidewaiters, with salaries varying from 75*l.* to 55*l.* per annum, and 1*s.* a day when employed; 100 water-

men, with salaries varying from 55*l.* to 45*l.* per annum, and 1*s.* a day when employed; and 42 watchmen, with salaries varying from 50*l.* to 40*l.* per annum, and 1*s.* a day when employed; to which may be added 4,416 boatmen belonging to the coastguard. Nobody supposes that officers of this description can be formed, for any practical purpose, into a single service with the educated clerks of Government Offices. In the Post Office department, the appointments in general have necessarily a local character; the keeper of a post office must have a house in a certain town or village, and sometimes in a certain street; it is also convenient that this house, in towns, should be a shop. Post Office messengers must likewise be persons resident on the spot. These conditions give to the Post Office department a character of its own, and prevent its officers from forming part of a general Civil Service.

So far, therefore, as the proposed plan contemplates the abandonment of the system of departmental promotion, and the creation of a general Civil Service, independent of departmental limits, and comprehending all the Government Offices, and all the revenue services (*See p. 8*), it appears to me to involve an impracticable principle. I am, however, bound to say that although this object is announced as desirable at the commencement of the Report, I do not see any recommendation by which the principle is attempted to be carried into effect; for the recommendations in pages 22-3, respecting promotions to superior appointments in other offices, and supplementary clerks, would not have any sensible influence.

We now pass to the consideration of the proposed plan of examination, for which purpose we must inquire what are the evils of the present mode of appointment, and how far they would be remedied by the system recommended for adoption.

The appointments of clerkships in the Government Offices are made in two manners: where the office is under a political head, the appointment is in general made by the head of the department; where it is not under a political head, the appointment is in general made by the Prime Minister, acting through the Parliamentary Secretary of the Treasury. The numerous appointments of the subordinate officers of the Inland Revenue and Customs departments are also made in the latter manner. With regard to the Post Office, which revenue department is under a political head, a portion of the officers is

appointed by the Postmaster General himself, and a portion upon the nomination of the Secretary to the Treasury. These rules with respect to offices having permanent or non-political heads, apply in general only to the original appointments. The promotions of the officers, when once appointed, depend upon their own immediate official chiefs.

The practical distinction between the modes of appointment for political or non-political departments is not unimportant. When a Prime Minister or Chancellor of the Exchequer appoints in the Treasury, or a Secretary of State appoints in his own office a clerk who is a near relation or a friend of his own, it is not to be supposed that he will in general be very ready to listen to representations of the unfitness of such person for the employment, or that the subordinate members of his department will be very forward in making such representations. But when a clerk is appointed by the Treasury in a non-political department, he is not regarded with any tenderness or partiality; the heads of such a department have an interest in being well served; they may establish any reasonable qualifications for the officers of their department which they think fit, and enforce them by an examination; and if the person sent to them by the Treasury does not come up to their standard, they may reject him. This rejection, if made on sufficient grounds, would be respected by the Treasury, the appointment made would be abandoned, and another person would be appointed in the same manner, subject again to the same veto of the department. It is in this manner that the numerous class of subordinate officers in the revenue departments are appointed, with the exception of those reserved by the Postmaster General. The names are sent by the Secretary of the Treasury, who in selecting them is mainly influenced by political considerations. They are persons of whom he can scarcely ever have any personal knowledge, and who are recommended to him by political supporters of the Government. The revenue department prescribes certain qualifications for the persons appointed to its subordinate offices, and subjects the candidates thus nominated to a proper examination. Those who do not satisfy the prescribed rules are rejected, and their places are supplied by fresh appointments. All the subsequent promotions are in the power of the department, which likewise can at any time dismiss

for misconduct. The relation of the Treasury and the non-political departments with respect to appointments is, therefore, like that of the patron of a living and the bishop; the Treasury presents a candidate, the department, if it thinks fit, institutes him into the office.

It is now proposed to put an end to all discretion in the original selection of persons for the clerkships in Government Offices, and for the subordinate officers in the revenue services, and to make their appointments depend on an examination to be conducted by a Central Board of Examiners. The examination is to be, in the main, a literary one; besides classics and mathematics, mention is made of history, jurisprudence, political economy, modern languages, and political and physical geography, as subjects of examination. Any person within certain prescribed limits of age, may become a candidate; and the candidates who distinguish themselves most in the examination are to be selected by the examiners for appointment.

There are two sorts of examinations in use at our universities and public schools for determining the proficiency and increasing the emulation of the students. The one of these is the competitive or maximum examination, the object of which is to select the best of a given number of candidates; the other is the standard or minimum examination, the object of which is to ascertain that every candidate possesses, at the least, a certain prescribed amount of knowledge. The first of these, for example, is such an examination as determines who is senior wrangler at Cambridge; the second is such an examination as that of candidates for a common pass degree at Oxford. The two sorts of examinations may be illustrated by the difference between a horse race and the process of examining horses for the use of a cavalry regiment.

Examinations have likewise been used for various public purposes, but hitherto they have always been examinations of the latter sort, for the purpose of ascertaining that each candidate possesses certain prescribed qualifications. Every officer who enters the army must now pass such a standard examination; and a similar rule also exists at present for the revenue service and for certain public departments. Every candidate for deacon's or priest's orders must likewise undergo such an examination, in addition to taking a university degree, which likewise implies two university examinations at least; medical diplomas and

certificates are also granted by the Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons, and by the Apothecaries' Company, after a similar examination. In the Church, and in the medical profession, the preliminary examination authenticates each member of the profession, as possessing a certain minimum of knowledge. Their subsequent advancement in the Church depends on the choice of the Crown, the bishops, and other patrons; in the medical profession it depends upon the choice of individual patients.

The peculiarity of the plan now proposed is, that it recommends, for the first time, the use of a competing examination in the appointment of Public Servants; that it substitutes the principle of competition for the principle of authentication. The examiners, instead of conferring a certain guarantee of goodness, are to be required to select the best.

There would, I feel confident, be no difficulty in giving effect to this proposal, so far as the mechanical working of it is concerned. I do not doubt that there are many hundred persons in this country at present who would be competent to conduct such an examination as that required, which would be considerably easier, even for the highest class, than that for a pass degree at Oxford and Cambridge; and for the lowest class, would include little, if anything, more than reading, writing, and the four rules of arithmetic. I have myself had the honour of twice acting as an examiner for the Newcastle Scholarship at Eton, and once as an examiner for the Ireland University Scholarship at Oxford; and I can bear witness from personal experience that the first object of the examiners, on such occasions, is to reduce the decision, as far as possible, to an arithmetical result, and to exclude anything which does not concern the strict merits of the question. I doubt whether there is any decision, involving the comparative pretensions of different candidates, from which fear, favour, and affection are so completely excluded as in the examinations at our universities and public schools. I am satisfied that if a board of examiners received from the Government clear and precise instructions as to the course which they were to follow, they would proceed at once to carry them into execution with rigid fidelity. So far as the question could be settled by written answers to questions, I feel sure that the comparative intellectual proportions of the candidates would be determined with as mechanical regularity as

the comparative height of the candidates among the ancient Æthiopians, who (as we are informed by Aristotle in his *Politics*) distributed the public offices according to stature.

The difficulties which I see are of a wholly different nature. What I doubt is, not the facility of working the plan, but the expediency of applying the principle of a competitive examination to the selection of candidates for public offices. I admit that the selection of candidates may thus be reduced to the simplicity and certainty of an arithmetical problem, and that the question may be decided by adding up the marks on different papers of answers; but I am not satisfied as to the policy of superseding personal discretion, and still more of extinguishing personal responsibility, in the appointments to public offices. One of the first qualities required in the clerks of a public office is trustworthiness. In many public offices, papers containing information respecting pending questions of great importance, and of deep interest to private individuals, to companies and associations, to the public at large, and to the whole civilized world, necessarily pass through the hands of clerks in their successive stages of preparation. The honourable secrecy which has distinguished the clerks of our superior offices, and their abstinence from communicating information to interested parties or to public journals, cannot be too highly commended. But this discreet reserve depends on qualities which cannot be made the subject of examination by a central board, or be expressed by marks upon a paper of written answers. Mr. Jowett, in his letter appended to the Report on the Civil Service, remarks that "the perseverance and self-discipline necessary for the acquirement of any considerable amount of knowledge are a great security that a young man has not led a dissolute life" (p. 24). It is quite true (as Mr. Jowett has said) that a studious life, and what is called a life of pleasure, are rarely combined; but it is not true that such an amount of study as might enable a clever young man to succeed in such an examination as that now proposed, necessarily, or even presumptively, involves the possession of qualities which render a person discreet and trustworthy.

It is probable that these and other objections were present to the minds of the authors of the plan, for they have carefully excepted all offices of power from the operation of the competitive examination, and have sub-

jected to it only the subordinate and merely ministerial offices. But if this principle is the most effectual safeguard against corruption, or error of judgment, in the selection of candidates for office, why is it not applied to those offices in which a good selection is the most beneficial, and a bad selection the most mischievous? Even if the form of our government does not admit of the political offices being filled in this manner, why is not the competitive examination to be applied to the superior Permanent Civil Servants, from the Lord Chief Justice downwards? It is not sufficient to say, that the persons now selected for such appointments are preferred "on account of their acknowledged eminence in one of the liberal professions, or in some other walk of life" (Report, p. 15). No excellence in a profession, or in any other walk of life, is ever so eminent as to be acknowledged by all:

Envy does merit, like its shade, pursue;

and there is always a minority who decry every distinguished man. If, therefore, there is a self-acting test, which enables us to distinguish with unerring precision, and with mechanical regularity, between the worthy and the unworthy candidate, is it not to the highest and most important offices that this test ought to be peculiarly and principally applied? Why should it not be extended to the army and navy, and above all, why should not the Church be brought within its operation? Why should not the tutors and heads of colleges and public schools be chosen by this method of selection? At all events, if it is the proper mode of appointment for the Civil Servants of the Crown, there can be no reason why all the numerous officers who are now appointed by local authorities—why the Civil Servants employed by counties and parishes, in connexion with prisons, bridges, roads, police, the relief of the poor, and other local objects—should not be selected by a competitive examination.

If a competitive literary examination was in reality the best mode of selecting persons for situations of trust and skill, we should probably see it voluntarily adopted by public bodies, such as railway and dock companies and even by private individuals, in the choice of their servants. No attempt, however, to adopt such a principle of selection appears to have been made, or even seriously proposed, in this or any other country.

For these reasons I cannot approve of that part of the plan which recommends that the examination should be competitive, and the number of candidates unlimited. Nevertheless, I think that all candidates for subordinate offices in the Public Service should be subjected to a standard or minimum examination, for the purpose of ascertaining that they possess a certain prescribed amount of knowledge. For giving effect to this purpose, the proposal of a Central Board of Examiners, who should be independent of all official connexions, seems to me peculiarly deserving of consideration. Their duties, according to my view of them, would be simple and light; their principal qualifications would be independence and fairness of judgment. The number of new appointments to civil offices, in a year, is not very large; much of the mechanical part of the examinations might be delegated to others, and they would act principally as referees. The expense of such a system to the public might, if proper arrangements were made, be extremely small. The advantages of such a Board would be, that it would introduce certainty, regularity, care, and uniformity, where now there is often irregularity, uncertainty, and neglect; that with regard to the political departments, it would prevent improper appointments from facility, good nature, or ignorance, even where improper motives did not exist; and with regard to the non-political departments, it would introduce a closer and more systematic scrutiny of the candidates presented by the Treasury than is now always made.

The principle of examination, under the conditions which I have described, seems to me so beneficial, when applied to candidates for the Public Service, that I would carry it even beyond the limits proposed by the reporters. If this test is a valuable security for the efficiency of public officers, why should it be limited to candidates for offices in government departments, and not be extended to officers appointed by local authorities? At present, the only local appointments with which the central Government can interfere, are those in the Poor Law service. With respect to these, the Poor Law Board can prescribe the qualifications, and dismiss any officer for incompetency or misconduct. When any appointment takes place, a printed list of questions concerning the new officer is transmitted to the Board of Guardians, and the particulars contained in the answers subsequently returned to

the central office furnish much information as to his qualifications. No personal examination of the new officer, however, is instituted. With respect to other paid local officers, no systematic inquiry by any central authority takes place. It seems to me worthy of consideration, whether it would not be advisable for the powers of the Central Board of Examiners, in case such a body were constituted, to comprehend certain classes of officers appointed by local authorities; an arrangement which would increase the efficiency of the local services, without any diminution of the local power of appointment.

A short period of probation is, as recommended in the plan, desirable in the case of every new appointment; and, if a faithful report of the conduct and capacity of the probationer was always laid before the head of the office, the result of this experimental proof would probably be not less important than the previous literary examination for determining his fitness for the peculiar service.

We now come to the question of promotions in the office, after the original appointments have been made. The Report states that the clerks of an office are at present divided into different classes, with different scales of salary; and it proceeds to describe the method of promotion as follows:—"the theory of the Public Service is, that the annual increase of salary from the minimum to the maximum of the class, is given as matter of course as the reward of service, and with no reference to the comparative merits of the individuals; but that promotion from class to class is the reward of merit, or rather that it is regulated by a consideration of the public interests, and that those only are to be transferred from one class to a higher who have shown themselves capable of rendering valuable services in it. This salutary principle is, however, in practice often overlooked, and promotion from class to class, as well as the annual rise within the class, is more commonly regulated by seniority than by merit:" (p. 18).

The recommendation with respect to promotions is, that whenever a vacancy occurs in an office, a report should be made on the qualifications of the clerks in the inferior class, and that the best of these should be selected for promotion. It is not proposed to apply the principle of examination to promotions.

It appears to me that the efficiency of the Civil Service depends, at least, as much upon the system of promotions



as upon the original appointments, and that the defects of the present state of things are owing more to the former than to the latter. My experience does not confirm the general description of the Civil Service given at the commencement of the Report (p. 4); there are indeed, in most offices inefficient persons, who ought never to have been appointed, or ought subsequently to have been dismissed; but the large majority of clerks are efficient, and among the superior clerks in the more important offices there are persons who, in point of ability and knowledge of their own subjects, occupy a high position.

The unattractiveness of the Civil Service, and the consequent difficulty of inducing young men of ability to enter it, or to remain in it, is painted by Sir James Stephen in strong colours. "A clerk in a Public Office" (he says) "may not even dream of fame to be acquired in that capacity. He labours in an obscurity as profound as it is unavoidable. His official character is absorbed in that of his superior. He must devote all his talents, and all his learning, to measures, some of which he will assuredly disapprove, without having the slightest power to prevent them; and to some of which he will most essentially contribute, without having any share whatever in the credit of them. He must listen silently to praises bestowed on others which his pen has earned for them; and if any accident should make him notorious enough to become the suspected author of any unpopular act, he must silently submit to the reproach, even though it be totally unmerited by him. These are indeed the indispensable disadvantages of the position of a clerk in a Public Office, and no man of sense and temper will complain of them. But neither will any man of real mental power, to whom the truth is known beforehand, subject himself to an arduous examination in order to win a post so ill paid, so obscure, and so subordinate."

In estimating the attractions of the Civil Service, and comparing it with other professions, it is necessary to avoid a partial view of the case. The remuneration may not be high as compared with that of the law, but it is high as compared with that of the army and navy, and even of the church. A person enters it at an early age. He is not required to have taken an University degree, or to have gone through an expensive education. No outfit is required; he is not compelled to procure uniforms or horses, to hire chambers, or to buy books. He avoids

the vicissitudes and uncertainties of an open profession; his advancement, if his conduct is good and his attendance regular, is a matter of course. His position may be obscure, but if he is not praised for his acts, neither is he blamed for them; if he does not enjoy personal distinction, he avoids personal responsibility with respect to the public at large. Everybody's character is, however, perfectly well known in his own office, and although a clerk's ability may not be appreciated by the public, it is always recognised by his superiors in office. Industry may exist without the love of fame; there are many persons in public offices who work in the most conscientious manner from a mere sense of duty and a love of the subject, without the smallest reference to a public recognition of their services. It should, moreover, be borne in mind, that even the open professions confer little celebrity except upon their leading members. At the bar, many a leading counsel gets the credit of work done by his juniors; many junior barristers who attend the courts, many pleaders and conveyancers, succeed in their profession, but are quite unknown to the public. To what extent is general reputation an incentive to the exertions of medical men, with the exception of a few London physicians and surgeons, and a few writers on medicine? Taking the great body of professional men, it cannot be said with truth that the love of fame spurs them on "to scorn delights and live laborious days," more than the clerks in Government Offices.

It appears to me, that the great discouragement which operates upon men of ability in the Civil Service is not so much the obscurity of the position, or the insufficiency of the pay, as the system of promotion by seniority rather than by merit. "In the open professions (the Report remarks) a man's success depends upon his obtaining and retaining the confidence of the public; and as he is exposed to a sharp competition on the part of his contemporaries, those only can maintain a fair position who possess the requisite amount of ability and industry for the proper discharge of their duties. The able and energetic rise to the top, the dull and inefficient remain at the bottom. In the public establishments, on the contrary, the general rule is that all rise together."—(P. 5.)

The depressing effect of promotion by mere seniority upon the clerks who would be promoted if merit were

taken as the criterion is manifest, and cannot fail to influence their conduct. It implies a non-recognition of their merit, not only by the public (for which they may be prepared), but by the heads of their own department, by those to whom their superiority over the persons promoted ought to be, and probably is, known. It is remarked in the Report that a large majority of the members of the Civil Service prefer promotion by seniority to promotion by merit, because they think that promotion by merit would, in practice, become promotion by favour (p. 19). It is certain that promotion by seniority is better than promotion by favour; but I suspect that this view is taken by those who think that if promotion depended on competition and superior merit, they would be distanced in the race. Every clerk's character and efficiency is perfectly well known in his own office; and the head of a department would have little difficulty in arriving at the truth, if he took proper means for the purpose. Honest mistakes might occasionally be made, even where due diligence had been used. Nothing human is infallible; but in the vast majority of cases the most meritorious person for promotion, on the occurrence of a vacancy, might be ascertained by proper inquiry. The facts to be ascertained are the manner in which the various candidates for promotion have performed their duties in the office, and their capacity for performing similar duties of a higher description. These are to be learned from the superior persons in the office, who are able to give the requisite information: a literary examination would be out of place when the candidate's special qualifications and appropriate fitness can be ascertained by positive testimony.

The real obstacles to the introduction of a system of promotion by merit are of a different kind. In the offices with political heads, they arise from the fear of imputation of political partiality, and of giving offence to powerful persons. Nor can it be said that the motives which induce the political head of a department to persist in the safe system of promotion by seniority are weak. "My experience" (Sir James Stephen says) "teaches me that a Secretary of State who should promote any one of his clerks over the heads of his seniors must arm himself with the fortitude of a martyr. The inflictions he would have to undergo from the tongues and the pens of the kinsmen and the kinswomen, of the patrons

"and the patronesses, of the private and the political connexions, of the many he had passed over, would leave him no rest day or night. And why is he to incur and have all this animosity? Just in order that he may hand over his office to his future successor (some political antagonist) in the highest attainable state of perfection."

It may be added, that where the head of any department makes the experiment of incurring the resentment of powerful persons in order to promote deserving subordinates, he will probably not be supported by public opinion. The disposition of the public is to regard an office as a life estate, and to sympathise with the holder of it, not only when he is passed over for want of merit, but when he is dismissed for positive misconduct.

In spite of these obstacles, it is my conviction that the most effectual means of improving the Civil Service is to make the promotions depend upon merit, and not upon seniority; and to use the power of dismissal in case of incompetency, irregularity, misconduct, and indolence more freely than it is used at present. The system of promotion by merit, and of removal for unfitness, is now employed to a great extent in the Inland Revenue and Customs services, and has, I believe, been attended with the best results.

If, after the ablest men in the Civil Service had been selected for promotion, the most efficient clerks in the higher ranks of the great offices were, when fit occasions presented themselves, advanced to those superior permanent appointments which, in the Report, are called "staff appointments," a further impetus would be given to the efficiency of the Civil Service. At present, from the influence of the system of indiscriminate promotion by seniority, the clerks at the head of the most important departments are of a very mixed quality, and thus advancement to the highest class is a proof rather of long service than of capacity. If, however, the least able and efficient were winnowed away at the successive promotions, the best men, as in the open professions, would rise to the top, and there would be a greater inducement than now exists to promote the head clerks of an office to staff appointments. If, for instance, an efficient clerk in the Home Office were appointed an inspector of prisons or factories, or a clerk in the Colonial Office were appointed a colonial governor or secretary, an inducement would be

given to industry and activity in the Civil Service which now is generally wanting.

If the Government were to decide in favour of such a measure as I have described, I can see no sufficient reason why it should be carried into effect (as is proposed in the Report) by parliamentary legislation, so far at least as the Civil Service of the Crown is concerned. There is nothing in the changes recommended which it is not within the competence of the Crown to effect. When the plan of the Government had been definitively settled, it could easily be put in an authentic form and laid before both Houses of Parliament; so as to afford opportunity for objection and discussion before it was carried into execution. If, after it had undergone the scrutiny of Parliament, the Government decided upon its adoption, either in the original form, or with amendments suggested by parliamentary criticism, it could be put in operation by an Order in Council. The creation of a permanent board of examiners would necessarily entail some expense; and, however small this might be, it would necessitate an annual vote, which would give the House of Commons a practical veto upon the system once in every session. There is no danger that any system of this sort which Parliament condemned would be upheld; on the other hand, if it was supported and approved of by Parliament, there would be no danger of a new Government overthrowing it, even although it rested only upon an Order in Council.

Such are the views which I have been led to form on this subject, and I regret that I have not been able to explain them in a smaller compass. I may, in conclusion, be permitted to express my sincere respect and admiration for those who are desirous, at the sacrifice of Government patronage, to promote the important principle of making the original appointment and subsequent advancement of Public Servants dependent upon merit and not upon favour. As to the details of the proposed plan, different views will naturally be entertained: as to the excellence of its object, there can be but one opinion. In a free country, where the course of public affairs is determined by the successive predominance of different political parties, it is of great moment that the principle of fitness should be regarded as the first consideration with respect to the Civil Service; that a permanent Civil Service should exist, and that when a party comes into power, it

should not proceed to clear all the Public Offices and fill them with adherents of its own. It is scarcely to be expected and perhaps not to be wished that the pressure of the political party which is in the ascendant, operating through its representatives in Parliament, should not make itself felt in the choice of candidates for new appointments. A great, and in my opinion a sufficient security for the efficiency of the permanent Civil Service is obtained if all new candidates are subjected to a standard examination, and to a period of probation, and if the promotions are made to depend upon merit.

JAMES BOOTH, Esq.,

Secretary to the Board of Trade.

*Board of Trade, August 1854.*

I PROCEED to give the best answer that I can to your letter of the 14th of May last, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government are desirous to have my assistance in framing measures for the improvement of the Civil Service, and you request me to give them my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, which has been laid before Parliament, and to state whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and if any, what improvement.

I agree with you and Sir Stafford Northcote in thinking the present arrangements for making the first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed open to much improvement. But although I concur generally in your views of the nature and extent of the evil to be remedied (and I think the public is deeply indebted to you and Sir Stafford for the zeal and courage with which you have investigated the subject and brought public opinion to bear on the question); and, although, with one important exception, I agree in the general principles of your Report, I am unable to accede to your scheme of throwing all the offices in the Civil Service open to public competition.

I feel as strongly as you can do the importance of the proposed preliminary examination as a test of the fitness of any candidate for office; but I think the appointment to that office should be made on the responsibility of those

who are responsible for the mode in which the business of the department is conducted, and that the functions of the examiners should be confined to excluding such candidates as are unfit.

I am compelled therefore to differ from you with respect to the first of the three objects which you state that you principally had in view, viz. :—

1. To provide by a proper system of examination and probation *for the supply* of the Civil Service with a thoroughly efficient class of men.

2. In the second of your objects I entirely agree with you, viz. :—To encourage industry and foster merit by teaching the Public Servants to look forward to promotion according to their deserts, and to expect the highest prizes in the Service if they can qualify themselves to win them.

3. I think also, with reference to the third object proposed by you, that the promotion of public officers to staff appointments in other departments than their own would often be attended with benefit.

It may well happen that in a particular department none of the clerks is qualified to fill a staff appointment that has become vacant, whilst in another department there is a clerk in every way qualified for the office. I think it better in such a case to promote the deserving clerk than to bring a stranger into the Service. You thus enlarge the field of promotion, and by adding to the number of prizes, raise the standard of the Service generally, and so are likely to attract into it a higher class of men.

With reference to your proposal "to mitigate the evils which result from the fragmentary character of the Service, and to introduce into it some elements of unity"—so far as this object involves an interchange of the clerks of the different departments, I think the policy of it is very questionable.\* If the transfer from one department to another be made in the way of promotion (not interfering with the just claims of those already in the department) or with the view of transferring a man from a place for which he is less fit to one for which he is more fit, it may no doubt occasionally be advisable. But it should be in exceptional cases only, and certainly not with a view to any speculative general improvement of the clerks. The object to be kept in view is to secure the efficiency of the clerks in their several departments, and this will in general

\* See the note on Sir Thomas Redington's Letter at page 233.

be best attained by confining their services to those departments with the details of the business of which they are practically familiar. The experience thus to be acquired will be the appropriate education of the clerks. Their general improvement is a secondary matter, and must ever be kept subordinate to this the primary object.

There is one point, however, in some degree connected with this branch of the subject which appears to me not to have received all the consideration to which it is entitled; I mean the question whether it is not desirable that each department should lay down rules for the conduct of its business, to be printed for the information of the officers of the department, and which, perhaps, with a view to their greater uniformity and permanence might usefully be subjected to the revision and sanction of the Privy Council; the rules having for their object to prescribe the duties of the several officers of the department and to fix and individualize their responsibility in the discharge of those duties. The rules should recognize the principle of promotion according to merit, and should provide for bringing under the notice of the head of the department and of the secretaries immediately under him, the mode in which the several clerks execute their duties, in order to furnish the means, so far as may be, by which the head of the department may be enabled to regulate the promotion according to that principle.

I think your suggestion a very good one, at least as applicable to the subordinate branches of the several Public Offices, that the annual increase in the salary of each clerk should be dependent upon a certificate of the officer having the general superintendence of the branch of the office to which the clerk in question belongs, that his conduct in the past year has been satisfactory.

I believe such a regulation would have the best effect in keeping alive the diligence and punctuality of the clerks where higher motives might be wanting.

I think also that with a view to facilitating the dismissal of such clerks as prove themselves to be unfit or unworthy, and to breaking down the notion, now universally prevailing, that an appointment to a clerkship in a Public Office is an appointment for life, however incapable or indolent the clerk may be, it is well deserving of consideration whether the system of demanding from the clerks contributions to a superannuation fund might not advantageously be put an end to.

I approve of your recommendation to introduce a supplementary and lower class of clerks (lower paid I mean) in those departments of the Government where the work is of such a character as to render this expedient; that is to say, in those departments where there is a considerable amount of work of a routine or mechanical character, and I believe there are few departments to which this description is not applicable.

In the Board of Trade, which is the only department of the Government with the constitution of which I am intimately acquainted, this is eminently the case. In the mercantile marine and railway branches of that office especially, there is a very large amount of work of a routine character, demanding for its performance no higher qualifications than steadiness, ordinary intelligence, the power of writing a good hand, and familiarity with the common rules of arithmetic.

A just regard to economy, therefore, would suggest that these places should be filled by men whose ambition does not look beyond a very moderate competence, and who having succeeded in obtaining one of these situations, would be content cheerfully to remain there with the prospect of getting from 80*l.* to 180*l.* a year, or at the utmost 300*l.*

The great bulk of the work of the clerks of the Board of Trade, as distinguished from the staff officers, is of a kind demanding for its performance qualifications no higher than those I have described, and which would be amply paid for at the rates that I have suggested.

There is also a considerable amount of this work of a more intellectual kind, and demanding qualifications of a character higher than those referred to. The question then arises, whether the demand for these higher qualifications can be best supplied by an upper or senior class of clerks of the same order as that before described, merely receiving higher pay, and into which the clerks of the class before mentioned may reasonably expect to succeed in the ordinary course of promotion as the reward of diligence and good conduct; or whether it is more desirable to have an entirely distinct order of clerks, from whom higher qualifications are expected, and to whom a correspondingly higher rate of pay is assigned.

The objection to the first-mentioned plan is, that either you must have the upper or senior class very numerous, and that is objectionable on the ground of expense, or

there will be an immense mass of dissatisfaction in the class below from the slowness of the promotion. The clerks will all have entered the lower class, looking forward to promotion in the ordinary course of things, and nearly the whole will be disappointed. The great mass, therefore, will be in a state of chronic dissatisfaction.

It would be otherwise if they had entered into a class of a distinct order, such as I have referred to, and with no higher expectations than to get to the top of that class. This by diligence and good conduct they may expect to attain, and it is as high as the average of the class of men that I have described as best fitted for the clerkships in question ought to expect to rise. It is as much as they could in general expect to attain in the other walks of life.

Moreover, if you are to look to the lower class of clerks to furnish the comparatively small number which is required of clerks of the higher order, you must necessarily raise the standard of the whole of the lower class, in order that there may be a reasonable certainty that this demand will be supplied; and this, again, is objectionable on the score of economy.

On the whole, therefore, I think that it will be found to be the best plan to have two distinct orders of clerks, a higher and lower paid order, each separated into two divisions; and with respect to which orders, promotion should not be expected to take place from the lower into the higher.

The lower class I would propose to be filled by young men who, as a class, do not commonly receive a university education, but who, having received a more or less complete rudimentary education in the proprietary and other schools of the country, and not possessing any very commanding talents, look forward on quitting school to getting their livelihood in the position of clerks and book-keepers in mercantile houses, railway offices, and the offices of solicitors, general medical practitioners, and in other like employments. The work in question is more fitted for persons of this description, and would ordinarily be better done by them than by persons of a higher order of intellect and more extensive educational acquirements.

The great majority of men of this kind would be sufficiently rewarded by situations varying from 80*l.* to 250*l.* a year (which is the scale recommended in the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and ourselves on the establishment

of the Board of Trade); and, if 250*l.* were fixed as the ultimate limit that they were to look to, they would be satisfied with it.

But although I would propose to fix 250*l.* (or perhaps 300*l.*) as the limit beyond which the clerks of this class were not to expect to rise (and I would not have them rise into the higher division of this class, even, except as the reward of merit), I would by no means propose that the fact of admission into this class should operate as a barrier to admission into a higher class. I would leave it open to the head of the department to select a person from this class as much as from any of the other walks of society. What I mean is, that the clerks in this class should have no claim to such promotion; that the circumstance of having passed creditably and without reproach through all the grades of this class, and having become the senior in it, should give to such senior no right whatever to expect to be removed into a higher class.

There would no doubt occasionally be found in this lower class men of extraordinary merit—men who would evince qualifications showing that they were fitted for the discharge of duties of a higher character than those of the class in question; and the head of a department would in such cases do well to select one of such men to fill a vacancy in the clerkships of a higher class, or in one of the staff appointments. The example of such an appointment would have the best effect in stimulating the zeal and industry of the other clerks, and in awakening any latent ability that may be in them; and the chances are, that a clerk thus selected, who had been tried in office, and whose character had become thoroughly known, would prove a better appointment than an entire stranger, however well recommended, brought for the first time into the Service.

The great point on which I differ from you and Sir Stafford Northcote, as I have already stated,—and it is one of primary importance,—is as to the mode in which you propose to make the first appointments into public departments. These you propose to place in the hands of a Board of Examiners, who are to proceed on the principle of public competition, and to assign the offices to the most distinguished competitors, the Board having been satisfied with the certificates of health and character of the candidates before admitting them to enter the lists. You further propose that the services of the Board of

Examiners should be made available in determining the removal of any candidate who, in his period of probation, has not given satisfaction, and also in determining the claims of Public Servants to superannuation allowances, and to the good service pensions and honorary distinctions which you propose should be awarded.

On both these points I feel compelled to differ from you. I think both the responsibility of the original appointments to the office, and the duty of regulating the promotions therein and of reporting as to the propriety of a pension being awarded or withheld, ought to rest entirely with the head of the department. I think this is required not only with a view to the efficiency and due regulation of the clerks, but also with a just regard to the dignity and authority of the head of the department. The position of that minister would be essentially lowered if any such interference as that which is suggested were allowed in the department of which he is at the head, and for the conduct of which he ought to be responsible.

I think the functions of the Board of Examiners ought to end with the examination of the candidate and the report of his fitness. Supposing the candidate to be reported to have the requisite intellectual and educational qualifications, and the requisite degree of constitutional vigour, the responsibility of having appointed him to the office, and of governing his conduct when appointed, ought to rest exclusively with the head of the department.

The moral qualifications of the clerk (to use a compendious phrase) are quite as important as, or rather they are more important than the intellectual; and for making a due selection in this respect, the head of the department must, I think, be held responsible. I have no faith whatever in any amount of certificates that might be required to be furnished by candidates to a Board of Examiners, as a preliminary condition to being admitted to the competition.

I know it is said that the examination itself affords a considerable test of the moral qualities of the examinant, for that high intellectual attainments are not to be acquired without industry, perseverance, and self-denial. But how small a part are these of what go to make up the character of a good Civil Servant—good judgment, good temper, integrity, a strong sense of duty, deference to superiors, consideration for those in a subordinate posi-

tion—none of these are implied in the fact of having passed a successful examination.

Do not however let me be understood as in any degree undervaluing the importance of the preliminary examination. As a means of excluding unfit men, I deem it of the highest importance, and I agree with you in thinking that the examination cannot be conducted in an efficient manner throughout the Service, if it is left to each department to examine the candidates. Considering the pressure that is put on the Treasury by men having powerful parliamentary interest, and that which is put on the heads of departments both by parliamentary interest and by the claims of private friendship (and the object of the persons possessing this influence, is generally to palm off on the Public Service such of their sons or nephews as are fit for nothing else), it is impossible to estimate too highly the importance of a preliminary examination conducted by an independent and competent Board of Examiners as a bar to the admission of incompetent persons.

The functions of the proposed Board of Examiners are, I think, accurately stated in the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and ourselves on the Board of Trade in March 1853. "We cannot," we say, "avoid expressing our opinion that the whole subject of the examination of candidates for public employment is well worthy of consideration, and that it would be of great advantage if a proper system were devised, and a central board of properly qualified examiners appointed, *without whose certificate no person should be placed on the public establishments.*"—(p. 141, of *Reports on Public Offices*).

The examination which I should propose for the lower class of clerks should be essentially rudimentary. It ought to be very strict and searching, and good hand writing should be insisted on as a *sine qua non*.

The examination for the higher class of clerks should be of a higher range, but in both cases the great object should be to test the general intelligence of the candidate, and his familiarity with the ordinary elements of a rudimentary education.

I would, however, have a marked difference in the range of the two examinations; that of the higher class ought to be such as to have the effect of excluding any man who is not decidedly above the ordinary or average range of intelligence and acquirement. Without this it would not

be possible to avoid the painful anomaly of having in the higher order of clerks men not only not generally superior in capacity to those in the lower order, but in many cases inferior to them.

If the responsibility of making fit appointments is thrown upon the head of the department who is responsible for the efficient discharge of the duties of the department, and if all unfit persons are excluded at the outset by a rigorous preliminary examination, and those who prove themselves unfit or unworthy are at once removed—and if the zeal and energies of the clerks are called forth by a careful system of promotion according to merit, and at the same time the general standard of the Public Service is raised by opening the staff appointments to the clerks, whose merits are such as to justify their promotion, I think you will have gone far to remove all the existing defects of the system, and to place the Civil Service upon a sound footing; and I confess I think it is wiser to aim at correcting the defects of a system that has on the whole worked well, than to give to it an entirely new character with results that can hardly be calculated.

One obvious effect of the competition which is proposed by you would be to fill the offices with the picked clever young men of the lower ranks of society, to whom such offices would be a great object of ambition, which they would not in general be to men of the higher ranks. There would thus be a lower class of men gradually introduced into the Public Service, and a lower tone of feeling would prevail; and though, no doubt, there would be a larger amount of intellectual ability brought into the Service than by the other method, it does not necessarily follow that the business of the department would be better done.

The tendency of your system gradually to fill the Public Offices with a lower class of men, I consider one of the strongest objections to it. The lower you descend in the social scale the less is the probability that the candidates for the Civil Service will possess those moral qualifications which I have already insisted on as being more important than the intellectual ones in the practical business of official life.

You say "it would be natural to expect that so important a profession (as the Civil Service) would attract into its ranks the ablest and the most ambitious of the youth of the country; that the keenest competition would prevail amongst those who had entered it, and

“that such as were endowed with superior qualifications would rapidly rise to distinction and public eminence.”

I cannot agree with you in calling this a natural expectation. The Civil Service does not hold out the high prizes that are necessary to attract the ablest and most ambitious of the youth of the country. Its highest prizes are low and insignificant compared with those to be attained in the law, in the church, in medicine, and in commerce; and the progress to such distinction and public eminence as the Public Service admits of is almost necessarily slow.

Fortunately commanding talents, or extensive acquirements in any great number are not required; they would, in fact, be misplaced in almost every department of the Government. It is rather steady and persevering devotion to the every day business of the department that is to be desired: and it is one of the objections to your system of competition that from the over-education of the clerks, accompanied probably by a corresponding amount of self-estimation, there would, looking at the character of the work to be done, and the slow rate of promotion, be much disappointment and much dissatisfaction with their work, attended probably as a general consequence, with listlessness and indolence.

But although the prizes in the Civil Service are not such, and cannot be made such as to attract the ablest and most ambitious youth of the country, yet the Service has in it many attractions; and I have little doubt that if its general standard be raised by throwing open the staff appointments to the clerks, and if the rules and practice of the departments are such as to call forth and foster the ability and energy of the gentlemen employed there, persons every way fitted for the higher offices will in general be found among the clerks, and that the staff appointments may, with the exception of those requiring professional knowledge, be adequately filled without the necessity of looking beyond the limits of the Service.

Another objection to your system of competing examinations is to be found in the stimulus that would be given by it to over-education. There can be little doubt that great numbers of youths who are now content to seek to earn their subsistence in the lower ranks of the professions and in trade and mechanical employments would be attracted by the more captivating prospect of these Government Offices to pursue their scholastic studies in

the hope of being successful competitors in the annual examinations, the greater part of whom would necessarily be disappointed, and would be thrown in that state on society, with educations that unfit them for, or at least make them dissatisfied with, such employments as are at hand.

The example presented by Prussia and some other continental governments of the evil effects of the influence of the government on the education of the class which forms what has there been not inaptly called a bureaucracy, and of the artificial stimulus given by those governments to the number of aspirants to public employment, may make us pause before we enter on a like course.

On the whole, I must conclude by repeating that whilst entirely agreeing with you in the necessity for a thorough reform in the constitution of the Civil Service, I am not prepared to assent to so great a change as you and Sir Stafford Northcote propose; and I think it more prudent, not only with a view to the chances of accomplishing any reform at all, but with a view to the improvement to be expected from the proposed change, that the reform aimed at should be of a less sweeping character, and should be limited to correcting the defects of the existing system in the mode that I have ventured to recommend.

E. CHADWICK, Esq., C.B.

August 1, 1854.

I HAD the honour to receive on the 14th ultimo, a communication stating that Her Majesty's Government were desirous to have my assistance in framing measures for the improvement of the Civil Service, and my views on the general principles set forth in the Report thereon by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, and my opinion, “whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and if any to what, improvements.” In compliance with this request, I gladly submit for consideration the chief results of my own experience and observations, which have been peculiar and extensive, believing that they have practical bearings in support of the great



objects which Her Majesty's Government desire to obtain. My opportunities of experience have arisen from my having been called upon to take a part in the execution, as well as the preparation of measures by which some of the largest additions have been made to the Permanent Civil Service of the Government—from having had passed through my hands the applications of between 1000 and 2000 candidates for staff appointments—and from having been employed in the business connected with the regulation of the expenditure of between 500,000*l.* and 600,000*l.* per annum on about 12,000 local appointments, besides much business connected with local dismissals.

Prima facie case for the re-organization of the Civil Service.

When proposals were made that duties belonging to all forms of civilized governments, such as the duties for the construction and maintenance of the public highways by public and responsible officers, at the actual cost of the service, should be extended to the new modes of communication by railways—when it was suggested that railways were actually thus managed by the civil servants of several continental governments, with, on the one hand, higher dividends to the capitalists, and greater security and value to *bonâ fide* investments, and on the other hand, greater safety and convenience to the public, (for their rate of fares, one third lower than ours, is now equivalent to a relief of between five and six millions per annum of annual charges in inter-communication and the transit of goods)—when it was urged that these public duties ought not in this country to be abandoned to private and practically irresponsible hands as sources of private trading speculation on the necessities of the population—the late Sir Robert Peel met these proposals by declaring his preference for the method adopted. Notwithstanding all the objections to which it was open, he considered it preferable at all hazards to placing the proposed services in what, with a widely expressive phrase, he termed the “torpid hands of Government.” Political officers in the Treasury itself have met similar proposals, by avowing as an axiom, based upon their official experience, that “Government does everything badly.” Mr. Henry Cole has recently put forth a pamphlet, with high approbation, the gist of which is to represent, that unless the residue of profit from the Great Exhibition be extricated from the ordinary course of Civil Service or Government management, the proposed measures for its application will be failures. It

Present incapacity.

is not, however, the particular measures proposed, but the fact that the common ground of objection made to them is the declared incapacity of our Civil Service to execute them—it is the alleged inefficiency of the Civil Service, as compared with rude private service;—that I would submit as constituting an argument, for the application of the proposed principles of amendment. This assumed inefficiency, which may be corroborated by cases of actual trial, serves in Parliament as the basis of opposition to all new appointments for new service, however urgently needed by the public as means of economy. The belief always is that the appointments will be merely more “patronage,” and being patronage, that the promise of efficient service in return for the payment must be illusory.

Obstruction to new service by the principle of patronage.

My colleagues, not only in the Poor Law Commission of Inquiry, (including gentlemen of such lengthened official experience as the Right Hon. Sturges Bourne), but also in other Commissions, unanimously concurred in urging as a condition indispensable to the efficient discharge of our duties, that we should be freed from appointments in the common form of political patronage, and be allowed to select our own assistants. The investigations into devastating local evils and waste, displayed the fact, that one of the primary causes was the practical operation of the same principle of patronage, or the appointment of officers on other grounds than those of fitness for the duties to be performed. In advising on the general executive arrangements for correcting those evils, there was equal unanimity in recommending as conditions absolutely necessary to their success, that the new Commissioners should be protected from appointments made like those in the older departments, and should be entrusted with the exclusive right of the dismissing as well as of the appointing all their own officers. This right was readily conceded as proper for the object, and I am unaware of a single instance in which its exercise was ever directly or indirectly interfered with by the chiefs of any Government.

Necessity for dispensing with the privilege of patronage where new and efficient services are needed.

Whilst new and additional securities for fitness by education, tested as far as may be by new and more strict examinations, are demanded for the church and the law, for the medical profession, for the naval and military service, and also for the mercantile marine; it may be submitted that the Permanent Civil Service should not alone be continued exempt from the common securities for a due return of service for salary, nor be made a refuge for those who can neither pass an examination nor sustain competition

Why should the Civil Service be exempted from the new securities required for the open professions?

for the higher emoluments obtainable in the open professions or commercial service, and that it should no longer be left in the condition of general torpidity, described by the experienced prime minister, unimproved in itself, and a powerful source of obstruction to improvements required elsewhere.

It is unfair to require from official promoters of the proposed improvements, the display of scandalous abuses. Official offences coming under the old legal categories of *non-feasance*, *mis-feasance*, and *mal-feasance* may be proved, (most frequently *non-feasance*,) and the dicta cited be justified; but even if it were conceded that the general condition of the Civil Service might be deemed good, officers of experience are not to be discredited when, after due investigation, they declare that it may be made still better, and be put in due relation with the general progress. It might indeed suffice to elicit the general relative condition of the Civil Service, by asking, what would be the chances of a candidate for employment, whether principal or subordinate, in any establishment under private management requiring good business habits, such as a bank, or merchant's counting house, if he were to put forward as his chief qualifications some years of previous service in a Government department? I am assured that the fact of previous service in Government offices has, in reality, operated as a powerful objection to candidates for employment in commercial houses.

Yet, I could adduce particular instances, where, from careful examination on admission, and improved arrangements of Public Service, so as to ensure personal accountability as well as reward for service performed, officers trained in it, have been found qualified for private service, in which they have been eminently successful. I could adduce instances where our clerks have left, and have become heads of establishments; and could give evidence—some of it from similar experience in other departments—to justify a confident belief that, by successfully carrying into effect the proposed principles of improvement, it would be practicable to reverse the present general condition of the Civil Service, and to make the fact of service in a Public Office a recommendation not only for any social standing and respectability, to which it may now be entitled, but also for efficiency.

I may refer to instances where the power of examination for fitness, as a stimulus and test of training, to elevate the Service, has been already demonstrated. It is

Practice in the older departments deemed evidence of unfitness for private service.

Cases where practice in new and improved Public Service has been found a qualification for private service.

only necessary to refer to the deplorable condition of the school teachers for parochial schools, and the teaching of the poor in general twenty-three years ago. Two former Poor Law Assistant Commissioners—Dr. Kay, now Sir J. Kay Shuttleworth, and Mr. Edward Tufnell,\* (excited by the evils they had witnessed in their first service,) matured the better training of school teachers tested by competitive examinations for certificates of competency, under the auspices of the Committee on Education of the Privy Council. The general qualifications of those teachers were, by this off-shoot from the Poor Law Commission, soon so far advanced that higher salaries were bidden for them for private service than could be gained by them in the service for which they were trained, and until their salaries were increased and other arrangements were made for their retention, they were taken away, to a seriously inconvenient extent, for clerkships in engineers' and merchants' and traders' counting houses. It has been stated to me that in these positions many of them have succeeded so well, that some of the most active and successful private traders will actually have owed their success and opulence to a special education under the auspices of a Government department.

In the Government School of Mines, under the direction of Sir Henry DeLaBeche, the training of the pupils is tested by competitive examinations for certificates of competency. Under this stimulus their qualifications have been so well established, that hitherto all the pupils have obtained employment in the private service market.† Although the commencing salaries offered were 150*l.* per annum, more than double those of junior clerks, I am informed that none of the certificated pupils have hitherto been got to accept them.

Such instances serve as tests of the condition of the Public Service relatively to the general service or labour

\* Mr. Tufnell devoted to this object a whole year's salary.

† I am informed that competitive examinations for certificates of competency are now proceeding with good promise of success in the Government Schools of Practical Art, under the superintendence of Mr. Henry Cole and Dr. Lyon Playfair. I learn that the results of the training of female school teachers, tested by examinations, have been similar to those of the competitive examinations of the males for certificates of competency, but in another direction; the females have been so far advanced in mental power and influence as to have been lost to the service by matrimonial engagements obtained with exceeding rapidity. To avoid these losses plainer candidates were selected for training, but they too have obtained preference as wives to a perplexing extent.

Instances of superior qualifications for private service elicited by competitive examinations for the public service.

Further instances of examinations for the public service.

market, and also to the state of public administrative information, on which it will be my duty further to remark, when adverting to the means of pecuniary economy by improved service.

Under the Poor Law Amendment Act one portion of the higher appointments was made on the evidence of one form or other of successful practice, chiefly in the improvement of local administration, or in analogous services, which were considered to have elicited the special qualifications desired. I examined another portion of the candidates, and gave instructions to others after their appointments were made. Another portion of the candidates were appointed on what appeared to be such pre-eminent recommendations and testimonials as seemed to render any examination superfluous. Under the Public Health Act the chief appointments have been similarly made. In respect to the engineering inspectorships, my colleagues agreed to a form of instruction, which I herewith submit for a report on a stated case (Appendix B.), intended to serve as the basis of an examination. This form exhibits the course which I myself usually took in vivâ voce inquiries or examinations. That course was to place before a candidate a case of the evils to be remedied, to ask for his report, or a statement of his views upon them, and upon that to question him more particularly as to the mode of dealing with them.

I do not believe that a single original appointment was made under either Commission except with an anxious view to the public service on the part of every Commissioner. A very large share of proved pre-eminent success may be claimed for the great majority of these appointments. But notwithstanding all the care taken, there have been mistakes, shortcomings, and some few positive failures and resignations. It would be found that the greater part or nearly the whole of the failures, (which however, in other departments, would not have occasioned the removal or have much altered the position of the officers in question,) were from the class where the appointments were mainly based on recommendations and testimonials to moral conduct as well as to general qualifications and social position.

The improvements of local administration have usually been accompanied by the recognition of the necessity of the adoption of increased securities for fitness, or by the exclusion of what, though exercised by popular assemblies (by many instead of by one or a few), is in principle patronage—appointment from favour. I have subjoined

Greater proportion of failures where the appointments are based merely on testimonials.

Instances of the abolition of local patronage, and of exami-

a portion of evidence, which briefly characterises the patronage under which the expenditure of upwards of seven millions of local taxes was managed.\*

Under the Poor Law Amendment Act the local appointments and dismissals were subjected to the approval of the

\* Extract from "Report of the Poor Law Commissioners," p. 327.

"The statement of Mr. Richard Gregory of Spitalfields, is characteristic of the circumstances under which the permanent officers are commonly appointed in town parishes.

"Might not paid and responsible officers be elected by the parishioners? He answers, 'No; I think you would never get such offices well filled, unless it was by accident. The people have no conception of what sort of men are requisite to perform properly the duties of a parish officer. If such a situation were vacant, what sort of a man would apply for it? Why, some decayed tradesman; some man who had got a very large family, and had been unfortunate in business, which, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, means a man who has not had prudence or capacity to manage his own affairs; and this circumstance is usually successful in any canvass for a parish situation to manage the affairs of the public. Men who have before been in office for the parish would obtain a preference. And what sort of men are those who would be likely to be at liberty to accept a vacant situation? The situations of overseer and churchwarden are by some considered situations of dignity, and such dignity always attracts fools. I have known numbers of small tradesmen who were attracted by the 'dignity of the office,' and succeeded in getting made overseers and churchwardens. Their election was their downfall. They have not given their minds to their own business as before. The consequence of this was that they have lost their business, and have been ruined. Now and then a good man of business will be desirous of taking office when he thinks he is slighted, or has had an affront put upon him by being overlooked; but in general, any man in decent business must know, if he has the brains of a goose, that it will be much better for him, in a pecuniary point of view, to pay the fine than serve. I could name from fifteen to twenty people in our parish who have been entirely ruined by being made churchwardens. These would be the people who would succeed best in parochial or district elections; for the people would say of any one of them, 'Poor man, he has ruined himself by serving a parish office, and the only recompense we can give him is to put him in a paid office!' This always has been the general course of parish elections, and, I have no doubt, would always continue to be so. There is infinitely more favouritism in parish appointments than in government appointments. In appointments by the Government there is frequently some notion of fitness; but in the case of parish appointments, fitness is out of the question. When I was the treasurer of the watch department of the parish, I took great interest in the management of the police of the district, and determined to make it efficient. You would have conceived that the inhabitants would have been so guided by their own apparent interest as to get active men appointed, but I had solicitations from some of the best and most respectable houses in the parish to take their old and decayed servants and put them on the watch. I had also applications from the parish officers to put men on the watch who were in the workhouse. As I was determined to make the police efficient, I resolutely resisted all these applications."

nations to ensure fitness.

Character of local patronage in the administration of local rates.

Central Board. For a time the regular application of correct principles was obstructed by notions such as may now be expected to stand opposed to the reconstruction of the Civil Service. But eventually instructions were sent to the local Boards as to the nature of the qualifications required from the officers. Bankruptcy, insolvency, failure in other pursuits, or service in party or political agency, instead of being as heretofore recognised as the common ground for the exercise of patronage, were urged as disqualifications and presumptive evidence of unfitness. (*Vide* extracts from General Instructions, Appendix A. third Annual Report, p. 83.) It was the duty of an Assistant Commissioner to attend the local Board and to aid in the examination of the competing candidates, in which he generally took the lead. Each of the candidates might be examined by the proposers of the other candidates. A frequent result of these examinations was that all the competing candidates were declared to be ineligible, and that either advertisements were issued for fresh candidates, or that a request was made to the General Board to send some one deemed competent, and that I had myself to examine candidates for the appointments. The Assistant Commissioner's Report was required for the approval of the appointments by the General Board.

The powers under the Public Health Act for retrieving the administration of the rates for local works from previous waste and inefficiency were greatly impaired by successful opposition, and the securities originally proposed for qualifications of the officers were struck out. I am, however, happy to state that evidence has, nevertheless, arisen of an extending perception by the local boards, of the necessity of the abandonment of patronage, and the adoption of increased securities for fitness, and the utility of some form of what is deemed competent examination.\*

Character of  
local patronage  
in the adminis-  
tration of  
works.

\* For drainage works, hitherto no qualification whatever was usually conceived to be requisite. I was informed that when one of the old district commissions of sewers advertised for a person to act as a surveyor to the works who understood the use of the spirit level, the candidates, who were nearly all common house builders, were greatly surprised at the novel demand, and several of them began to learn the use of that instrument in order to qualify them for the appointment. In the canvassing letters which I have seen for parochial or local surveyorships, I never observed qualifications for skill or science even adverted to, and where a special qualification happens to be prescribed by statute, it is not regarded; for example, the Act of 5 & 6 Will. 4. enables the parochial

Suggestive information has been circulated to those boards also as to the special qualifications required; but they have not had, as the guardians had, the assistance of inspectors to aid them in their examination and choice; in a larger proportion of cases, therefore, than under the Poor Law Amendment Act, applications have been made to the General Board for aid by examinations. The local boards of Hull, and other places have, of their own accord, sent up to the General Board the persons whom they had selected as the most fit to be their chief officers (surveyors), with the request that these persons might undergo a proper examination before the appointments were confirmed. The service of conducting these examinations has generally been entrusted to Mr. Austin, the chief Engineering Inspector, and his reports have been transmitted to the local boards accordingly.

Instances of  
the spontaneous  
abandonment  
of local patron-  
age.

In some instances the General Board has been re-vestries to appoint as surveyor a person of "skill and experience" to serve the office of surveyor of such parish. As an example of this description of appointment, I may mention one, where in an important metropolitan district, the person appointed was an illiterate tinman, a leading speaker at parish meetings, who for a service occupying part of his time, receives a salary of 150*l.* per annum, that is, as much as a lieutenant of Engineers and a private, or as much as three sergeants of sappers and miners, whose whole time is devoted to the public service. In the same parish, a tailor, in low condition and with little better qualifications, got himself appointed to a legal clerkship with a salary of between four and five hundred pounds per annum. Both these officers were local agitators who had considerable influence in the return of members pledged to protect the so-called local self-government. Even under the Public Health Act, whilst the local authorities of the important proportion of cities and towns above stated, have voluntarily abandoned their patronage—in others, in consequence of the absence of securities for fitness, tradesmen have been appointed as town surveyors, who were utterly ignorant of the duties of the office, and are a source of embarrassment from their unfitness to superintend the new measures proposed for the regulation of buildings in towns. In one town a large brick sewer of noxious deposit had been constructed at wrong levels, and at an expense which would have sufficed for efficient house drainage, as well as self-cleansing sewerage. It turned out that this had been done at the instance of a grocer, who had got himself made surveyor. In another town, where obstructions to the adoption of any improved plan of works were experienced, it turned out that a neighbouring farmer, who had diverted a portion of the town sewerage for the irrigation of his own land, had by an offer of cheap services got himself made town surveyor, in order to prevent the adoption of any plan of drainage by which the outfalls would be changed to his disadvantage. In another town, under the Public Health Act, a coal merchant was appointed to the place of town surveyor; in others carpenters and plumbers.

requested to make direct appointments at such salaries as it might deem proper. The local authorities of twenty-five cities and towns, including Dover, Southampton, Salisbury, and Coventry, have practically abandoned the principle of patronage, by requesting the General Board to name an engineer for planning and taking the responsible superintendence of the execution of their local works. The General Board has also received similar applications from places not under its jurisdiction. In all, the local boards of no less than sixty-nine towns have, in one way or another, abandoned the principle of appointments by patronage, and have voluntarily sought the aid of the General Board, or of their officers.

Having, as one of the commissioners for inquiring into the constabulary force, and the means of appointing an efficient local police, been frequently consulted on the establishment of new county police—I can state that there has been an extensive, I believe, a general abandonment of patronage by magistrates in relation to the appointments of the superior as well as the inferior officers. In the absence of any provision for previous training, numerous applications were made to my late colleague, Sir Charles Rowan, to name qualified men, and to appoint more than he was able or willing to spare.

Objections that patronage is necessary to the working of representative bodies examined.

When the measures were first proposed for the abolition of patronage, in the parliamentary sense of the term, in local administration, the notion of their practical working was then treated, as now in the Civil Service by old political and other officers, with the like incredulity that the old Mahratta chieftains treated the notion of European armies or Native armies in India being moved or maintained in the field without regular plunder. It was said, indeed, by well intentioned persons engaged in local administration, "If you interfere with and regulate the appointments of the local officers, if you regulate business and interfere with contracts, and exclude the exercise of influence and feeling, where shall we get our attendance at boards, or men to attend our committees?—and how shall we withstand agitation and obstructive opposition, if we are deprived of the means of rewarding the labours or meeting the reasonable expectations of our supporters?" Such were the remonstrances used in some of the larger town districts. The phrases may be taken as synonymous with other phrases which have been

heard, such as, interference with the means of keeping the legislature in harmony with the executive: or non-interference with the patronage of "the Crown," as if the Crown received lustre from the inefficiency of the Public Service. The local opposition to the discontinuance of patronage was frequently made with vehement declamations in patriotic guise (under which there generally lurked some one or other form of jobbing,) against interference with the people's management of their own affairs (*i.e.*, the expenditure of other peoples' money by the select few,) and against infringing upon local self-government. In the larger town parishes, there were places of profit to be disposed of—beadships at 60*l.* to 90*l.*, or more per annum; clerkships at 80*l.* to 150*l.*; surveyorships at similar amounts; vestry clerkships at from 200*l.* to 300*l.* and 600*l.* per annum; besides private professional business for attorneys, collectorships of local taxes of the country to the total amount of 7,000,000*l.*, contracts for its expenditure, and opportunities for shifting shares of burdens by the management of valuations and assessments. The business there was ill regulated, the qualifications of the officers were undefined or disregarded. There were also commonly found local cliques meeting at pot-houses, party clubs, and violent chronic party agitation. Nothing proposed was good; nothing was satisfactorily done by the party in power. After agitation for a term of years the party in office were ousted; the new party removed the paid officers, and put the executive "in harmony" with themselves. These changes were productive of variations, but rarely of improvements in administration or expenditure. In the Sanitary Report made in 1842, speaking of the local administration of public works, I had occasion to observe:—"No one can have had occasion to examine much of the business of local administration, without being aware of other evils entailed by the multiplication of badly appointed officers, in addition to the evils of the excessive cost, and the bad quality of the service to the ratepayers. One of the evils is the fuel they add to the flames of local parties, by which both parties are generally losers. Where special and scientific qualifications are not defined, or if defined, not secured—where the most fatal errors, as in this instance, are shrouded by the nature of the work from detection—all the idle dependents of election committees who have time to spare, because they have failed in their own business for want of steady application, and because

"their time is worthless, are let in as candidates; and in proportion to the absence of security for qualifications is the extent of expectation created, and of disappointment and continued agitation ensured."

Removal of the motives to sinister action followed by regularity of action.

Neither the newly improved arrangements of business and duties which displayed the specialities required even for local service, nor the examinations and additional securities provided for the fitness of officers, and for their protection by the board against unjust removal, have been established in vain. Their result has been greatly to advance the respectability of the local service, and to discourage candidates of the class described, whose time was given in aid of mere agitation and the obstruction of the local administration. As a result of the improved local administration, the local party agitation has been checked, and to a considerable extent has disappeared. Fewer persons are put upon the lists of candidates merely to carry appointments, or contracts; and the respectability of the representation has been improved. The attendance of persons of higher qualifications on the local boards has been obtained, and the business has been better transacted.

Among the clerks in the local boards have appeared instances of ability in the despatch of business, and in correspondence, which might advantageously enter into comparison with services in the higher offices.

Examples of improved administration obtained by improved service.

The first step in the improvement in the whole administration of the Poor Laws was the abatement of the local patronage, and improvement in the permanent officers appointed. I may mention as illustrative of the effects of the new securities for fitness by the examination of school teachers, that at the time of my first investigation full two thirds of all the children brought up under the charge of the former parish officers and their untrained and unexamined school teachers returned as permanent burthens upon the public,—the females who had personal attractions, as prostitutes; and the males, as well as females, who were not known to be living in vicious courses at large, as helpless paupers,—while a large proportion of the inmates of bridewells were found to be ill-educated and incorrigible parish apprentices. Scarcely one third were trained into courses of productive industry. These consequences of administrative ignorance and neglect—consequences which were nowhere more conspicuous than in many of the large parishes where the agitation was most furious—have been since so far reduced by the introduction

of a better system with regard to pauper children, that full two thirds of them have been got into permanent courses of productive and independent industry.

In the district schools, however, where a better order of well-trained and well-examined school teachers are, by the advancement of the service, brought more systematically to bear upon the objects, there is an almost entire absorption of the worst portions of paupers, the offspring of hereditary vagrants, into honest and productive courses of industry—except, of course, in cases of bodily or mental disability, such as malformation or idiocy, partial or entire. Even they, however, may be eventually provided for by further practical improvements, if the opposition to district schools, to extended classification, and to special treatment,—an opposition mainly arising from the aversion to give up contracts and management, or from petty local patronage,—be withstood.

No voluntary or private educational efforts, even of the middle or the higher classes, if we compare their present with their former results, can show a rate of progress equal to that obtained in the improved union or district schools,—a progress owing mainly to the increased efficiency of the service, resulting from the improvement of appointments, general as well as local. Like improvements have been effected by the advanced modes of instruction introduced by Government officers into Ireland—improvements which, as regards the pauper children, are mainly due to the original exertions of Sir George Nicholls. Irish children of the class which once attended hedge-schools, but has latterly passed through the training of the National Schools, are actually now as adults obtaining preferences for appointments in private establishments in Scotland, as they have frequently done in the police in England, owing quite as much to their steadiness and sobriety as to their intelligence. The improvement due to the increased efficiency of this service proves the absolute practicability of improving the whole status and conduct of the entire rising generation, and of bringing the benefits within the enjoyment of the living parents.

Private improvements exceeded by improved public administrative improvements.

It may be alleged that the abolition of local patronage and the increased securities for the fitness of appointments have largely contributed, with the extension of areas and the consolidation and economy of means, to the improvement in the English Poor Law administration; and that it has been an improvement which would not indeed have

Benefits, in improvement of the representative bodies, improvement of administration, and reduction of burthens, consequent on the diminution of local patronage.

been effected without the aid of fitter officers, inasmuch as the substantive law, the 43rd of Eliz., and the right to relief, remained unchanged. Not only has the threatened increase in pauperism been averted, but upwards of forty millions of rates have been saved, exclusive of labour rates in various forms abolished, which, though not brought into account, were estimated at between one and two millions per annum in addition.\*

Under the County Police Act, instances have been presented, as in Essex, where a new and efficient police force has been instituted out of little more than the savings of the former local expenditure for constabulary purposes; and this has been mainly the result of the abandonment of patronage and the requirement of special fitness, instead of influential connexions in the officers appointed—for (some few administrative changes excepted) the substantive law remains the same as that under which the parish constables acted and still act in other counties.†

\* The total amount of the poors' rates was in 1813, 2s. 6½d. in the £l., on the value of real property as assessed in 1815. In 1852, it was reduced to 1s. 0½d. in the £l. on real property as assessed in 1851. In 1813, the rate of expenditure was 13s. 1¼d. per head on the population of 1811. From that period there was an apparent reduction, but a real augmentation of the burthen by the shifting it upon labour rates and other rates. It was, however, 8s. 9½d. per head on the population at the time of the passing of the Poor Law Amendment Act. At present it is 5s. 6d. per head. At the rate of expenditure per head of the population in 1834, it would now have been 7,881,290l.; but at the former rate of expenditure, inclusive of that shifted upon labour and other rates, taken at 13s. 1¼d., it would have been 11,747,230l. instead of 4,939,064l., the amount for 1853, inclusive of the payments for all the new officers and the new union houses, the expenses of which were treated as ruinous.

† I am informed from the United States that the appointments to the police forces of the principal towns have been much used as patronage, and have been commonly as much jobbed, and directed for party purposes as they frequently are by the local authorities in the cities and borough towns of Great Britain. (See the evidence given before the committees of the House of Commons on the county police, and on the licensing system during the last session.) I have received a copy of the six-monthly report of the chief of the police of New York for 1854, on the working of a new law passed there for the abolition of political patronage in the appointments, and for the institution of an examination as to the fitness of the candidates. The report states that previously the police of that city "well understood, that they had to enter the political arena, and connect themselves with the dominant clique of partizans in the separate wards, in order to secure a re-appointment at the expiration of the term for which they were appointed; so that instead of being disinterested officers at the polls during the

The new local administrative arrangements under the Public Health Act have not been in operation sufficiently long for their effects to be manifest; but it is proper to state that where fitness of appointments has been the most regarded, the new measures have certainly been prosecuted with the greatest zeal and energy. Three districts will be drained at an expense heretofore incurred for one, and the population will receive supplies of water at one-half the rates charged by trading companies. Local public administration will thus be vindicated from the usual charge of inferiority to common trading companies, by the far cheaper as well as better execution of their works.

I consider, however, that all the arrangements to which I have referred were in themselves only of a rudimentary

"election, they became interested partizans striving for the success of their favourite cliques. Policemen were found connected with clubs, committees, or other organization of a political character, leading them to perform their duty with inattention, and sometimes to entirely neglect it, thus exercising a most baneful influence upon the efficiency and character of the department. In some instances policemen resigned their situations a few days prior to an election, to enable them to enter upon the contest untrammelled, while their places were kept purposely vacant until the election was over, when they were re-appointed for a term of years. In other cases, policemen, on ascertaining that their particular cliques had been defeated at the election, would resign their offices, and obtain their re-appointment from the alderman and assistant then in office, for a term of years extending beyond the period of time for which their successors were elected." "In this way, the whole department was kept as it were in a state of constant excitement, impairing its usefulness, and turning it into a political engine for the advancement of particular cliques or individuals." By the new law the New York Police are forbidden to belong to any political clubs or associations, and the following is the account given of the working of the examinations. "By the operations of the present law any citizen may apply for appointment, and, as all applicants are personally examined by the appointing powers, in addition to being required to furnish undoubted testimonials as to character and fitness for the duties of policeman, the Commissioners have it in their power to select only such as in their united judgment are most competent and capable for the post. That appointments have thus far been made with decided advantage over any other system, is abundantly manifested by the superior character of the newly appointed men, and the high state of discipline and efficiency to which the department has attained, fully justifying the confidence which the community has a right to repose in a force so large and important." To check the introduction of patronage into the metropolitan police force, the late Sir Robert Peel provided that no one should be admitted as qualified for the office of inspector or superintendant who has not been trained by actual service in each subordinate rank.

character, for in combined action in which a man finds himself hedged in on every side by limitations, and compelled to innumerable concessions, it is only some qualified and incomplete good that can at present be obtained.

Tendency of conflicts for patronage in representative bodies, similar to that displayed in the United States.

Large town districts under local Acts, which are allowed to continue practically independent of responsibility for adherence to general public principle, and where the appointments remain on the old footing of patronage, may be pointed out as the seats of excessive local agitation and of party conflicts, and as presenting features resembling the more prominent features of the general as well as local administration of the United States. These features are:—the absence of the recognition of any special qualifications for any administrative service, unless it be those of subserviency to party agitation; exclusive party appointments; the removability of the paid officers with each change of party (carried to the most reckless extent in the United States); degrading displays of violent passions in public proceedings, such displays as would occasion the expulsion of any person from any private house or society of his own class; an increasing distaste to public office and the consequent practical exclusion from it of the most accomplished persons in society; the lowering of the efficiency and the respectability of public administration; the retardation of its progress relatively to the general progress of society; and a tendency to increasing corruption concurrently with increased party feeling.\* In the United States this tendency has been developed to such an extent, and has been so prevalent in the higher federal representation, superinduced upon the lower local representation, that in the last year public opinion compelled the passing of an Act to impose special penalties on the acceptance of bribes by Members of Congress or by the high officers of State, for the use of their votes and influence in respect to public works or public measures.† The tendency of the system in the lowest as

\* *Vide* Mr. Tremehere's "Constitution of the United States."

† In illustration it may be mentioned that Mr. Joseph Whitworth invented a street sweeping machine, by which one man and a horse would do the work of twenty sweepers. He offered its use to ensure twice the amount of cleanliness for the same expenditure of rates. Of the fact of the return of service on his condition, there could be no doubt; but the increase of service was no stimulus to the adoption of the machine, and did not prevail against the patronage and influence of dust contractors and scavengers, and the mere trouble of making a change of practice in

well as the highest representative bodies in the Union is displayed authentically by some proceedings upon the presentment of a grand jury, and the examinations of witnesses before the Recorder of the City of New York against aldermen and officers of the council of that city for actual and habitual bribery and corruption in respect to public services and concessions of railways, of sewers, and other works.

Such administration is in a condition below the educated intelligence of the country, and, for the service rendered, it is excessively expensive. Examination shows it to be additionally expensive, from the burdens and evils maintained in consequence of neglect and omissions; one proof of which is the voluntary labour and subscriptions to which the public are put by the necessity of attempting to supply such omissions, and to do those things by voluntary associations which can only be done efficiently by a competent Civil Service. It is expensive in the occupation of public time and attention in mere personal conflicts—which might as well be occupied by so many bull-fights or boxing matches—to the exclusion of attention to substantial administrative measures. The attention to one such conflict ending in the elevation of one morally indifferent person or another, would often suffice for effecting an important social or administrative improvement. Grievous complaints are now being raised in the United States that the price of the so-called freedom is "eternal vigilance" and labour of the majority of the community in watching the changing administrations, and keeping their administration pure—in which they, as denoted by the statute referred to, nevertheless fail egregiously. The extent and irksomeness of this labour to the members of a community engaged in their own private affairs, occasions the outcry that they are made

the larger districts. He proposed his machine to the local authorities at New York. His agent was at once frankly told that there was a fatal objection to the working of the machine in that city—viz., it had no votes, and it interfered with the patronage, not of the master scavengers as in England, but of the journeymen scavengers who had votes. With an excessive expenditure of rates, New York is described as being often ankle deep in mud, and as filthy as the worst parts of London—all the filth being traceable to patronage. A former political member of the American Government told me that he found the votes and the patronage of the great numbers serving as the scavengers of New York the most difficult to deal with of any matter he had met with in the agitation in which he had been engaged for the election of a president.



“slaves to liberty.” And yet the condition of the representative bodies most worked by patronage is such that, according to all competent testimony, as a general rule, any systematized measure, especially any measure partaking of a scientific character, is extremely difficult to pass, is never improved in them, but is almost sure to be sent out worse than it came in, unless it can be got through by stealth.

The advantages resulting in every direction to the local administration from the abolition of mere patronage, and the adoption of increased securities for fitness, so far as they have been applied, together with the improvement in the transaction of business, which the improved appointments permitted, would, I apprehend, be realised to a still greater extent in the general Public Service of the country.

Objection that educational qualifications for the lower ranks of the service are unnecessary.

One of the first objections raised to the principles of improvement proposed, is that they are not required for the whole field of the Public Service. It has been averred, in relation to the whole body of 53,000 persons who, according to the census, are engaged in the Civil Service, that there is a large proportion of them, almost all the lowest ranks (comprising, according to one objector, the larger proportion of those engaged in the “Post Office, Customs, Excise, Dockyards, and “persons in all departments, including messengers, porters, “workmen, and artizans, and many others”), who “require “only arms and legs, health and strength, little education, “but frequently some degree of trustworthiness.” And for all these any special educational training or examination to ensure fitness is treated as wholly unnecessary.

Now it may be averred and maintained, that such estimates as these are superficial, and made in ignorance of the qualifications practically needed even for the lowest ranks of the Service, and that they overlook the waste, failures, anxieties, contrivances of checks, and labour of superintendence required to supply their deficiencies. To refer for illustration to other branches of services than those in question,—it is usually assumed that no higher qualification than those above described are needed for the “common policeman;” and yet when it comes to actual service it is found that courts of law and the public require of him, in the performance of his extraordinary duties, almost the discretion of a judge—in dealing with the

lowest ruffians, the command of temper of a clergyman—in the collection of evidence, the astuteness of an attorney general—and in the performance of his ordinary and minor duties, the amenities of a gentleman—and expect all this for eighteen shillings a week; being astonished and indignant if he fail in any particular. The like qualifications are required from the relieving officer, and any deficiency in them is similarly censured. He is to exercise the kindness of a good Samaritan with the strictest regard to economical principle; and is, in the expenditure of other people’s money, to withstand the wiles and curses of the profligate, and the displeasure of the powerful, who want to pay wages and get cottage rents out of rates.

It is really matter of surprise, to find on close inspection how frequently well-trained and soundly-educated men, serving in obscurity and contentment in the lowest ranks of the Service, exercise the most valuable moral and mental qualities. Even as regards the rank and file of the army and of the navy, the common supposition is erroneous that they need little more than arms and legs and health. I have received the evidence of experienced naval officers, that they can work a ship more economically and safely with a smaller crew of trained and educated, than of uneducated seamen; and experienced officers of the army, who have seen much service in the field, have attested to me the fact that trained and educated men are more valuable as soldiers for the ranks, more efficient and “bid-dable,” steadier under fire, and safer from panics than ignorant men. To physical force education adds the element of moral power, which, on the most important occasions, acts with preponderant effect.

In respect, however, to the ranks of the Service immediately in question, Mr. John Wood may best answer what is needed of the “common exciseman,” in dealing with fraudulent traders, and in resisting powerful temptations to connivance. Mr. Rowland Hill may represent how far the mistakes, miscarriages of letters, abstraction of their contents, and obstructions to improvement in the postal service of which the public complain, are due to the system of patronage by which the ranks, and the local appointments of that department, have been filled up. Dr. Lyon Playfair and Mr. Henry Cole may show, in respect to practical science and art, what room there is for the advancement of the education of artizans

for service within their own proper sphere, and the public advantages of giving appointments to them upon an educational test in preference to every other. Mr. W. Fairbairn has shown, in respect to one class of artizans—those engaged in the use of steam power—what dangers and losses, what obstructions to improvements and to practical economy are occasioned by their low educational standard, and by their want of information and care as to the nature of the elements they are appointed to manage. But if it were conceded that no material improvements, no other than ordinary qualifications, are needed for the ranks of the Service—that we should go on with three ill-paid and ill-conditioned men doing what may be done better and more economically by two who are better appointed, if not better trained—the question still remains, whether the appointments shall continue to be given on political influence as patronage; or, to state the matter plainly, whether a large proportion of public offices shall continue to be given away for political influence, that is one form of the bribery which the legislature, in compliance with the public opinion, condemns and endeavours to repress? The practice of holding out places for favour,—that is, of the offer of salaries with little or no responsibility for efficient service, and its tendency to corrupt the population by the creation of bodies of office-seekers larger than can possibly be satisfied, may, as I have before stated, be seen displayed on a large scale in the United States, in the maintenance of the party and political agitation, and of those obstructions to administrative improvement and legislation which patronage is supposed to be necessary to overcome. It would, I apprehend, be far better to put up all offices of mere general qualifications for sale to the highest bidders, even if the proceeds were thrown away. To avoid the evils of patronage, and to determine the choice in cases where the special qualifications for service may be equal, there is presented the alternative and the claims of general educational qualifications.

Social influence of the qualifications of the lower class of officers upon the community.

The social influence of more than fifty thousand officers, *i. e.* of a body of men twice as numerous as the clergy, is, in itself, deserving of serious consideration. Nor can it be doubted that the possession by them of an education beyond the apparent and immediate need of the routine of the service, would be of public advantage. I say the immediate need, because there are occasions in which they are

called upon to perform collateral services for which the general educational qualification is advantageous.\*

The lower class of officers are spread over the country, and by their intelligence and respectability would exercise a beneficial influence on the lower ranks of society in remote places. In thinly populated rural parishes, where there are no gentry, the curate and the curate's wife are often at the head of society, and frequently by their social influence with the farmers and farmers' wives, prevent relapses into extreme rudeness and barbarism of manners. In villages, where there is no curate, the postman and the exciseman are commonly the chief persons of note or consideration. To these may now be added the relieving officers. I hope and believe that the substitution of this new and respectable class of men, and others of the body of 12,000 new local officers will have contributed new and valuable social influence. In the improvements of local works, I have urged the use of self-cleansing processes, and the discontinuance of inferior and filthy labour as occasioning the social gain of the substitution of a better class of local public officers, freed from the influence of degraded personal habits. Whilst at present the appointments to the lower offices in the Civil Service are commonly of a description to excite little other popular feeling than that of disrespect for useful service, the walking example in the postman of the attainment of a respectable position by superior scholarship in the village or district school, presented by the only man whom they ever or repeatedly see with the Queen's uniform, would really teach an important moral, as well as exercise a just and pure political influence. Such uniforms are now, too frequently degraded in popular estimation, as the insignia of invidious jobbing or political bribery. On the principles proposed, every uniform would be looked upon with respect as implying in the wearer social merit, as well as public service.

When, however, the actual requirements for the lower ranks of service are closely examined, with the view to improved provision for them, I apprehend, it will

\* As an instance of such collateral service, let any one compare the census of Ireland collected by the better educated police for the two last periods, with the census for England collected by English overseers under the most zealous superintendence of the late Mr. Rickman.

be found that all which may reasonably be expected from the application of the principles proposed with that object, instead of exceeding, will rather fall short of the direct and immediate necessities of the official service itself. Men from the new training schools, especially from the improved Irish schools, or men from superior natural capacities advanced in sound education beyond the common level, and beyond what may be expected, for a long time, to be a common level, are occasionally found in the lower ranks of service, not only without any inconvenience and disadvantage to the Service itself being experienced from their attainments; but markedly the reverse.

It is, no doubt, to be deeply lamented that literature did not afford to Burns the poet the competence that it would do now, and that he was obliged to take the office of an exciseman; yet he must have judged, that the post of exciseman was a relief from the extreme penury of the condition of a small farmer, or from impending starvation. But on looking to his official papers and reports as an exciseman, it appears probable that—being in the ranks, it was a wrong to the Service and to himself, that the promotion due to his superior qualifications was denied to him in consequence of the preference given to patronage and seniority over merit.

All who are acquainted with the narrow circle of the highest class of permanent officers in the Civil Service will speak of them with respect; and for myself I should testify that most of them are in nowise exceeded in business, power, and devotion, and are rarely equalled in general capacity and accomplishments by the chiefs of the highest manufacturing, commercial, or mercantile establishments, which lead the prosperity of the empire. In adverting to the class of appointments below them in the Civil Service, but immediately above the ranks, and composing the older Public Offices, I would beg permission to avail myself of the testimony which Sir James Stephen has given in relation to this large proportion of persons serving there. Speaking of the condition of the offices up to the time when he quitted the post of Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, seven years ago, he states:—

“ The majority of the members of the Colonial department in my time possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost incredibly low, either the talents or the habits of men of business, or the industry, the zeal, or the knowledge required for the effective

Direct testimony as to the proportion of unqualified persons in the offices of the highest service.

“ performance of their appropriate functions.” \* \* \*  
 “ It would be superfluous to point out in detail the injurious results of such a composition of one of the highest departments of the State. Among the less obvious consequences of it were—the necessity it imposed on the heads of the office of undertaking, in their own persons, an amount of labour to which neither their mental or their bodily powers were really adequate—the needless and very inconvenient increase of the numbers borne on the clerical list—the frequent transfer of many of their appropriate duties to ill-educated and ill-paid supernumeraries, and the not infrequent occurrence of mistakes and oversights, so serious as occasionally to imperil interests of high national importance.

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“ In reliance on much uniform, concurrent, and credible evidence from others, and in reliance of what I myself knew and observed at the Board of Trade, I believe that the state of the Colonial Department, as I have described it, is no unfair example and illustration of the state of the other great departments of the Government, as they existed during my personal connexion with the Public Service.”

He states that the majority usually entered the office with no greater store of information or maturity of mind than usually belongs to a boy in the fifth form at Eton, Westminster, or Rugby. What they so brought they never afterwards increased by any private study. Finding themselves engaged in the actual business of life, they assumed that their preparation of it was complete, and (so far as I could judge) they never afterwards made or attempted any mental self-improvement.”

These, he states, “were without exception men who had been appointed to gratify the political, the domestic, or the personal feelings of their patrons, that is of successive Secretaries of State.”

Improvements have no doubt been made in the administration of the older departments during the last seven years, but private and professional service has also been improved in the meanwhile, and the above may be taken as a short view of the position of the Public Service relatively to private service, and as constituting, as respects the higher offices, a pressing case for the proposed measures of amendment. It may be challenged as an unwarrantable supposition that such a state of things prevails,

or would be endured, or would work, as private establishments, with a dead weight of an actual majority of persons who "possessed only in a low degree the habits or the knowledge required for the effective performance of their respective functions;" and that must be treated as a morbid and distorted view of the moral standard of the age and country; upon which it is alleged that there is neither intelligence nor a sense of rectitude capable of the attainment of any thing better. The impartial public feeling on the subject is decisively displayed to the extent to which I have shown; that local patronage has already been spontaneously abandoned. The standard of the administration of the highest public affairs, must be degraded below existing standards of subordinate departments, below even those presented by local boards throughout the country; the proposed examinations must indeed be worse conducted than the lowest of those in actual practice; if they failed to protect the Service from the further influx of persons above described, either by compelling them to obtain the requisite qualifications previous to appointment, or by totally excluding them.

And, first, with respect to the nature of the examinations proposed as means for securing these qualifications.

When examinations are spoken of in general terms, the common educational examinations as to general qualifications are taken as implied; and certainly whilst even such examinations may under existing circumstance be of advantage simply as a barrier to positively inferior and corrupt appointments, I submit that, for the due advancement of the Civil Service, examinations should be, as much as possible, directed to ensure in the officers an education which is new and special, and even particular and practical.

The Report of Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote does not propose any one form of examination, and leaves that an open question; but from the reference made to Mr. Jowett, as to the practical working of examinations, objections are raised to the proposed measure on the assumption that it is intended to provide only for general qualifications; and that those qualifications would be only such as are supplied by the present university education, tested by the common academical examinations.

It may be here premised, without going into the technicalities of the question, that in the Civil Service the demands for service will generally be found to be divisible into two large divisions requiring distinct treatment,

Division of the Service into higher and lower practical qualifications.

first, of those who require primary or textual examinations for elementary practice; and secondly, those who require examination as to the application of settled principles, after some form of service that may serve as preliminary to service in more advanced stages;—the division being one of practical art and of corresponding practical science. To take an example from the service in which I have been recently engaged. Questions as to a capability of taking levels, as to the conduct of a survey, or the preparation of finished plans,—necessary parts of the examination of a candidate for a town surveyorship,—would be superfluous in the examination of a candidate for the higher office of an engineering inspectorship. Indeed the text and the elementary practice will frequently be forgotten in proportion as an officer has risen into superior practice; and he might be as little able to pass an examination as La Grange, the great mathematician, avowed he was to pass the examination of his own pupils. It is to examinations, whether for admissions or promotion in the intermediate and the higher class of appointments, that the question as to the adoption of the present academical qualifications will chiefly refer.

One noble lord, himself an eminent public officer, objects to the measures proposed, because, overlooking professional examinations at home, he says, the plan is Chinese—the Chinese having examinations for their Civil Service. But in what and to what are those Chinese examinations? It might as well be objected to popular education that it was Hindoo, because the Hindoos have a popular education, with endowed village schoolmasters, but it is education based on a belief in astrology. It is the appearance of appropriate and practical knowledge which in China confers rank, as it would here, if rank were given for proficiency in the dead languages, or in abstract and impracticable science. It is, however, declared by well-informed persons, that such as they are, it is these examinations which make the Chinese and their empire superior to the wretched Burmese. Under the impression created, that the examinations for service would be scholastic or academic, I should fully concur with my noble friend and other objectors on the same grounds. If indeed the specialities of departments were not intended to be provided for by every means, I apprehend that the measure will fall far short of the extent of improvement which is required, and practically attainable. *Dolus*

Corruption  
lurking in  
merely general  
requirements.

*latet in generalibus.* Beside corrupt appointments from the want of competency, there are corrupt appointments of persons with high but unsuitable qualifications. The insufficiency of mere general qualifications is popularly perceived, and the justice of appointments founded on them disputed. The fitness of special qualifications when they are stated is conceded.

What I apprehend is to be striven for is, that we should do with the money of others as we would do with our own, in engaging professional or other service for ourselves. We should look primarily for the special qualifications, and, *cæteris paribus*, should be determined in the choice on a competition, as to those qualifications, by collateral considerations of social position or even of general accomplishments. We should have disappointed the expectations of local boards of health, if, on reference made to us for the examination of candidates, the examination had been directed mainly to the general, instead of the special qualifications.

The provision for specialities appears to me of such essential importance, and I have observed so many failures in the expectation that they would be superinduced upon general qualifications, that I beg leave to submit explanations upon it, and upon the objections to merely general examinations of a merely general character.

Taking the general qualifications which Mr. Jowett contemplates to be those conferred by university education up to this time, it is objected, and, so far as my own experience has gone, I concur in the objection, that in the Civil Service, even first-class men have, as a matter of fact, proved failures in as large a proportion of instances as any others.\*

\* Sir Charles Lyell in his evidence before the Oxford University Commission attests, with others, "the prejudices and aristocratic notions fostered amongst the middle as well as the higher classes, by the neglect of useful knowledge in their education," giving them notions incompatible with the line of life to which they may be destined, although that line may be one demanding a liberal education—which occasion "the youth, however well satisfied with the honourable calling proposed for him," to "discover at the end of a few terms, that such occupations are vulgar and beneath his dignity. How much vulgarity of feeling and want of true independence may be at the bottom of such fine notions, it is superfluous to inquire here." "If, at the age of twenty-two he had acquired an aristocratic distaste for the professional career which was open to him, it may be years before he recovers as much common sense as will open his eyes to his true interests." "I must also," says Mr. Robert Lowe, M.P., "as a sincero

The failures have arisen, both from unsuitable qualifications and from holding themselves above the valuable, steady

"well-wisher to the university, express my hope that the physical sciences will be brought much more prominently forward in the scheme of university education. I have seen, in Oxford, men placed in positions in which they had reason bitterly to regret their costly education, while making them intimately acquainted with remote events and distant nations, had left them in utter ignorance of the laws of nature, and placed them under immense disadvantages in that struggle with her which they had to maintain." A retired officer, of long experience in the Civil Service and in another department, in writing to me on the subject, observes on this point, "Many persons expect great improvements to the Civil Service from university examinations, or from examinations conducted in a similar manner and on similar subjects; and some persons desire to restrict all responsible public offices to persons who have taken a degree, by way of securing respectability and capacity. There would be force in this notion if university graduates were invariably, or usually found to be in office superior to other men of their class. But this is not the case in official life. Certainly many first-rate public men have been brought up at public schools and universities, because the majority of the classes from which they are taken are educated at these places, but many equally able officers have not been so educated; and it is well known to all minutely acquainted with public offices, that the universities furnish many of the most worthless. The first requisites of a young man entering life, public or private, are good handwriting, a familiarity with common arithmetic, and common forms of business and accounts, and the power of writing correctly his own language. Now, it is notorious that young men from the universities usually enter public offices very deficient in these qualifications, and that they commence and often remain very bad men of business." No merchant or banker would require his clerk to undergo an initiatory examination in the *Antigone* of Sophocles or in *De Morgan's* Differential and Integral Calculus, nor would he think that such qualifications, however interesting in themselves, would be of more use in his business than the power of copying a painting of Turner's or a statue of Canova's,—very interesting things in their way also, and which in truth did formerly serve the purpose of tests, when Rubens was made an ambassador, and the display of ability in the arts led to employment in the service of Courts on pressing occasions when ability was pressingly needed. The merchant hires what he wants, and not qualifications that are no use to him, and no test of peculiar capacity, and for which he would have to pay extra; yet the qualifications he requires are quite as high as those of a Government clerk. Many an awkward-looking fellow of no great attainments is found to distance his more elegant and university-educated competitors in the long run, because he has steadiness and self-command; it is found that whatever he can do, he can be trusted to do: he is punctual, regular, industrious, and pains-taking; acquires soon a knowledge of official details and a power of carrying them out; knows all that is going on, and can always be referred to with reliance. In time he cannot be done without, and will and must be promoted. Had it been a question of acquired knowledge, he would have stood no chance with a university examiner, because he has not a smattering of the calculus, and does not

labour called "drudgery" required in subordinate appointments, and above applying zealously such general qualifications as they may really possess. Of late times gentlemen's families and families of condition have sought places for their younger members in banks and the larger commercial houses. There the notions and the habits fostered in the universities and the higher schools are practically found to preponderate over their advantages of a better literary education and more courteous address, and place them below the steady labour of persons of inferior general condition in life.\*

The strongest supporters of university reform are those who have entered into actual life, and who are reformers, because they find, as most do in every pursuit, how much they have to learn which they might and should have learned before, under a better direction of their studies and a due regard to "common things." Attainments in one thing are no doubt evidence of capability, but of capability for similar things, and the evidence is weaker as the things are widely dissimilar or remote.

To refer in the first place to examples of the various special qualifications frequently needed in the subordinate service. Superior skill in book-keeping and practical accountantship, has been required for ensuring correct expenditure in public offices. This qualification was not to be found in those hitherto educated at the universities, and for this we have had to seek amongst persons trained in large commercial offices. Clerks who were skilled in the calculation of tables were needed. For these I applied to Mr. Finlaison, the actuary of the National Debt Office, and to Mr. Griffith Davies, the actuary of the Guardian Insurance Office, and when extra assistance was required, it was sought from those practised in the calculations for the Nautical Almanac. For the filling in, and the due preparation of orders, for the preparation and due service of official notices; for "looking up" the law for aid in the preparation of Bills for Parliament; for attendance on committees, for "putting forward" business punctually, we had to seek persons who had served as managing clerks in the offices of solicitors in good practice. For some

\* "make Latin verses. He understands common accounts, however, which are of much greater importance, though the examiner himself in all probability, neither knows nor values them. He is not above hard work, or below it, or afraid of it."

\* *Vide* Gilbert's "Practical Treatise on Banking."

Examples of the special qualifications needed in subordinate office.

branches of the Civil Service a good legal training, such as academic qualifications do not give, nor the Public Offices as at present constituted provide, is found to supply important qualifications. For the performance of much business in relation to public works, for the examination of local plans and checking estimates, clerks were sought who had been trained in the like service in architects' offices. For speedy note-taking, frequently required to collect information communicated verbally, as well as to take down instructions, clerks were sought who had practice as short-hand writers. Such qualifications are not derived from any general forms of education, and they are rarely found in the crowd of candidates for service, but must at present usually be sought out. Some of these specialities may no doubt be expected to arise upon improved selection and training within the offices, but until then many must, I apprehend, continue to be supplied, even for the lower as well as the higher appointments, from without. I believe that due and special notification, under arrangements on a larger scale, would often bring them out in sufficient numbers for a competitive examination. When special acquirements were equal, the collateral general qualifications and accomplishments, would, as we have found, advantageously determine the choice.

Some of the most eminent members of the professions, as well as of the Civil Service, have, however, gained their start in actual life and training for it, not away from it, but in the midst of practice so early as to preclude academical accomplishments. The first entrance into life of an eminent Civil Servant, high in the Civil Class of the Order of the Bath, was, as he says, in being, when a boy, pushed through a porthole of a ship into the midst of a coil of rope.

An examination mainly on an academical basis would have excluded from the Public Service more than one recent Lord Chancellor and Chief Justice, who began life as young clerks in attorney's offices. The present Commander-in-Chief entered the army when he was little more than twelve years of age. The late Duke of Wellington declared that an academical examination would have excluded him from the army. It would have excluded Nelson from the navy. There is little doubt, however, that if they had been put to such examinations they would have passed them; but what countervailing advantages would they have derived from having been put to them,

Specialities unprovided for in general education.

at the expense of several years passed in the university, learning the classics or abstract science, instead of being in the field or on shipboard, learning by actual practice? The question is, whether after sixteen or eighteen years of age, four or six years spent at the universities, mainly in the cultivation of accomplishments, or four or six years spent in actual practice or in special training for practice, and in the world, (the cultivation of accomplishments, being left to be pursued as accessories and as amusements in relief of the Service,) would be productive of the highest eventual efficiency? In the present state of education, and until there shall be a high order of university training for specialities, or until the degree of Bachelor of Arts is restored to the original intent, the graduates being made literally *artista*, as exemplified in the case of the Bachelors of Medicine, according to the statute of Edward the Sixth (which provides, according to the tests of practical knowledge of the time, that a student "shall have made two dissections and effected three cures at the least before he shall be allowed to take the degree of Bachelor of Medicine and to practise surgery");—I am decidedly of the view taken in the ordnance department, that the advantage to the Service will be in the admissions to it being at the earlier rather than the advanced periods of life. Eminence in the attainment of that which is of little practical use is frequently found to have been obtained, to the exclusion of that which is practically the most needed. These objections have not reference solely to the time spent in obtaining proficiency in the classics, but, also, and more, to the present mode of treating what are called the pure sciences (the purity of which is at the expense of practicality), and to giving prizes for eminence in the habit of reasoning *from* abstractions which commonly only conclude *to* abstractions. I would note, as examples of what I mean, eminence in pure geometry, which leaves the landowner incapable of measuring his own lands or of testing their measurement by others—pure or hypothetical hydraulics, which give him no help in draining his fields, and which being full of false or inapplicable formulæ, lead, as we have practically found, to great waste and failures—abstract pneumatics, which give no help for the ventilation of the buildings he constructs, or the house he inhabits, and which, with abstract acoustics, leave both houses of Parliament in a state of helpless annoyance—finally mechanics, abstract from the knowledge

Failures of  
general but  
inapplicable  
qualifications.

and consideration of density of substances, strength of material, and friction, which leave the accomplished theoretical engineers of the French colleges, and indeed our own military engineers educated in the like manner, to be surpassed by the rude practicality of the most eminent English engineers, whose education began at the wheelbarrow or the workbench. To refer to instances of the practical errors occasioned by the past methods of training in merely abstract reasoning, which are matters of notoriety—the late Superintendent of machinery at the Woolwich Dock-yard, was eminent as a calculator; and, being one of the three judges appointed to determine a question between locomotive and stationary engines for the first railway at Liverpool, he declared—reasoning upon the habit of abstract mathematics without reference to the real nature of friction—that, if a locomotive were produced which dragged without cogs, he would undertake to eat the rails and the whole engine. A strictly academical examination would have admitted him and would most certainly have excluded those who did the work. It would have admitted the gentleman who is, *par excellence*, an instructor in the abstract sciences, and who wrote articles in the reviews to show the impracticability of steam navigation across the Atlantic, and it would have excluded those who accomplished the feat. It would have admitted those who condemned the screw propeller "as being contrary to the abstract law that action and reaction are equal and contrary," and therefore impracticable, and it would have excluded those who effected the improvement. It would have included such men as the Astronomer Royal, who brought before the Institute of Civil Engineers an abstract calculation to prove that the Crystal Palace could not stand, and it would have excluded the gentleman who had designed it and who made it stand, as he had made other buildings stand, and who opened the way to some of the largest structural improvements that have been made in our time. Other instances may be cited as more directly applicable to administration—as, for instance, in relation to finance, it would have included the "calculating boy," and would have excluded the greater proportion of the most eminent actuaries, merchants, directors and officers of the Bank of England, and of the East India Company, and other great commercial bodies.

The present academical education and the examination attached to it, would, in respect to some branches of admi-

nistration, give the preference to those geometrical and abstract reasoners who, from narrow premises on the ratio of the increase of population to that of production, inferred a state of destitution and crime, as arising from sheer unavoidable necessity, and therefore as unpreventible and irremediable by any legislation or administration; who inferred from abstract data a continued downward tendency in the face of all the facts of increasing prosperity; and who excited the benevolent to exertions in order to get the country out of an abyss which it was not in nor near getting into.

It would have given precedence for the Poor Law service to a gentleman who could tell me the names of Actæon's hounds, but who could not tell me the names of the chief statutes to be dealt with, and whose education had grounded him neither in the older principles of public policy nor in law or political economy applicable to them; and it would have excluded a candidate who was pre-eminent in the practical administrative reform, though he had never taken an academical degree. It would give the preference to those doctors in medicine who have instituted, and against experience have defended quarantines, over those who have at once proved the uselessness and evils of such measures of precaution and the efficiency of others.

Numerous examples might, I apprehend, be adduced to prove that for a safe basis even of general examinations it would be necessary to look to a greatly reformed university examination, or to the proposed new school of practical science and art, in which professional administration, public as well as private, might hereafter be included.

Whilst the necessity of improved securities for fitness for the Civil Service is admitted by the majority of the permanent heads of departments, it is yet contended by several of them, that the required securities, whether by examinations or otherwise, should be left to be carried into effect, not by the constitutional authority of the crown, or under the responsible supervision of any one agency in its behalf, but separately and independently by themselves, the heads of departments, who object to open competitive examinations.

The first objection to the plan of separate and close departmental arrangement is, that they will be carried into effect for the future, much as they have generally been hitherto. If past experience of them be fairly consulted, it will be found that they have mostly fallen short of

practically attainable standards of efficiency, or have been neglected, after the proposer has been removed, or have failed entirely. As for example, Mr. Henry Taylor, of the colonial department, writing in 1836, says, "At the colonial office for several years past, no clerk has been appointed without passing through a twelve months probation, at the end of which the probationer is pronounced to be either fit or unfit for the establishment." And yet only seven years ago the actual majority of that same establishment is pronounced to have been in the condition reluctantly described by Sir James Stephen. Similar examples may be adduced of the shortcomings and failures of departmental examinations, and on an impartial review of the circumstances under which they have occurred, it will be seen that the means of efficient examination are generally wanting to the separate departments, and that the proposals to conduct them separately are founded on a misconception of what is required and practicable.

To conduct examinations completely, requires laborious attention and well-considered preparations, sufficient for a specially qualified service of officers, acting in regular form and order for the performance of, what should be made, most serious and responsible judicial acts. Examinations conducted departmentally are, and must usually be, entered into suddenly, on the occasional occurrence of vacancies, amidst other business, when the duty is and must be, in the greater proportion of cases, performed perfunctorily. In the absence of deliberate and settled preparations of the general and particular topics requiring systematic attention for a well laid out field of action, the candidate is often as little prepared to do justice to himself, as the examiner, just called away from other business, is prepared to do justice to him, or to the general service. A cursory impression, however produced, in favour of a particular candidate, will frequently, upon the departmental examination, determine the choice with the least trouble to the examining officer. On merely departmental arrangements for examinations to fill vacancies which occur occasionally, not only will the duties be thus performed in general—and at the best they are performed in manners which, as compared with the systematised procedures, are scarcely deserving of being called examinations—but the means of performing them in the most efficient manner practicable will be wanting. The notification of vacancies and the choice of candidates must usually be restricted from the wide range of attraction of the general service,

Failures of separate departmental arrangements.

Inherent defect of comparative insufficiency of means.



to the narrow circle of the personal connexions or the knowledge of the chief officers of the departments. Moreover departmental nomination by itself would only be one form of patronage.

By preparation and watching for opportunities when the field appears clear of more eligible candidates, offices may frequently be almost made family heritages, as against the claims of the service itself and the public. On the failure of particular appointments, it is now common to plead in extenuation that they were the best of the candidates offered, and truly so, under the existing circumstances, of the absence of the practicable means of obtaining a more extended selection. Officers who have regarded only the occasional vacancies occurring in their own offices, have objected to the institution of an examining board as a piece of machinery wholly disproportioned to the work required to be done, and unnecessary; but they have overlooked the fact, that the aggregate number of all ranks engaged in the Civil Service is double that of the medical profession, which occupies the labours of several examining boards.

The power of systematised arrangements, as well as the all important means of competition, will be as the numbers made available for aggregation and separate treatment in *classes*. One permanent chief speaks with confidence of the sufficiency of competitive departmental examinations, of "two or more" on the occasion of a vacancy. He would have perceived the practicability of attaining far different and more efficient results in a systematised examination of two dozen or more of candidates. The sinister influences which influence appointments, dealt with singly or in cases of two or more, in comparative obscurity, will not prevail upon systematised operations applied to larger classes and in public. The chief securities for integrity and improvement, must be comparatively weakened, frittered away, and lost, and the standard of the Service kept low in numerous separate departmental arrangements; whereas the wider and the more open the arrangements for the service and the competition, the greater the certainty that the standards of the Service will be elevated and maintained. From such observations as I have made of the working of independent departmental arrangements, and appointments under circumstances as good as most of those proposed, or better, I have generally felt that although the best appointments were made, of which the circumstances admitted, yet that if wider notification had

Want of adequate means for competitive examinations.

been given, it was scarcely possible that candidates with qualifications highly superior to any then obtained would not have been forthcoming. I am confident that with regular and thorough competitive examinations upon the largest scale, the Service in those particular cases must have been greatly advanced.

Notwithstanding I have presented the two Boards entrusted with an independent power of appointment and dismissal, with which I have been connected, as exemplifying an advance upon the common condition of the Service, I should nevertheless include them as falling short of what is practicable under systematised arrangements on a larger scale. The cases of those two Boards, were, however, extraordinary and exceptional, in the prevalence at their outset of more powerful interests to ensure results on which their establishment depended, than would commonly be found in old departments, or than could be reasonably expected to continue in full force even in those boards under ordinary circumstances. If the work were to be done over again, and if there were such an examining board as I hope may be instituted, with means of examining to specialities as well as to general qualifications, I should, even with an absolute power of appointment and removal, greatly prefer sending candidates there for examination. I should do so for reasons similar to those which led local boards to refer candidates to the general boards or to their officers. The local boards, in doing so, acted upon the impression, that with the general boards such a service "must be more of a business," conducted upon wider opportunities of observation, and with more of skill from practice, exercised independently and impartially, than could be obtained by a local board.

If the examinations were left entirely open, but without competition, they would, at the best, be merely like the ordinary "pass examinations" for degrees as compared with the competitive examinations for honours.

I beg leave to refer to further illustrative experience as to competitive examinations:

I have had, with increasing experience, increasing reason for admiration of the more eminent members and the great body of the medical profession. Yet, in the business connected with the appointments and practice of medical officers of the Poor Law Unions, instances have frequently occurred of cases of mala praxis on the part of persons who, though they had obtained diplomas, were

Experience of competitive examinations for medical degrees.

evidently so illiterate, and so low in feeling and action, as to reflect decidedly and unfavourably on any examinations through which they could possibly have passed, and to suggest, for the credit of the profession as well as for the sake of the public, the expediency of additional securities being placed on all such examinations, wheresoever held. It is well known that the re-examinations for admission to the Medical Service of the army, the navy and the East India Company, have often proved necessary as a security, not only for the specialities of the several services, but also as a guard against the frequent failures of the original examinations as tests of general qualifications. The inefficiency of the ordinary pass examinations is displayed by the fact that a re-examination of licensed surgeons, and even physicians, who apply to be appointed paid officers of dispensaries, is frequently deemed necessary by experienced practitioners. One new security urgently required for the original examination is, that the examiners should not be dependent on fees upon admissions,—*i. e.* made to lose by all whom they may find it their duty to reject, and to gain by all the numbers whom they crowd in upon the field of service. But however imperfect may be the examinations as at present conducted, it may confidently be stated that without examinations the condition of the medical profession would be intolerable. Moreover, it is important to state, as showing the direction of well informed minds, and as a recognition of the value of the examination as an instrument, that the institution of some form of competitive examination for the determination of hospital appointments has, for some time past, been regarded by independent members of the medical profession as the best means of freeing the profession from the evils produced by appointments made under the pressure of influence as patronage.

For myself, though I entertain a confident opinion that the public as well as the profession lose by the competition of unlimited numbers *within* instead of *for* the limited field of service; I submit what follows only by way of illustration of the principle of competitive examinations. If we suppose that vacancies occurring in the profession in Great Britain by deaths and retirements to amount to a given number annually: that instead of flooding the field of service with double the number required, the number should be limited to the ascertained vacancies, together with what may be found sufficient for the probable

augmentation of the field of service, and that the admissions to practice are then given to those out of all the candidates for diplomas who upon examination are proved to be the best:—though the number excluded might be a small per centage of the total number, yet by such an arrangement the quality and aspect of the whole of the examinations would be changed. At present the barely passable get diplomas, and receive the same rank as those whose qualifications are of the highest order. But the possibility of the exclusion of any, would give to all the additional stimulus of a competitive examination; The examiners are put to the examination of the real grounds of difference which determine why A. is to be preferred for admission before B. The teachers and fellow pupils and friends of B., who at least ought to be present at the examinations, constitute a public to scrutinize the grounds of exclusion. Examiners who may care little for the injuries done by undue indulgence to the absent and unknown public will, under the competitive examinations, care much for any injustice to present candidates, and will be driven to fortify their decisions against suspicions of injustice and attacks from friends. An examination of the difference in efficiency of the medical “pass examinations,” which are not competitive, as compared with the examinations for honours, which are competitive—would be decisive in favour of the competitive examinations for the Civil Service. It may now, however, be confidently anticipated, that an example of the improved results generally derivable from competitive examinations, will be afforded by the new competitive examinations for medical as well as for civil appointments in the East India Company’s Service, hitherto distributed as patronage, but in January next for medical appointments, and in August for writerships, to be opened to merit. I am assured that whilst this promise is opened for the service, persons in influential position in relation to the distribution of patronage, already experience that satisfactory relief from solicitations, which members of the legislature would derive from the general measures proposed.

Besides the examples of the comparative working of competitive examinations for honours as well as of certificates of competency in England, we have an available example of the practice of competitive examinations in France, known as the *concours*, of which an account is given in a paper annexed (Appendix C.), which I wrote in 1828. I received much of my information from the late

Dr. J. King, a young physician of great promise, who had gone through the competition. His account to me was corroborated by the statement of other medical men who had opportunities of contrasting the examination in England with the competitive examinations in France, and who agreed in declaring that the method there had greatly the advantage. Dr. Sutherland, one of the medical inspectors of the General Board of Health, who has been present at some of the competitive examinations, confirms the account of them contained in the paper annexed. It is understood that the use of the *concours* for the medical service has been extended or restricted, and that it has been applied to other services, or withdrawn from them, as the interests in favour of strict qualifications, or otherwise, have prevailed. But the efficiency of competitive examinations as absolute barriers to the admission of ordinary incompetency is nowhere denied, and their efficiency as a means of elevating the service is generally admitted. Besides the appointments to the chairs of medicine and surgery, the *concours* is now applied to the professorships of the public schools; to those of the naval and military schools, to *les écoles forestières*, and to all schools and institutions where science is felt to be rigorously necessary; and it admits of a large commentary on the expense and disaster displayed where practical science—that is to say, the most comprehensive knowledge put in the best form for practical application—is not felt to be rigorously necessary in public administration. It appears, however, that of late it was felt to be absolutely necessary to take really efficient steps to remedy the relaxed condition of the administration in the naval department in France. In a printed report on its reorganisation, of the date of 3rd March, 1852, by the Minister of Marine, he sets forth as a commonly recognized fact, that “*Les employés trop nombreux et mal retribués ne produisent que peu de travail, et ne lui donnent que peu de soin. La régularité et la discipline des bureaux se relâchent, quand les agents secondaires perdent dans des stériles loisirs une partie du temps qu'ils doivent à leurs devoirs. Des agents bien retribués, et en petit nombre, parlent moins, et agissent davantage.*” The remedies proposed were to improve and simplify the procedure, and to retrieve the appointments by the application of the *concours*. This has been done, and it is understood to have succeeded completely.

The application of the *concours* has been sometimes withheld from the higher professorships, and in cases of

General condition of a branch of the French Civil Service which competitive examinations were found to be a means of retrieving.

the appointments of men of high scientific celebrity; and on due consideration it will be admitted that there is a good foundation in principle for a line of distinction as respects the higher offices.

It has been asked, as an objection to the proposed measure: “Why should not the principle be carried throughout, and examinations instituted for the highest as for the lowest offices?” Why not have competitive examinations for judgeships? To this I answer, that the object of the examinations is to obtain evidence of the fitness of persons who are untried, and who have as yet yielded no such evidence; but that the higher class of appointments will generally be confined to persons who have already been tried, and by some actual service, (usually extending over a long tract of time and in a competitive career,) have given much better evidence than could be elicited by any form of examination. The whole of the previous professional practice of the candidates for judgeships as now appointed will have been a competitive examination, by a *concours*, in fact, of years' duration. But there are in other respects sound public grounds of distinction, (to some of which, as the special qualifications gained by previous competition, I have already referred,) between the higher class of appointments and the mass of ordinary appointments and promotions.

It is stated that the *concours* is defective, in that it gives to ready answers undue advantage over written and deliberate answers to written questions—and it is said to have failed in some instances on that account. Inconveniences have been also felt from the presence and excitement of a larger number than are necessary of pupils. The course of education, and the examinations in classes at the most efficient schools are, however, no other than a species of *concours*. If showy persons or the quick obtain undue advantages over the slow of speech, it will more frequently be the fault of the examiners—of an impatient and indiscriminating and unconscientious discharge of their duties—than of the institution of the examination itself. The disadvantages of the timid were usually with single examiners. The improved examinations are now usually conducted by three examiners, who correct the defaults of personal temper in each other; and more is done with written questions and answers and less by verbal questionings. The examinations for medical degrees at the London University are reported to be so far improved in efficiency and fairness as

Why competitive examinations unnecessary for the higher classes of appointments.

to enhance their value, and to occasion increasing voluntary resort to them.

Much specious use appears to be made of the specialities of the separate departments as arguments against the proposed arrangements for the reconstruction of the Civil Service, as if arrangements upon general principles must necessarily be incompatible with those specialities. This appears to me to be like arguing from the specialities of the Ordnance, or of the separate War offices, or from the specialities of the training and direction requisite for horse, foot, and artillery, the navy, or the marines, against the common principles of examination, appointment, and promotion; and that unity of supervision of an army service, intended by common consent to be carried into effect by the new department of the War Minister. The specialities of the Civil Service, when closely examined, will be found to furnish as cogent reasons for their aggregation under general supervision for the advancement of the specialities themselves. Thus, to take the speciality of each department in its accountancy. Different offices with different objects of service, will have different subject matters of accounts, as have different professions and trades; but the accounts of each will be subject to the general principles of the accounting art. As I shall have occasion to submit in relation to the means of ensuring the application of aptitudes and regulating promotions, the general practice of public accounting (besides being encumbered with needless variations in different offices), is essentially incomplete as compared with private and professional accounting. For the advancement of this speciality of accounting, it would be economical to have one special examiner of the candidates for those services which are chiefly of account, in the general principles applicable to all the departments. The principles would be extended and confirmed by the consideration of the departmental variations in their application. By such an arrangement each department might obtain the service of special examiners of a higher order than might be obtainable separately, and ensure a higher order of efficiency in the speciality than it could under ordinary circumstances obtain within the office itself.

To advert to other specialities, those of Public Works, and of the Woods and Forests. There is now a new branch of Service, that under the Public Health Act, provided,—as ante,—with officers, medical as well as

General arrangements needed for the advancement of specialities.

Examiners in specialities practicable under general arrangements.

engineering, specially qualified for the consideration and direction of the structural arrangements of house and town drainage, ventilation, and works conducive to health or the prevention of disease. There are other departments having charge of public edifices, offices, houses, barracks, hospitals, going on at the same time without the knowledge or consideration of these specialities, maintaining overflowing cesspools, keeping underneath public and private edifices, the sources of atmospheric impurity, and of injuries to health, as well as of dilapidations and waste. [*Vide* Correspondence on the drainage of the Houses of Parliament, and on the cesspools spread beneath them.] Whilst under the Public Health Act, these specialities are provided as to house and town drainage. Under the Enclosure Commissioners is another new department; there are officers practically conversant with agricultural land drainage, whose services are not made available as they might be, for those parts of local public works where marshy wastes, or commons, as suburban lands, forming part of the sites of towns, require to be agriculturally drained in a superior manner; nor do these special services as to land drainage appear to be made available, unless casually and incidentally for the treatment of the Public Lands or the Woods and Forests.

In respect to the effects of the special training in *les écoles Forestières* in France, I am afraid that there, as well as in some of the German states, we may find examples of the management of the Woods and Forests being in advance of the management of private estates, and productive of proportionate revenue; whilst here, amongst the results of the management essentially as patronage, we have outcries for getting rid of the public lands and their administration, and for putting them under rude private management on account of its present superiority. Now it admits of proof in respect to Public Works, that this inferiority to private management here is due to the present defects of the departmental administration, and is by no means inherent to all forms of public administration, as frequently assumed by eminent members of the legislature. It may be fully established before impartial judges, that the new specialities in this country above referred to, rudimentary though they may yet be, are far in advance of private professional practice. Sir John Burgoyne applied to me for copies of the minutes of textual information, collected for the advancement of these specialities, which he wished to be given to the young en-

gineers of the Ordnance department. But I apprehend that in a full consideration of the subject, it would be found to be the most economical, under general supervision, comprehending all the separate departments of works, military as well as civil, to appoint one or more examiners, conversant with these specialities of practical science, common (as those referred to should be made) to them all; to make one common entrance, and that a special one, to the departmental sub-specialities. On the separate departmental arrangements the bases even of the specialities must be comparatively narrow, and the standards comparatively low; under general arrangements the standards of the specialities will be proportionate to the width of the collective experience brought to bear. On the greater extent and variety of the works requiring public administration, including docks, tidal harbours, and hydraulic works on the largest scale than can be comprehended in any private practice, may be founded as a means of large public economy, special examinations, constituting a school of public works superior to anything which exists, or than has ever been attempted to be got up in this country by private efforts.

Apprehensions may be entertained that the active promotion of the specialities would militate against the general qualifications required for the service. Such apprehensions are not however warranted by experience. There are persons who limit their exertions to the attainment of excellence even in sub-specialities, and who are perfectly happy in remaining in them, whilst others arise who make them practical evidence of the possession of high general powers. The greatest general in modern times was an artillery officer, and eminent generals have been obtained from other specialities of the army service; and so it may be expected to be with the Civil Service. The late Mr. Drummond, one of the most able civil servants in the country, was bred up as a military engineer. Two founders of successful banks, and themselves superior managers of banks, were bred up as captains in the East India Company's naval service. Even the specialities should be left open to general competition. As the art of war has received percussion locks and the breaking the line, and it is understood other improvements, from clergymen, and in other arts some of their greatest improvements from persons not technically engaged in them,— as agriculture from lawyers,— so it may be expected to be with the

administrative art; and entire freedom should be maintained in behalf of the public for the admission of improvements from whatever quarter they may arise. It would be consistent with such freedom that at the outset of the reconstruction of the Civil Service the examinations as to the general qualifications might be so framed as to represent rather common agreement as to what should be excluded than as to what should be admitted, which cannot be foreseen for any safe determination in the first instance.

In what I have submitted on the necessity of a provision for securing specialities, I must guard myself against the supposition of being unaware of the objections to the creation of mere official technicalities. Whilst it is to be repudiated as one of the most disastrous fallacies that passion or sinister interest has ever promulgated, that public administration, unlike private administration of smaller affairs, needs neither special aptitude nor study, and that, being incapable of principles as a practical art, unlike all practical arts, it may at once be undertaken by all people with almost equal success—it should by all means be kept free from the sham science and mere craft which has been the bane of the administration of justice, and which it has been one great object of law reform to obliterate. The proper official specialities are those which are common to private as well as public business, and are for the most part derivable from the best private practice, and when further cultivated will return contributions of improvements to that practice.

By means of the competitive examinations, such contributions may be made highly important. There are now, for example, no examinations for the professions undertaking large structural arrangements, and high titles to practice are often assumed by dangerous and wasteful empirics. If, in those of works referred to, a successful course of practical instruction be laid down as a qualification for admission to the Public Service, and the evidence of successful *practice* be preappointed for the higher grades, and open competitive examinations in them be conducted in such a manner as to ensure public confidence (as has been done in relation to the competitive examinations for certificates of competency from the School of Mines and for school teachers), it may be confidently expected that persons will be trained to the prescribed standards, and that the examinations will be resorted to for degrees or certificates as means of obtaining private engagements. A

Use of systematised public competitive examinations for the promotion of private practice.

standard of nautical education, tested by competitive examinations, for service in the Royal Navy, might be made supplemental to the examinations now instituted for the mercantile marine. For merchants and men in private business, who have no time to make textual examinations, for service in the Colonies, not to say in the United States, a certificate from a well-known and responsible Public Board, that a candidate had stood high in a competitive examination, must often enable the possessor to emerge from the narrow circle of personal connexions, and serve as a valuable passport to private practice. The like certificates would be available for accountantships and various branches of private business, for which there are now no common educational preparations, none known that may not be easily surpassed by public arrangements. The principles of public and private administration of property and business, are often essentially the same. An improved administration of a public income has been found, for example, a good training for the administration of a private income. A nobleman made a wise selection in taking for the improved administration of his own estate a successful Assistant Poor Law Commissioner at an increased salary; and other instances may be presented of successful and profitable exchanges of public for private service by staff officers, as well as by subordinate clerks.

On a full consideration of the public requirements, I apprehend that there will be found occasion for examinations for various stages of progress in the specialities as well as in general qualifications. This measure will commend itself as one of humanity as well as economy for the Civil Service (as urged for medicine by Dr. Sharpey, Professor of Anatomy at London University College). For it would provide that capacities of real worth may be early ascertained, and receive confirmation and confident direction at stages of progress, that grievous errors of unapplied, or misapplied, or insufficient capacities may be early and decisively detected, and that pupils may not be kept going on, some in mere idleness, others in courses for which they are the least fitted, consuming their time and the means of families, until the period when they might have gained a training in suitable occupation has closed, and rejection involves a total wreck, and grievous loss of money and hope.

The tendency of administrative improvement will, so to speak, be to specialise, while the tendency of supervising

boards and examiners will, unless provided for, be to generalise and to overlook special and practical adaptations. To protect departments against this tendency, and to meet the departmental objections, too, against general examinations, I would submit for consideration provisions to the effect following:

That the department needing new or additional service shall send in a requisition for it to the Board of Examiners, setting forth any particulars or specialities which may be required.

That the Board of Examiners shall issue notifications and take steps for the proper competitive examinations to be made.

That the chief permanent officer of the department, or any other whom he may depute, shall be an ex-officio member of the examining board, *quoad* the examinations for vacancies in that department; those cases being excepted where relations or particular friends of the members of the department may be candidates.

This last proviso would serve to reconcile private with public interests, in relation to an important class of appointments. It has in some instances become almost a recognised practice, and if it were not proposed, there is a natural tendency to carry it out as a rule, to reserve some appointments for the sons of deserving public officers; but securities should be taken that this should be only *cæteris paribus* as to qualifications; for otherwise it would only be one form of patronage, or the payment of former good service by the admission of inferior service which cannot sustain competition. Experience in the Service will have given the parent opportunities of which he may be fairly entitled and expected to take advantage for the special direction of the education of his son; and he ought to be content, for the sake of justice and public feeling and the Public Service, to have the due use of those opportunities tested by an impartial examination.

The principle of the concession of precedence (which I believe all classes are disposed to yield) *cæteris paribus*, to members of families of high social position and political connexions (when their position had been determined, with strict justice, by proper examinations) would be of great importance to such families. It would be of benefit to them, as a class, that those of them who do obtain such appointments should be selected from their own class for their proved qualifications, and should be relieved from the stigma

Precedence due to the sons of officers; its limitations.

of corrupt influence and favouritism by being put to maintain their own position by a due use of the advantages which the position gives them, for acquiring knowledge in relation to the Public Service. Whilst places are obtainable without the trouble of thinking, the candidates are not to be expected to take upon themselves the labour of thought in relation to the qualifications and duties of the service, and those of the class above-mentioned suffer eventually by being placed at a disadvantage in relation to the higher appointments—with which they cannot now be intrusted.

Objection, that persons of high family and condition in life will fail in competition, answered.

One apprehension expressed as an objection against the proposed measures, is, that those who will succeed best in competition, will be persons not of the higher, but of the lower conditions in life. It is assumed that the classes who now compete for low-paid commissions in the army, who undergo the examinations required for the artillery and engineers, to which the advanced social position of those corps is particularly due, will not similarly compete for offices in the Civil Service, which, it is also assumed, must continue to be ill paid; whereas, the effect of a reconstruction in bringing it up to the efficiency of private business must eventually proportionately bring up the remuneration with the market value of the Service. It is also objected that, although more ability may be obtained, this elevation of the Service in ability will have the effect of lowering its position in society. These objections have no warrant in analogous experience, and appear to arise from some illusion as to the actual height in social position of the great bulk of the Service, from which a fall notwithstanding, or by reason of an increase of efficiency, is apprehended. At present, families of good position prefer getting sons clerkships in banks to clerkships in most of the government offices; and so far as social position depends on service, the banker's clerk is at no disadvantage. It will be found, however, that only two of the Public Offices are chiefly composed of members of aristocratical families; the actual majority of the other offices being otherwise constituted. The fact is, that at present only a small proportion of the whole mass of patronage has been obtained by the representatives of the county constituencies or by persons of high position, and that a larger and increasing proportion has been obtained for the constituencies of the smaller boroughs by persons of the lower condition; and however high the present social position of the Service, I should say that the proposed

Composition of the greater proportion of public offices not aristocratic.

measures might be supported as being needed, and as calculated to check its downward social tendency, produced by the present system of patronage. For it is a fact, really of most serious importance, that this larger proportion of appointments has been given not only to persons of lower condition but to persons of education and qualifications greatly below the average of their own class. A secretary, complaining of the disadvantages of his service, related in illustration, that out of three clerks, sent to him from the usual sources, there was only one of whom any use whatsoever could be made, and that, of the other two, one came to take his place at the office leading a bull-dog in a string. I have been assured that, under another commission, out of eighty clerks supplied by the patronage secretary there were not more than twelve who were worth their salt for the performance of service requiring only a sound common education.\*

Political patronage often given to persons the lowest of their class.

\* A retired officer, writing to me on this subject of lively official interest, says, "that a faithful portrait of the parties who have procured appointments in public offices might well be considered a scandalous misrepresentation. Many instances could be given of young men, the sons of respectable parents, who were found unable to read or write, and utterly ignorant of accounts. Two brothers, one almost imbecile, the other much below the average of intellect, long retained appointments, though never equal to higher work than the lowest description of copying. Another young man was found unable, on entering, to number the pages of a volume of official papers beyond 10. It used to be by no means uncommon to have a fine fashionably dressed young man introduced as the junior clerk; on trial, he turns out fit for nothing. The head of the department knows, from old experience, that a representation of this fact to higher quarters would merely draw down ill-will upon himself; the first official duty with which the young man is charged is, therefore, to take a month's leave of absence that he may endeavour to learn to write." "Besides the imbecile who is below work, and the coxcomb who is above it, there are other kinds of unprofitable officers, including a large class who have ability enough if they would apply. The Public Offices have been a resource for many an idle dissipated youth, with whom other occupations have been tried in vain. Such a person can be made of little use, whatever be his abilities, because he cannot be trusted. No one can tell to-day where he will be to-morrow. The ice is in fine condition and he skates for a couple of days; a review tempts him; a water party cannot be resisted, and after dancing all night he is not seen at the office next morning. In fact, causes of absence are endless. Incessant altercation takes place with his superiors, with little effect, for he knows they cannot degrade or dismiss him, as a merchant or a banker would do, and he is proof against fines and minor punishments. At last he is given up as utterly incorrigible. Instances also occur of good abilities and dispositions rendered powerless by unconquerable indolence."

The principles of amendment proposed, when properly applied, would obtain for the Service not the lowest or what the old writers termed the "wastrels," but the best available of each class. My own experience in the Public Service is confirmatory of the view taken on the subject by the Dean of Carlisle, when he states:

"I feel confident from my experience of open fellowships and scholarships at the University that the highest classes in the country are quite capable of maintaining their own in any open competition with which they may have to contend, and I cannot think that any real favour is done to young men of these classes by putting them out of the reach of such stimulants to exertion and good conduct as might exercise a beneficial influence on their whole character."

Why promotion should not be exclusively from within the offices.

The same principle of precedence as above stated, would, I apprehend, hold good as to promotions within offices, and, I think, should be strictly applied, *cæteris paribus*, as to special ability obtainable from without. In respect to the chief appointments, other circumstances are to be taken into consideration—as, that long service generally fixes views as well as habits, and incapacitates those formed in them, from making the changes required for the public wants and progress; and that the public are entitled to representation, so to speak, within the offices.

Within the Post Office, for example, there was no power to conceive the practicability of the great administrative improvement, which is leading to the adoption of similar principles and means of intercommunication in all other civilized states as well as in this country. So little regard had been paid to the public conveniences and necessities, that from within the department the whole change was strongly opposed, and it became necessary for Mr. Rowland Hill, at a personal sacrifice, to take office in order to promote the execution of his measure, and save it from misrepresentation and obstruction at every step.

Objection, that improving the Service will create discontent, answered.

Apprehensions have also been expressed that the proposed measures, by bringing more ability than is needed for the lower positions, will create discontent on the part of those who may not find in the Service the employment for their talents which they were led to expect. Improvements in the transaction of the public business calling for the exercise of more ability may certainly be expected for every post; but, within my own observation, such discontent has been more frequently engendered by unsettled arrangements

and ill-assorted qualifications, which discontent has been abated as these have been rectified, and as increased securities for fitness have been enforced. One evil of the present system of patronage, indeed, consists in the vague expectation and hopes which it excites and disappoints. It has appeared to me that examinations, when pressed as closely as possible to specialities, would be of particular service in bringing before the candidate at the outset more definitely what he will have to do and has to expect. A friend whose letter I have before quoted describes the nature of a common cause of discontent and unhappiness which pervades the lower ranks in the older Public Offices.

"The ignorance of parents in accepting situations for their sons without ascertaining the nature of them,—situations greatly worse in prospect than they have any idea of—frequently leads to unpleasant results. A youth who could not hope to receive, at first, more than 30*l.* a-year in a merchant's counting-house, receives an official appointment of 100*l.* a-year, and he and his friends think that his fortune is made, and that in time he may be Chancellor of the Exchequer, or an Under Secretary of State at least. Years pass by; his salary increases very slowly; and he discovers, to his dismay, that he has no prospect of equalling the income of his father, a respectable tradesman, or of his younger brother, now his father's partner, which *he* might have been, and that he must remain a subordinate clerk for the rest of his life, or resign and try some active business for which his pursuits have entirely disqualified him. Ever after he leads a life of discontent, by no means favourable to a zealous discharge of his duties. Excellent prospects are constantly forfeited by such mistakes, as every one acquainted with official life must well know."

Why the present service creates discontent.

Now the course proposed of preparing the mind for the regular office work, by making known the special duties, and ensuring previous attention to them by the preliminary examinations, will be the best means of dispelling the apprehended illusions attracting "ready-formed statesmen in disguise" to the lower positions of the Service.

I have endeavoured to get the particular duties of each officer expressed in writing, and, when they relate to a class of officers, to have them printed. These written statements serve to check the imagination and to confine and direct attention. They should be accompanied by statements of the collective experience of the position as



instructions for new comers. They should be revised from time to time to adapt them to the changes of the Service. They would serve to guide examinations and other purposes.

What competitive examinations will not ascertain, or only ascertain imperfectly.

The examination, however, is only a first, though a necessary step. Unless there have been previous service into which to examine, the examination will not ascertain, or will only ascertain imperfectly, the qualifications of industry, punctuality, correctness in the transaction of business, steadiness or reliability, the power of fixing the attention immediately and steadily on new work, or any peculiar capacity. About these qualifications indeed, I agree, that a young candidate's connexions and friends, or even witnesses altogether unbiassed by affection and interests, can only give inconclusive testimony, because real life and business act so differently and unexpectedly on different temperaments. These qualifications can only be determined by the second stage, which I apprehend is implied as forming part of the principal improvement contemplated, namely, the probation on fair opportunities.\*

Responsibility of permanent chiefs not diminished, but increased by the proposed reforms.

It is objected to the competitive examinations and to the whole plan of admission that it would diminish the responsibility of the chiefs of departments, meaning the changing political chiefs—as if the present state of things had not arisen under the supposed security of that same responsibility. The measure proposed of giving the responsibility to the permanent chief, would no doubt be an improvement; and when the permanent chief is himself subjected to additional responsibility and is made to have the same real interest in the success of the department as

\* In respect to testimonials to character or qualifications, the general morality is extremely lax as to private service, and much worse as to the Public Service; indeed, for the lower classes of appointments, it is generally utterly worthless. In the earlier stages of Poor Law Amendment, and in endeavouring to promote the migration of the then supposed redundant labourers of the pauperized parishes of the south to the manufacturing districts in Lancashire, as the employers required certificates to the characters of the migrant labourers, it was commonly found upon experience, that a whole body of persons, not unfrequently including the squire, would join in giving a certificate to the greatest scamp of the parish in the hope of getting rid of him. Too often the name of the clergyman was found at the head of such certificates to the character, for which the excuse was, that the testimonial had been given in large faith, hope, and charity, that the party recommended would behave himself better in another position. The local testimony on which appointments are pressed by members of parliament are frequently of the like description.

the promoter of a private-enterprise (which is at present only the case with the proposers of new measures), then, on the principle of unity of management, he might most safely be entrusted with the entire responsibility of appointments. The interest, however, of the directors of private enterprise or of the heads of private establishments in the results, does not always serve to protect efficient servants against the unjust promotion of relations and connexions. Under the Public Service, arrangements would, *a fortiori*, be required for the protection of officers against injustice.

It is assumed as an objection to open competitive examinations, that they would utterly exclude all departmental discretion; but this is by no means necessary. As in competitions for works there is usually a reservation to the effect that the promoters do not bind themselves to take the lowest tender; for it may be that the sureties for its execution are the lowest, so it may be with competitions for service. With *ex officio* representation in the Examining Board, due security would be given to the department, which, besides having a weight in the representation of collateral circumstances likely to influence considerably the nominations, would have preponderant weight in the decision as to appointments after probation, and also in the promotions. It may be expected that future arrangements consequent on the abolition of patronage will be so conducted as to increase the responsibility and proper influence of the permanent heads of departments.

Cases of services rendered to the higher officers of state, as those by private secretaries—for which there are now no adequate means of payment—are stated as grounds for the retention of patronage: but these cases would be better met by larger allowances for the temporary service, as being far more economical to the public than payments by permanent appointments to offices, for which, as the objection assumes, the creditors for the occasional service have no special fitness. Payments for temporary service better by money than by patronage.

On the whole, in respect to the present officers, it will be found that their proper interests, especially of the younger and most energetic, are concurrent with the interests of the State in the reconstruction of the Service. It is to their interest that their services should be made more valuable, and that their value should be conspicuously vindicated. Competition on the largest public scale must bring an improved Civil Service into the like

advantageous confrontation with the higher paid open skilled labour market, that it has done in the case of pupils in the School of Mines and of school teachers, which open market value must after all determine the true value of the Civil Service. The more closely the well trained and educated examine private business, the more confidence they will have in themselves. They may be assured that energy with sound education, training, and intelligence will prevail against the common energy which is deficient of those qualities. The chief officers, whilst they might lose somewhat in patronage, would, by the wider arrangements, be relieved from the trouble and vexation of the private sieges perpetually laid to them for the surrender of their influence in behalf of particular candidates, and by the reduction of redundant hands, and by the increase of efficiency, would gain in proper personal influence.

Mere uninvestigated opinion evidence,—considering how few there are who have had occasion to look beyond their own offices, or to try them by other standards, allowing for the natural biases which it were needless to particularize,—may reasonably be expected to preponderate *in numero* against the main principles of the proposed reconstruction; but if the facts and available experience, such as I have referred to, are fairly examined, they will be found to prove:

General conclusions as to the examinations.

That appointments as patronage have been extensively abandoned, spontaneously, by local administrative bodies; and that public opinion, when fairly and impartially consulted, is in favour of the principles of the proposed measure of administrative reform:

That to the extent to which mere patronage has been already abandoned, and securities for special fitness in appointments have been applied, the efficiency, economy, and respectability of the Service have been advanced:

That in proportion as appointments merely for patronage without special qualifications, through favour or for party purposes, have been abolished in local administration, the action of the representative bodies has been improved and their respectability advanced:

That competitive examinations are the most efficient instruments for the advancement of the service, in promoting such qualifications of acquired knowledge, as may be selected as preparations for office:

That it is essential for the advancement of the Public Service that the examinations should be directed as closely as practicable to its specialities:

That amendments conducted separately or departmentally, have fallen short or failed of the extent of improvement required:

That for the due efficiency and working of the chief measures proposed for the improvement of the Public Service, it is essential that they should be conducted, not on separate and independent departmental arrangements, but on the general scale of the entire Service.

The evidence on which I should mainly rely as establishing these and other conclusions applicable to the questions under consideration is that derived from experience in England. But they may, if necessary, be supported by evidence from abroad, and that evidence will show the ignorance of facts on which a cry is raised against what is called a continental bureaucracy; it will show that in so far as the present Civil Service is dilatory, vexatious, and expensive in time and money for the results produced to the public, and poor in pay and unsatisfactory in the employment to a large proportion of the persons engaged, the state of things is similar to that which has prevailed in France,\* and that we *have* already a bureaucracy esta-

Evils ascribed to bureaucratic administration will be removed by the proposed reform.

Conditions of the service in England, the same as those complained of in France.

\* An experienced officer in one of the larger departments, once pointed out to me Balzac's novel, *L'Employé*, as containing striking features of resemblance to the state of things in his own office. Balzac thus adverts to the general condition of the Civil Service in France (in the contrast of the public and private service in England and in the mode of payment, I shall have to make some observations):—"Vous devez apercevoir maintenant pourquoi tout va si lentement dans le pays de bureaucratie. L'état payant très peu ses employés, les employés sont obligés d'avoir une double existence, de faire deux choses,—de se partager entre l'administration et une autre industrie; en sorte que les affaires souffrent, vont lentement, et ne peuvent pas aller autrement. On se demande, comment la maison Rothschild, qui a tout autant de détails que le ministère des finances, qui remue autant de capitaux, qui est obligée de savoir les ressources et les finances non seulement de la France, mais de l'Angleterre, de l'Espagne, de la Belgique, de l'Autriche et de Naples, du Pape et du grand Turc, qui paye autant d'intérêts que la France, et qui a des relations avec toutes les villes d'Europe, fait ses affaires avec vingt commis, quand le ministère des finances en a plus de mille. Les vingt employés des Rothschild travaillent dix fois plus que ceux du trésor; mais ils ont un avenir, ils apprennent à être banquiers, ils veulent savoir comment on gagne des millions, ils voient une récompense proportionnée à leurs efforts; tandis que les employés, en France, ont

blished; but in so far as the principles of reform proposed are allowed to have place, they will substitute a state of things wholly different in character, such as will be in the best sense popular and will require another designation; were it not that the one in use will be made essentially and transparently a truth, *i.e.* a *bonâ fide* PUBLIC SERVICE. There is, however, one portion of experience in the German States to which I think it important to advert. The proved inefficiency of the Civil Services during the war, led the governments of several states to have recourse to their universities for qualifications and the bases of ex-

“ un misérable avenir, peu d'honneur quoique très honorables, et  
 “ n'apprenent que la dépense sans apprendre la recette. Autrefois dans  
 “ les ministères François, les efforts, les travaux pouvaient être récom-  
 “ pensés : un ministère attendait les petits employés Colbert, Letellier, de  
 “ Lyonne. Aujourd'hui il faut être député pour devenir adminis-  
 “ trateur. Les traitements ne sont point proportionnés aux exigences du  
 “ service. Cent employés à douze mille francs feraient mieux et plus  
 “ promptement que milles employés à douze cents francs. Mais la  
 “ machine est ainsi montée, il faudrait la briser et la refaire; et personne  
 “ n'en a le courage en présence de la tribune et des sottises déclamations  
 “ de l'opposition, ou des terribles *puffs* de la presse. Il s'ensuit qu'il  
 “ n'y a point solidarité entre le gouvernement et l'administration;  
 “ un ministère veut et ne peut pas, il y a des lenteurs interminables  
 “ entre les choses et les résultats. Si le vol d'un écu est impossible, il  
 “ existe des collusions dans la sphère des intérêts. On ne concède  
 “ certaines opérations qu'après des stipulations secrètes, impossible à  
 “ surprendre. Enfin les employés, depuis le plus petit jusqu'au chef  
 “ de bureau, ont leurs opinions à eux—ne sont pas les mains d'une  
 “ cervelle—c'est-à-dire, n'agissent pas tous dans la pensée du Gouverne-  
 “ ment; ils peuvent parler contre lui, voter contre lui, juger contre  
 “ lui. \* \* \* La subordination n'existe pas dans l'adminis-  
 “ tration à Paris. \* \* \* Un employé supérieur, un directeur  
 “ qui fait et défait des préfets, qui décide des choses les plus graves  
 “ dans l'état, n'est presque rien dans Paris. \* \* \* Sur les neuf  
 “ heures qui tout employé doit à l'état dans les bureaux, il y en a bien  
 “ quatre et demie de perdues en conversations, en narrés, en disputes, en  
 “ faille de plumes, en intrigues. Ainsi l'état perd cinquante pour cent  
 “ dans le travail. Il pourrait faire faire pour dix millions ce qu'il paye  
 “ vingt. Les chefs de bureau ont tous à se plaindre, ou des hommes,  
 “ ou des choses, ou des ministres. Sachez bien que tous ont la conviction  
 “ profonde des résultats qui sont consignés au chapitre précédent.  
 “ Entre quatre murs ou en rase campagne, il n'en est pas un qui ne  
 “ vous dit, 'C'est une drôle de chose, allez, que l'administration!'  
 “ Ils ont vu le bien possible en théorie impossible en pratique; ils ont  
 “ vu les résultats les plus contraires aux promesses; ils ne croient à  
 “ rien et croient à tout. Résignés sur tout, ils accomplissent les affaires,  
 “ comme Pilate prononçait le jugement du Jésus Christ, en se lavant  
 “ les mains.”

Notwithstanding this general state of things, there, as here, instances of improvement are available from particular parts of the field of service which may be found to be applicable to the whole.

aminations for public employment. The university qualifications were abstract like those of our own, and were dreamy, the students were what is called “over educated,” *i.e.* miseducated, and failed in practice. A considerable number of men, more than were required for the Public Service, received the university education for it, and proving unfit for private service, they were ruined or made discontented men. This error has been proclaimed as an argument against the proposed measure, but nothing has been said of the important evidence in its favour, derivable from the experience of the mode in which that error has been retrieved. (*Vide* Dr. Lyon Playfair's Report on Education in Industrial Art in Germany.) The education has been made more special and practical, and from the knowledge given of common things, has been found better adapted to the common business of life, and is now called a real education\*; the surplus hands are absorbed, and officers are now frequently taken from the government offices, as possessing better qualifications than any to be found in the common labour market, for conducting private eminent enterprises.

The proposed measures for the improvement of appointments may be taken as having been based on the assumption of the necessity of improvements being made in the arrangements for the transaction of public business, but that it is first necessary to ensure the competency of officers to conduct the improved arrangements; for without such arrangements as those included in the second stage of the question, that of promotion after admission to the Service,—involving accountability and securities for application of the qualifications elicited,—the objection would be well founded that active talents would be evoked, often only to be deadened and destroyed, by being placed where time is consumed less in working than in wearisome waiting, under the torpid influence of bad regulations and remiss superintendence.

It may be objected, and indeed it must be expected, unless provision be made for the due application of the <sup>Improved securities alone</sup> insufficient,

\* In consequence of there being at present little or no teaching of physics, which is deemed to be of practical value, either at the Universities or at any of the schools in this country, it is becoming an increasing practice to send advanced pupils to the new schools in Germany, where the most useful tuition is provided.

without improved means and securities for the transaction of public business.

Failures of able men in office.

qualifications obtained, that, as it is with university examinations, so it will be with the proposed examinations for the Civil Service,—that when the examinations are passed, and the situation (like the degree) obtained, in the absence of securities as motives, the studies will in many instances be stopped, and the books closed never to be re-opened. Persons distinguished for ability—in some instances, for brilliant ability in society—within the office, if distinguished for anything, are so only for torpidity or the evasion of duty—making the office a resting-place from out-door enterprise of profit or pleasure; and, when interfered with, usually making it a theatre of intrigue or treachery against the superior officer who would bring them to a proper sense and performance of their duties. In the absence of efficient arrangements, those who have attained the chief places are led to seek the character of “safe men,”—which is gained by avoiding entering into questions or giving reasons, that they may “not commit themselves;” by evading difficulties neatly; and by speciously turning away from troublesome duties, and letting evil principles work themselves out at the expense of the public, unless forced into notice by clamour,—applying the rule—“Never to act until you are obliged, and then do as little as you can,” and generally following as rules of office, the old monk’s rules of life:—*“Fungi officio taliter qualiter; nunquam male loqui de superioribus; sinere insanum mundum vadere quo vult, nam vult vadere quo vult.”*

Certain qualifications only to be ascertained by probation.

After some experience of failures of the application of the ascertained qualifications in the minor appointments in the local Poor Law service, subsequent to the examination and appointment, it became necessary to adopt a general rule that the appointments should only be probationary; and, on further experience, the period of probation was extended. To check mere cramming, to prevent the examination being abused, and to protect the offices from slight—but repeated, and therefore in the aggregate, serious—causes of unsuitableness, against which no form of examination has been found to be a sufficient protection; I would submit for consideration a general rule founded on my experience and observation of appointments of a higher class; namely, that success in the examination should in no case ensure permanent appointment, but only admission to a probationary appointment, generally of a year’s duration, to be renewed by a distinct act and with addi-

tional securities against the probation being made a mere form.

When well or ill working officers, or good or bad individual official service is spoken of, exclusive official standards of comparison are usually implied, but the correct standards, for skilled labour, are now, as I apprehend, those which prevail in the mercantile, or open professional, or general skilled labour market of the country. It is to those, to which, at present, reference should be made. On the examination of the causes of the frequent superiority of private enterprise, will be found principles of action, as conditions of success, which in the Civil Service are wanting.

Comparison of the essential merits of difference on which the efficiency of private as compared with the public service mainly depends.

One of the first principles is, unity of direction, and of individual interest and responsibility. This principle which prevails in the most prosperous private establishments, though frequently lost sight of in joint stock company management, is one which the legislature is not prepared to adopt; nor does it appear to be practicable, under the best circumstances, to apply it simply and throughout to public administration, but it should nevertheless be steadily kept in view, and measures should be taken to fill its place. And there is good ground for believing that well devised arrangements, with the advantages of the larger scale of public over private business, would more than compensate in the public administration for the absence of private individual interests, which are the motive power in gaining success in private business.

It should be remembered that the head of a private or professional or commercial establishment selects his own assistants, and may at once dismiss any one who does not come up to his own views of efficiency. If there be any minor cause of jarring or disagreement, or if, without any positive unfitness, he observe any superior service elsewhere in the labour market, the principal may at once “suit himself,” and dispense with the less eligible assistant. If the assistants do not succeed well at one point, they are immediately and at discretion either removable to another, or they are dismissable. In the Civil Service, however, except in case of gross misconduct, or such criminality as would justify prosecution, the permanent officer of the highest grade must frequently bear with almost every degree of short-comings in the subordinate officers, or else put the public to the expense of maintaining several, on the chance that one may be found available. He has little or no

Officers irremovable for ordinary misconduct.

power of applying the unoccupied officers of one portion of a department in aid of another which is unduly pressed; he has not the same ready support from the political chiefs which the permanent manager of a trading company finds in the common interests of the directors. The political chief may obtain extra aid for a time, but the permanent officer must do the work himself, if he cannot procure the required aid by additional appointments at the public expense. In private establishments, if even a partner fail to do his fair share of duty, the partnership may be dissolved; but, in the Civil Service, the drag must generally be borne by the zealous conscientious worker. A large proportion of the most notorious overwork will, I apprehend, be found to be due to the hopelessness of efficient assistance from unwilling or careless subordinates.\* Even when more than common care had been taken in the original appointments, I could state instances of cases of inefficiency to the extent of one third of the force, owing to a subsequent falling off.

\* M. Thiers, in a conversation with my friend, Mr. Senior, gave the following account of his experience as a minister, in respect to the Civil Service in France, which is corroborative of the general account of it given by M. Balzac. I consider that it would be unjust to our own service to apply to them the same epithets, but the situations of permanent chiefs, who have striven on occasions of emergency to get business advanced with rapidity (and who have been allowed by the Treasury no extra pay for doing so) have from dilatoriness and dead resistance, if not from treacherous hostility, been little better than the one described by M. Thiers. "When," said he, "I was minister, I used constantly to find my orders forgotten, or neglected, or misinterpreted. As I have often said to you, men are naturally idle, false, and timid (*menteurs, laches, paresseux*). Whenever I found an employé supposed that because an order had been given, it had been executed; or that because he had been told a thing, it was true—I gave him up as an imbecile. Buonaparte nearly lost the battle of Marengo by supposing that the Austrians had no bridge over the Bormida. Three generals assured him that they had carefully examined the river, and that there was none. It turned out that there were two, and our army was surprised. "When I was preparing for war in 1840, I sat every day for eight hours with the ministers of war, of marine, and of the interior. I always began by ascertaining the state of execution of our previous determinations. I never trusted to any assurances, if better evidence could be produced. If I was told that letters had been despatched, I required a certificate from the clerk who had posted them or delivered them to the courier. If answers had been received, I required their production. I punished inexorably every negligence and even every delay. I kept my colleagues and my bureau at work all day, and almost all night. We were all of us half killed. Such a tension of mind wearies more than the hardest bodily work. At night my servants undressed me, took me by the feet and shoulders and placed

One element of commercial efficiency and success is due to the principle of accounting for time (or rather for the results of the application of time), as well as for expenditure. The correct theory of official "recordation" and "minutation," as usually applied to whole departments, is essentially the same as that of the manufacturing, or commercial account keeping, of the work done or business transacted, as well as of the money expended; but in public administration, it has yet to be practically applied to the services of individuals, and to be systematised.

The most eminent private, professional, commercial, or manufacturing success is due to the principle of piece-work variously applied,—to the analysis of the time occupied in each stage of production, bringing home the accountability for service in return for payment made to every individual person engaged, and getting out the total cost of each transaction. In a systematised manufactory of machines, for example, the time and money expended on every wheel and piece by each workman is regularly noted, and compared with the time occupied on the like sort of pieces by other workmen, and those who are shown on the account book to be the most diligent or skilful are employed at the best work and are the last to be reduced. The responsible commercial chief does not trust to his own impressions or to reports, but to correct accounts of gain or loss by each assistant. By accounting, or by the principle of piece-work, an interest is given to the operative in every blow he strikes, for he feels that the blow is struck for himself as well as for his employer. By a proper system of accounting for time, as shown by the results, the like interest may be given to every step taken in Civil Service, and this may be done without making each separate step a matter of

"me in bed, and I lay there like a corpse till the morning. Even my dreams when I dreamt were administrative. To do all this a man must have an iron will and iron body, and what is rarer than either, indifference to the likes and dislikes of those about him; for he is sure to be hated. There is only one exception, and that is in the case of a general. A good military administrator is the idol of his troops, because they feel that their comfort and even their safety is the result of his care and of his energy—he is their providence. But the labours of the civilian are unknown to those who profit by them. The sailors at Toulon did not know that it was owing to me that their ships were well stored and victualled. My subordinates respected me, perhaps admired me, but they looked on me as a severe taskmaster, whose exigencies no exertions could satisfy."

separate charge, and of separate superintendence and of accounting. In the system of manufacturing and commercial account-keeping there is included, besides the accounts for the day, the week, the quarter, or the year, a periodical "stock-taking,"—analogous to the examination of the public store accounts—for comparison with the money accounts.

Unequal action  
in the public  
service from  
the want of  
accountability.

In public establishments there is great inequality of service; one person doing less than one-third of his day's work, another doing more than his own. One man is very diligent in rendering "eye service," that is to say, such service as will come within the view of the superior in office; whilst out of his sight everything is neglected:—another man labours in obscurity and is overlooked. Political chiefs, from the assiduity manifest in all which comes before themselves, are apt to infer the same of the whole department. As it is with the difference of labour in individual officers, so it is with classes of them. I have frequently known the officers of one part of an office working severely at high pressure, or requiring extra aid from without, whilst those in another part were comparatively in idleness. As it is between rooms of the same office, so I believe it will be found frequently to be between one office and another. These inequalities in service are often facilitated by the operation of what wears the appearance of a division of labour, and action on principle—assigning to every function a functionary, to every book a book-keeper for that one book and no other, to each set of returns a clerk, though the service is only to be rendered occasionally or quarterly. By such divisions of labour, the public is often served much in the same way as a Hindoo household, where one servant brings up the meat, another the vegetables, one has the charge of the pipe, another the business of cooling the water, and so on with each service; more than a dozen serving men being required to do work which with us is better done by one servant on the principle of consolidation.

Besides the excessive expense of this ill-paid and redundant service, there is the additional expense occasioned by the obstructions and delay, of which no account is taken, in getting the proper officer to "do his office." The often cited catastrophe which befel the king of Spain, who was roasted, by the blazing up of a fire before which he was seated, and from which etiquette prevented him from

either moving himself or allowing others to move him in the absence of the "proper officer," is no bad illustration of the inconvenience of the arrangement.

If a manufacturer were to proceed, as is done in some of the Public Offices, without keeping any account for time or the results of its use, he would very soon become bankrupt. In proof how little time is taken into account, I might adduce such instances as one, where on a question as to an outlay of 40%, a delay of three weeks, of a service costing 100% a week was occasioned, and the delay of that service caused an eventual pecuniary loss to the public of 4,000% a week.

Expense of the  
loss of time un-  
accounted for  
in the public  
service.

As an inducement to recommend the services of sappers and miners to execute the surveys of towns, it was represented by officers of the ordnance that the work would be done on a sub-division of labour amongst trained privates as chainmen, non-commissioned officers as levellers, and commissioned officers as levellers—each class being paid at from one-half to one-third the rates which a private surveyor or a civilian must pay for the same description of labour; suggesting the conclusion (which the officers who had not been called upon to examine the results, no doubt believed,) that the time occupied in executing the work and the expense of it would be less. But, to say nothing of the results of delay upon sanitary works postponed in consequence, in the shape of preventible sickness or mortality (as shown in the minutes of the Board transmitted on that subject); on accounting for the time in the amounts chargeable for the completed work, it appeared that the operations, from the torpid manner in which they were conducted, were more expensive than if they had been done by Civil surveyors—occasioning, in some instances, double the expense at which Civil surveyors have admitted that the like work has paid them fairly. The economical remedy suggested by the full accounts would be piece-work or contract work, which gives the proper stimulus of reward for speed.\*

\* To those to whom accountability for time in service is new, attorneys' bills will afford some exemplifications. Our American brethren are, I am informed, beginning to act upon the suggestions they afford, and promoting law reform and getting rid of the law's delays by a new practice of asking the attorney before entering into litigation, "for how much will you undertake to see me clear through the business," and requiring an undertaking against excess of charge, and thus substituting for multiplied fees on multiplied steps and delays, one great fee payable

In the absence of settled arrangements for individual accountability, the permanent chief has only the alternative of seeing to the execution of all important orders himself, at the expense of other demands upon his time; since, if any conscientious subordinate report to him of delay, it is reporting to him of others' default, and is set down to private malice and occasions hostility within the office. The chief, in the absence of such arrangements, has only the painful check of the chance of out-door complaint from the few who may expect to obtain redress by complaint.

In manufacturing and commercial establishments buildings arranged to save time.

Accountability for the employment of time impresses the value of time upon the mind, and in commerce and manufactures tends to the study of arrangements to save it. Private offices, and manufactories, and buildings are often re-constructed to economise time in communication and in superintendence. For the Poor Law Commission at Somerset House, two private houses were assigned. It was clearly made out to me that the saving of the loss of time to clerks going backwards and forwards to small rooms in different parts of the premises, would pay for their re-construction. I am assured that if the time were taken into account (as it would be in private business) which is lost by the separation of connected operations in disconnected public offices, the same business might, with better architectural arrangements, often be performed with one-third fewer clerks. Such waste goes on year after year unnoticed or uncared for, because no individual is responsible for it, and because there is no practise of accounting for public time, which would display the expense of its loss by displaying the actual expense of public transactions.

Time uncared for in the public buildings.

The real cost of particular transactions, only known accidentally in public business.

I am unaware of instances where the actual cost of the particular pieces of business to the public has been thought of—except, indeed, in such cases as the above, of the charges for particular surveys, where the expense has been charged upon private individuals or upon localities; and there the accounts of the different expenses of accomplishing similar objects by different civil procedures yield important suggestions as to the comparative value to the public of different services and modes of procedure, which I beg leave to exemplify.

immediately on the results being obtained, and which the attorney has therefore an interest in striving to obtain immediately. Members of the profession are stated to be there finding their account in the fusion of common law and equity.

The expense of such services, as obtaining legislative sanctions for railway enterprises, (which are stated to have amounted in particular instances to as much as 6,000*l.* per mile, in addition to the extravagant costs of construction,) might be contrasted with the expense (some two or three hundred pounds for a whole railway) of the service of obtaining a better departmental examination and sanction under the East India Company, or with the still better examination and service, for the *bond fide* capitalist, of obtaining departmental sanctions, at the expense of a few pounds, in some of the continental states; but it may suffice to give examples of more ordinary service yielded chiefly by departments. I would refer to the expenses of examining a proposal to authorise a private enterprise, and of giving an official sanction to the association of a number of persons to execute it, under the authority of a charter. To get a sanction passed for a limited liability to build model dwellings, the value of eleven dwellings or 1,100*l.* was paid, and these expenses were deemed moderate. To have got an official sanction formerly for the enclosure of a small common or waste, would have required from the commoners an expenditure of money requiring the sale of from four to six thousand geese. To have got passed a legislative sanction for the improvement of a town, cost on an average as much as would suffice for permanent waterworks to serve for two thousand of population; formerly, to have got a sanction for the drainage of a settled estate, the cost amounted to the price of half a million of draining tiles—that is, in many cases, as many as would have sufficed to drain the estate. To have got passed the sanction for an exchange of outlying patches of land belonging to contiguous estates, would often have cost as much as the fee simple of the land exchanged was worth. The official operations for passing a sanction for the protection of the labour of invention by a patent, the official sanction for a charter, are like the Hindoo principle of a division of labour; and yet the separate sums paid for each step, for getting the attention of the several officers, including Privy Seal, Chaffwax, Clerk of the Signet, and Messenger, did not seem so very large. It was only the sum total that afforded the demonstration of the necessity of simplification. In all these cases the service included no information or protection against waste in return for the large sums paid.

Examples of such cost got out.

Examples of the saving of cost by improvements in civil procedure.

The accounts of the Commons Enclosure Commissioners shew that the expense of their improved proceedings on enclosure, leaving the case ready for Parliament to deal with, is 17*l.* 9*s.* 2*d.*; that parcels of land are now exchanged for between 10*l.* and 11*l.*; and that the examination and sanction for the drainage of a settled estate, with new and additional securities, is now given at an expense of from 10*l.* to 15*l.* Under the Public Health Act, the sanction for important towns improvements, including printed instructional engineering reports locally circulated, with securities against waste, and protection to individuals and minorities, is given at one sixteenth or twentieth of the expense of a Local Act, and by Order in Council in one fourth the time. Such improvements in civil procedure are equivalent, in the benefits they confer on the community, to improvements in the mechanical arts; yet, so little is time (considered as money) regarded in public administration, that they excite little notice or interest as improvements, whilst they excite rancorous hostility as innovations, on the part of persons whose fees and emoluments are reduced by them; and this hostility passes with members of the legislature, as public distrust and dissatisfaction. The effects of the like comparisons of expense and of savings for similar "transactions" made in one part of a field in commerce, in ensuring the immediate adoption of the means of economy in every other part, will be at once conceived, as well as many of the uses to which a systematised accountability for time in results would be applicable for the Civil Service. In the absence of any such accountability in the public service, the stimulus of credit for efficiency or discredit for inefficiency is lost, as regards individuals as well as departments in the Civil Service; and to this omission much of the "torpidity" of the hands of the Government may be traced. It is often in the Civil Service, as respects individuals, as it would be in large manufacturing or commercial establishments, if the mutual security of accounts of work done were dispensed with, and justice to the persons yielding service were left dependent on the impressions of the much-occupied principals. It is often said that it should be the duty of the permanent heads of departments to observe and bring forward merit; but the merit really deserving public regard will be made up of particular and definite acts which are best made matter of record, and brought forward in records or accounts.

It is common to ask for reliance on honour and social station, for the due performance even of obscure duties. Unfortunately the greatest failures have occurred where the parties were of the highest social position. "Ordinary service," said Mr. Burke, in his great speech on economical reform, "must be secured by the motives to ordinary integrity. I do not hesitate to say that that state which lays its foundation on rare and heroic virtues, will be sure to have its superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption." Suspicion, not confidence, is the proper basis for administrative arrangements of this class to ensure honest results.

False securities for the performance of the public business.

In the public, as in other services, there are two practical principles of action available for obtaining results—either of force or of persuasion, that is to say, either without giving any direct individual interest in the results, to obtain them by simple coercion, applied by rigid discipline and stringent rules, maintained, step by step, by laborious vigilance; or by animating the persons serving to free, spontaneous, and zealous action by individual notice and reward. At present the condition of large proportions of persons in office partakes of the slave condition; they are deprived of the vivifying principles of hope and fear. If they give ordinary commercial labour—which, within the office would be extraordinary labour—they get immediate enmity for the contrast they afford, and have only distant and faint prospect of eventual promotion. If they do little, the course is easier, and the eventual prospect, if no better, is no worse in the obscure positions, which are without that stimulus of shame or that hope of celebrity which obtains in the highest and most conspicuous places. Though the official hours are short and the labour in itself generally slight—under this state of things, and the sense of capacity misapplied and time wasted—it is wearisome to minds of any energy. It is "entombment," from which the relief is the open air and collateral employment in other service—to which service they give the energy that under better conditions would be wholly derived by the public. When the force of these depressing influences is fairly considered, it is matter of surprise that less is not done, and that there are so many instances of energies rising above them. Now, relief is given to the persons serving, and their interests are ensured in proportion as the principle of piece-work is applied, or as by giving credit for successful results and providing for pro-

Quasi slave condition of the service, in the absence of the stimulus of hope, as well as fear.



motion or pay upon them, any approximation to piece-work is obtained; and the perfection of the action of piece-work depends on the care and perfection of accounts for service in return for money.

Examples of the improvement of the service by the stimulus of piece-work.

To the objection, that improved qualifications, or examinations for them, are unnecessary for much of the drudgery of public offices, such as mere copying—I would answer, that it is practicable to mitigate the drudgery, or to render the employment of the permanent staff unnecessary by getting it done, if not by law stationers, by extra or unattached clerks as piece-work. Of this I would submit the following illustration. On the outset of the Poor Law Commission, there were as many as seventy, including extra or copying clerks, supplied by the law stationer, but the trouble of management increased in greater proportion than the number, and, to meet it, I was compelled to propose that the whole of the copying should be done as piece-work at per folio. The effect was, that we were enabled to get the work done by thirty-five at a reduced expense; yet the income of the reduced number was improved from 60*l.* and 70*l.* to 80*l.*, 90*l.* and 100*l.* per annum. But the clerks were set free from any coercion by time books. They could take work home with them; therefore they were let go when they pleased—there was an end of all trouble in looking after them, or hearing applications for leave of absence or for holidays; no urging was required to extra attendance after the regular office hours. They were always willing to stay, and the work was done with promptitude, while the higher class of clerks were more regularly served, and were deprived of any excuses for delay on their part, on account of alleged delays by the copyists. I believe that a large proportion of the other office labour admits of the application of the same principle. From my own experience I recommended it to other offices, where I believe it has been applied with similar advantage.\* A friend in one office wished to introduce it, but he informed me that the change had been objected to by the

\* Since this paper was written, Mr. Henry Taylor's work, the "Statesman," was brought under my particular notice, and I find in it, p. 167-71, a statement of similar experience having been obtained, apparently concurrently, at the Colonial Office. I find also in that same work on several other points, experience and observation corroborative of my own, eloquently stated, pp. 60, 160, 163, and passages cited (*post* p. 205), on the illusory character of much official responsibility.

then political Secretary of the Treasury, on the ground that it would interfere too much with the patronage which he needed.

The same principle I may show to be applicable to the higher as well as the highest descriptions of public business, with direct economy of expenditure, the saving of time and of evil and inconvenience to the public, and with the increased pay to the officers which all efficient piece-work for increased energy necessitates. I have frequently found that payments *per diem* for professional or other services, though at higher rates than regular salaries, are better for the public, in ensuring assiduity of attendance and facilitating changes, and more agreeable for the time to the persons employed, in giving them an interest in the service. Inferior service, which, under the practice of fixed salaries would have been retained, was with the less difficulty dispensed with and replaced by service which was superior. The correct policy would be to pay liberally for occasional or extraordinary service; but, in practice, the opposite course is pursued, and the worst pay or no pay whatever is given for services which are productive of the largest results in Civil administration. Sometimes, however, they are admitted as claims for permanent appointments; that is to say, permanent pay is promised for doing little in a long time, in return for having done much in short time without the pay that was due to the service immediately it was yielded. Generally in the absence of accountability, time of service alone, although it may have been occupied worthlessly, has been received as evidence of merit and as the foundation of a claim to promotion, whilst instances occur of service of the highest order of which no account is taken, because it has been rendered in a short time.

As a means of applying the principle of accountability for time as well as money, under the Poor Law Commission, I proposed that each inspector should keep a diary in which he entered on one side an account of his expense for the day, and on the other side the nature of his services during the day. The same plan was adopted at the General Board of Health. The diaries were made up and returned weekly; the diaries of each engineering inspector are audited as to the services, by the chief engineer, and they were then read weekly at the Board. The Board was thus enabled to keep under view the daily course of each individual. But the diaries can only contain brief general notes of the sort of business

Improved means of accountability by diaries.

done, and is inapplicable to the accounting for broken time, or the transaction of miscellaneous business. Men moreover labour unequally from day to day, and the comparative labour is only seen at longer periods—for which monthly or quarterly reports, setting forth completed results, with the cost in money, are required. For a complete audit of accounts of services, there is also required the examination of the matters themselves which are accounted for, analogous to stock taking, and this latter is most needed for the highest order of service. The diary and other forms of accounting for time, it need scarcely be observed, are useful to the officer for self discipline, and should be kept as private individuals keep diaries simply for their own private guidance. The plan was adopted for the assistant Tithe Commissioners, and for the Inspectors to the Education Committee of the Privy Council; and I perceive that it is noticed in the Reports of the Committees of Inquiry. I proposed that the principle should be variously applied, as for instance, in weekly accounts from each room or class, with quarterly as well as yearly accounts, leading to an examination of the causes of all arrears. The principle of piece-work is obtained not alone by accountability upon each separate transaction, or upon the labour of the day or the week, but upon the aggregate results at the end of the year.

The rule of fixed advances of salary in the Civil Service, without any accountability whether the service has been good, bad or indifferent, partakes, I would submit, of the condemned principle of promotion by seniority without reference to merit, and throws away other persons' money on demerit. In well systematised professional or commercial establishments, advances are made only on satisfactory record in the accounts or other evidence of beneficial results produced.

The diaries of the superior joint service of members of Boards should be contained in the board minutes, which require consideration and systematizing.

The periodical accounts of service performed are useful to the officers in giving them opportunities for making any representations they may think fit, of obstructions experienced, or of improvements which they may deem practicable for the advancement of the Public Service.

With the annual money accounts of every department, there should be rendered an account of the service performed during the year, as the sum of the sub-departmental and individual service, of all departmental arrears of busi-

By reports  
quarterly or  
annual.

ness, and why there are arrears, and when and how they are proposed to be cleared up.

The Annual Reports of the Poor Law Board have to some extent partaken of this character, except as to the length which was rendered necessary under the extraordinary circumstances of that service.

The preparation of these reports or collective accounts of service, like the keeping of private diaries, are of service to the department itself, in sustaining interest in the work, in keeping attention to it, and guiding it, although no one out of the office were to read a word of them; just as the money audit is of value, although the accounts should go on without the detection of an error, and although the moneys recovered did not pay any proportion of the expenses of performing the audit. Such reports serve also to keep before every officer in the service the general ends in view, and to save constant orders and multiplied instructions in relation to them. With this view, and preferring to act upon the understanding rather than by curt orders, I have always advocated reasons being set forth fully, at an immediate expense of labour, making documents as far as practicable self-justificatory. Labour bestowed on leading cases is usually a great economy of time for large classes of other cases. If we would have an intelligent zeal in subordinate officers, beyond the immediate salary we must enable them to see the general objects of the service and take an interest in their progress. In these views, finding the intervals of the publication of annual reports, as to Poor Law administration, too long, I proposed the issue of an "official circular," containing instructional documents for the use of the permanent officers and others engaged in the local administration,—which practice, I would submit, should be extended to other departments having extensive ramifications.

The publication of such accounts is however needed, for the information of the legislature and the public, and for the justification of the efficient portions of service, to relieve them from the depressing effect of unjust public discredit. The reverse of the maxim *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, is now popularly applied to the Civil Service. Whilst public improvements of the highest importance, for the removal of the most prominent evils which prevail in one portion of a field, are energetically prosecuted within a department with desperate labour at the expense of the health of its officers,

Use of the  
reports to the  
officers them-  
selves as sus-  
taining atten-  
tion.

Uses of reports  
for the infor-  
mation of the  
legislature and  
the public.

the experience of some minor portion of evil in other portions of the field of service within the same jurisdiction, with which there is neither time nor means to cope, raises a clamour against the whole department as a seat of perfect idleness, inefficiency and waste. Offices conducting the most important public services are at present precluded from answering these attacks in any way, or from displaying at any time their larger service as counterbalancing the smaller inconveniences and omissions, if any such there be. Thus, by the repeated complaints, well or ill-founded, in the newspapers, against particular inconveniences of defects in the postal deliveries, unfavourable impressions are given respecting the whole department; whilst I apprehend that it would be seen in an annual report of the service of the department, that there had been incessant and severely directed labour in the successful promotion of large organic improvements, for the completion of one of the greatest measures and highest administrative improvements in our time—a measure which has led to the like improvements in the service of all the civilized states in the world, and to the educational, commercial, and social benefits resulting from a five or sixfold inter-communication of thought, action and sentiment. From complaints before noticed, of the delay and expense incurred by the Ordnance in the execution of the town surveys, injurious inferences have been raised in a number of towns as to the efficiency of that department; but the effect, in an annual report, of such a display as the one contained in the Report of the Committee of Inquiry at p. 279 of the active reform prosecuted within the office, showing as a consequence that, notwithstanding a greatly increased amount of more efficient service, the number of officers engaged in the department have not only not been increased, but has been considerably diminished, would have served to stop much of the abuse that is still poured upon that office. Whatsoever foundation there may be for complaints of our Colonial administration, it is fair that it should be made known that commercial bodies have of late times tried to found colonies, and have failed, while the department has colonised successfully. Nothing, I apprehend, would induce more content than for the public, as well as the legislature, to have the means of constantly seeing the service rendered for the expenditure.

Accounts of service rendered should be audited as well as accounts of money expended; but it would not always

Use to the offices for defence, and the suggestion of improvement.

be absolutely necessary in the Civil Service that the audits should be coincident in time.

The recent Reports of the Treasury Committees of Inquiry into Public Offices may be deemed to partake to some extent of the nature of a superior audit of service as distinguished from the audit of the money expenditure.

Systematised accounts of service needed for the protection of the public against waste, should, for the protection of officers and private individuals against injustice, include the main facts and reasons for dismissals as well as for promotions. They should include the reasons for inaction as well as for action, on cases presented quasi judicially. Reasons and facts in detail are the justificatory items of accounts of service, corresponding with the particulars in the figures of money accounts. Without the particular reasons the ordinary recordation is what the accounting for money would be if it were confined to general expressions of "sundries," "miscellaneous," or "sum totals." The need of such a provision as well as some additional grounds for requiring full departmental reports, are, I conceive, forcibly stated by Mr. Henry Taylor, of the Colonial Office, in a passage which I subjoin from a chapter on "Executive Reform," in his work on the Practical Attributes of a Statesman.\*

\* "The far greater proportion of the duties which are performed in the office of a minister, are and must be (?) performed under no effective responsibility. Where politics and parties are not affected by the matter in question, and so long as there is no flagrant neglect or glaring injustice which a party can take hold of, the responsibility to Parliament is merely nominal, or falls otherwise only through casualty, caprice, and a misemployment of the time due from Parliament to legislative affairs. Thus the business of the office may be reduced within a very manageable compass, without creating public scandal. By evading decisions wherever they can be evaded, by shifting them on other departments and authorities wherever they can be shifted, by giving decisions upon superficial examinations,—categorically, so as not to expose the superficiality in expounding the reasons; by deferring questions till, as Lord Bacon says, 'they resolve of themselves;' by undertaking nothing for the public good, which the public voice does not call for; by conciliating loud and energetic individuals at the expense of such public interests as are dumb or do not attract attention; by sacrificing everywhere what is feeble and obscure to what is influential and cognizable; by such means and shifts as these, the single functionary granted by the theory, may reduce his business within his powers, and perhaps obtain for himself the most valuable of all reputations in this line of life, that of 'a safe man,' and if his business even thus reduced, strains, as it well may, his powers and his industry to the

The Civil Service, with all defaults, superior to much joint stock company management.

I have confined my comparisons of the arrangements for efficiency chiefly to the larger and more systematised professional or commercial establishments under private or individual direction rather than to the management of trading companies; because, whatsoever may be the faults of public offices in respect to origination, executive promptitude, or economy of time, in pecuniary integrity and in other respects, they will be found to be already greatly in advance of the management of a number of considerable joint stock companies. It may be asserted that it is impossible that any such waste as double or even three-fold outlays on works, or such jobbing and ignorance, as has been displayed in extensive disasters from joint stock company management—could have occurred in any public office. In respect to promptitude and efficiency, as well as economy of service, instances may even now be pre-

utmost, then (whatever may be the theory), the man may be without reproach,—without other reproach at least than that which belongs to men placing themselves in a way to have their understandings abused and debased; their sense of justice corrupted, their public spirit and appreciation of public objects undermined. Turning (I would almost say revolting) from this to another view of what these duties are, and of the manner in which they ought to be performed, I would, in the first place earnestly insist upon this, that in all cases concerning points of conduct and quarrels of subordinate officers, in all cases of individual claims upon the public and public claims upon individuals, in short, in all cases (and such commonly constitutes the bulk of a minister's unpolitical business) wherein the minister is called upon to deliver a quasi judicial decision, he should on no consideration permit himself to pronounce such a decision, unaccompanied by a detailed statement of all the material facts and reasons upon which his judgment proceeds. I know well the inconvenience of this course; I know that authority is most imposing without reason alleged; I know that the reasons will rarely satisfy, and will sometimes tend to irritate the losing party, who would be better content to think himself overborne than convicted; I am aware that the minister may be sometimes by this course inevitably drawn into protracted argumentation with parties whose whole time and understanding is devoted to getting advantages over him; and with a full appreciation of these difficulties, I am still of opinion that for the sake of justice they ought to be encountered and dealt with. One who delivers awards from which there is no appeal, for which no one can call him to account, (and such, as has been said, is practically a minister's exemption), if he do not subject himself to this discipline, if he do not render himself amenable to confutation, will inevitably contract careless and precipitate habits of judgment; and the case which is not to be openly expounded, will seldom be searchingly investigated. In various cases also, which concern public measures, as well as those which are questions of justice, ample written and recorded discussion is desirable. Few questions are well considered till they are largely written about, and the minds and judgments of great functionaries transacting business *inter mœnia*, labour under the deficiency of bold checks from uoppgnant minds."—*Statesman, Reform of the Executive*, p. 155.

sented of portions of public service so far advanced as to be beyond a large proportion of joint stock management, and equal to professional or private establishments under individual direction, and therefore to sustain the conclusion, that it is practicable to place the Civil Service generally in advance of joint-stock companies, as well as the private service, in every point.

Some of the reasons why they are so, and why they might still more extensively become so, are urged in Lord Ebrington's Letter on Official Salaries, pp. 39, 40, and are, I know, from long experience, frequently as conspicuously operative in the civil as in the military and naval service of Her Majesty.

"There is yet, however, something in the honour of serving the public. We have still lingering among us the feeling of the olden time, which recognized the service of the State, or labour in one of what were called 'the three professions', as the only employment in which it behoved a gentleman to engage himself. It is now, however, constantly on the wane, and the true dignity of labour in itself is more and more appreciated.

"But there is one other principle of a far nobler character, which renders the Public Service for its own sake attractive to some, in spite of all the adverse circumstances attending it—I mean the sentiment of patriotism.

"The consciousness, indeed, of labouring not for self but for others; not for the profit of brother shareholders merely, or commercial employers, but for the honour and prosperity of the Queen and country, for fellow citizens, for brother Englishmen, and yet further, for the benefit of mankind; is, as many both high and low in the Public Service can testify from delightful experience, at once inspiriting, elevating, and soothing—stimulates to exertion, fortifies for endurance, and consoles under disappointment. As an earthly motive it deserves to be placed next to the loftiest and holiest motive for doing and suffering; and its reward is, perhaps, the nearest earthly approximation to that 'peace, passing all understanding,' with which it is not only not incompatible, but often, and in the highest degree, concurrent."

The combined effect of the absence of proper systematized accountability for service, and of the principle of patronage, is to foster public impressions favourable to the attacks of those whose object would seem to be to make

all public administration impotent and therefore wasteful, as well as to treat it as such. One effect of the dereliction of public duty is no doubt to promote "private enterprise," but it is enterprise greatly at the public expense, for the private service is less responsible, dearer, and inferior. At the present time there are strong sinister interests engaged in the production of such results.

Public mis-information prevalent, as to the nature and value of much public service.

It were desirable as a new branch of public instruction that besides accounts of the immediate subject matter of services, regard should be had to the consequences, including the expenses to the public of the want of service. Welsh farmers rose not only against exorbitant tolls but against *any* tolls. Instruction would have prevented these riots and shown them that they were rebelling against the saving of three sixpences in horse labour, by means of the expenditure of one sixpence in a toll for an improved road. Yet persons of education and political position, from disregarding the expenses of evil, while they assume the character of strict economists in blindly cutting down and opposing the adoption of new service, are doing no better than the Welsh farmers, and are economizing the means of economy on the largest scale. The most wasteful element is niggardliness in the guise of economy, which, looking no further than immediate payment—taking no account of the results to the public—deems all service cheap where the pay is low.

A proper accountability for service would render the like benefit to some branches of administration that it has to inferior manual labour—as in showing, for example, that the expense of a mile of road and the time of execution would be less with skilled labour, costing 3s. 6d. and even 5s. per diem, than with slave labour costing little more than a shilling; or even that the principle is, as it was expressed to me, in respect to horses, by Mr. Whitworth, who stated to me that he found on calculation that he could not *afford* to have his machine worked by a horse which eat less than eighteen pounds of oats a day, or that cost him less than thirty pounds.

The topic is so important that I beg leave to submit some collective instances of the practice of ignoring the benefits of services and treating the expenses of the officers by whom they have been rendered as so much dead weight upon the resources of the country.

Thus the whole parliamentary expenditure on education, and that for the services of the officers engaged

Examples of economising

in the central supervision exercised by the Poor Law Board, was treated as extravagant or so much waste. In illustration of the economy of superior service for education, I may mention the case of a manufacturer who, as a matter of sentiment, provided training and education for about two hundred of the children of his workpeople. But after a time he declared that he found the expenditure a profitable investment, for, said he, "I would not take less than 7000*l.* for my set of workmen in exchange for the uneducated, ill-trained and ill-conditioned workmen of a manufacturer opposite. We find that the steadiness of the educated men induces steadiness of work, and comparative certainty in the quality and quantity of the produce." This might be taken as a short exemplification of the money value of training and education as a national investment. But the Public Service, properly consulted, affords experience on a wider scale. Taking the average cost so low as 2*s.* per week from infancy, for food, clothing, house-room, and training,\* a pauper child will have cost 70*l.* at fourteen years of age—the age at which he ought to be enabled to earn his own subsistence, and something over and above as payment to the employer for his capital, and for superintending as well as providing productive labour. In adverting to the results of the improved school teaching produced by competitive examinations, I have already stated that formerly, of the cases of public expenditure, or investments in pauper education and training, two out of three were failures, the subjects returning upon the public, if not as paupers, as delinquents. In whichever condition they lived the expense of maintenance for the remainder of life, (which from fourteen years of age would be, according to the insurance table, about forty years,) at not less than double the same rate, would entail an expense of 400*l.* per case of failure in addition to the original outlay for the child. There was therefore a loss of 800*l.* for the maintenance of three pauper children as paupers or delinquents during the rest of their lives. In other words, the expense of local patronage (which may be exemplified as ante, note, p. 141) in the appointment of inferior school teachers, themselves actual paupers, or little above them, was upwards of a thousand pounds upon every four pauper children reared to ma-

\* Mr. Aubin's contract price for pauper children at the Norwood School was 4*s.* 6*d.*, and at the North Surrey District School the cost is even higher per week.

turity. By the check given to the local patronage, by better appointments from such untrained services as were then available at such low salaries as could be obtained for the union school teachers, involving an additional expenditure of from 6*l.* to 10*l.* per case, or say about 20*l.* for every three—two instead of one being got into courses of permanently productive industry—an average saving of between three and four hundred pounds of the former losses was effected. But where by the service obtained by prescribed qualifications, tested by competitive examinations for the certificates of competency, involving an outlay of 12*l.* to 14*l.* per head for the increased market value of the improved school teachers, and by a combination of labour including the service of chaplains for religious as well as secular teaching and industrial training in the district schools, *all* the children have been, with the exception stated of cases of bodily disability, got into permanent courses of industry, nearly the whole of the former losses have been saved, and the children converted into means of pecuniary gain.

The increased value in the labour market of properly qualified service to effect these results, being at the utmost only about five per cent. on the previous outlay, what would be said of the commercial intelligence which neglected to insure such qualifications, merely as an insurance charge against future pecuniary loss, to say nothing of the demoralisation, crime, and misery to be prevented? I believe that the difference of the expense of educational service requisite to ensure a good education will be more than repaid by forty years consumption of postage stamps and duty-paying paper, as compared with that sort of education which in many counties has left sixty per cent. of the population, including a large per-centage of parliamentary voters, marksmen.

Lord Shaftesbury proposed on religious and moral grounds what was really a great measure of pecuniary economy of the same description, when he brought in a bill making the parents, or in their absence, the public, responsible for the proper training and education of the neglected mendicant children found in the streets. By that measure he would have upturned the largest seed plot of delinquency, and established a means of a large economy of upwards of a million and a half of expenditure, in the ineffectual repression of crime by the present penal administration. But the measure was stopped by the objec-

tions of the metropolitan representatives in the House of Commons to the expense; *i. e.* the application in service of the means of economy.

The expense of the service of medical officers and others (11,000*l.*) against the extraordinary visitation of cholera, was resisted, and returns of the expenses of printing to give warning were moved for on the assumption that all such service was an extravagance. At the rate of mortality where no such measures were taken, the two millions of expenditure, the estimated expense of the epidemic in sickness, premature mortality, widowhood, and orphanage, might, but for the outlay in measures of prevention, have been augmented to upwards of four; while with larger expenditure in economical service commensurate with the representations made on the subject, the two millions of expenditure might probably have been reduced to one. The general expenses consequent on the ordinary preventible sickness and premature mortality—in respect to which an expenditure in efficient sanitary measures is a means of pecuniary economy—prove on investigation to be not less than twelve millions per annum.

The outlay for the service of the Poor Law Board and its staff has been challenged as an extravagance. Now it amounts to about three quarters per cent. on the taxation or income superintended, which is a lower charge than that for any similar private service. It is about one and three quarters per cent. upon the actual economy effected, *i. e.* an average of two millions per annum. In my view, if the expenditure in superintendence was augmented by increases and changes of the staff, it might be made the means, with the abolition of the law of settlement, of the economy of another million per annum, and of much further improvement in this branch of public administration. It may be conceived with what alacrity and freedom a power of service for reducing expenditure or increasing profits, which cost only a small per centage, would be resorted to in commerce or manufactures; and yet it is observable that commercial representatives are not seen to apply commercial principles to public administration—so little are its principles considered. The expenditure of 14,000*l.* in the School of Mines, and a similar expenditure for the School of Practical Art, were objected to as waste. Now the value at the pit's mouth of the coal and mineral productions of the country, which the expenditure for instruction at the School of Mines and the geological survey serves to

direct, is not less than twenty-six millions per annum; and the losses as ascertained in the mining share market by the failure of expenditure for wrong objects, is not less than one million per annum. The expenditure to increase the production and to diminish the loss forms but a trifling percentage on the whole; as does the expenditure on instruction in the arts which give attractiveness of form, and thereby extend the consumption of the many millions of the manufacturing products of the country intended to be ornamental.

I do not present these examples as comprising the elements of common expenditure, but they are examples of the common state of mind which deals with all the expenditure in public service; and that is only to be corrected by the information which may be elicited by proper modes of accounting. This state of mind is, indeed, displayed on this very question, in the objections put as insuperable to the plan proposed, namely, the expense of examiners and of the proposed new Board, an expense which would be only a small per centage,—a mere fractional amount in the large economies to be effected by means of efficient examiners and strict supervision. For such an object it will be economical to be lavish in the expenditure requisite by trial upon trial, change after change, to ensure services of the highest order of practical efficiency.

Effect of  
accountability,  
in displaying  
the value of  
individual  
service.

The examinations of the results to the public on a systematized accountability for different services will tend to a better appreciation of individual qualifications, and to care in the adjustment of interests as motives, as well as in the original appointments to the service. Commerce and private enterprise, where combinations of service are required, owe their efficiency to the extent to which are shared the results of success with the agency which has most contributed to their production as the efficient enterprise of war is due to its practical treatment as paid work by prize money and reward. Astonishment is sometimes excited at such salaries as 2,000*l.* or 3,000*l.* per annum paid to a secretary, or between 3,000*l.* or 4,000*l.* per annum to a dock-master, to a commercial company, for services for which salaries of from 600*l.* to 800*l.*, rising, perhaps to 1,200*l.* per annum, would be the most that would be thought of for the Public Service; but such large salaries turn out on inquiry to be very moderate, or even niggardly remuneration for results shown in the accounts and in the dividends of these companies, (and in private

concerns larger salaries are often given in the shape of partnerships,) to be due to no favouritism, but to the tried and ascertained value of the recipient's qualifications in the labour market. The accounts made manifest, how small in proportion to the outlay was the difference in expense between the best and the less trustworthy service. Public accountability for results on the commercial principle would positively show, in several instances, differences to the Service of such sums as a quarter of a million per annum between one chief officer of an administrative department and another. A due appreciation of the saving of time and labour in the prosecution of improvements in the Service, would display the wasteful obstructions created by the unconscious operation of fixed habits on the part of old and respectable officers, in maintaining old and comparatively profitless practice, and would show the cheapness of giving full and immediate retiring allowances. I have seen instances where it might be proved to the satisfaction of commercial men, that it would be cheap to give as retiring pensions, such sums as 10,000*l.* or 20,000*l.* per annum, if they were necessary, rather than delay or forego the greater gains or economies of a new and more efficient service. But the prevalent principle of patronage is in its very language corrupting. Such words as "gifts" of places, "patronage," and the like, implying that places are benefits to the donee to the amount of the salary, for which the least possible work is to be done, and making any compulsion to proper duty an injury to be resented, should be as inapplicable to the Civil Service as it is to appointments in commerce and manufactures, where the payment of the salary is the condition of a full amount of service, and the acquittance of that service is an acquittance of all obligations to any principal, for other than preferences strictly *cæteris paribus*, or social civilities. The language of patronage ignores any differences of services, and is reckless of them. It obstructs changes by assuming that no change will effect improvement, or do more than impose new burthens; and that all pensions are simply extravagances, since the whole career in office has been one of benefit without return of equivalent service.

In some instances of new services, the legislature has provided for their revision, (which may be called an audit of service,) by provision for their periodical renewal. But practically the Ministers of the day being too much

Futility of the  
accountability  
of Departments  
by the existing  
methods of  
Parliamentary  
revision.

occupied to make a revision of the nature intended, and also being liable to receive sinister misrepresentations, communicated confidentially, which they have no time to examine—the provision generally only obstructs the Service without improving it. Lord John Russell has stated it to the Committee on Civil Salaries, as “rather a defect in the government of this country, that the time of the Ministers is so very much absorbed with the duties of their offices that there are very few of them who can give their attention to a great subject, and look at the consequences to the country of the measures which are adopted.” I apprehend that this is not only the case as respects new measures; that generally a minister has little time to look into the technical or working details of his own office, in its more important relations, and that this is a defect which requires some regular provision of the nature of the recent examinations by Treasury Committees. The recent practical Reports of the Treasury Committees of Inquiry serve as an instructive contrast to the reports of parliamentary committees, such as that on Civil Salaries. Although the parliamentary committees comprised superior men, their reports are wretchedly meagre and unsatisfactory, owing to the absence in the members of a preparation for the task such as that possessed by the Treasury Commissioners of Inquiry, and their inability to give it similar continuity of attention. Such inquiries as those of the recent committees into the Public Offices appear to me to be among the most satisfactory and important first steps hitherto taken for the improvement of the Civil Service.

Superiority of  
revisions by  
competent and  
superior  
officers.

I venture to submit, that similar examinations ought to be made periodically through all the offices, for the purpose of advising on the correction of deficiencies, and of promoting the improvements required by changes of times and of the public necessities. I have no doubt that zealous officers would look forward with satisfaction to the examinations made, as these have evidently been, in a friendly spirit, by superior officers of practical experience, competent to judge of their representations, and sure to do so with impartiality. At the same time, it is proper to observe that the examination within the office, though in itself an important first step, forms only one part and often the least important part of the subject matter for examination; and that for complete audits it will, in a large proportion of cases, be necessary to extend the revision to the fields of service outside the

department, and to hear the parties affected by its proceedings, so as to ascertain how much of any insufficiency is owing to the department itself, how much to any want of legislative aid, how much to the failure of any collateral support due to it. No complete examination of the working of the Poor Law department, for example, could be wholly made in the office; the greater part must relate to the out-door operation of the Poor Law Board's regulations in the Unions.

I beg further to suggest, that annual reports and returns of the business done, and of the state and movement of the staff employed in doing it, might be brought under cognizance of the Board of Examiners, who might prepare the results in a connected and comparative form for submission to the Government, and for presentation to Parliament, turning to account, for their own examination, the facts thus brought to their own knowledge.

I would suggest also, that some of the chief members of the Board of Examiners should be connected with the proposed audit of service and periodical revision of the Public Offices, as it would serve to keep up their own knowledge of the changes of circumstances and of practice, and of the particular and special, as well as general points to which their examinations should be directed. One or two experienced managers of private establishments, conducted successfully on a large scale, might be usefully enlisted in aid of the proposed periodical revisions.

When thoroughly sound principles are adopted and earnestly prosecuted by the sustained attention of competent and zealous officers, the difficulties in their practical working are usually found to be less than were apprehended, whilst unforeseen, collateral and preponderant advantages are developed in the course of their application. By officers who are indifferent or adverse, the new advantages are disregarded or set aside, and every real or imagined difficulty is magnified. It is impossible not to feel and urgently represent, that the success of whatsoever measures are adopted will mainly depend on those to whom their execution is entrusted, and that they will not be fairly dealt with and must be expected to fall short, or to fail, if their execution be left dependant on removable political officers, heavily charged with other duties and subjected to adverse influences. It is proper to represent that a most depressing scepticism prevails throughout the Service of any regular and just application

Proceedings  
by Orders in  
Council the  
most eligible  
course.



of the proposed measures of improvement, if they are in anywise left dependant on changeable, political, or party officers, like the Secretaries of the Treasury for the time being. The influences to which such officers are themselves subjected; must militate against any such measures, and they cannot be expected to be otherwise than indisposed to them. It may be submitted that a procedure by Orders in Council, supervised by a Special Committee of Privy Councillors, selected for their interest in the subject and their known superiority to common party motives, would not only be the most constitutional exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, and in every way the most eligible course, but would also give the greatest confidence.

Accountability for service necessary for the practical working of the principle of promotion for merit.

I have submitted with lengthened illustrations my views on the necessity for the establishment of systematized accountability for service in return for expenditure, because I believe that as it is in the most successful use in commerce and manufactures on the largest scale, so it will be with public administration; and that the success of the important principles of improvement proposed will turn upon it. Without it the remedy proposed for all defects, and naturally so popular in the offices, even if it were likely to obtain a trial—the simple augmentation of all salaries—would be of little avail; for that measure alone has little warranty in experience of difference of performances, and in the value of services rendered, being uniformly proportioned to amount of emolument derived. Without accountability for service and competitive examinations, I do not see that claims to augmented incomes founded on the only proper basis—the market value of the services—can be regularly established. Without the systematized accounts of individual service, I do not see that the important principle now recognized of promotions for merit can be regularly and extensively carried into effect, unless with serious preponderant inconveniences and difficulties.

Practical difficulties of the working of that principle without accountability.

The application of the principle of promotion for merit by itself is often attended with very great practical difficulty, and is liable to grievous injustice in all cases where the differences of merit are not largely conspicuous. The chiefs themselves are liable to be misled by "eye-service," and various incidents. Their decisions are exposed to the suspicion of the bias of connexions. The permanent ill-feeling which is generally occasioned by putting juniors over seniors,

would frequently be too great for the impartial performance of the duty. In those commercial houses where the individual services are of a nature not to be obviously and widely distinguishable, or where a proper system of accounting is not well applied, considerable difficulties are sometimes experienced in the application of the principle, and it is common for the chiefs to avoid ill will and conflicts with the jealous challengers of their decisions by giving bonuses secretly and confidentially to particular clerks and assistants, according to their impressions of individual merit.

Careful and systematic accounting and records of service, which, like well kept money accounts, shall place the differences of service beyond doubt or cavil, will serve for the protection of the chief, and for inducement as well as protection to meritorious officers. The practicability of accounting for service is admitted, where it depends apparently on the notation of simple and obvious particulars; but examples may be given, showing the practicability of accounting by *general expressions* obtained by due and responsible supervision of the details. The simplification of business operations will often be found necessary for accountability as well as for efficiency. There are, however, few or no cases in which the protection needed for the officer and for the public may not now be given.

Under an improved organisation of the Service, I believe it will be found expedient as well as just to pay at once the value of any extraordinary, or increase of ordinary service without postponing that payment to the occurrence of the uncertain contingency of the demise or the removal of any other person.

I apprehend that generally, and according to all impartial testimony, the grounds for the augmentation of salaries are yet to be prepared and established by the Public Offices. From the information I have received from officers in large departments, and from what I have myself observed, I believe that under the stimulus of better pay to reduced numbers, and better arrangements of business, the same amount of service might now be generally rendered by at least one-third fewer officers. Under the best circumstances of original appointments and arrangements, including the proper adjustment of interests, it is not too much to allege that the present amount of business might generally be transacted by one half the present

Increase of salaries not justified without improvements in the Service.

Extent of re-  
dundant hands  
now in the  
Public Service.

number of persons. Persons in office, who have consulted no other than the older official working standards, will consider this to be an over-statement, but I believe it may be sustained. It may be presumed that the persons introduced by patronage into the Public Offices—described by Sir James Stephen as forming the majority of the Colonial Department—who possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost incredibly low, either the talents or the habits of men of business, or the industry, the zeal, or the knowledge required for the effective performance of their appropriate duties, might take their departure without material detriment to the Service. They, however, are victims of the system, and immediate and forced reductions would be a course ineligible on account of their difficulty, as well as of their injustice, if they were attended with any reduction of income. Moreover, it cannot be said what these persons may not be taught and made to do until they are placed under an adequate stimulus of interest to learn and to apply themselves efficiently. But it appears to me that it is essential to an efficient re-organisation that the existing numbers of officers should be reduced; for, whilst the numbers in excess of what would be required by a well arranged administration burthen the public to some extent by the direct expense of salaries, but much more by the excessive multiplications of steps, obstructions, and delays in the transaction of business, they are oppressive to the effective officers, by the obstacles to promotion created by the redundant hands, depressing the hopes and the spirit and energy of the Service.

I have had some experience which leads me to express a confident belief that the difficulty may be met, and that some large preparations for improved organisation may be best accomplished by the present officers themselves.

On several occasions, when an obvious reduction of business suggested the existence of a redundancy of hands, other more pressing business usually prevented or procrastinated the examination in detail necessary to effect safely an enforced change. In this state of things vacancies occurred, and, as a matter of course, a case was made out for their being filled up, there being no time or opportunity to effect the general change of practice requisite to dispense with the appointments. I next proposed that it should be announced that on the occurrence of further vacancies, if it could be made out that the same business could be

Need of the  
reduction of  
numbers for an  
efficient re-or-  
ganisation of  
the Public  
Service.

Proposal to  
make it the  
interest of the  
officers to pro-  
mote a reduc-  
tion of their  
numbers.

executed properly by the reduced staff, they should receive a proportion of the salary previously paid to the person holding the lapsed appointment. This proposal I was unable to carry out to the extent which was practicable, but it elicited suggestions of simplification, despatch, and other improvements, to an extent for which I was previously unprepared; redundant hands were helped by their colleagues to move to new positions; and this method of reduction of numbers, giving augmentations of salaries, acted, in the particular instances where it was brought into operation, most satisfactorily to all parties.

I confidently recommend, on declarations made to me by officers serving in more than one office, the like course for the present purposes, and that it should be put upon a legitimate footing and adopted, as far as practicable, as a rule. Such a rule would no doubt be exposed to some obvious abuse; but effectual precautions are no less obvious, and the abuse in the present state of things and for some time to come is very little to be feared. Moreover, the improvements in detail which are elicited from within the offices themselves are in all respects of very high value, and the privilege of suggestion should on all fair opportunities be extended to every class. Under this rule, suggestions of improvements would be promptly given and zealously executed, and I believe they would be much larger than might at present be anticipated.

In the cases where any reduction was found to be impracticable, the occurrence of a vacancy in any one office should be notified, and a right of precedence, *cæteris paribus*, as against new appointments, should be given to candidates from other offices.

I confidently submit that by this process—by shutting the door to new appointments until the supply afforded by consolidations from within the offices is fairly exhausted—for some time to come the evils of patronage may be checked, the office business improved, and a material reduction of expense effected.

In addition to such a cause for the gradual reduction of redundant hands, with the aid of the officers themselves, the measures proposed by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote for facilitating interchanges of service between different departments, has appeared to me an important means of aiding overworked offices, and by aid given as extra work on occasions of extraordinary pressure, preventing unnecessary permanent augmentations of

Uses of the  
interchange  
of service.

establishments. The specialities of departments are alleged as objections to the practicability of such a course. But it is from the specialities that such interchanges might often be made; as, for instance, when from an extraordinary pressure of business a department is thrown in arrear in its registration or its accounts, it might obtain relief from the aid of the accounting or registration clerks of other departments as extra work. Extra work on extraordinary occasions, and interchanges of service (which might be obtained by notifications for volunteers from the offices,) may be viewed as an aid to the principle of promotion on the ground of merit, for it is in the opportunities afforded by extraordinary service that the merit, confined by the routine of ordinary duties, is the most frequently developed.

If to the several proposed arrangements for engaging in the re-organisation of the Service, the direct interests of the majority of persons already employed, and in particular, if to the right of a fair and impartial hearing to all proposals of improvement in practice, were added a rule for giving to the officer who has prepared them in a practical shape, and who appears to be otherwise duly qualified, a fair share in their execution, powerful stimuli will be given for the advance of the Service to its due position.

The chief conclusions, then, which I would submit for consideration in addition to those before recited in support of competitive examinations by an examining board, would be—first, those last stated—

That on the occurrence of vacancies, no new appointments (staff appointments excepted) shall be made, if it can be shown that upon a division of the salary within the office, or part of the emoluments attached to the vacant place, the duties of that place can be performed satisfactorily.

Second, that notifications of vacancies in any one office be made to all the rest where there are lower appointments, and opportunities of promotion, *cæteris paribus*, be allowed to them.

Third, that systematized reports and accounts of the service rendered for payments made by individual officers, and collectively by offices, shall be required, and that those accounts as well as the money accounts shall be regularly audited.

Fourth, that future promotions to the classes of appointments in question, shall, as far as practicable, be based on audited accounts of service rendered.

To him who  
devises let the  
execution be  
given.

Fifth, that the application of the proposed measures for the re-organisation of the Civil Service, shall, where statutory provisions are not absolutely required, be made by Orders in Council with the aid of a Special Committee of the Council.

The latest experience and observations of the comparative condition of the Civil Service, and its influence on the political and social condition of the country, confirm the views of the greatest statesman of the last century in considering the improvement of that service as paramount to almost all others; for unless it be efficiently improved, almost all other improvements will fall short, or utterly fail of their proper effects.

Mr. Burke, in his speech on economical reform, says:—  
“What I bent the whole force of my mind to was, the  
“reduction of that corrupt influence which is itself the  
“perennial spring of all prodigality, and of all disorder,  
“which loads us with two millions of debt, which takes  
“away vigour from our arms, wisdom from our councils,  
“and every shadow of authority and credit from the most  
“venerable parts of our Constitution.”

Since his time, as the last census shows, the population has increased more than it had done during a thousand years before. The rate of increase has been as if two new cities, such as Manchester proper or Birmingham, or two new counties, such as Worcester or the North Riding of Yorkshire, had been annually added to Great Britain, or as if six kingdoms, as populous as Scotland at the commencement of the century, had been included in the previous population of these islands within the last fifty years. Almost within the time of the present generation the whole empire has been more than doubled, and the interests, requiring an advanced Civil Service, proportionately augmented, whilst the ancient official machinery and the forms of business remaining much the same, the evil consequences of all defects upon the increased population are proportionately aggravated.

The late Sir Robert Peel, speaking of the Encumbered Estates Act, said it was “so very good a measure that he  
“really wondered how it had ever passed.” Nevertheless, great faith and hope may be had in the public and private integrity, to which the proposed measure for the relief of the Civil Service from its encumbrances appeals, against narrow views and feelings and sinister interests, in behalf of

the extended relations and the most important interests of the empire.

Should the principles proposed be allowed a fair operation, Her Majesty's Government will succeed in doing what Mr. Burke attempted. Their success will extend beyond the Civil Service itself, and will not only beneficially influence the morality and efficiency of all other analogous service in the country, but also the education and political condition and relations of the whole empire.

#### APPENDIX A.

EXTRACT FROM THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO BOARDS OF GUARDIANS, FOR THE SELECTION OF LOCAL OFFICERS, WITH THE PARTICULAR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED UNDER THE POOR LAW AMENDMENT ACT.

##### *Mode of Appointing Paid Officers.*

46. As at this second meeting some appointments of officers will probably be made, the Commissioners observe, that the integrity and sense of justice of the Guardians will prescribe a full and impartial examination of the qualifications of every candidate for employment in the Union. The Guardians should look to the *evidence* of ability and good conduct in previous situations as the security for future good service; general testimonials to fitness, without such *evidence*, being of little weight, especially from persons unacquainted with the new duties to be performed. All canvassing should be repressed, as an attempt to induce the Guardians to injure the public service, and commit injustice by pledging themselves in favour of one candidate without an examination of the claims of the others, amongst whom there might be persons better qualified for the office. The circumstance of a person having been a bankrupt or an insolvent, or of having failed in other pursuits, is regarded by the Commissioners as presumptive evidence of unfitness.

47. The Commissioners trust that political and sectarian feelings will be always carefully excluded from the proceedings of the Board. The mixing up of politics with the administration of relief, has almost always been found to operate prejudicially in increasing the spread of pauperism amongst the labouring classes, by causing relief to be distributed for other than the simple purpose of relieving the destitute, and by occasioning the appointment of paid officers, not for their fitness for office, but for their activity as political agents.

48. The correct course of proceeding will be, to read the several proposals of candidates in the order in which they have been received, and, when they have been read, to call in the candidates

and examine [in which the Assistant Commissioner had in instructions to take a part, and usually led] them in the like order. Each Guardian will put such questions as he may think fit to the candidate. The Chairman will then take the votes of the Guardians; and when each Guardian has voted, the total number of votes should be added up, and the candidate having the greatest number declared duly elected.

#### APPENDIX B.

TESTS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDING ENGINEERING INSPECTORS.

The General Board of Health have received your application for an appointment as a Superintending Inspector under the Public Health Act, with the testimonials as to your professional standing and qualifications for such an office.

In deciding upon the merits of candidates the General Board feel themselves called upon to keep in view the conclusions as to the requirements of such an office arrived at by the Sanitary Commissioners, and stated by them in the following terms:

"The more the investigation advances the more it is apparent that the progressive improvement and proper execution of this class of public works, together with the appliances of hydraulic engineering, cannot reasonably be expected to be dealt with incidentally or collaterally to ordinary occupation, or even to connected professional pursuits, but require a degree of special study which not only place them beyond the sphere of the discussion of popular administrative bodies, but beyond that of ordinary professional engineering and architectural practice.

"In justification of this conclusion, and to show the evil of the perverted application of names of high general professional authority, we might adduce examples of the most defective works which have received their sanction.

"All the improvements which the public have yet obtained in this branch of public works have been the result of the special and undivided practical attention of well-paid qualified officers."

That the Board may be enabled to judge of the positive as well as of the relative ability of the candidates for employment in this service, they will require, in addition to the ordinary testimonials as to general ability and moral trustworthiness, to be furnished with proofs of a special aptitude for originating, expounding, and superintending the execution of the class of works in question.

In the Public Health Act you will find set down the various duties of a Superintending Inspector, and among others, that of dealing with the owners and occupiers of districts in the way of exposition, examination, and judicial decision.

It will be evident to any one who has followed the course of the inquiries relating to Public Health Works that the principles that have been established for future operations will render inapplicable much of the experience that has been formed in the

execution of existing works of house, street, and land drainage, water supply, and general cleansing.

It is stated in the First Report of the Health of Towns Commission that, "of the replies of the fifty towns on the subject of "draining and cleansing, in scarcely one place can the drainage or "sewerage be pronounced to be complete or good, while in seven "it is indifferent, and in forty-two decidedly bad, as regards the "districts inhabited by the poorer classes;" and on the subject of the supply of water, that "in only six instances could the arrangements and the supplies be deemed in any comprehensive sense "good, while, in thirteen, they appear to be indifferent, and in "thirty-one so deficient as to be pronounced bad."

As the means of enabling the Board to judge of your application, they would ask you to lay before them your views of the means of remedying these defects. To this end they would wish you to state, in the first place, the general principles which, during an inquiry and inspection of any city or town, would govern your determination of the boundaries which might be most advantageously adopted for the purposes of the Public Health Act, and then to select or suppose some case of defective house and land drainage, water supply, and cleansing, and show, in detail, the way in which you would treat it.

Take, for example, a small provincial town or large village, or a detached suburban district of five or six hundred houses, on an undrained heavy clay or marshy site, and it may be affected with ague or typhus.

Let the locality you fix upon be either on the borders of a river, and in whole or in part below high-water mark, or on a flat ground with no river near, and state the arrangements that you would make for its thorough and perfect drainage, that is to say, for complete surface drainage, including the drainage of the land and open spaces of the neighbourhood, sub-soil drainage, and the relief from floods, especially in low lands. Reference will, of course, be required to be made to the materials, forms, sizes, and inclinations of the drains, the machinery that might be requisite, and the cost of the works.

In the next place, you would require to show how you would select, gather, store, and distribute water for domestic use, for cleansing, and for the prevention of fires, with the character and cost of the works, and also to state the principles that would guide your procedure in this important department. It will be most to the purpose to choose for this object a town with no suitable river water at hand. The qualities requisite in water to be supplied to towns, the materials to be employed in waterworks, their sizes and proportions, and the amount of supply necessary for a given population are, you are aware, all essential to be attended to.

The paving of the streets of the different classes of main and secondary streets and courts, including the materials, the method of forming the foundation, the form and inclination of the surface, with the cost of work, would also require to be given in refer-

ence to any place that you might select or suppose, and also the means you would adopt for cleansing streets and courts, and for disposing of the refuse. The disposal of solid refuse from the habitations would likewise have to be provided for.

You will, moreover, be expected to give a very precise and detailed account of your views as to house drainage. One of the chief objects of sanitary works being the immediate removal of all decomposing refuse, soil, and waste water from, around, amidst, or beneath human habitations, it is desirable that you should fix upon a house—for example, one of the fourth class, or of the kind inhabited by the labouring population—and show by what materials, forms, sizes, and construction, and at what price, you would accomplish this object. The same ought also to be done for blocks of houses. It would be requisite to distinguish between the cases of old houses, and the applications that you would propose for new buildings or new districts.

You ought further to show by what methods you would avoid the retention of solid decomposing refuse in the neighbourhood of habitations, as well as the pollution of rivers with soil water, and at what expense you would accomplish these objects.

The Board would require to receive your exemplifications of these points in as compact a form as possible, and with such sketches and illustrations as you may think necessary for the elucidation of the subject.

It is assumed from the fact of your application that you have devoted special attention to the subjects of which a knowledge will be essentially required for the satisfactory discharge of the responsible duties of the office which you seek, and the Board consider that under such circumstances a fortnight would be sufficient time for the preparation of your answer, but the Board do not desire to restrict you to this period should you wish to have it extended.

#### APPENDIX C.

##### THE CONCOURS.

The *concours* consists of the whole of the medical faculty who can be brought together in the district. In addition to these there are the candidates, who on the occasions of the elections for *élèves internes*, amount to between 100 and 200. The examinations are conducted before the public audience, which seldom consists of less than 400 or 500 persons. A jury of five medical practitioners are chosen by ballot from amongst the medical body. A number of skilfully framed and comprehensive questions are placed in a vase. One is drawn out by a public officer, and presented to each of the sets of candidates as they pass on in rotation to private rooms, where they are kept from communication with others. Eight minutes are allowed them to frame verbal answers, which they return and make publicly. It frequently happens that the question will hit some

point on which the candidate is entirely ignorant, and instead of returning he takes to his heels in terror, in which case it is announced to the *concoirs* that *Monsieur un tel* has disappeared. Others break down in their first answers. The examinations are greatly narrowed by the number put *hors du combat*. Each candidate is at liberty to question his competitor, and in the contests for the higher offices these cross-examinations often create finished and instructive displays of science and skill.\* Besides the questions to which verbal answers must be given, another set of a higher nature are put to the candidates, who are required to furnish written answers within two hours, during which time they are inclosed in rooms by themselves and prevented communicating with others. The answers are sealed, and at the next meeting of the examiners are opened and read publicly, after which the jury retires to consult upon their merits. The proceedings are adjourned from day to day, and are often carried on to the extent of a fortnight.

A better plan than this for supplying a constant and powerfully acting motive to exertion, and for securing just decision, has never, that we are aware of, been conceived or executed. It may easily be imagined how anxiously the student will anticipate the display which he must make before the assembled body of the profession to which he seeks admission, and before the public at large, on whose good opinion he must depend for success. He can only win his way by sedulous attention to the entire course of his study, and by availing himself of every opportunity that may be offered to him for gaining practical knowledge. It is sometimes stated as an objection to public contests, that they must operate prejudicially against modest or timid merit. This is an objection which does not apply to this case, since the education of medical students in classes, and their general discipline, is eminently calculated to free them from the embarrassing influence of such feelings. There is indeed no intellectual qualification more necessary to a medical man than those which are usually designated by the term presence of mind, namely, the power of entirely abstracting the attention from circumstances extrinsic to the object in view, of not being disconcerted by unexpected occurrences, and of applying to that object without hesitation all the knowledge that is applicable, from the store of a memory that is full and rich, and at once retentive and ready. It is one of the most valuable circumstances belonging to the public examination, that it puts these qualifications to the test.

\* It often occurs that a vain pretender, who in over confidence ventures the trial of a *concoirs*, falls a victim to his temerity and is dissected—eviscerated—to the edification of the profession and greatly to the instruction of the public. The shift of a candidate who was somewhat of this character excited on one occasion great amusement. "Now," said his competitor, "you have sent forth to the public this book, which I will prove to be from beginning to end full of mischievous blunders, and evidence of incapacity." He then read some passages, and accompanied them with several posing questions "Quant à cela," replied the author, with an air of dignified nonchalance, "*ce sont des personnalités auxquelles je ne répondrai point.*"

The public examination is invaluable as a security to the candidate against misdecision from the operation of the judicial vices, partiality, ignorance, indolence, inattention, ill-humour, or caprice. By publicity the judges or the jury are themselves put on their trial, and they cannot commit an outrageous act of injustice without subjecting themselves to infamy, nor can they misdecide from incompetency or any other cause of misdecision, without incurring shame or the loss of character from the profession and the public. The only frequent opportunity for the exercise of undue partiality is in those cases where the merits of the candidates are so close that the question of superiority will fairly admit of gloss and dispute. Some cases which were considered of flagrant misdecision have occurred in Paris since the institution of this mode of trial, and the consequence was, in each case, that the exercise of the feeling of the profession and the public in favour of the individual wronged, more than compensated him for the injury he had sustained at the hands of his judges.

Where the judges or examiners conduct the examination in private, they are released from the operation of nearly all the desirable securities against misdecision to which we have adverted. Those who have performed functions of a judicial nature, singly or with any number of men, (setting aside the operation of sinister interests,) will own the powerful operation of publicity in creating a greater attention to the due performance of their duties; they will admit the contrary tendency of privacy in permitting them to perform the functions with the greatest ease to themselves, and that under this mode there is comparatively the *most carelessness* in the mode of conducting the operations. Whatever vices are admitted by private examinations may be expected in the greatest degree where they are conducted by permanent functionaries. It appears to us to be a peculiar excellence of the French *concoirs*, that the judges or jurors are unknown, and chosen by ballot for the occasion only. Where those who are to decide upon the merits of a candidate for admission to a profession are previously known, and hold their office permanently, it becomes his interest to ascertain the opinions of his judges, and he will direct his studies to their standard rather than to the latest state of scientific information, which we may be sure will not be the state most favoured by the oldest practitioners, who generally attain these offices by seniority. It is frequently a business to ascertain the habitual routine of questions put by the permanent examiners, and prepare pupils to answer them. There are other evils attendant on these duties being entrusted to permanent and comparatively irresponsible functionaries. It becomes known that they entertain partialities for particular schools, or for particular professors of those schools, and that wherever certificates from them are presented, the partiality is manifested by more easy and indulgent examinations. Hence pupils flock to the professors of those schools whose certificates will attain their object with the least trouble; and

those teachers are of course avoided whose certificates will occasion them to be examined with extreme rigour, if not rejected from caprice. In few cases are regulations enforced by medical lecturers to secure constant attendance to their lectures; in still fewer is any thing done by subsequent examinations to secure the application of those who are present during the whole course, so that in fact such certificates in general prove no more than that the professor has paid a certain sum of money for the privilege of attending a course of lectures; they prove nothing as to his proficiency. The medical student in France, on the contrary, knows not who may be his judges, or what may be the questions which he may be called upon to answer, and his only security to enable him to meet them successfully will be a complete proficiency in a wide range of knowledge. He is at the same time conscious that the presence of the members of his profession and of a public whom no relationship, no pecuniary interest can bias, will secure a due estimation to the successful results of his labours. Let the doctor inquire at Paris, and he will find that all the eminent practitioners have at one period or other been distinguished at *concours*. The physicians of the several hospitals are selected by the administration from amongst those who have been employed in the Bureau Central; and these medical officers of the Bureau are chosen to their situations by *concours*. The surgeons are elected in a similar manner, but after having served at the Bureau, they have in general a second *concours*, at which all doctors in surgery may be candidates. The *chef des travaux anatomiques* and the *internes en pharmacie*, or officers of *pharmacie centrale*, are elected by *concours*. The *pharmacien en chef*, or chief apothecary to an hospital, is always elected in the same manner. On these occasions have been displayed the talents of such men as Davy, Gay-Lussac, Thenard, Brande, and the contests are viewed by all scientific men, young and old, professional and non-professional, with an intensity of interest of which we could give no adequate conception.

During the Villèle administration some attempts were made to take into the hands of the government these appointments from the *concours*. The medical body saw at once that this policy took from merit its just ascendancy, and rendered their preferment dependant on their adroitness in the ways of interest and intrigue. They therefore justly felt the independence of their profession attacked, and this was one great cause of the political ferments which have of late agitated the French medical schools. An annual ceremonial of the opening of the Faculty of Medicine takes place at Paris. On this occasion one of the Ministers of State usually attends, and a discourse is pronounced. At the opening of the Faculty in 1821, when the orator Dupuytren but mentioned the word *concours* in his address, an unanimous burst of applause was elicited from the whole medical body, which manifested in a striking manner how highly they appreciated the advantages of this mode of election.

SIR THOMAS REDINGTON, K.C.B.,  
Permanent Secretary to the Board of Control.

*India Board, August 2, 1854.*

THE best manner in which I can reply to your letter of the 4th ultimo will be by stating my own views on the better organisation of the Civil Service.

I fully concur in the opinion expressed by Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself of the importance of that Service, and if the State pays adequate salaries, and will pension liberally those who have been worn out in its employment, I think it has a right to expect that it shall be well and faithfully served.

It appears to me, however, that too unfavourable a view of the actual Civil Service has been taken in your Report; for, although like other professions, it may contain some who are "unambitious," "indolent," or perhaps "incapable," yet I should be unwilling to consider this as the rule, and to regard competency and efficiency as the exception. I think also that it is a mistake to treat the whole body of servants in Civil employ as members of one service, and that it will not be always proper to apply precisely the same rules to the 16,000 persons in the public establishments of this country.

A great distinction should, I think, be drawn between the higher departments belonging to the Executive Government, such as the offices of the Secretaries of State, where in some, constantly, and, at times, in all, matters of a confidential nature, or, at least, which it is not for the good of the Public Service, should be disclosed, come under the cognizance of the youngest clerks, and those other offices, such as the Boards of Customs and Inland Revenue, which belong to the class of administrative departments.

Now, I gather from your Report that it is proposed that the Civil Service, including not alone all the departments I have named, but the 16,000 places of the class of clerkships to which you have referred, should be opened in future to public competition in the shape of a competing literary examination.

That which you have in view is to supply the Public Service with a thoroughly efficient class of men, and to encourage their industry when in office by a better system of promotion.

These are most desirable objects; but I think they may

be attained without adopting the course which you propose, and in which I do not entirely concur. I don't think it will be of advantage to the Civil Service to make admission thereto the reward of superior literary attainments, as in the case of scholarships at a university, because I do not believe the best scholars would necessarily make the best clerks. Many other qualifications besides book-learning are required to form a good man of business, either in a private or public office. At the first examination of a candidate for Civil employment these cannot, it is true, be as readily judged of as proficiency in science or in classics; but a facility in abstracting papers, in analysing and reporting on subjects,—the materials for which are scattered through many documents,—will be a good indication of qualification for official life, although accompanied by only the ordinary information in history, modern languages, &c., possessed by those who have received a liberal education. I therefore reject altogether the principle of an open competing literary examination for admission to the Public Service; but in any case I should consider its application to the higher departments of the Executive Government most objectionable. For such employment, not alone the ability of the clerk, but his character, condition in life, and that of his associates, has to be considered; otherwise, the successful competitor might be a person of either lax principle, whose discretion and fidelity could not be relied upon, or he might be the child or associate of persons in whose judgment the loss of character,—which among honourable men attaches to a violation of official confidence,—would be lightly thought of.

Instead of open competition for these appointments, I would propose that the present system of nomination continue, but that the candidate should be examined by official examiners, whose duty it should be to report to the head of the department their opinion as to his general competency, by character, education, and intelligence, as well as age and health, for admission to the Public Service. These examiners should be annually appointed, say by the Lord President, and should act under his direction, being allowed a suitable remuneration for their services. The candidate having been admitted, should remain one year as a probationer in the department; at the end of which period, if his conduct and capacity were still approved, he should be placed on the establishment, and considered in his second year of service. As regards admission to other Civil Clerkships, I consider that the efficiency of the Pub-

lic Service will be amply secured by adopting the same rule.

The general objections already urged as to a competing literary examination not being the best test of what is required for official life, would still apply to these other departments, although the necessity for securing the services of young men, whose discretion and loyalty of character might be relied upon, would not exist to the same extent. However, if by the proposed examination, the rejection of inefficient, and the admission of only efficient persons into the Public Service is secured, the object in view will have been accomplished.

I am aware that many persons desire Government patronage in such matters should be done away with; but that is a subject which must be viewed on political grounds.

As I know from experience that it would relieve Members of Parliament and official men from a most disagreeable portion of their labours, I should not regret that some other mode than that which at present prevails were adopted for admission into the Public Service. This, however, it may not be so easy to accomplish in a manner that will give general satisfaction. At present, as either political party is in power, their friends in each locality have their share. In any new arrangement, however, if the distribution of places is not to be equal over the whole country, or at least so impartially made as that no great district shall be excluded or particularly favoured, there will arise constant complaints of alleged unfair preference either to parties or places. Public competition, it is true, would show that there existed really no such unfairness; but, on the other hand, it would give the appointments to the *best* educated districts, although persons sufficiently well educated were to be found in other localities; and this again would be a source of dissatisfaction, causing, perhaps, national complaints and jealousies. It is true, a system might be introduced, by which, at annual examinations in certain towns of the United Kingdom, the qualified candidates might be passed, and a selection from these names might afterwards be made, by ballot or otherwise; but if the improvement of the Civil Service can be sufficiently effected under the existing system of nomination, I don't think it probable such a plan would be adopted; and even supposing the abolition of political patronage to be resolved upon, this will be but imperfectly effected by dealing merely with such appointments as clerkships; for there will still



remain many appointments for which only residents in the locality are eligible, and with respect to whom recommendations will have to be sought, while in others the nomination could not be made to depend on such an examination as is proposed.

As to promotion in the public departments, I think the practice of allowing it to proceed entirely by seniority is objectionable.

In several departments, as regards the higher appointments, it has, I believe, ceased to prevail.

Every public office, whatever its constitution, will be found to comprise two degrees of clerks, although these may again be divided into several classes. The higher clerks are charged with duties of a more responsible character, either as conducting some special branch of the business, or superintending generally its conduct in some division of the office. The junior clerks are engaged in carrying out the details of business under the direction of the former. Promotion to the higher clerkships on the ground of seniority alone should be discountenanced, the selection being made for superior qualifications and merit. No doubt, the experience which is only acquired by long service will generally be found to strengthen the qualification of a candidate, and so far, even in these appointments, seniority will indirectly have some weight.

The other clerks are usually employed in the initiative duties of juniors. There is not there to the same extent the opportunity for any great display of intelligence, and the efficiency of the clerk is more frequently to be judged of by the amount of diligence and attention he brings to the discharge of his duties than by any other means. It is true, his services as private secretary (if so employed) may have given more scope to his abilities; but it would be hard to allow this to operate to the disadvantage of his companions, who, if afforded the same occasion, might have exhibited the same capacity for business.

In the promotions, therefore, through the classes of junior clerks, I think the principle of seniority must be allowed to prevail in some degree, and I should myself be more disposed to act on the principle of rejecting an inefficient rather than of rewarding the most efficient clerk, when the difficulty of really determining who is the most efficient is so great. I am aware that many of the oldest Civil Servants regard these views unfavourably, and see in this proposal, not a security for merit being duly rewarded, but rather an opportunity for the exercise of favoritism; while and with truth, it is urged that the long services of

unpretending but hardworking public servants may be unfairly dealt by, when preference is given to less modest merit. There can be no doubt that unless proper checks are placed upon the operation of this system, such as the regular recording of the reports upon which promotions have been made, &c., this evil may arise. If the system, however, is sound in itself it should not be rejected, because it may be open to abuse, if not strictly watched in its operation.

Having now given my opinion as to the mode of admission and promotion, I shall only refer to one or two other points.

The age of admission of clerks on their first entry to the Civil Service should be fixed at from 18 to 25.

I concur with you in rejecting the scheme for the establishment of a general copying office, as impracticable; but I fear I must add, that I consider the proposal for correcting what is called the fragmentary character of the Service, by transferring clerks from one department to another, as little less so.\*

At present, I believe, it is not unusual at the Treasury to take a superior officer from another public department when a qualified person is not to be found in the office itself; but to hold out, as I understand your proposal, to every clerk, that he may have a claim to promotion on vacancies occurring in other departments, if he has qualifications superior to those in the office where the vacancy has occurred, will, I think, lead to great inconvenience, and

\* With the exception of the Supplementary Clerks, who are employed chiefly on mechanical duties and receive uniform rates of salary, it was not intended that clerks should be transferred *as such* from one office to another. The recommendation in the Report had reference to the more individual and responsible situations in offices which, for want of a better name, were denominated Staff Appointments; and it was proposed that when these situations become vacant, they should be filled, not by the appointment of strangers, but by the selection of a well qualified and deserving person in the same office, or if there is no such person, then of a person, being duly qualified, in some other office, so that a stranger should be appointed only when talent and experience are required of a kind which the existing body of public servants cannot furnish. A comparison of the paragraph beginning "It is of course essential to the Public Service," at page 7 of the Report, with that at page 22, beginning "By this system not only would greater certainty," and a reference to the Summary of the recommendations at the close of the Report, will show what was intended. The paragraph at page 18, beginning "Another point to which the attention of the chiefs of offices should be called," merely suggests an interchange of the duties of the junior clerks *within the same office*, for the purpose of giving them as general an acquaintance as possible with the business of the department, before they are called upon to take a leading position.

not to the benefit of the Public Service; for the person thus promoted would usually be quite a stranger to the business of the office in which he had been called upon to take a higher position.

I would now, before concluding, only observe, that I think many arguments, based upon the measure of last Session, for opening the Indian Civil appointments to public competition have been erroneously urged in favour of a similar course as regards appointments here.

It should, however, be remembered that the Act referred to in no degree interferes with the appointment and selection of persons to be employed in the Government Offices either in India or at home. The Governor-General, the Governors of the Presidencies, the Lieutenant-Governors, and the authorities at home, still select those whom they feel can be entrusted with such appointments.

Again, as to our system of departmental service and promotion, there is no doubt that the contrary prevails in India; but in that country the early career of a Civil Servant makes him practically familiar with judicial and revenue questions, as well as with the country generally, and he is therefore qualified, on being employed at the seat of Government, to enter upon the duties of a Financial, Judicial, Revenue, or Home Assistant Secretary. Here, however, such cannot be the case; and it would not be possible to make a clerk in the Home Office practically familiar with the business of the Foreign Office during his service at Whitehall; nor a clerk in the Board of Control, while employed in Cannon Row, conversant with that of the Colonies. The practice of India has in neither instance any strict application to this country.

Although now some years in the Public Service, I cannot pretend to the same experience as the majority of Civil Secretaries upon this question; but such opinions as I have formed I have endeavoured to lay before you in this letter.

W. G. ANDERSON, Esq.,

Principal Clerk for Financial Business at the Treasury.

*Treasury, August 5, 1854.*

I BELIEVE there are few persons who have been charged with the responsibility of superintending the duties of a

public office who will not agree in that part of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, in which you recommend a more careful selection and a stricter examination of candidates for first appointments in the Civil Service. In replying to the letter you have addressed to me, I will first refer to that recommendation, because it is with first admissions that improvement must commence. Without entering into the defects of the present system of examination, which are fully argued in the Report, I beg to express my entire concurrence in the proposal that future examinations should be conducted by an independent Board of Examiners. The practice hitherto followed has been to throw upon the executive officer at the head of each office the odium of rejecting the nominee of the Treasury or of his immediate superior in office, and of justifying such rejection by the results of an examination, the extent of which is in a great measure left to his own discretion. The consequences of this practice are precisely those which might be expected; a disinclination to injure the prospects of a young man on the threshold of his career, and the desire to avoid the chance of a collision with his patrons, generally secure to every candidate of doubtful acquirements the most indulgent consideration of his deficiencies; and although he may be wanting in those qualifications which would give an assurance of his becoming in time fit for the higher duties of the department, his competency to perform the lowest quality of duty in the office to which he has been nominated will, in most cases, secure him against rejection. This evil will be remedied by the proposal to subject all candidates to an effective examination to be conducted by a Central Board.

To show how little the examinations have been conducted with a view to secure the services of persons possessing the peculiar qualifications required for the business of each department, I will mention a circumstance within my own experience which occurred in a large department of account, and which strikingly illustrates the consequences of a deficient examination. During the early period of my service, the Commissioner at the head of a large department was desirous of introducing improvements in the mode of keeping the accounts of his office, improvements as urgently pressed upon his notice by the defective state of the accounts themselves as by the increased demands of Parliament for information which his books

could imperfectly supply. Having had some experience himself, before he was appointed to office, of the system by which commercial men reduce to order the large and varied operations of trade, he determined upon applying the principles of that system to the public accounts of his department; but although he had a large establishment of clerks almost wholly employed in the business of accounts to select from, he could not find one who was sufficiently conversant with the scientific principles of accounts to carry out his plans of improvement. If the system which he proposed to introduce had been one of modern invention or only partially known, such a result might have been accounted for, but it was one which for a long period has been in almost universal practice in this and other countries for all accounts of any magnitude, and which must have been co-existent with commerce itself.

It must not be supposed that the mischief of admitting ill-qualified persons into departments of account is limited to the inconvenience of a defective plan of account. The security which the system itself ought to provide is supplied by creating departments of check or by other complicated contrivances, which, being further involved by legislation founded upon them, render the public accounts unintelligible to all but the few to whom they become familiar by long practice.

A stricter examination of persons admitted to clerkships would, moreover, be productive of economy. Every person who has had experience in conducting a large office will admit, that if all were really efficient, not only would the business be better and more expeditiously done, but it would be probably executed by two thirds of the number of clerks at present employed. I need not enlarge further on this subject to show how fully I concur in the proposal contained in the Report to establish a strict, impartial, and independent examination of candidates for appointments in the Civil Service.

The proposal contained in the Report, that the appointments in the Civil Service should be thrown open to public competition, and that nomination should consequently cease, is one which I am not very competent to discuss. Whether a general competition would bring with it, as many apprehend it would, an overwhelming number of candidates, whether local examinations would be fairly and efficiently conducted, and whether the comparative merits of a large number of candidates could be accurately ascer-

tained by the proposed examinations, are at present subjects of speculation which I need not enter into; but separating the question of open competition from those considerations which connect it with the promotion of education, and viewing it solely with reference to the requirements of the public departments, I am disposed to consider that an impartial and independent examination of candidates would, in a great measure, accomplish all that is needed to secure, if not the best, at least *good* public servants. And I may venture to add, that although nomination would limit, it need not exclude the principle of competition. If nominations to particular offices were abolished, and those who possessed the right of nomination were to send up to the proposed Board of Examiners three candidates for every vacancy to be supplied in a particular class, not only would competition be established, but the members of the Government who had the right of nomination would have a strong inducement to select candidates whose acquirements gave the best promise of success. Thus, if there were thirty vacancies in a particular class, ninety candidates would be nominated from whom the thirty best men would be selected.

I confess that I should have preferred, as a first step, some intermediate plan which would have tested, in a modified degree, most of the difficulties of the larger scheme; because, if successful, it would have rendered the ultimate adoption of a more comprehensive and perfect measure easier and more certain, and it would have avoided the danger of re-action which may result from even a partial failure of the one proposed in the Report.

With respect to the proposed minimum age of admission, I would beg to remark, that the clerkships in the superior offices of the Government, including the Treasury, all the offices of the Secretaries of State, and the Board of Trade, scarcely amount to three per cent. of the whole number. In all the other offices of Government, by far the largest portion of the business transacted is connected with the receipt and issue of money and stores, the examination of claims, the keeping and the auditing of accounts either of quantities or of value; in other words, the great bulk of the duty consists of *account* business; and it is for these appointments that the largest number of candidates will present themselves. The best training for these appointments which a youth, after leaving school, could undergo, would be two or three years' service in a banker's or mer-

chant's counting-house, or in a house of business of some kind where he would have an opportunity of acquiring habits of business and a *practical* knowledge of accounts; and to give time for that training, I would suggest whether it might not be desirable to fix the age of admission at nineteen instead of seventeen, as proposed in the Report, and to advance the minimum salaries on admission 20%.

I will only trouble you with one further remark; it has reference to retirements. Complaints are made of the want of energy and zeal of Public Servants. I believe that such complaints are not confined to public offices, and that all large bodies of clerks are exposed to a similar charge. One reason for the deficiency of zeal among Public Servants is the absence of sufficient stimulus to exertion in the early period of their service. I have known good men kept down in the junior class for twenty-five or thirty years, waiting for vacancies in the superior classes; this can only be remedied by compulsory retirements. After a prescribed age and period of service, when it may fairly be assumed that a clerk has passed his best, it should be compulsory on him to retire, unless specially ordered to retain his office. Some arrangement of this kind is required at present; it will be still more necessary for the Public Service if you desire to attract into its ranks and to retain the services "of the ablest and most ambitious of the youth of the country."

RICHARD GRIFFITH, Esq., LL.D.,

Chairman of the Board of Public Works, Ireland.

*Office of Public Works,  
Dublin, August 9, 1854.*

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, stating that Her Majesty's Government are desirous of knowing my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself respecting the organisation of the Civil Service, and requesting that I will state whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed open to any, and if any, to what improvements, together with a copy of the Report in question, and of a letter from the Rev.

B. Jowett, containing some recommendations for carrying into operation the suggestions contained in the Report.

Having maturely considered the subject of reference, I am of opinion, that the principle laid down, if judiciously and faithfully carried out, would work beneficially, by introducing into the Civil departments of the Public Service a class of persons, on an average, much superior in qualification for the respective duties to be performed to those at present employed, and would nearly if not altogether remove the anomaly, that the really efficient permanent officers of any department are to be found rather among the junior, than in the senior classes, a result which is mainly attributable to promotion being regulated more by seniority, than from the superior qualifications and industry of the individual promoted.

The main object to be attained is, as far as practicable to introduce into the Civil Service of the Government, the same facilities which individuals possess of raising themselves to comparative eminence through superior attainments and industry, as in ordinary professional and commercial employments; and such may be attained by the abandonment of all patronage, the adoption of the proposed system of examination, &c., and that promotions within the offices be regulated, not by seniority, but by the industry and fitness of the individuals to fill the vacant offices.

Fully adopting the principle of examination previous to appointment to a permanent office in the Civil Departments, I shall shortly state my opinion of the arrangements which may be followed.

1. I coincide in the necessity, in every case, of obtaining a certificate of acquirements and of moral conduct for a fixed period as preliminary to examination.

2. Of establishing distinct schemes of examination for candidates offering themselves for the superior and ordinary departments, as recommended by the Rev. Mr. Jowett.

3. That for the higher class, the examinations should consist of written answers to specific questions, and of *viva voce* examination.

4. That the certificate of the examiners should contain a full statement of the several subjects in which the candidate had answered satisfactorily, distinguishing those in which he had been most successful.

5. That the examiners should make a report after every examination, in which the candidates who had obtained certificates should be classed, as best suited to

employment in the Foreign Office, Board of Trade, the Treasury, Customs, &c.

6. That the head of every department should have power to fill up vacancies in his department, by selecting from among the candidates who had obtained certificates, not being absolutely bound either to the order in which the candidates were placed, or their classification as being suited to particular departments. This freedom appears to be desirable, to enable the head of a department to select the person who from his peculiar acquirements, appears to him to be suited to fill the vacancy.

In regard to candidates being taken into the office on probation, it appears to be desirable, that in every case they should be employed for a certain period in several departments of the office, and that their final admission to permanent employment should depend on a satisfactory certificate from the head of each department.

In the present state of the question it does not appear to be necessary to do more than give a general opinion, as should the principle be adopted, the best means of carrying out the detail will be easily arranged.

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ROWLAND HILL, Esq.,

Secretary to the Post Office.

*General Post Office, August 18, 1854.*

In compliance with the request conveyed through Sir Charles Trevelyan, I have the honour to submit my views on the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan "On the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service," and to suggest such improvements as occur to me in the arrangements for making the first appointments and promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed.

The object of the plan on which my opinion is desired is certainly of the highest importance. The evils of the present system I know by experience to be very serious; and their removal, so far as practicable, I cannot but regard as a great national benefit, worthy of the noble sacrifice which the government proposes to make in the surrender of its patronage.

To the principle of founding promotion on merit alone, I attach the highest importance. Not only would it raise

to the most responsible posts the men of greatest efficiency within the Service; but it would have the additional advantage of attracting able men to the Government Offices, and at the same time of repelling the incompetent; whereas promotion by routine has the reverse effect, and even causes some of the most efficient officers to quit the Service in quest of employment where their ability may receive more speedy recognition. So potent for good, indeed, do I regard this part of the proposed change, that I cannot but think that its full recognition by Government would alone go very far to secure to the Service that high efficiency which is the aim of the Committee.

The great difficulty in departing from promotion by routine is, as recognized by the Committee, to prevent abuse; I think, however, that this would be checked and the operation of the principle materially aided by a slight modification of the means proposed.

Adopting the excellent rule laid down of making the advance of salary annual, but at the same time dependent on satisfactory conduct, I would suggest that the clerks in each class be arranged, *inter se*, according to the amount of salary to which they are severally entitled; an arrangement which would obviously tend to bring the most deserving men into the position most favourable for promotion, and thus, on the one hand, render it more difficult for a chief to recommend an undeserving person, and on the other, remove the necessity of hurting the feelings of the less competent by repeated rejection of such as would otherwise gradually accumulate at the head of the class.

The question of original admission to the Service appears to present much greater difficulty. The ingenious device proposed, viz.; a "competing literary examination" to be "so conducted as to test the intelligence as well as the mere attainments of the candidates," and to be preceded by "careful previous inquiry into their age, health, and moral fitness"\* would certainly be a vast improvement on the present order of things, since it would doubtless raise an effectual bar to mere patronage, though I am afraid it would produce other evils of serious magnitude in its place.

Examination, indeed, so far as relates to such qualifications as are necessary for the service in view, would undoubtedly be of great use; but a competition by which

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\* Report, page 11.

appointments would be given mechanically to such non-disqualified candidates as display the greatest amount of literary attainments would, I fear, place admission and exclusion on an unsound basis.

Of the qualities constituting a good public officer—good principles, good habits, sound judgment, general intelligence, energy, and positive acquirements—the last, though the least important, is the one upon which the competition would mainly turn; and though positive acquirements do give some indication with regard to other qualifications, yet experience shows that the test is often fallacious, especially where the progress attained is the result of any strong stimulus, whether of hope or fear.

Again, while the selection even for the more intellectual duties would thus be liable to great error, that for mechanical and still more for menial duties (as those of messengers and letter carriers) would, I fear very frequently, perhaps generally, fall on the wrong persons,—men possessing acquirements above their neighbours, but unable for want of other qualifications to succeed, like them, in procuring more profitable employment. Such men would, I fear, prove not only incompetent to their duties but also dissatisfied with a position so little according with their tastes, powers, and habits; and without having energy either to secure promotion or to obtain more congenial employment elsewhere, would become nuclei of discontent in their respective offices.

It is easier, however, to point out objections than to supply a remedy. Some limitation on the number of candidates is indispensable, and if competition be abandoned another must be found.

If there existed in the country any general system of examination, so as to enable all applicants, from whatever quarter, to obtain a trustworthy attestation of certain definite though moderate acquirements (an arrangement which, besides its value for the purpose in question, seems highly desirable on many other considerations,) probably the best way would be to allow all those bearing such diplomas, and none other, to become candidates for appointments; the selection from these remaining with the heads of offices. Awaiting such an institution, I am of opinion that all ends might be tolerably well attained by an arrangement which should provide for the examination of all such as might be nominated by the heads of the respective offices, and should limit appointments to those who, after satisfying the examiners as to their age,

health, and moral fitness, should demonstrate their possession of such knowledge and, so far as it can be ascertained, such intelligence as are required for that grade in the Service to which they had been nominated. Further security being taken by a probation which I think should last for at least a year.

Yet more to guard the Service against the intrusion of persons applying rather under immediate necessity than from any settled desire or conscious fitness for the occupation—I would recommend that, until the appointment was made absolute, the novice should be on half pay. The justice of such an arrangement is obvious from the fact that in the outset the service rendered is generally of small value; and after all, the sacrifice would be trifling in comparison with that demanded in any one of the liberal professions or even in the higher mercantile employments.

The whole arrangement now submitted, while it would afford considerable security against abuse of patronage, would at the same time leave the heads of the different branches of the Service in undiminished responsibility for the appointments made—a matter of the highest importance to the integrity and efficiency of the Service, and which, if fully recognized and established, would of itself greatly tend to render the selection judicious and faithful.

Even supposing the modifications here suggested to be less eligible than that part of the original plan for which they are proposed as a substitute, yet, inasmuch as they involve less deviation from what is now established, they might be advantageously taken as a first step, leaving the subsequent course to be decided on further experience. At all events I would strongly advise that if any admissions to the Service be founded on absolute and unlimited competition, such should constitute but a moderate fraction of the whole, and that the selection so made be for the more intellectual duties only, all other appointments being made as suggested above. To such a step, *by way of experiment*, I can see no objection; on the contrary, I think it would be a positive advantage. Of course it could be easily extended or contracted according to the results.

I cannot conclude without expressing my earnest conviction that any arrangement which, like the great measure in question, would tend to purify and elevate the Public Service, must increase its efficiency in its various departments, promote education in the highest sense of

the word, and operate most beneficially on electoral purity and public morality.

As regards economy, its operation would probably be not so much to diminish outlay as to secure more valuable services in return. There would be fewer officials, but such as there were would receive higher salaries—the due recompense for greater ability, energy, and integrity.

HENRY COLE, Esq., C.B.,

Joint Secretary to the Department of Science and Art.

*Marlborough House, August 19, 1854.*

HAVING been desired by Her Majesty's Government to consider the general principles of the Report made by Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, and the improvements which might be made in the existing arrangements for making the first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of persons appointed to the Civil Service of the country, I have prepared the following brief observations, the scope of which refers more particularly to the importance of an examination before appointment than to the mode of appointment after examination or to subsequent promotion in the Civil Service.

1. The aim of the general principles laid down in the Report is to ensure the appointment of competent persons, and to encourage their exertions after appointment, so that the public may derive the fullest benefit from their service.

Superiority of private over public administration.

2. At the present time no one would *publicly* dispute the propositions that competent persons only should be appointed to the Civil Service; that the most perfect securities should be taken to secure competency; and that the greatest encouragement should be given towards enlisting the best energies of the officers as long as they hold their appointments. The practical working of the present system proves, notwithstanding, in too many instances, that public services are far less efficient and more costly as a whole, though often underpaid in particular cases, than like services under private administration. If the management of any public office of account be compared with that of any large merchant's counting-house, banking

establishment, or warehouse, I believe it will appear that in respect of punctuality, promptitude of action, simplicity, accuracy in the accounts, style in the forms of registration, and cost of management, the advantage is greatly on the side of the private establishment. The highest statesmen have often admitted the inferiority of Government administration as notorious. The Marquis of Lansdowne in 1847 declared it to be "universally admitted that Governments are the worst of cultivators, the worst of manufacturers, and the worst of traders."

3. It probably must ever be so, for whilst in the public service reward for exertion is far less sure than in private work, so in public work there is virtually little penalty paid for mistakes. On the contrary, in private administration the penalties of failure are instantly felt; and until means are found greatly to quicken responsibility, it seems to me hopeless to render public administration as efficient as private.

Reasons for this.

4. Should it be possible to introduce the principle of contracts for the performance of at least the more mechanical and common-place kinds of public duties, we may hope to see some inherent defects removed, and to obtain more of that efficiency which is found in private administration; and perhaps it might be worth trying the experiment of administering the details of some public office by means of a contract with its chief executive officer. Any extensive adoption of a contract system, however, seems at present impracticable; but the admitted want of a responsibility equal to that secured in private agency, renders it all the more necessary to take every security for the appointment only of the most competent persons, and to make it their interest to perform their duties in the best way.

Efficiency to be found in contracts.

5. The earliest problem therefore to be solved for improving public administration appears to me to be how to secure the services of competent persons.

6. The Report on the Civil Service proposes to adopt, as a principle, preliminary examinations before entering the Public Service, and my personal experience of the great utility of the examinations which have been adopted in my own department leads me to agree entirely that this principle is sound and likely to furnish the most effective antidote to the mischiefs of patronage. Indeed, looking only to the interests of the Public Service, should an inflexible rule be established that none but persons proved to be competent are eligible for appointment, the *mode* of appointment seems to me a subordinate point.

Preliminary examinations recommended.

Examinations  
adopted in the  
Department of  
Science and  
Art.

7. The advantages of preliminary examination before appointment have been signally proved by the great success which has attended the present system of appointing masters to Schools of Art. In 1852, for the first time, a rule was made by the Board of Trade that no master should be appointed to any School of Art who did not pass a precise and satisfactory examination. Before this time, under the late system of the schools of design, candidates frequently sought these appointments by the usual means. An unsuccessful artist or drawing master submitted testimonials from persons having parliamentary or other interest with the Government; no proof was required that the candidate could teach a class, or possessed the special requisites for conducting a school. The specimens of his works, which the candidate submitted, often proved that he was unable to execute the standard examples used in the schools of design, and that he was scarcely acquainted with the system of instruction. At one period so many masterships were held by persons afflicted by some bodily infirmity, that a regulation became necessary, and was passed, by which lame or deformed candidates were declared ineligible. The working generally proved that all candidates who brought the strongest parliamentary patronage turned out the worst masters. As soon as the Department of Practical Art had been constituted, its first printed document imposed on all candidates the necessity of undergoing a systematic examination. The immediate effect of this regulation was to clear the field of many incompetent candidates. Since it has been in force, several applications have been urgently pressed on the department, but without effect. There has been one especial instance of a drawing master who has brought every species of influence to bear, in order to obtain a mastership for himself, but he has always hesitated to submit even his works to the preliminary examination. Every candidate is required to fill up the accompanying form (Appendix No. 1 and 2), and to produce the works named in it. If these are satisfactory, he is passed into the training class, and afterwards he may come up for the appointed public examination (Appendix No. 3). Thus a course of complete examination has been gradually matured which has been found highly efficient. Examinations take place twice in the year, and certificates are granted for various stages of competency; and no master is recommended for appointment who has not passed the first stage satisfactorily. The candidates assemble in a large room, and are required within speci-

The system of  
examinations  
pursued.

fied periods, usually of two hours, to answer written questions; to solve certain problems in geometry and perspective, and to execute certain drawings and paintings. They are also required to teach a class of students. The first certificate, which *all* must obtain, involves the knowledge, the actual practice and power of teaching practical geometry, perspective, free-hand drawing, and elementary colouring. Between June 1852, when the first certificate was granted, and June 1854, twenty-seven candidates had been examined and received appointments to Schools of Art, and of these, only one has subsequently failed, not in consequence of incompetency, but infirmity of temper. In August 1854 the complete system came into operation, and twenty-seven out of thirty-six candidates for the first certificate passed the requisite examinations. As respects promotion from one school to another of more importance, the practice has been to declare the vacancies, and invite all the masters to become candidates, and then to promote him who has succeeded best with his former school, and at the same time is able to submit the best proofs of his own executive ability.

Results.

8. The Report on the Organisation of the Civil Service, besides proposing the establishment of a proper system of examination before appointment, recommends that, before the appointment is confirmed, the candidate should be subjected, as at present, to a short period of probation. In the necessity of these arrangements, which really show only common prudence, I fully concur. This course is more or less followed by all persons in the transaction of their own business, and I apprehend it will not be seriously maintained, even by the opponents of the proposed reform, that Government is not free to adopt those securities for the management of its business which are free to every individual. To carry out this examination it is recommended that a *Central Board* should be constituted for conducting the examination of all candidates for the Public Service whom it may be thought right to subject to such a test. The examinations are to be periodical at stated times, to be entirely open, and to be held in various parts of the United Kingdom.

Probation after  
appointment.

9. It appears to me that this mode of examination, which is avowedly a preliminary step only, would be partial and imperfect, not be the most effective or economical process for obtaining the result, and that it is liable to objection as having too great a tendency to centraliza-

The prelimi-  
nary examina-  
tions should be  
conducted and  
certificates  
given by public  
institutions and



not by a central Government Board. I am of opinion that instead of constituting any *Central Board* to conduct the *first* examination, it would be preferable to invite the existing institutions throughout the country to undertake this work, and themselves to give certificates of the candidates' proficiency. These certificates would have different degrees of value, comprehending groups of subjects of *general* rather than technical or special knowledge, and should be arranged so as to meet the circumstances of the varieties of attainments required from officers of the Civil Service. These may be classed as messengers, excisemen, lockers, weighers, letter carriers, &c., clerks of various kinds, such as copying clerks, corresponding clerks, the higher class of clerks in the chief departments, India writers, accountants, &c. In my opinion *all candidates* for the Civil Service without exception should be subjected to examination before appointment, in order to prove that they possess a knowledge of the English language, the ability to speak it and write it grammatically, a good handwriting, and the power of drawing elementary forms accurately, now becoming a part of national education and taught in parish schools, together with an acquaintance with arithmetic as far as decimals. These qualifications should be required from all candidates whatever may be the office sought, whether that of a messenger, letter carrier, or an India writership, but would not be exacted from individuals who may be invited by Government to fill staff appointments. It must not be assumed that these are ordinary qualifications; many speak and read badly, write and spell badly, but few, very few, do so well. Legible penmanship, as Lord Palmerston not long since officially reminded the Council on Education, is not a common acquirement, and it is only necessary to listen to the next conversation or public debate to witness how rare is a correct knowledge of the English language. An examination in these primary generalities I believe would exert a wholesome and useful influence even on the highest class of schools in this country. In most of them it would require some preparations to enable their managers to state on their authority and public responsibility that youths educated by them had satisfactorily proved their knowledge of these things.

Certificates to be given by public schools and institutions.

10. I would suggest that these certificates or diplomas should be received from a very wide range of schools and institutions having a recognized *public* character, collegiate

schools, grammar schools, training schools, schools under inspection, mechanics' institutes, &c., and the stimulus they would receive from exercising the privilege would be extremely useful to themselves. As they exist throughout all parts of the kingdom, there would be every reasonable facility for examination. A person self-educated, or one educated at a private school, could have no difficulty in obtaining a certificate of competency from them.

11. Precise forms, in which the certificates should be drawn up would have to be prepared and circulated, and these should also include a certificate of the moral and physical qualifications of the candidate. The mode of examination would have to be suggested, but it is sufficient at present to say that all candidates should be required to read and write the English language, draw, and cipher, in a public examination, and the public would be the best witnesses of the fairness of the certificate. Examination in public.

12. It might be expected that the influence of such a system would reach not merely candidates for Government Civil Service, but all who sought public local employment. The late census shows that, whilst there are 37,698 men in the Civil Service of the nation, there are 29,785 in offices of local government, and 3,708 are officers of the East India Government residing in Great Britain. It might be expected that after a time it would be hardly possible to seek any public employment even of the lowest kind without possessing such a certificate, whereas a certificate from the central Government, as proposed in the Report, being applicable only to candidates for the Civil Service, would I conceive be much more limited in its influence. Beneficial influence of the certificates on local government.

13. Besides reading, grammatical writing, and spelling of the English language, penmanship, arithmetic, and elementary drawing, which proves the accurate knowledge of form, there would be many other subjects for which certificates of general competency might thus be given, such as ancient and modern languages, mathematics, the applied sciences, &c., but it is not necessary at present to enter into further details. Of the absolute necessity of the primary subjects which I have proposed there could be no dispute.

14. It has been seen that opposition to the proposed Central Board of Examiners has been raised by those who Opposition to preliminary

examinations  
would be put  
down.

are interested in the existing system of patronage,\* but I feel sure that if the initiatory examinations could be made the work of the people themselves rather than of any central Government agency, the popular interests and sympathies of the whole country would be enlisted in them, and that all opposition to a system of preliminary examinations would be speedily vanquished. Whilst I am satisfied that the incidental benefits to general education and the Public Service would be great from *any* system of examination, I conceive they would be greatest under that which was most popular.

Institutions for  
special training  
for the Civil  
Service sug-  
gested as in  
Church, Army,  
Navy, Law,  
Physic.

15. Having secured this preliminary examination, I should then propose that candidates for Civil Service, holding certificates, instead of being passed into some Government Office on probation, should be required to enter a training institution or examination department for official work, to be established in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh. In this department the candidate would have to undergo a thorough testing of his preliminary certificate, his attainments, pretensions, and moral qualifications, and learn something of the discipline and routine which are common to all departments of the Civil Service. Each class of candidates should be required to prove their ability and aptitude for executing those simpler kinds of work, such, for instance, as keeping a register of correspondence or books of account, making the *précis* or translation of a despatch, auditing an account, &c., which are common to most public offices.

16. It must not be hastily assumed that official system and management could only be learned or tested in an office itself; it might as well be said that arithmetic could only be learned in a counting-house. It is a fact, that the management of public offices has yet to be properly systematized in detail; a necessity which would be proved if a comparison were made of the modes in which correspondence is received and registered in different public offices. At present, even such registration is often pretty much a matter of chance. Such a training institution would exercise a useful influence in improving the transaction of public business. It is possible in each and all

\* "Had not a long course of elective corruption blinded the constituencies to its true import, and given members an instinctive antipathy to any method for curtailing the means of corruption, such a measure would have been hailed with applause."—*Times*, August 11, 1854.

kinds of official work to do it ill or well. General formulas for performing it well might be established, and the candidates exercised in carrying them into effect. Candidates for the higher class of appointments might be required to attend courses of lectures on subjects having especial bearing on the Civil Service, such as modern history, modern languages, public revenue, how it is obtained, collected, distributed, accounted for and audited, international law, political economy, &c.

Lectures to  
candidates for  
the higher  
appointments.

17. I should propose that there should be fees for entrance to these institutions, to be proportioned to the grade of the office for which the candidate applied, and the period during which he should be required to remain. These fees should be at such a rate as to make these institutions self-supporting. The expenses must be borne by the State, or by those who derive the immediate personal benefit from them; and I believe the action would be more healthy if the institution were self-supporting than if it were maintained by the State. Indiscriminate admission would entail a great waste of cost and labour on the public, whilst the necessity of paying a fee would deter that very class of candidates from seeking admission which is the least desirable. If it should be objected that it would be a hardship to put the candidate for a letter carrier's or a messenger's office to the cost, say of 20*l.* for travelling, residence, and fees, I answer, that if a man has no means of commanding 20*l.* in order to obtain an employment for life, he is *prima facie* an ineligible candidate; the public themselves generally require a much larger investment of capital for putting a child as an apprentice to a mechanical trade.

Fees to be paid  
by candidates.

Proposed  
institutions to  
be self-sup-  
porting

18. The successful working out of this, or indeed any plan, depends altogether on its details and their judicious administration. It is not prudent to theorize too much on details beforehand, but, having settled a sound broad principle, rather to establish them by cautious practice and experience. And I am of opinion that as any system of examination must be experimental, the fewer rules that are made beforehand the greater will be the chances of ultimate success.

19. It appears to me that until the first object is accomplished, namely, that of producing a supply of competent candidates and limiting the selections for appointments wholly to them, any material changes in the

present system of making the actual appointments might be postponed. I believe the mere limitation of choice to competent candidates would work immense reform.\*

All public departments should report their proceedings annually to Parliament.

20. The only other improvement which I strongly recommend, until a system of examination is matured and in action, is that *all* public departments should be required to report to parliament annually a summary of their proceedings. Most of the departments recently created do so; but I would make it obligatory on all. The reports need not be bulky, they would economize the cost of many parliamentary returns, and save some parliamentary inquiries. They would be of great public interest, especially those relating to the Customs, Post Office, Public Works, and Excise. It is my conviction that one of the most active securities for obtaining good public administration is to be found in subjecting it to the most complete and frequent public scrutiny.

## APPENDIX.

### No. 1.

*Department of Science and Art, Marlborough House, London.*

#### MASTERSHIPS IN SCHOOLS OF ART.

1. WITH a view to prepare students for masterships in local schools of art connected with the department, a normal school has been formed at Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London, in which instruction is afforded in general and ornamental art and methods of teaching, together with courses of lectures on various subjects.

2. Candidates who show a sufficient degree of competency are admitted to the normal school without payment of fees.

3. If the candidate has been educated in one of the schools of art connected with the department, is in some degree acquainted with the system of instruction adopted therein, and proves himself competent to teach a parish school—he will be appointed, as vacancies occur in the class, to receive a personal allowance of 1*l.* per week, during the period of his training.

\* Of course all subsequent measures should tend to elevate the status of the Civil Service and give it a professional *unity*. As a first step towards this, I would recommend that the whole of the Civil Service should be divided into classes, and that the remuneration of each class or rank, as in the army or navy should be made uniform.

4. When capable of conducting a school of art himself, and desirous of qualifying for a high class certificate, the candidate is sometimes allowed to remain in the training class for a period not exceeding two years, with an allowance of 1*l.* 10*s.* per week, a portion of the time being devoted to giving instruction in the metropolitan district schools.

5. Candidates seeking admission to the normal school are required to fill up the accompanying form—and to forward it, together with the works specified below—addressed to the Secretaries at Marlborough House.

6. As each course of instruction is arranged to commence with the session, candidates can only be admitted in March and October.

7. The form of application properly filled up, must be forwarded, in or before the second week in February and the second week in September in each year, together with the works which are to accompany it, unless the works are included among those of the students of the various schools of art sent up for inspection and exhibition in the spring or autumn, in which case the candidate may send his application separately from his works, and refer to those exhibited as proofs of his competency.

8. The following works will be required from each candidate, to which may be added any others considered by himself as evincing his further proficiency.

- No. 1. A sheet containing not less than ten plane geometrical figures drawn by means of instruments, and a written description of the methods used in their construction.
2. Two sheets of diagrams of linear perspective, one of superficial forms lying on the ground plane, and one of solid forms.
3. One example of outline from the cast.
4. " of shading from the cast.
5. " of drawing from solid models, being some objects shaded.
6. " of the figure in outline from a copy.
7. " of foliage outlined from nature.
8. A coloured copy of the diagram illustrating the harmonious relations of colour, published by Chapman & Hall, 193, Piccadilly, for 9*d.*

HENRY COLE, } *Joint Secretaries.*  
LYON PLAYFAIR, }

Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London.

For particulars relative to the advantages held out to certificated masters by the department, candidates are referred to "Directions for conducting schools of art," Art. 55, &c.

## No. 2.

*Department of Science and Art, Marlborough House, London.*

CANDIDATES FOR MASTERSHIPS—(Form of Application).

1. Name of applicant - - - - -
2. Address - - - - -
3. Age - - - - -
4. Where, under whom, and how long he has studied ornamental art? - - - - -
5. Has he been a student of the Royal Academy; if so, in the antique school, or the school of the living model? - - - - -
6. Present occupation - - - - -
7. Has he been engaged in teaching? - - - - -
  - (a) Where? - - - - -
  - (b) How long? - - - - -
  - (c) Where is the greatest number of pupils he has had at one time? - - - - -
8. Names and addresses of three referees for respectability and moral conduct - - - - -
9. Has he sent up the eight drawings required? - - - - -
10. Specify any other works that accompany the application—and their number - - - - -
11. Date of application - - - - -
12. Date when the works were received—and by whom received - - - - -
13. Date when passed into the class of training masters - - - - -

*Signature of Head Master* \_\_\_\_\_

It is indispensable that applicants fill up this form as far as No. 11 correctly and neatly.

## No. 3.

*Board of Trade Department of Science and Art.*

MASTERSHIPS IN SCHOOLS OF ART—(Course of Examination for Certificates).

I. By a minute of the Right Honourable the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, dated 4th March 1854, the department was authorized to adopt the system of the Committee of Council for Education, of aiding the master's income by payments graduated according to certificates of competency obtained by them, and to make such payments contingent on certain conditions attached to their appointment—(See *Instruction in Art*, par. 63—73). It has been, accordingly, determined

that the twenty-four stages of art instruction in the department shall, for the present, be divided into six groups; and that when a master has received a certificate of competency to teach any group, he shall receive the annual sum allotted to it, as long as he is engaged in teaching, under the inspection of the department, and fulfilling the necessary conditions.

The following are the groups which form the subject of certificates—

- |   |          |
|---|----------|
| Group 1. Elementary drawing and colouring.                      |          |
| Stages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, and 13                          | - - 10l. |
| Group 2. Painting with examination in styles of art.            |          |
| Stages 11, 12, 14, 15, and 22                                   | - - 10l. |
| Group 3. The figures drawn and painted.                         |          |
| Stages 8, 9, 16, and 17   | - - 10l. |
| Group 4. Modelling ornament, with examination in styles of art. |          |
| Stages 18, 20, and 22   | - - 10l. |
| Group 5. Modelling the figure.                                  |          |
| Stages 8, 9, 19, and 21   | - - 10l. |
| Group 6. Technical instruction                                  | - - 10l. |

It is hoped that as the masters attain increased proficiency, many will be entitled to receive payments equal to the allowances given by the Privy Council. The maximum aid to an individual teacher is not to exceed 50l. a year, and that sum is to be awarded only in those cases where the highest efficiency as a teacher has been obtained. A certificate for Group 1 may be taken separately; but a certificate for Group 2 must be taken after No. 1, and the certificate for Group 3 after 1 and 2, and the Modelling Group 5 after Group 4.

II. The following regulations relate to the periods of the examinations, and to the nature and order of the exercises to be completed by candidates for certificates—

1. The examinations will take place at the offices of the department, Gore House, Kensington, in the third week in February and the third week in July in each year.
2. Candidates who are desirous of passing such examinations must forward their names, together with the requisite works (sec. 4), to the Secretaries of the department, at Marlborough House, on or before the first week in February and the first week in July of each year.
3. They must state the group or groups for which they seek to obtain certificates.
4. Their application must be accompanied by at least one work, entirely their own production, in the ornamental section of each stage of each group for which they are candidates. One work of every successful candidate, in each stage, will be retained by the department. Works of unsuccessful candidates will be returned.

These examinations will take place before the art superintendent, assisted by any other examiners who may be associated with him. They will be conducted partly by written exercises, and partly by studies made in a given time. Each candidate will be required to teach a class in the presence of the examiners.

## FIRST GROUP.

## III. Candidates for certificates for the first group—

1. Must have attended the training school of the department at Marlborough House, and have obtained a recommendation for admission to examination from the head master, which must include a declaration that they have been engaged in parochial class-teaching, and have conducted such teaching to his satisfaction.
2. Must be prepared to instruct a class in the presence of the examiners in free-hand drawing, geometrical drawing, perspective or model drawing.
3. To sketch, in a given time, a group of models, placed by the examiners for that purpose.
4. To solve, in writing, questions on the harmonies of colour, also papers on geometry, and on perspective, and to colour a diagram from memory, in order to test their power of seeing tints and hues correctly.

## SECOND GROUP.

## IV. For the second group each candidate—

1. Must already have obtained a certificate for the first group.
2. Will be required to sketch in colour, in a given time, a group placed by the examiners for that purpose—using any medium or vehicle which the examiners may propose.
3. Will have to answer, in writing, a paper of questions, on the characteristics of styles of ornament of various historic periods.
4. Answers, in writing, will be required to a paper of questions on the proper application of ornament to various fabrics and manufactures.
5. Sketches from memory of a series of characteristics of ornament of the various historic periods.

## THIRD GROUP.

## V. For the third group each candidate—

1. Must already have obtained certificates for Groups one and two.
2. Will be required to answer, in writing, a paper of questions on the anatomy of the human figure.
4. In a given time to draw the bones or muscles, within the outline of an antique figure, from memory.
5. The living model will be posed for a time-study by each candidate.

6. From candidates who are students of the Royal Academy, and have been admitted to study there from the living model, this last exercise will not be required.

## FOURTH GROUP.

## VI. For the fourth group each candidate—

1. Must already have obtained a certificate for Group 1, in all the stages of that group which include drawing.
2. Will have to answer, in writing, papers of questions on the various styles of plastic ornament, and on the application of ornament to various materials, and its various modes of production, as by carving, casting, chasing, &c.
3. To sketch from memory the characteristics of the various historic styles, and in a given time to model a piece of ornament, in low relief, from a print or drawing.

## FIFTH GROUP.

## VII. For the fifth group each candidate—

1. Must already have obtained the certificate of the department in Group 1, as limited in sec. vi. 1, and in Group 4.
2. Will be required to answer, in writing, a paper of questions on the anatomy of the human frame.
3. In a given time to make a sketch, in low relief, from a print or drawing of an antique figure; and give the anatomical details from memory.  
The living model will be posed for a time-study by each candidate.
5. From candidates who are, or have been, students of the Royal Academy, and admitted to study there from the living model, this last exercise will not be required.

## SIXTH GROUP.

## VIII.

1. Certificates in Group 6 are granted on proof competency to teach—(a) Mechanical and machine drawing, and geometrical projection; (b) Naval; (c) Domestic, or (d) engineering architecture; and the special application of ornament to plastic and surface decoration for various fabrics, manufactures, and architectural purposes.
2. In general, certificates in Group 6 must be preceded by certificates in Groups 1, 2, and 3, or 1, 4, and 5,—although, in special cases, this must necessarily be modified.
3. The character of the examinations in this group, for technical knowledge, will be determined by the nature of the applications for examination, and the conditions will be declared according to the circumstances of the case.

(Signed) HENRY COLE, } Joint  
LYON PLAYFAIR, } Secretaries.

EDWARD ROMILLY, Esq.,

Chairman of the Board of Audit.

*Audit Office, August 22, 1854.*

With some slight change of form and expression, I transmit, in answer to your communication of the 17th of July last, the papers I had already written on the improvement of the Civil Service.

In the opinions they contain I have but little to alter. In other respects I am aware they are faulty enough; but I have not time to revise them as I could wish.

There are, however, two points on which I have added a few observations in paper No. 5. The one has reference to first appointments; the other to the influence the political branch of the Treasury has over the conduct of the Civil Service.

Paper No. 1 was written under the impression that any thorough change in the source of patronage was not in contemplation; and the suggestions it contains were therefore adapted to the existing system. The proposal since made to revise that system altogether, has induced me to state that it should, I think, rest with the heads of departments and offices to nominate their own subordinate officers, whose final appointments should depend upon their successfully passing through a bonâ fide examination, conducted under the sanction of the Government.

No. 1.

The following suggestions are made with a view to the improvement of the Civil Service:

1. No one should be admitted into the Service except after due examination.
2. Promotion in the Service should be by merit, and not seniority.
3. A larger number of the higher offices of the Government should be bestowed upon those who are already in the Service.
4. The Treasury should not have the power of lessen-

ing the amount of superannuation allowance; but they should have that of awarding any extra allowance beyond that awarded by the Act, on laying before Parliament the amount so awarded, and the names of the persons so distinguished.

5. Every department and office should have its rules and regulations drawn up, printed, and circulated among its officers. A copy of such rules should be deposited with the superintending department, viz. the Treasury.

6. The rules laid down for the Service generally, as well as those adopted in each department and office, should be established on the authority of an Order in Council.

7. Proper buildings and accommodation should be afforded for the transaction of public business.

1. No one should be admitted into the Service except after due examination:

There are two modes by which the examination of candidates for admission to the Public Service may be conducted.

Firstly, the candidate may be examined as to his knowledge of what may be deemed indispensable for the Service, and if found wanting he should be rejected as unfit; or, secondly, a certain number of candidates may be examined together in such subjects, and the best only selected. Whichever of these modes be adopted, it would be necessary, in order to render the examinations bonâ fide ones, that the examiners should not be the same persons as those who make the final award; that they should be at least three in number; that the examinations should be in writing; and that the questions and answers, together with the joint report from the committee of examiners, should be laid before the superintending body for their decision.

If the examiners and judges were united in the same persons, it would necessarily be the superintending body who would have to perform the task in question, since it is their duty to decide; and being responsible for the work of the office, it is they who should choose the instruments with which that work is to be performed. But their subordinate officers are more conversant with the practical working of the office than they can be themselves, and are therefore better fitted to be the examiners; and if the Board were to constitute themselves examiners and

judges also, there would be no check upon their decision, and however well disposed to perform their duty honestly, they would be more liable to private solicitation on the part of the candidate and his friends, and less able to resist it.

The examiners thus chosen from among members of the office subordinate to the superintending body should be at least three in number. Care must be taken that the questions put are answered by the candidate himself, who should not be allowed access to others during the examination; and care must also be taken that the examiners are not open to the suspicion of favoritism, or subjected to improper solicitation. These risks are much greater in the case of a single examiner than when the examiners are more numerous. In a body of three, each acts as a check upon the other, and there is neither opportunity nor motive for favoritism or neglect of duty.

When the examination papers, together with a report from a committee of examiners, are in writing, the former are a check upon the latter, and both are a check upon the superintending body. The superintending body will not venture to disregard the conclusions at which the committee of examiners have arrived, when the examination papers remain recorded to prove how just those conclusions are; nor will the committee give any undue preference to a candidate when all must concur in doing so, and the written evidence is there to contradict them.

With such a system in force, there would be real security that unfit candidates would not be admitted into the Service.

But although this might answer in those offices in which less is required of a clerk, would it be equally efficacious in the higher departments of the State? The Treasury, the Secretaries of State, the Admiralty, and others, could not carry on their business successfully without a much higher standard of ability and knowledge than what would be sufficient for pay offices and offices of mere routine; and would a system of examination which simply excluded the unfit, fulfil the wants of those higher departments of the State?

It may be said, that by raising the standard of examination, and introducing into it those special subjects which each department might require, the object in view would equally be attained; but the more the standard is raised the more difficult it is to pronounce and to prove

in a way which cannot be contested that the candidate is unfit. In such cases it is more a matter of opinion than of certainty; and as most of the higher departments are connected with the Ministry of the day, are presided over by members of the Legislature, and assisted by political secretaries, political influence is not unlikely to be brought to bear upon the final awards arising out of such examinations, and to render them nugatory. Means might perhaps be suggested of checking every department which is subordinate to the Treasury; but it is doubtful how far those means would be effective—how far the influence of the Treasury, acted upon as it would be by similar political tendencies, would or could be successfully exerted; and indeed if it were, what check could be interposed upon the improper admission of candidates into the Treasury itself—into that department which is superior to, and is supposed to superintend all the others? *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*

These considerations lead to the conclusion that in all the higher departments of the State which are more or less under the immediate control of members of the Legislature and of the ministry of the day, the second mode of examination already adverted to, namely, examination by competition, might be advantageously adopted.

If a certain number of competitors, never less than three, were to enter upon such an examination, and care taken that the forms before described were rigidly observed, there is no reason to suppose that the best would not be preferred; and in selecting the best out of three, there is little probability that he would not be fit for the vacant post. At all events, candidates so selected would be more fit than those usually admitted into the service under the present system. Indifference to the interest of the public may possibly be no uncommon failing in official men; but injustice to an individual is not. However great the reluctance to pronounce a candidate unfit for the Public Service, every one shrinks from deliberately pronouncing the best of three candidates one who is obviously inferior to the rest.

In such a case, the examiners, whatever their motive, may be relied upon for doing what is best for the Public Service, while the political members of the department could have no motive in interfering with the award when all the candidates have been equally nominated by the party in power. Any undue influence exerted in favour

of one would irrevocably offend the friends of the other, and what would be gained in political influence in the one case would be lost in the other. The result, therefore, would be that the public interests would be effectually secured.

It may, however, be asked what is to be done with those candidates who have not been successful? Notwithstanding their defeat, they may have shown great ability and aptitude for the business of the departments in question. In such cases it might rest with the discretion of the examiners to make a special report in their favour, with a view to such defeated candidates being allowed to compete a second time on the next vacancy that occurs. If, on the contrary, there were no grounds for such recommendation, they might at once be sent on to those offices where less is required, to undergo an examination as to mere fitness for the Service;—such an examination being more easily carried into effect in those offices where less political influence prevails, and where it is more capable of being resisted.

It has been suggested, with a view of still more effectually counteracting the political influence of the Government, that these examinations should be conducted by a body of men wholly independent of the offices themselves, and specially appointed for that purpose. But, however learned such a body might be, it is questionable whether persons wholly unconnected with the Civil Service would be the best judges of those qualities which that Service requires; and whether the heads of an office, responsible for its official working, should not have some voice in choosing the instruments with which their work is to be performed. It is also to be observed that there is nothing to exempt such a body from the infirmities common to human nature; and that they too would be exposed to private and political solicitation, and that their decisions, if not swayed by it, would be open to suspicion. It is not by transferring the responsibility from one set of men to another, but by establishing rules for the attainment of the object in view, and rules which will work without any extraordinary effort of moral courage, that one can hope that the object will be attained. More depends upon the rules than upon the persons, and if such rules as those before indicated were adopted and *enforced*, the several departments and offices might safely be left to decide upon the fitness of their own officers.

Another idea that has been suggested is, that the examination should be of a very high order;—that the higher this standard the greater the degree and quantity of ability that will present itself for the public service. But is not this a delusion? Will not this rather depend upon the Civil Service itself than upon the nature of the examination for admission to it? If that service offers high prizes, attainable by superior intellect alone, superior intellect will be tempted into it. If it does not, no examination, however difficult, which is to be ultimately and comparatively barren of result, will have any such effect. It may however be said, in order to enlarge the field of competitors, Government patronage may be abandoned, and the public generally admitted into the lists. But even this expedient, supposing it to be practicable and desirable, would not have the desired effect as long as other modes of life offered better chances for attaining wealth and fame. It should also be borne in mind that moral qualities and social position are often as important elements in the character of a public servant as great facility and intellectual power. Good sense and judgment, good manners and moral courage, energy and perseverance, a high sense of honour and integrity, a wholesome fear of public opinion, and the desire of being well thought of by a circle of friends, are more important qualities and motives in public officers, for the practical business of official life, than familiarity with classical and modern literature, science, and history. The latter may be tested by examination, the former cannot\*; and the lower you descend in the scale of society the less the guarantee that candidates for the Civil Service will possess those moral and social qualifications, which are so indispensable for the practical business of official life.

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\* It may be said that intellectual attainments presuppose industry, perseverance, and self-discipline; and that those who have given evidence of such qualities on a former occasion, are likely to do so again. This, however, depends upon the motives to exertion continuing equally strong on both occasions. The same motives which lead to the attainment of a fellowship at one of the universities, do not necessarily accompany the successful candidate through life; and in the absence of the motive, indolence often supervenes. Thus, in the same way, a great effort may be made to obtain a permanent appointment in the Civil Service,—but what is required is the continuance of the efforts while in the service.



2. Promotion in the service should be by merit and not seniority.

Few persons *out* of the Civil Service contest this principle, but there are many in it who do. The reason for this difference of opinion is, I believe, to be found in this—that the former are content to lay down the principle without inquiring how it is to be carried into effect, while the latter are so sensitively alive to the practical difficulties it necessarily entails that they abandon the principle altogether.

The mere enunciation of the principle, however true and important, is of little use, unless it can be endowed with practical value; and to do this requires more patient investigation, and a greater knowledge of the motives which actuate human nature, than has as yet been bestowed on the subject.

In offices which are not presided over by a political chief, and are not merely nominally but practically subordinate to the Treasury, promotion by merit may perhaps be more easily enforced than in the higher departments of the State, in which the chief has no personal and permanent interest in its future efficient working. But even with the latter, if the temporary and political head of the department could not make such promotions except on the recommendation of one or more of the highest civil servants of his establishment, and the permanency of this rule were secured by an Order in Council, as in the case of the Admiralty, the object in view would be attained. The reasoning in favour of the principle of promotion by merit will be found in paper No. 2., p. 273.

3. A larger number of the higher offices of Government should be bestowed upon those who are already in the service.

In order to tempt into the Civil Service a larger number of men of high intellectual and moral qualities, and above all to bring into active operation that amount of zeal and intelligence which is already in existence there, but under the present system is lying dormant, it is essential that the higher prizes of the service should be more frequently bestowed upon those who have toiled in it in subordinate situations.

It is unnecessary to say that men will not work hard without some object in view which is worth attaining, and which they have a reasonable prospect of attaining

by their own exertions. No doubt instances may be cited of high-minded men who under the present system toil on as clerks, day after day and year after year, with a perseverance which is as honourable as it is surprising. Their exertions may be appreciated within the narrow circle of their own office, but within that narrow circle, as they well know, they are destined to live and die. Their superiors, even if their attention has been attracted to such meritorious exertions, can offer them no adequate return; they cannot presume to make known and recommend to the dispensers of patronage the meritorious officers for reward. Nor, under the present system, would they perhaps be much disposed to do so, if they had the power. To lose a very useful officer, without any prospect of replacing him, will not lighten their own labour, nor diminish the responsibility they are under for the due performance of the work of the office. But if the loss of a subordinate, whose attainments are greatly superior to those of his colleagues, were not a rare exception, but established as the rule of the service,—if the better paid offices, instead of being considered as specially belonging to the department where vacancies occur, were thrown open to the Civil Service generally,—for every meritorious clerk so lost to any office, ten others would be gained, who would be striving by similar exertions to attain a similar reward.

But how is this practically to be carried into effect? If these appointments depended upon the ministry of the day, private solicitation and unfit appointments would, it will be said, go on just as before. The only difference would be that civil servants, instead of political supporters, would profit by the change, and in doing so the Civil Service would suffer. The real work of the Government would be neglected for objects of personal interest and ambition, and the ministry of the day would not be likely to make better appointments when they had to choose from among a class of whom they know comparatively nothing, instead of from those whose character they have in all probability been familiar with, and of whose capacity for business they have had some experience.

In answer to this, it may be observed that a principle has already been adopted in one department, which, if made general throughout the service, would effectually dispose of the objection. In the Admiralty it is only on the recommendation of officers of the permanent Civil Service that the Lords make their appointments. A

similar course might be followed in every other department or office throughout the service. First appointments might depend upon the ministers of the day (subject of course to the examination before adverted to); but all subsequent ones should be made only on the recommendation of officers of the Civil Service. These recommendations, which should be by written report, being made *a sine qua non*, would be a check upon the minister; and the power which the minister would have of making the appointment, and of disregarding the recommendation on his own responsibility, if he had good grounds for doing so, would be a check upon the person or persons recommending.

It may be said that, in the Admiralty, what has just been designated as appointments are in reality promotions, and that what might be desirable in the one case would not be so in the other. But what is or ought to be the distinction between the two—between those promotions which ought to be strictly considered as promotions, and those which should in reality be new appointments?

The members of the Civil Service consist of two classes: the one strictly civil and the other political; the one permanent, the other changing with the change of ministry. Some departments and offices are presided over by persons who have won their way to their high position by struggles in the House of Commons, and who hold their offices only as long as the political party to which they have attached themselves remains in power. Other offices are presided over by persons who in all cases are virtually appointed for life, and most of whom, under the present system, owe their elevation to a similar political career. In those branches of the service in which it is important that there should be some high functionary to furnish to the Legislature such information and explanations as they may require, these political appointments are not only proper but essential. But in all those offices in which no such necessity exists, the only motive for such appointments being filled by political partizans is gratitude for political services. Active exertions in obtaining votes in the House of Commons, large sums of money spent in elections, a steady adherence to one political party, at last followed by one adverse vote, just to indicate that the former unswerving devotion ought to be duly appreciated—these and similar considerations actuate the minister of the day in dispensing receiverships, secretaryships, commissionerships, and chairmanships, as they fall vacant.

It may be true that capacity in one situation may afford evidence that it will not be wanting in another, and that the political partizanship, to which the individuals in question owe their appointments, will not influence them in the performance of their new duties; but it is equally true that they have had no official experience; that although in some cases men of talent are selected, in many more they are altogether deficient in ability; that in all cases they are appointed, not because they are peculiarly fit for the situations, but because as political adherents they must be provided for; that they look upon their appointments, not as imposing new duties, not as an important field for fresh exertion, but as a reward for the past, and an agreeable and easy retirement from active life for the future. In other words, the good of the Civil Service is sacrificed to political considerations. A political party must be kept together. Hopes must be raised in the minds of the rising generation of politicians. But in the same proportion as hopes are raised in members of the House of Commons by every fresh political appointment to situations in the strictly Civil Service, they are lessened and crushed in the Civil Service.

This cannot be a satisfactory state of things; it surely calls for some remedy, and the remedy would seem to be that strictly political appointments should be bestowed on political men, and be considered, as they are, *appointments*; and all others be treated as *promotions* in the Civil Service, and be bestowed on civil servants. The higher situations of the strictly Civil Service should be filled by members of the Civil Service, on the recommendation of the Civil Service.

But when there are only a certain number of higher prizes to be disposed of between the two branches of Government, what is given to the one must necessarily be taken from the other; and it may be said that if the higher Civil Service appointments were bestowed upon civil servants, although new spirit and activity might be thereby infused into the Civil Service, such a practice would lessen and perhaps destroy the means of carrying on the political concerns of Government, and that the latter are far more important than the former. But without going into the question whether there may not be a higher and a better and even easier mode of forwarding the political interests of the country than by the system of patronage which is now adopted, can that system be a sound one which deprives one class of what

is apparently their due, to bestow it upon another who have no title to it?

If the politician aspired to political rewards alone, and the civil servant to those which belong to the Civil Service, both would be gainers; the motives of the former would be less open to suspicion, and the character of the latter less liable to the reproach of inefficiency, and the conduct of both would be improved; and although the undue exercise of Government patronage would be lessened and controlled, what remained of that patronage would be more worth having. A first appointment in the Civil Service, opening, as it would then do, an honourable and comparatively lucrative career to men of energy and talent, would be far more valuable than it is at present.

4. With respect to the 4th head, relating to superannuation allowance, I beg to refer to a paper which I have already written on that subject (See No. 3., p. 283.)

No allusion has therein been made to the power which the Treasury should have of refusing any superannuation allowance whatever. The reason for this omission is, that the Treasury ought not, as it is conceived, to have any such power with respect to any one, *unless he be first dismissed from the service for misconduct*, or compelled to resign to prevent dismissal.

5. Each department or office should have its rules and regulations drawn up, printed, and circulated among its officers.

This is so obvious a proposition, that its mere statement ought to be sufficient to procure assent to it; and yet it may well be doubted whether there are not a vast proportion of Government offices, and old established offices too, in which it has never been carried into practical effect; where a newly appointed clerk has no means of ascertaining what are the duties he is expected to perform except by repeated *vivá voce* communications with his superior; where that superior is continually interrupted by such inquiries, or the subordinate left in ignorance; and where, if these evils are avoided, it depends upon the particular views of the superior officer in question to say what those duties are, the views of one officer being very often widely different from those of another of the same standing and of the same authority. It is scarcely necessary to say that this leads to so much confusion and delay, and the

loss of such valuable time, that it may well be wondered how business can be carried on at all in any office in the absence of rules, or whose rules are not accessible to every officer in it at any moment.

The practical mode by which such regulations might be obtained would be by calling on the most intelligent officers of each class in any department or office to put down in writing what he considers to be his duties, adding to the list any alterations which he might think would simplify or facilitate the transaction of business without interfering with the security of the public. The several lists would then be laid before the heads of the office for their consideration and revision, and for the subsequent consideration and sanction of the Treasury, to be then confirmed by an Order in Council, as will be hereafter alluded to. A copy of such rules should be deposited with the Treasury.

The Treasury is the superintending department, and as such they ought to be informed of the rules and regulations and practical working of the offices under their control; not for the purpose of frequent or unreasonable interference with the management of those offices, or of assuming a responsibility which is vested in others, but for the purpose, firstly, of seeing that such printed rules are in existence, and therefore accessible to the civil servants who are to be guided by them; and 2dly, of seeing whether rules which appear to be judicious and useful in one office might not be adopted with advantage in others, and thus introducing a greater degree of similarity of practice and harmony into the Civil Service generally; and, 3dly, to secure a periodical revision of the regulations.

6. These rules should be established on the authority of an Order in Council.

At present they depend on the will and pleasure either of the Treasury, or of the political chiefs of those departments which are so presided over. In either case directions, however formally promulgated, may be and often are revoked. The same authority which enacts may of course abrogate, and the subordinate department or officers are bound to respect and obey that authority. An important principle may have been laid down on the authority of a Treasury warrant for the guidance of the heads of an office in

cases of promotion; but the time comes when to carry this principle into effect is thought inconvenient, perhaps objected to altogether. The moment for effecting the desired change is favourable. The head of the office, or one of the superintending commissioners, is personally known to the then secretary of the Treasury. He has his private interview, states his case and gains his point, and down comes a Treasury letter superseding the old principle by an entirely new one, to the astonishment and in some instances dismay of a large body of clerks, whose prospects are materially affected by the change, and who were entirely ignorant of what was in store for them. The result of such a power existing and being not unfrequently exercised, is that no one in the Civil Service can believe in the permanence of its rules.

If promotion for merit were the rule laid down by the Treasury of to-day, who is to say that promotion by seniority will not be the view taken by some future secretary of the Treasury; and that a subordinate officer of the Civil Service, after having devoted years of hard and persevering exertion with a view to his own honest advancement, will not suddenly find himself deprived of the fruits of all his toil by some such caprice, for it is entitled to no better term? In truth, the subordinate officer knows already what he has to expect, as long as Treasury rules can be set aside by Treasury authority; and he shapes his course accordingly. Nor is this all; as long as Treasury rules depend on Treasury authority alone, there is nothing to prevent these rules being set aside to serve political interest, or the interest of an individual.

In the Treasury there are political secretaries as well as Civil Service ones. The former go out with the change of Ministry. Their own tenure of office, and that of their colleagues, high and low, and the political interests of the Government to which they belong, depend in no small degree upon their exertions. It is their province and their practice to endeavour to keep their own political party together and secure a majority in the House of Commons, to serve their own political friends, to grant them any little favour they may require, and to look upon any change of administration as involving far more important considerations to themselves and to the country than all the drudgery of the Civil Service put together. It is their duty to prevent, as far as it may be in their power to do so, so great a catastrophe; no means, how-

ever trivial, are to be neglected for this object; and if it should so happen that some Treasury rule interferes with the prospects of some relative of an important political supporter, is there not some danger that the rule will be set aside and the interest of the latter preferred?

It is true that there is the Civil Service Secretary to stand up for his branch of the service, and to interfere if he consider it necessary to do so. But his authority is subordinate to that of the political secretary, and although he has, no doubt, the power of appealing to still higher authority than either, he will, unless endowed with more than the usual amount of moral courage, be reluctant to do so, especially when the responsibility of the course taken does not in reality rest with him.

It may be said that the rules of the Civil Service should be established on the highest authority, and that for this purpose an Act of the Legislature would be preferable to an Order in Council. But it should be remembered that that authority is the best which offers the surest guarantee that it will be respected. The provisions of Acts of Parliament are not unfrequently disregarded in the Civil Service; and there is no penalty by which they are enforced. An Order in Council is much more likely to be binding; its authority may be less, but its sanction is greater; and it admits more readily of revision if found to require it. It is very easy to say that legislative enactments are unintelligible or impracticable; and it sometimes happens that they are so; and the mere fact of there being no remedy and no ready means of introducing a declaratory Act is a motive and justification for neglecting them.

Again, the Legislature will not and cannot take the trouble of seeing that their directions are obeyed; nor will the Treasury, or any other department of the State, assume the responsibility for them. But Orders in Council, founded on rules which have received the sanction of the Treasury, are more readily enforced by the Treasury itself. Any deviation from them would be more quickly observed; any remedy that may be required, more easily supplied; and the responsibility would rest, where it ought to rest, with the administration itself. It has been too much the habit of the House of Commons to interfere in matters for which not they but the Executive are responsible. It is the duty of the Executive to provide for the efficient and harmonious working of the

Civil Service; and they cannot transfer that duty to any other body far less competent to the task than themselves, without infringing a great and important constitutional principle, already too often infringed, to the great detriment of the public service.

Notwithstanding the constant interference of the House of Commons in matters relating to the Civil Service, the reform of the Civil Service remains just where it was. Their single panacea for all the evils they supposed to exist in it is, was, and ever will be, retrenchment, the abolition and consolidation of offices, and the diminution of salaries. The mode of making the service *efficient* seems never to have entered their minds; and the real reform of the Civil Service is still left for the Civil Service itself to accomplish.

It may be said that if a Board of Examiners is to be appointed for persons entering the public service Parliament must be applied to. But this is in itself a ground of objection to such a board. It is for the Government alone to adopt the necessary means for ensuring the entrance of fit persons into the public service; and if Parliament should think fit to endow such a board with still more extensive powers, they would only be creating an *imperium in imperio*, which would be continually clashing with the Treasury itself, and with those departments and offices whose recruits would be selected by them, and being so selected would not be received in those offices with the greater favour on that account.

7. Proper buildings and accommodation should be provided for the transaction of public business.

The peculiar nature and situation of such buildings, the size, form, and number of the rooms, &c. are important subjects for consideration. Offices between which there is necessarily frequent communication, should, in order to avoid loss of time, and therefore increased expense, be in the same neighbourhood. The rooms of subordinate officers should be so arranged as to admit of ready access on the part of the superiors, and to ensure the comfort and convenience of the occupants. No office whose business is of the same character throughout should be in different buildings, separating a large body of clerks from the heads of the office. It ought not to be matter of necessity, as was the case in one office at least, that clerks should be placed in rooms in which, during the winter,

the thermometer cannot be raised to 40° of Fahrenheit, or in which three or four are huddled together in a room not large enough for two. The proper discipline of an office cannot be maintained, nor the discharge of its duties adequately performed, if the health and comfort of the clerks be not properly attended to.

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No. 2.

*On Promotion in the Civil Service.*

[This paper was written in 1848, and many of the observations it contains do not now apply to the office to which they had more particular reference. But as there are many other offices in which promotion by seniority continues to be the rule, it is conceived that to give the reasons which may be adduced in favour of promotion by merit will not be misplaced.]

A general impression seems to prevail that in order to meet a deficient revenue our civil establishments ought to be reduced; and as, in the present state of European politics, the army and navy are considered sacred, the Civil Service is to be made the scape-goat, and consolidations and reductions of offices are in every one's mouth.

But is it so certain that public offices are paid too much? May not the real evil be that they do too little? If it should turn out on inquiry that the Civil Service is not on the best footing, and that its officers are not as efficient as they ought to be, will matters be mended by merely reducing their numbers? If the present staff be inadequate from incompetency to carry on the public business, will half that same incompetent staff succeed better? The truth is that we are beginning at the wrong end. Our establishments should first be made efficient, and then they may be reduced, or rather, they will reduce themselves. Mere reductions and consolidation of offices will do but little; they will not even effect any real economy. A certain number of the inefficient may be squeezed out of the service, but a large amount of inactivity and dissatisfaction will be left behind. The work to be done will be more imperfectly done than before; and though its cost may be less, the object for which it has been incurred will be as far off as ever.

The truth is, that few persons have seriously turned their thoughts to the real evil. The expedient of cutting down establishments and reducing salaries is periodically resorted to; and it never occurs to these economists, whether it would not be more to the purpose to lay down and enforce rules by which our public establishments may be made permanently efficient.

It is a dull subject. It is one of detail and drudgery; none but an official person has much chance of solving its difficulties, and he is the last person who can be expected to solve them. If he be an active intelligent officer he has no time for the task; if he be not, he has not the inclination for it. Nor is this all. A civil servant appears in a double capacity. He owns allegiance, as it were, to the public on the one hand, and to his own office on the other; and to disclose the secrets of his office, without which his observations want life and substance, is but a sorry task in the eyes of those with whom he lives from day to-day, and even in his own. It is, however, a duty that each man owes to society, to endeavour to remedy those evils with which his lot in life has made him familiar, and it is with that view that the following paper has been written. I shall, however, confine myself to what has come under my own observation, without pretending to do more than point out some of the mischief which exists, and some of those remedies by which that mischief might be counteracted.

The first great disadvantage under which the Civil Service labours is to be found in the first appointments. It is no doubt very natural that a father who has parliamentary influence, and half a dozen boys, should look to clerkships in a public office as a very safe and comfortable provision for one or two of them. But if he has common prudence and common affection, he will take care not to select for this situation the genius of the family. *He* can shift for himself in one of the liberal professions, especially if, in addition to powers of mind, he should be blessed with health and strength of body. The one who is destined for the service of the public is of course the weakest and not the wisest of the brood. He has less chance of raising himself by his own exertions in the world, and is accordingly picked out for a Government office.

This is the rule. There are no doubt exceptions to it; for it does sometimes happen that a family is not

favoured with an invalid or a blockhead; but it is the rule with those who have Government influence, and the exceptions to it are fewer than might be wished. Complaints are constantly made of the absence of clerks from indisposition. This may, in many cases arise as much from official indisposition as bodily infirmity, but there is in reality a large proportion of the latter, and it is impossible it should be otherwise, as long as ill-health is not considered a bar to official life.

How comes it that such persons are appointed at all? In those cases in which the Treasury make the appointments, it cannot be supposed that they can know anything of the qualifications of their nominee; and as it is their province to do the favour, and that of the heads of the office to look after the interests of the office, the latter are invested with the power and responsibility of rejection. Such a power however is useless as at present established. It will never be exercised by a board; and although when an office is presided over by a single person, he possibly may feel the responsibility more, even he, unless endowed with more than the usual amount of moral courage, will, in a question involving the interests of the public on the one side and those of an individual on the other, prefer the latter. A rejected candidate is sure to be loud in his complaints; he has always friends to adopt his cause, and declaim against the hardship with which he has been treated. The public have no such luck; they suffer in silence, and often in ignorance of the injustice dealt out to them. And if this be true of single-seated chiefship, it is still more true with respect to a board. A board is always good-natured. The public opinion which establishes itself among its members keeps them from jobbing, in the ordinary sense of the word. They will not, when they are making a selection, choose the worst of the candidates because he is a friend; but, unconsciously no doubt, they do not hesitate to sacrifice the public, whose servants they are, but with whom they are not acquainted, and of whom they too seldom think when a fellow creature has had the luck to get a Treasury nomination, and comes before them for admission into the ranks of their office.

I have been twelve years the member of a board, and during that period not one candidate has ever been rejected; and only one, who was wholly incapable, was,

with difficulty, induced to resign, after a still greater difficulty on the part of the board to say that they would reject him if he did not.

Now, if we bear in mind that fathers in common prudence cannot but be inclined to send into the public service those sons who are least able to shift for themselves in other walks of life, and that the regulations for their admission are such as to ensure they will not be rejected, one cannot be surprised that a public office should sometimes be described as little better than a refuge for the intellectually and physically destitute.

The rule of rejection laid down is rendered still more operative by the way in which it is often carried into effect, or rather, to use modern phraseology, *carried out*; for it is a misnomer to say that it is carried into effect at all. A clerk is placed under probation for three months. At the end of that period, the inspector under whom he is placed has to report as to his qualifications. Very little is required, and that little is described by the inspector; i.e., it is drawn up by him, but it is copied by the clerk himself! Can it be supposed that the character will be an unfavourable one? In conversation, the board may ascertain privately that the candidate for admission can never make a good officer, but the written testimonials remain recorded, and they are in his favour, and the board have no official grounds for his rejection. The inspector feels that if a harsh thing is to be done, the board should do it, and not he who is in daily contact and communication with his clerks. The board, on the other hand, throwing the responsibility on the inspector, admit the candidate at once. Even if so unusual a course is taken as that of expressing before the board a doubt as to the character of the candidate, the board are ingenious in inventing excuses for a favourable decision: "He is not worse than a dozen others who have been admitted before; and it would be gross injustice to shut the door against E, after letting in A, B, C, D." Each commissioner shrinks from the responsibility of injuring the prospects of an individual; and no one thinks of that invisible and immaterial being the public. *Good nature is the bane of public offices*, and is more productive of mischief than any other good quality that can bless mankind.

This evil might be corrected by taking advantage of the natural infirmity of human nature, and turning it to

account. Although the interest of the public will not weigh down the scales when those of an individual are at stake, you may convert the interest of individuals to account in favour of the public. Instead of giving to heads of departments the power of rejection, give them that of selection. Let there never be less than three candidates, out of which they will have to select one. Let them be subjected to an examination, no matter how easy and elementary, the best will always be honestly selected, (for unless he be, injustice will be done to an individual, and that will be avoided,) and thus a better class will find its way into the public service. This examination must be a written one, and the papers must be laid before the board, with whom alone the decision should rest. This, so far from diminishing, would tend to increase the number of favours which the Treasury will have to dispense. It will not be their fault if some of the nominees are found deficient, or rather less good than the rest. It is equally a kindness to unlock the official door, and if the rules of the service prevent some from passing through, that will be owing to the rules of the service, which no one can reasonably complain of, and for which the dispensers of patronage will not be responsible.

This mode of examining by competition has no doubt already been tried at the Treasury, and failed. But it failed for this reason, that the examination was too difficult, and was thus turned into ridicule; and also that it was carried on not so much with a view to ascertain which was the best of the candidates, as to discover whether any of them had knowledge enough for the public service. The examination, however, can scarcely be too simple, provided it be sufficient to establish the fact of the best of the candidates. That alone would be sufficient to exclude a large amount of incompetency.

It might, however, be expected that when once admitted into the Civil Service, the regulations of each office would be such as to elicit exertion. But this is far from being the case. In many offices a clerk may be there 18 or 20 years without its being possible for him to advance himself by any effort of his own. It takes that time to get out of those classes, the promotion in which depends upon seniority alone, into those in which a selection for merit is permitted. The most intelligent and hard-working officer, who never neglects his duty, is exactly in

the same position as the ignorant and indolent one who just spoils enough of the stores of the Stationery Office to show that he is entitled to it. Such a system has an obvious tendency to corrupt and demoralize the whole body of civil servants; to make them consider a public clerkship as a public pension—a mere sinecure, where little or no work is to be done, but where regular attendance, and a decent outward show in the presence of superiors, is to be maintained.\*

It is true no one is to be promoted, even by seniority, unless he be considered fit for promotion. The board have still the power of rejection, but, as was before said, this is a power that is not exercised. The inspector has again to make a report, and if, in any rare instance, the slightest doubt is expressed as to the character and conduct of the applicant, it is always in conversation and not in writing; and this course is not the less pursued when the doubts and objections are of a more serious nature. Thus there are no official grounds for keeping the clerk back. "He is not worse, or, at all events, there is nothing to show that he is worse than many who have been promoted already; he has been appointed; and this is an argument for his promotion; he is as good now as he was then; and how can the board begin for the first time to act with a degree of harshness which has never been displayed on former occasions." Such is the reasoning successfully employed on the first occasion of promotion by seniority; the succeeding ones are more easily disposed of. The longer a man has been in the office, the greater his claim. No one can refuse to promote an officer who has been so many years in the service, or allow any one else to be put over his head. I have been twelve years in a Government office, and no instance has occurred during that period of any one being found undeserving of promotion. For 20 years each climbs up to the higher classes in the precise order in which he has entered the service; and if the records of the office were searched, I believe that this practice will be

\* And yet instances to the contrary are numerous; and clerks will be found who have no expectation of emerging from their humble sphere of action, and gaining the reward of their exertions, honestly and energetically performing their duties, day after day, and year after year, in silence and obscurity. But this is not in consequence, but in spite of the system.

found to have been invariable from the earliest periods; and there is no reason to suppose that other boards are more courageous than our own, or their rules better adapted to the wants of the service, and the principles of human nature.

Again, the remedy for this is very simple. The same rule applies in these cases as in those of appointments. Do not exact from a board the exercise of a duty which is beyond their strength. Do not insist upon their rejecting a clerk and pronouncing him unfit, for such a sentence will not be passed;\* but require that the *best* shall be selected, and this rule will be carried into effect without difficulty, and it will operate in the same way as the principle of rejection is *intended* to act, but does not, viz., in keeping back the inefficient.

To ensure its operation, however, this rule should emanate from the Treasury; and the Treasury should not content itself with issuing directions without seeing that they are obeyed. In order also to prevent the Treasury from infringing their own rules, to the injury of the service, the rules should be issued on the authority of an Order in Council.

By the rules and practice now in force every encouragement is given to those who command Government patronage to make the worst choice they can for the public. Abilities and diligence are seldom of any avail, in helping to raise the person endowed with them, and without them a provision is insured for life. But if the practice were altered, and, on admission or promotion from one class to another, the best were selected, the incompetent and idle would be left behind; these would and could have no reason to complain—it would be owing to the established rule of the service. And this would operate beneficially, not only with respect to candidates for office, but with respect to those who after admission cannot or do not exert themselves to any good purpose; for, in the first place, a smaller number of incompetent persons would present themselves for admission; and in the second, if admitted, the sooner would they become dissatisfied with the service and leave it.

In many cases the salary of a clerk rises from 90*l.* to 450*l.* a year or more by mere seniority. But if some of

\* See, nevertheless, article 1 of paper No. 1., p. 259.



these clerks were left behind in classes, the maximum salary of which was 220*l.* or 120*l.* a year, and had no prospect of ever getting more, they or their friends would be less anxious to obtain a Government appointment, and thus public offices would become more healthy in both senses of the term.

But, in order to carry these principles into effect, it is essential that they should emanate from the Treasury, and that the Treasury should have the means of observing that their directions have been obeyed, and should not themselves have the power of deviating from them. It is true that no reports from the subordinate office to the Treasury will establish the fact that in every instance the best has been selected; but those reports would show that a selection had been made; that such at least was the practice, and that the rule had been observed; and any continued deviation from such rule would necessarily call for explanation.

There is nothing more common than the notion that boards can and ought to be trusted in such matters, and that it is evincing great want of confidence in them, and derogatory to their character, to bind them down too strictly to rules. But this is a great mistake. In the first place, they neither can, nor ought they to be trusted; and if they could be, they ought to be grateful to any superior authority which strengthens their hands and relieves them from part of a very disagreeable responsibility. In making a selection, unless the senior happens to be the best of the class, one or more have to be passed over. This is an irksome duty to have to perform, and its irksomeness would be greatly lightened if the board had the power of saying, or of its being said for them, "They are in a place of trust, and have to obey the directions of the Treasury, and they are compelled to inform the Treasury that they have done so. The rule laid down may be unpopular in the office, but the board are not responsible for it, and it is impossible for them to deviate from it in any respect, when they have to sign their own names to a report saying, *totidem verbis*, that they have strictly observed it."

The same principle holds good between the board and the inspectors. The former should similarly strengthen the hands and lessen the responsibility of the latter.

To show how necessary it is that the Treasury should not merely lay down rules, but see them executed, it may

be stated that more than thirty years ago a Treasury warrant directed the commissioners of a board to select the best for promotion in *two* of the higher classes of the office. In the *one* case the commissioners were also directed to inform the Treasury of the selection made; in the *other* no such direction was given. In the former case the best, or the person considered the best by the board, was always selected; in the latter, the senior was invariably\* promoted. And in consequence of the best of the class being continually taken from it, while it was as continually recruited on the principle of seniority, that class out of which inspectors had to be chosen became at last so incompetent that no one could be found in it who was fit for the higher office, and a private application was made to the Treasury, which was followed by an official correspondence, to help the board out of their difficulty.

It has been said that the principle of rejection has not been acted on by boards and never will be; but if it were, how would it operate? D is promoted, not because D is better than his seniors A, B, and C, but because the latter have been rejected as unfit. A, B, and C are accordingly discouraged by this slur cast upon them, and D can himself lay claim to no merit on his part, since it is to the demerit of others that he owes his advancement. To erect into a system a practice of discouraging public officers, and encouraging none, of punishing and not rewarding, is surely an ill-judged and clumsy expedient.

Take the other system. Let D be selected for promotion because he is better than A, B, and C. D feels that he has received the due reward of his own exertions, and A, B, and C, although pronounced inferior to D, are not condemned as unfit; and each may still hope on a future occasion to be considered the best of his class. This would lead to renewed exertions on their part. They may be disappointed for the moment, but their hopes for the future are not crushed.

But an objection is raised to this system, that boards are liable to make mistakes, and that it is scarcely possible, between two candidates who are nearly equal, to make a

\* I have since learnt that this statement is not strictly accurate. On the *first* promotion after the receipt of the Treasury Warrant two clerks were passed over, who soon after retired from the service.

distinction. But whatever mistakes may be made, they are comparatively unimportant, provided deserving clerks are promoted, and undeserving ones kept back; and with two candidates of nearly the same pretensions no harm can be done by indulging in the natural tendency of preferring the senior. If they have the same amount of ability and diligence, the one who has been two years, or even two weeks, longer in the service, has evinced those qualities for a longer period and has therefore a better claim than his competitor.

Another objection is, that it opens the door to favouritism, to private solicitation, and jobbing. But these are not the sins of a public board, and even if they were, a check can easily be interposed to their indulgence. When five or six commissioners are sitting together with equal powers, a certain healthy opinion immediately forms itself around them, and it becomes a point of honour to communicate to each other that which concerns them all. Private solicitation is, under these circumstances, worse than useless, it operates against rather than in favour of the applicant. Good nature, negligence, indifference, acquiescence may find their place in these situations, from which the eye of the public is excluded; but the eye of the board and of the office is always open to personal injustice, and it will not be committed.

Nevertheless, the temptation to commit it should be lessened as much as possible. It ought not to be in the power of a board to raise at once from the lowest class to the highest any one who has just received an appointment. If it were, relations or friends of members of a board might get appointed by the Treasury to a clerkship of 90*l.* a year, and then be promoted by the board to one of 400*l.* or 500*l.*, to the infinite dissatisfaction of the office and detriment to the service. Promotions should not, as a rule, be attainable except by degrees. Step by step, each should advance from one class to another, thus affording so many successive checks to improper promotions, so many opportunities of reversing and correcting any mistakes that may have been previously made, and thus ensuring in the person promoted, experience in the business of the office. And it might therefore be a question whether, with a view to this latter qualification, it should not be a rule, that for some few years promotion should be by seniority. But this rule

should not operate for twenty years as it does in many, if not most, offices now.

The question, however, is not whether there may not be objections to a system of selecting according to merit, but whether those objections are not fewer and less serious than those to which the system now in force necessarily gives rise. If by the present system all good officers are discouraged and rendered liable to be converted into bad, and if the bad are only confirmed in idleness, and if by the system which it is proposed to substitute for the present, although the best may not invariably be preferred and receive his due as soon as he ought, its tendency is nevertheless to encourage the good and to increase their number, the latter is the better system of the two, and should be adopted.

### No. 3.

A large portion of the civil servants of Government, who entered the service after 1829, have long been endeavouring to obviate some of the inequality, and, as they consider it, injustice that exists between them and those who entered prior to that year with respect to superannuation allowance.

The scale of superannuation allowance is much more favourable to those who entered during the earlier period; and to render the inequality the more glaring, they contribute nothing to the fund out of which the allowances are paid, while the others contribute much more than is necessary for the object in view. Nor is this all; several public officers, such as high functionaries of state, judges, stipendiary magistrates, &c. &c., even though they have been appointed subsequently to 1829, are nevertheless wholly exempted from any deduction from their salaries. They receive their salaries in full, and their superannuation allowances in full also.

It may, however, be said that this arrangement is sanctioned by law, and was known to the acceptors of office before they accepted; and that they therefore have no *no right* to complain. The deductions made from their salaries may have amounted to a much larger sum than was contemplated by the Act. The Government may

have kept no separate account of the fund so raised, and the surplus may have been devoted to purposes altogether different from what was originally intended. But all this does not alter the case, as far as the officers in question are concerned. They have made their bargain. It may have been a hard one for them; it may have been imposed upon them; but it is, nevertheless, a bargain, and the Government are entitled, if they think fit, to keep them to it.

But, in the first place, even though there should be no just cause of complaint, you cannot persuade the service that this is so. Whether there be good grounds for dissatisfaction or not, the dissatisfaction exists; it is deep-seated and general. "What the public requires," as Sir C. Trevelyan says, in his most able paper on this subject, "is not merely service, but willing and cheerful service." And this service is less likely to be willing and cheerful when given by men who consider, whether erroneously or not, that they are unfairly treated, and their interests not duly attended to;—who experience present privations, and feel still more acutely the future penury which awaits their family when they are gone.

It was not pretended at the time the Superannuation Act was passed, nor is it pretended now, that the salaries of the civil servants are larger than they ought to be. This at least was not the reason for imposing the deductions. The deductions were made professedly for the good of the service, and for the benefit especially of those upon whom they were imposed; and now that experience has proved that the fund thus raised has not been appropriated for the benefit of those out of whose pockets it has been paid, and whose nominal salaries are confessedly not larger than the service requires, there would seem to be some ground for asserting that the spirit of the Act is departed from; and that if its provisions are not to be re-considered and revised, something in the nature of a Declaratory Act should at least be passed to establish its original intention—to provide in practice as well as in principle that the salaries now paid should be devoted in full, in one shape or another, to the persons entitled.

The mode by which the persons who have taken the most active part in these proceedings propose that this should be done, is by the establishment, out of the deductions made, of a provident fund for the benefit of the widows and relations of deceased officers, their retired

allowances being paid at the same rates and on the same conditions as at present, but out of the general resources of the State.\* This would no doubt be a great boon to the present generation of public officers, and would be rendering an immediate benefit to the public service. But it would not perhaps be equally beneficial for the future. Most justly does Sir C. Trevelyan say, "the moral effect of such compulsory arrangements is not beneficial. Ready-made settlements, however small, promote improvident early marriages. A compelled provision for wife and family is felt to supersede the necessity of voluntary sacrifices." . . . . And, "the relation of the State is with its servants, and of the servants with their families." It certainly would be unwise to disregard principles so incontrovertible as these. Men cannot perhaps be made virtuous by act of parliament, but they may be led from the path of virtue and happiness by ill-judged interference with those moral and social duties, which it is their province and privilege alone to perform. But there is a further objection to the proposal. It has always appeared to me injurious, that an appointment to the Civil Service should be considered, and in reality be, a provision for life. And if this be objectionable, making it a provision for the families of civil servants also increases the evil.

All the rules of the service are founded upon the hypothesis that an appointment to a Government office is a certain provision for life. In a large proportion of cases, at an early period of life, when a young man is entirely dependent for his support and future prospects upon the kind offices of a father, uncle, or friend, who happens to have some influence with the political party in power, a nomination is obtained for him in a Government office. His patron has done the best he could for him, and for himself also; for he will probably save at once some 90*l.* or 100*l.* a year, which would otherwise have had to come out of his own pocket. The nomination obtained, the subsequent appointment may be said to be practically secured. After a clerk has been once admitted to the public service, every effort is made to retain him there, quite irrespective of his aptitude for it. His health may be failing, he may have

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\* It is understood that these views have since been somewhat altered.

the prospect before him that it will be irretrievably ruined, unless he at once changes his occupation and his London abode; but until his health is gone, until he is pronounced incapable in body and mind by the certificate of two medical men from performing his duties, he is not entitled to a pension, until, indeed, he has reached the age of 65, when this formality is dispensed with. His taste for the service, and with it his qualifications for the performance of its duties, may have changed. During twenty or twenty-five years of his life he may have rendered most efficient service to the public; but if he gives up his post he is not entitled to any recognition of those services, nor to the restitution of one farthing of the annual contributions that have been taken from his salary to meet the contingency of his retirement. Although an unwilling and therefore probably an inefficient agent, the State insists on his remaining; and perhaps, under these circumstances, logically enough, but not very wisely, considers that any one admitted to the service is *entitled to a competency* for life. Among the most intelligent Civil Service reformers but few, it is believed, hold a different opinion. They think that promotion by seniority, as a mere matter of routine, should subsist, at all events, until the clerk has reached a salary of 250*l.* or 300*l.* a year, sufficient to maintain a wife and family in decent respectability. I cannot however share in that opinion. No one should be paid more than his services are worth; and those who are unfit for the service should not remain in it.

The nomination once obtained, the established appointment follows as a matter of course.\* The appointment is then succeeded by certainty of increase of salary, by certainty of promotion, and certainty of a retired allowance; and now to these it is proposed to add certainty of assistance to the family and relations of officers after their death. This continued certainty, irrespective of ability and exertion, seems to me most injurious to the Civil Service.

Sir C. Trevelyan says, "The prospect of a provision for the close of life is the strongest motive which the State can offer for the fidelity of its servants." If it were merely "a prospect" when the time arrives, if it

\* This is the rule; there are, no doubt, some exceptions to it.

ever does, it might act as a motive on the conduct of public officers. But it is no prospect, but a certainty. "The fear of forfeiting this provision," it is farther alleged, "is an invaluable check on misconduct." But no such fear can exist; no one was ever refused a retired allowance, except on the ground of gross misconduct involving moral delinquency. The mere fact of an officer remaining in the service with the concurrence of the heads of an office, necessarily entitles him to a retired allowance on quitting it; and, although it is farther observed that, "by proportioning the amount of the superannuation in some degree to the merit of the retiring officer, a wholesome influence is exercised over the whole of his service," a general impression exists throughout the service that it is better, when such claims are under consideration, to rely upon the good offices of some kind and influential friend at the Treasury, than to trust even to the recorded opinion of the heads of a department, however favourable. Whether there be good grounds for this impression or not, it exists and does away with the "wholesome check" which is supposed to be exercised.

Nor is this all. If the official conduct of an officer were on all occasions alone considered in awarding the amount of superannuation allowance, the estimate cannot easily be made. The heads of the department in which the case occurs have probably known nothing themselves of the early career of the broken-down and worn-out servant before them. They have to weigh the exertions and capabilities of one who has lingered on in the service longer than he should have done, and who accordingly has of late years appeared before them not in the most favourable colours. It is not surprising that they should lay far less stress upon the former than the later period of his career. The one they know by experience, of the other nothing but by hearsay. And it is perhaps the fear that full justice will not be done them in their own office, and that they have no friend to say a word for them at the Treasury, which often induces subordinate officers to cling to the service and to their salary far longer than is good for themselves or for the service either.

It is for these reasons, among others, that it may well be doubted whether the Treasury ought to be endowed with the power of *diminishing* the amount of superannuation allowance awarded on retirement. If the officer has

remained in the service with the consent of his superiors, and has regularly contributed to the superannuation fund, he is entitled to a full retired allowance for his past services. If those services have been super-eminently efficient, then an additional sum might be awarded by the Treasury with the knowledge of Parliament; and the fact of thus appearing with credit before Parliament and the public would be a stronger inducement for extra exertions than even the pecuniary advantage by which the act would be accompanied, and a stronger inducement also than the fear which is now supposed to be exercised by lessening the amount of the allowance.

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No. 4.

Since writing the above I have had an opportunity of considering the report of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, suggesting, among other principles of great value and importance, that first appointments to the Civil Service should be made by open competition. Notwithstanding its ability, that report, together with other papers advocating this principle, have not convinced me; it still seems to me that the ultimate result of open competition will be a democratical Civil Service, side by side with an aristocratical Legislature.

Open competition must necessarily be in favour of the more numerous class. The natural abilities of that more numerous class, *i.e.*, of the lower or less rich class, are not inferior to those of the higher or richer class. Inducements to cultivate those abilities for a special and important object, attainable by such means, will not be wanting. The comparatively moderate prizes of the Civil Service rise in value as you descend in the scale of society. Two or three hundred a year is a much larger fortune to the son of a tradesman or farmer than it is to the son of a nobleman or squire; and I therefore believe that the great majority of the appointments will fall to the lot of those who are in the lower social position.

Raising the standard of examination, if it operate as a restriction at first, will not do so ultimately. I cannot believe, with Sir S. Northcote, that a university training would ensure the selection of a large majority from among those who have received it. Latin and Greek, moral

philosophy, political economy, modern languages, history, &c. &c., will not long be an impediment in the way of those to whom 200*l.* or 300*l.* a year is so substantial an object of ambition; and the more the Civil Service is recruited from the lower classes, the less it will be sought after by the higher, until at last the aristocracy will be altogether dissociated from the permanent Civil Service of the country.

The encouragement given to education would no doubt be great if the system were once fairly established, and its continuance believed in; but it will be all in favour of the lower classes of society, and not of the higher.

If, while raising the standard of examination, the prizes of the Civil Service were raised also, the case might be, to a certain extent, different. This I am aware is out of the question. The proper principle is, no doubt, to obtain the article required at the smallest possible cost; and the public, in the true spirit of commercial economy, may come to the conclusion that a commissionership at a public board is too highly paid at 1,200*l.* a year, when there are plenty of persons ready to do the work for half the money. Nevertheless, can it be doubted that if those salaries were 2,000*l.* a year instead of 1,200*l.*, and were accessible to those who entered the service in subordinate situations, whether open competition for first appointments were resorted to or not, much of the ability that now finds its way to the bar, commerce, the medical profession, or the church, would be diverted from these channels to that of the Civil Service, and that the work of the Civil Service would be more efficiently performed than at present? It seems to me a self-evident proposition, that the higher the prizes of any profession, the greater will be the amount of the ability competing for them; and that raising the standard of examination for admission into the Civil Service will not command such ability, except from those ranks alone to whom more moderate emoluments act as a more powerful incentive.

It may be true that at present "a mixed multitude is sent up, a large proportion of whom, owing to the operation of political and personal patronage, are of an inferior rank in society." But it is also true that a *still larger* proportion of this multitude are at present in the higher social position, and that when under these proportions, the lower become associated with the higher, the lower gradually acquire more or less the habits, manners, and feel-

ings of the higher. There is, however, some danger that the moment these proportions are reversed, the contrary will take place.

It may also be true that "the idle and useless are the sort of young men," if not "commonly," *often* "provided for in a public office," and this may perhaps be remedied by the proposed arrangement, and "young men of an educated class may be secured." But the idle and useless can easily be excluded by a proper system of examination, established on rules which will work themselves with the ordinary run of mankind, without having recourse to open competition, and to a new and expensive board. Admitting that the proposed system is better than that now in force, is it the best that can be devised? The particular evils complained of may possibly be remedied by it; but it is to be feared that in curing them others of greater magnitude will be created. And it is a question whether the 20,000*l.* or 30,000*l.* a year, which this new board must cost, might not be altogether saved, or expended to more purpose for the benefit of the service.

I have never participated in the belief that there are any insuperable difficulties in conducting the examination of candidates however numerous. But their number is not likely to be limited, in any appreciable degree, by inability to produce the requisite testimonials as to character, health, education, &c. Such documents are always looked upon as matters of form. The greater the necessity for their production, the more easily will they be obtained. For every *one*, magistrate, medical man, and minister of religion, who refuses his signature in any doubtful case, there will be many others in each of these classes who will have no such scruples, and who will easily reconcile it to their conscience, that it is not their duty to shut the door in the face of a young man on the threshold of active life.

But even admitting that such certificates be difficult to obtain, and when obtained are thoroughly trustworthy, what will they prove? The medical man may certify that the candidate is, in his opinion, sound in body and mind; the magistrates may certify that, so far as they are aware, he has not been amenable to the laws of the land; and the minister of religion, that he has been a regular attendant at a place of divine worship. But when all this is done you will be as far as ever from having ascertained the existence of those moral qualities which

are useful in the public service, and which can be tested only by experience—punctuality, diligence, perseverance, energy, and moral courage—good temper, good manners, good sense, fidelity, and a high feeling of honour—deference to the opinion of others when in a subordinate situation, tact and judgment in influencing the conduct of others when in a superior one, founded upon a practical knowledge of human nature and a clear insight into individual character. Persons familiar with the public service know the value of such qualities; but moral character, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, and limited as it is by Mr. Jowett to the consideration of whether "a young man has led a dissolute life," or whether, therefore, on the contrary, he is a good husband, a good father, or a good son, temperate and sober, and just in all his relations with others, performing his domestic and social duties in an exemplary way,—these are moral qualities which cannot be too highly appreciated in their own sphere of action, but they do not necessarily form part and parcel of the Civil Service, and may be possessed in an eminent degree by individuals wholly deficient in those other moral qualities which *are* essential in the public service. The existence of these latter qualities cannot be ascertained by certificates, nor can they be tested by examinations.

It is also to be observed that it is not ability in the abstract, but that kind of ability which is appropriate to the work of the Civil Service which is required there; and that great attainments are far less important for this purpose than good judgment, practical habits of business, and a high sense of honour. The two former of these can perhaps only be acquired by experience; but they are more easily and thoroughly acquired by those who are endowed with the latter.

I am well aware that that which constitutes true gentlemanlike feeling is found in every rank of life; but it is less common in the lower ranks than in the higher; and a selection therefore from a selected class would seem to me preferable to any choice, however extensive, founded upon competition.

Admitting all the evils of patronage, and all the advantage of sweeping it away, as far as the Legislature is concerned, I do not think that the Civil Service should be made the instrument of the political regeneration of the country, unless it be good for the Civil Service itself. Parliament ought to be able to cure its own diseases;

without having recourse to the Civil Service for the purpose.

With respect to the reform of the Civil Service, I have in my former paper, No. 1, stated some of the views I entertain on that subject; and I still think that much more depends on the nature, permanency, and practical character of the detailed rules by which that reform is to be worked out, than upon any change, however extensive, in the constitution of the main body of civil servants.

There is already in the Civil Service a large amount of that kind of ability which is best adapted to its wants; but too much of it is lying dormant, because of that which is in active operation but little meets with its reward. This, as it seems to me, is the first great evil to be cured. The mere admission of ability, however great and however appropriate, will not ensure its resisting the influences of the service; and if those influences are unfavourable to exertion, exertion will not be made, except in rare instances. There is also a certain amount of incapacity which now finds its way into the service, but this can effectually be excluded by the extension of rules which are already in force in more than one department. And in those cases in which, after admission, officers may have become, from one cause or other, unfit for the service, facilities may be afforded for inducing or compelling them to leave it.

I cannot concur in the opinion, that when patronage and competition go together, patronage will trip up competition, if the rules by which competition is carried into effect are properly framed and established on the authority of an Order in Council.

It is asserted that in the Treasury, Lord Melbourne's plan of competing for appointments—in other words, the union of patronage and competition, failed. But what were the rules by which the examinations were conducted? Was there only one examiner or more? Did the ultimate decision rest with him, or were the examination papers, with a report in writing, submitted to any other and higher authority? Was the spirit of patronage, which is the great evil now to be combated, really dormant in the Treasury at that time? Were the examinations popular in that branch of the department; and if not, could not the same power which had established the test, also abolish it when considered inconvenient? Until such questions are answered, experience cannot, as it seems to

me, fairly be quoted as decisive against the principle of Lord Melbourne's plan.

But the most important consideration perhaps, which the proposed plan involves, has not yet been alluded to, viz., the entire independence of the permanent Civil Service in respect of the executive branch of the Government. If the superintendence as to the admission into, and the prospects afforded by, the Civil Service, are left altogether in the hands of a Board of Examiners, the executive can hardly be responsible for the proper working of the government machine, since they will have no voice in the selection of the officers by whom the work is to be done, or in their subsequent promotion and reward. At the same time, the Civil Service, as I conceive, ought not to be made subservient to political or other purposes, whether they be good or bad. The reform which the Civil Service stands so much in need of, should be effected for its own sake. In no other way, as it seems to me, can it be effectually performed. The attention, however, which is being bestowed on this subject, cannot but be productive of good; and it is impossible to be too grateful to those with whom it has originated.

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No. 5.

I have already stated that paper No. 1 was written under the impression that any complete change in the source of patronage was not in contemplation, and was practically out of the question; and the suggestions that paper contains were accordingly adapted to the existing state of things. If, however, the system be revised altogether, it then seems to me that it should rest with the heads of departments and offices to make the nominations of their own clerks subject to the veto of the Government. Page 258.

If the patronage of the country, instead of being to a great degree concentrated at the Treasury, as at present, or put an end to altogether by a competing examination open to all, were dispersed among the several departments, and the nominations so made were subjected to the test of examination, conducted by an independent body under the auspices of the Government, the ill effects of patronage—which it appears to be the chief object to

prevent—would be mitigated, if not removed, and the good effects on the Civil Service would, I think, be marked and obvious.

The chairman of the Board of Customs, of Inland Revenue, and of all offices not presided over by political chiefs, could have no inducement to risk making bad selections from political motives, when by so doing, their future official comfort, as well as character, would be at stake; and if they were more anxious to serve their own relations and friends than the interests of the public, nevertheless, the revision and reversal to which their nominations would be liable, would, it is conceived, ensure great care in the selections made. It would be a reflection upon the heads of a department, which they would be desirous of avoiding, to have their candidates rejected. With respect to departments presided over by political chiefs, their nominations also might be subjected to the similar ordeal of an independent and *bonâ fide* examination.

The Civil Service should, as before stated, be as far as possible assimilated to the ordinary professions; and no manufacturer, solicitor, or merchant, would undertake the management of a great concern, if he were compelled to employ clerks for the purpose, not of his own choosing, but forced upon him by persons who had no permanent interest in its success, or by a Board of Examiners, however highly gifted and impartial. At all events, it seems to me indispensable that the heads of offices should have either the power of rejecting, or that of nominating, their own clerks; of the two, I prefer the latter. But if they are deprived of both, there is, as I conceive, an end of their responsibility, and of all due security for the proper conduct of the business with which they are entrusted.

Another point to which I wish to refer is the following. It appears to me that the influence of the political branch of the Treasury, as exercised by subordinate officers of the Treasury over the Civil Service, is injurious, and that it is a matter well worthy of consideration whether some high permanent functionary should not be appointed in that department, whose duty it would be to attend to the Civil Service alone.

At present the ordinary business connected with the Civil Service is conducted, not by the Lords of the Treasury, still less of course by the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the First Lord, but by subordinate officers.

They issue their orders under the title of my Lords. The higher functionaries of the Treasury are necessarily absorbed by matters of a more pressing and important character connected with the policy and existence of the Government, and with their proceedings in Parliament; and when, therefore, questions affecting the good of the Civil Service have become so important as to render a reference to them inevitable, they are placed in the dilemma of having to reverse proceedings already taken by their own subordinate officers, or of deciding against the head of the department, who is probably most cognizant of the merits of the point at issue. If the former course be adopted, the civil servant may fear that although the decision in one instance has been in his favour, he has not conciliated the good will of one who has great power over his future prospects, and who may be supposed on most occasions to have the ear of the highest authorities; if the latter, then the public service is not unlikely to suffer. But this evil is greatly enhanced when the officer in question is not attached to the Civil Service, but to the political branch of the Treasury. His interest and his duty too lie in a different direction from that of the Civil Service. He belongs to a Government whose duration is necessarily precarious, and in no small degree dependent on his own exertions. It is his duty to avoid difficulties in the House of Commons, to keep things quiet there, and his party in good humour, to prevent inconvenient questions; and, still more, inconvenient discussions and divisions, and all his efforts cannot but be directed to those ends. The Civil Service is necessarily a matter of inferior importance in his eyes, and in any case in which its interests interfere with those which he is bound to consider paramount, it is needless to say which way the scale will turn.

But this is not all; Governments change, and in these days more frequently than formerly, and with them the political secretaries of the Treasury change also; and thus the heads of a department are constantly subject to the varying views and systems of successive Treasury masters. It may be said that many offices are under the control of the permanent Secretary of the Treasury; but even in such cases the authority of the political secretary is paramount, and if the former has come to decisions in which the latter does not concur, he is liable to be overruled and his decisions reversed. It seems to me that



there are grave objections to this system, and that it is not calculated to make the officers of the Civil Service over zealous for its permanent efficiency. For these reasons I think it a matter of the greatest importance that some permanent officer should be established at the Treasury, superior in authority, as far as the Civil Service is concerned, to the political secretaries, that to him should be assigned the special duty of attending to the interests of the Civil Service, and that all matters of importance permanently affecting any office should be referred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer before a decision has been come to.

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T. W. C. MURDOCH, Esq.,

Chairman of the Emigration Board.

8, Park Street, Westminster,  
9th September 1854.

IN compliance with the desire expressed in your letter of the 25th ultimo, I proceed to explain my views as to the general principles of the scheme for the reform of the Civil Service contained in the report of Sir S. Northcote and yourself, and the improvements which might be introduced into the present system of appointments and promotions.

I must preface what I have to say with two observations.

First, I must express my entire dissent from the disparaging terms in which the present Civil Service is spoken of. I do not believe that the service has been chiefly desired for "the unambitious, or the indolent, or incapable," nor that an unusual proportion of "sickly youths" are put into it. And the statistics recently got together for another purpose show that the retirements and the amount of pensions granted since 1829 have been extraordinarily small; and that so far from the public being "burthened" on this account it has been deriving a very large annual benefit from the excess of deductions for the pension fund over the amount of pensions granted. I am convinced, after an experience of upwards of twenty-eight years, that although there are incapable men in the Civil Service those who enter it are equal on an average to those who enter other professions. That many, in the course of years,

become listless and indifferent arises from other causes, to which allusion is made in your report, and to which I shall refer hereafter.

The second remark that I have to make is, that the magnitude of the Civil Service appears to me to be described in a manner to lead to misapprehension. It is stated in the report, that the public establishments of this country comprise "a body of not less than 16,000 persons," and in Mr Jowett's letter it is assumed that the vacancies in the superior offices, for which men who have received a first-rate education would compete, would average 250 a year. Now a simple reference to the almanack will show that the whole number of clerkships in first-class offices, such as the Treasury, Secretary of State's offices, Board of Control, Admiralty, Board of Trade, &c. does not exceed 250, and that the whole number in second class offices, such as the Commissariat, War Office, Inland Revenue, &c. does not exceed 400; and that the whole number employed in all the offices enumerated in the almanack is less than 4,000. Where the remaining 12,000 places are to be found I am at a loss to conjecture.\* Assuming that vacancies occur at the rate of four per cent. per annum (a high average) it will follow that in the first class offices there may be ten a year; in the second class sixteen; and in the remainder 120 or 130. The two first classes are those only for which men who have received a superior education are likely to compete; in other words, the 250 annual vacancies assumed by Mr. Jowett are not

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\* Mr. Bromley, at page 57, states the number of persons liable to assessment for the Superannuation Fund at 16,338, of whom 8,185 are described as clerks, and 8,153 as messengers and persons holding other subordinate situations. The Commissioners for the Census of 1851, who were enabled to take at once a more comprehensive and particular view of the public departments, give the whole number of civil servants at 17,815, besides 21,332 messengers, letter-carriers, and subordinate revenue officers, 14,531 artificers and labourers in the dockyards and naval arsenals, and 10,546 returned on the retired list of the same departments, or 64,224 in all. This statement, which was compiled from returns furnished by the respective offices, will be found in detail at page 439. Both these statements are exclusive of the diplomatic and consular bodies, and of the commissariat, convict, and other foreign establishments, which would come within the scope of any plan the object of which was to secure the appointment of qualified persons for the civil service of the country; neither do they include the establishments of the Law and Ecclesiastical Courts, or some of the ordinary civil establishments in Ireland and Scotland.

likely to exceed 26. The average salary of even these offices would at first be something less than 100*l.* a year.

Turning now to the more general question, the Report—on the assumption that the ministers of the Crown are unable or unwilling to dispense their patronage with a reference to the merits of candidates—proposes to take it out of their hands and throw it open to public competition; that any one who can produce satisfactory testimonials to character, which is tantamount to any one against whose character no serious objection can be urged, should be at liberty to compete, and, if successful, to claim any vacant office for which he may be suited; and that no one should be introduced into the Civil Service except in this way. The scheme, in short, contemplates making intellectual attainments the sole passport to the public service, and the examinations through which it is to be carried out will afford a test of such qualifications only as those attainments necessarily imply.

The most serious objection that I feel to this scheme is, that under the present system of the public service, unusual intellectual attainments are not the first requisite for a clerk in a public office. This will be evident enough if you consider the prospects of a young man now entering the Treasury, or one of the Secretary of State's offices, or any other office of the same class. He will begin, as I said before, on a salary of something less than 100*l.* a year, to be advanced by annual increments of 10*l.* to about 300*l.* His duty will be to copy papers, and he will seldom be called on to do anything more. He will continue at this work for not less on an average than fifteen years, when he will attain to a higher class, where he will receive a better salary and a somewhat more important description of work; and he will probably remain in this second class ten or fifteen years more. After from twenty-five to thirty years service he will attain to the first class, where he will at last be called on for the exercise of the higher faculties which his original examination was intended to test.

Now it is, I think, quite clear, that if fifteen years of a man's life are to be spent in copying, and ten or fifteen more in conducting routine correspondence, there are qualifications more essential than great intellectual attainments, viz., diligence, patience, accuracy, willingness; and that no natural abilities or acquired knowledge will compensate for any deficiency in these. And I have no doubt

that, as a general rule, men possessed of great abilities or who are qualified to pass first class examinations are less likely to exhibit such qualities in the daily drudgery of the lower grades of an office than less gifted men. There is such a thing as having too fine an instrument for your work. And to put a first-class man to copy papers on 100*l.* a year is like putting a racehorse into the plough; he would naturally grow impatient, discontented, and careless, and turn his attention to other pursuits. And it must be remembered that the prospect of advancement out of the ordinary course would then be even less than at present; for where all were subjected to public competition, none would be likely to be so superior as to justify his being advanced over the heads of his seniors.

The great fault at present is, I think, not in the men, but in the system—not in the manner in which they are originally appointed, but in that in which they are for the first many years employed. I am satisfied that in the first instance there is plenty of intelligence in those selected, not to make statesmen perhaps, (which we do not want,) but to make efficient and able public servants. But the monotonous drudgery at which they are kept for many years wears out whatever zeal they may originally have felt, and they come to discharge their mechanical duties in a purely mechanical manner with the least possible expenditure of thought or attention. What would be the result of a different system is, I think, shown by the eagerness with which every opportunity of being employed on work of a superior kind is sought, and the change which it produces in those who obtain it.

In your Report you have fully recognized the importance of separating intellectual from mechanical work. To me it appears that the separation, as far as practicable, of the intellectual and mechanical functions is the first and most important step towards a reform of the Civil Service. Without this separation no change in the mode of appointment would be effectual; with it, I very much doubt whether any would be necessary. I am satisfied, also, that mere copying work would be better done by persons employed solely for that purpose, of whose education penmanship would have formed a prominent part, and who would not regard copying as an unworthy occupation. In short, I believe that in this, as in other pursuits, excellence is to be attained chiefly by a division of employments.

My own view, therefore, would be to draw a distinct line between the lower and higher classes in all offices,

and not to require those who are to do the intellectual work to pass through the mechanical class. The effect would be that a vacancy in the intellectual class would set free a salary of 300*l.* or 400*l.* a year, which would be quite enough to procure the services of men of mature age whose abilities and character had already been put to the test, and who, therefore, would require no competing examination to prove their sufficiency. The only necessity for an alteration in the mode of appointment would then arise from the assumed tendency of the heads of offices to abuse their patronage. The extent of that risk I do not pretend to appreciate; but it would, I think, be less in proportion as the office to be filled was more important and ostensible, and at all events it would not be sufficient to justify so violent a change as is proposed. It may be the prejudice of a life passed in office, but I confess I should be loth to witness the introduction of a principle so novel as that which you contemplate, and which I think would be subversive of official discipline, until its absolute necessity had been shown.

The main obstacle to the plan which I propose is the difficulty of bringing it into early operation. Those who have been appointed on the original scheme, and who are now employed in the mechanical classes must be first provided for, and this could be done in a reasonable time only by throwing open to them the whole range of the service. An exception would also have to be made in the case of work which, though mechanical, is of a confidential nature. The exception, however, would be inconsiderable, as in most offices publicity can do no harm. But there could be no difficulty in making special appointments for work of this description, nor anything anomalous in attaching to them an extra remuneration.

In conclusion, I would beg you to believe that it is not without a full sense of the difficulty and importance of the question that I have complied with your desire to offer an opinion upon it. My experience has been very much limited to one class of offices, and perhaps, therefore, my views may be less generally applicable than I suppose them to be. One thing may, I hope, be predicted, viz., that the ventilation of the question now in progress will tend to remove or mitigate those defects which I agree with you in thinking now exist, and which bring the service into public disrepute.

JOHN WOOD, Esq.

Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue.

*Somerset House, Sept. 30, 1854.*

In pursuance of the desire communicated in your letter of the 14th June, I have the honour of transmitting for the consideration of Government the remarks which occur to me on the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, on the organization of the Civil Service; and also of stating in what respects I consider that the efficiency of that Service may be promoted.

In the general principle of that Report, and in many of its detailed recommendations, I entirely agree. But its tone has unfortunately been supposed to imply an almost indiscriminate censure of the Civil Service. This prevalent impression has produced an effect injurious to the scheme: the whole class considering itself included in censure applicable only to a part.

For the object in view, it is sufficient to state, that the Civil Service is capable of considerable improvement. This assumption is not inconsistent with an acknowledgment of the great talent, industry and acquirements of many of its members; and to such instances of merit it is evident that full justice was intended by the Report.

The great principle of the scheme is, that entrance into the Civil Service shall not depend, as heretofore, on personal connection or political influence; and that competition for employment shall be open to every one who complies with certain conditions, prescribed for the purpose of ascertaining fitness and merit; and that ascertained fitness and superior merit shall be the indispensable and sole condition of appointments and promotions.

The scheme recommends itself by its justice.

Government being an institution intended for the equal benefit of all, or as is better expressed, for "the greatest good of the greatest number," the individuals best qualified for the efficient discharge of the offices of Government ought to be selected to fill them, not only for the purpose of good government, but as an encouragement to exertion, and an act of justice to the most deserving. No system of exclusion should be allowed.

The beneficial effect on the national character of open-

ing the Civil Service to general competition can scarcely be over-estimated.

Let any one who has had experience, reflect on the operation of patronage on Electors, Parliament, and the Government. Over each it exercises an evil influence. In the Electors it interferes with the honest exercise of the franchise; in Parliament it encourages subservience to the administration; it impedes the free action of a Government desirous of pursuing an honest and economical course, and it occasions the employment of persons without regard to their peculiar fitness. It is a more pernicious system than the mere giving of money to Electors or members of Parliament to secure their votes. It is bribery in its worst form.

This formidable evil may be mitigated, if not abated, by the act of simple justice, which the Report on the organization of the Civil Service has the wisdom and courage to propose.

The scheme has been objected to as a theoretical experiment: this however, is the common form by which repugnance is expressed to any novel or distasteful proposal. It would be more accurate to describe the scheme as eminently practical; and as the mere enunciation of the truism, that where a given purpose is to be effected, the execution of that purpose should be entrusted to those whose fitness is already ascertained.

Few persons will be found to question the general principle, but many doubt its practicability, and therefore the mode of ascertaining the fitness of candidates becomes a subject of great importance.

It is essential that the examination should be undertaken by a tribunal so constituted as to secure confidence in its competency and impartiality.

Hitherto, the only examination has been departmental. In few branches of the Service has it amounted to more than a mere form, and the standard of qualification has not been sufficiently high. Experience, therefore, is not favorable to its continuance.

Supposing this system of departmental examination were compulsory, there is little reason to hope that it would be uniform, or that it would take a comprehensive view of intellectual capacity or mental acquirement, or that it would insure respect.

Its inquiries would probably be confined to mere departmental qualifications, without reference to general attain-

ment. It may, however, be very valuable as a supplementary test, as will hereafter be noticed.

For these reasons, an independent Board of Examiners is preferable; and no practical difficulty is to be anticipated in the selection of a competent body of skilful men, acting under such instructions as shall secure efficiency.

I do not propose to give more than a general sketch of the proceedings of the Board.

I presume that its preliminary duty would be to determine on the various classes into which appointments in the Civil Service should be divided, and the nature and extent of the qualifications required in each class; that such division, having been carefully considered, would be made public; that an estimate would be periodically declared of the number of probable vacancies in each class; that every person would be at liberty to offer himself as a candidate in any one class, on sending certificates of age, health, and character, with a specimen of his handwriting, and a general statement of his acquirements, properly authenticated; that having thus afforded presumptive evidence of qualification, his examination would take place according to a prescribed course; that if the number of candidates exceeded the probable vacancies, the Board would select the most meritorious; provided always, that no competitor be selected for office whose acquirements were not adjudged sufficient by the Board.

The Government would fill up the vacancies in the various classes, as they occurred, from the list of candidates approved by the Board of Examiners.

I do not enter into the detail of the subjects to be prescribed for the examination of the various classes of the Civil Service; but by way of illustration of the general scheme, I will suggest the probable division into classes in the Inland Revenue, and the requirements from the candidates in each class.

The persons employed in the department of Inland Revenue might perhaps be conveniently divided into four principal classes.

The first, to include Stampers, Warehousemen, Doorkeepers, and Messengers; the 2nd, Excise Officers; the 3rd, Clerks in offices of receipt and account, and Surveyors of Taxes; the 4th, Clerks in the office of the Secretary and Solicitor.

The first class should be examined in reading, writing, and the four first rules of arithmetic.

The second class, in reading, writing, vulgar fractions and decimals, book-keeping by double entry, the elements of geometry, and writing from dictation.

The third class, in reading, writing, vulgar fractions and decimals, book-keeping by double entry, the elements of geometry, writing from dictation, geography, and history, and in correspondence. The fourth class should be examined as the third, and also in one ancient and one modern language; and if intended for the Solicitor's department, ought to be conversant with some elementary work on law.

It may be objected that the number of candidates would be overwhelming.

The remedy appears obvious. Raise the qualification; and also let the Board of Examiners give to such unsuccessful candidates as desire it, a detailed certificate of relative proficiency.

When confidence in the Board of Examiners is established, it may be expected that bankers, merchants, and public companies will prefer to employ persons who have obtained a certificate; and thus the board will become more extensively useful.

The internal management of a department, Promotions, and Salaries remain to be considered.

Great confidence may be placed in the qualifications of persons who have passed the general Board of Examiners. But this ought not to dispense with an ascertainment of fitness for a particular office; and therefore a period of probation should be observed previous to full appointment; during which, not only elementary knowledge would be tested, but such employment given as would require diligence and punctuality, and lead to habits of business. Copying would probably form a considerable portion of the occupation of the first few months; although almost mechanical, it is of greater value than is at once obvious. It would probably be found that some persons were not adapted for a higher species of employment; and in large departments, these might eventually form a class of copying clerks, at salaries proportioned to their worth. In all departments, however, much of the mere copying may be advantageously entrusted to persons paid by the hour, and who are not on the establishment. Copying is a distinct branch of business in London, and may be obtained with expedition and economy.

The registration of papers would probably also form a

fitting occupation for beginners, with the further advantage of affording them an opportunity for acquiring general ideas of the nature and course of business.

These matters of detail must, however, be left to the heads of each department, who should be impressed with the necessity of a judicious distribution of work; of a systematic supervision, and of frequent periodical reports from the chiefs of their subordinate departments, as to the talent and conduct of the individuals under their immediate control.

Nothing is of more practical importance to the welfare of the Civil Service than a just system of promotion.

It is essential that every gradation of office, from the lowest to the highest, shall be within the reach of every individual in a department; and that the selection for promotion shall be absolutely in the Board, or other presiding power of each department; and that every step shall also be gained by merit, without regard to seniority, excepting where the qualifications are equal.

The prevalent custom is to promote according to seniority, unless the unfitness of the senior be glaring, or the vacant office of such responsibility as to compel a selection.

The temptation to promote by seniority is great. Seniority is matter of fact; merit is matter of opinion, and therefore implies the trouble of judging; the responsibility of making a choice; the risk of not making the best choice; and the odium of passing over persons who have been accustomed to consider that seniority gives them a claim to preference.

On a vacancy the just course appears to be to examine the claims of those in the immediate section in which the vacancy has occurred. If none therein be found fully qualified, then to consider the claims of those in the various subordinate sections under the same Board; and in default, to report the vacancy to the Treasury, or to the Board of Examiners, who may exercise a more extended choice.

The presiding power of the department ought also to have the free power of dismissal; subject, of course, as at present, to the appeal of the party to the Treasury; and it would be a great advantage if too much regard were not paid to fixity of tenure, but that removal from office should be exercised with as little scruple in the service of the State as in that of individuals.

The rate of salary ought to be such as to attract to the Civil Service the most available talent. It is false economy to give a rate below that which an individual may obtain in another employment.

It is also expedient, that there should be a periodical advance of salary, independent of promotion; such advance however not to take place, unless the merit of the individual be vouched for from time to time by his superior, to the satisfaction of the Board.

Liberal arrangements ought also to be made as to retiring allowances, and every encouragement afforded to life assurance, and provision for widows and children.

I am aware that these observations, though much longer than I had intended, do not enter into minute details. I have avoided them, because I conceive that I was called upon to observe on the general principle of the proposal, and its applicability to the improvement of the Civil Service, rather than to dwell on subjects which may more properly be left to a Board of Examiners, aided by the practical suggestions which they will receive from the several departments.

I have as little doubt of the applicability of the plan as of its justice. I believe that a class of persons may be thus selected for the Civil Service, whose special fitness for their several employments has been clearly ascertained; and of whose efficiency and good conduct there will be the safest assurance. That whilst the state is better served, emulation will be excited, the great cause of education advanced, and independence of character promoted.

At page 16 of the Report my own practice is specially referred to. I may therefore state that in disposing of a portion of the very few nominations in my gift, I have been favoured by the assistance of persons distinguished by their exertions for education, and among them I may particularly mention the Dean of Hereford. Pupils have been selected from schools under their immediate superintendence; and, after undergoing the examination prescribed by our departmental regulations,\* have been appointed to the Surveying branch of the Excise.

The result has been most satisfactory, as regards both the attainments and conduct of the young men so selected.

In conclusion, I trust I may be allowed to bear testimony to the ability, zeal, and industry of which my own depart-

\* See pages 311, 312 *sub.*

ment affords so many eminent examples; and to which I feel so deeply indebted, that it would be ungenerous to lose the opportunity of acknowledging it.

I may further refer to the Minutes and General Orders appended to this letter; as evidence of the course pursued by the Board in examination on appointments and promotions. The system is susceptible of much extension and improvement; but so far as it has gone, it affords great encouragement to the more comprehensive proposals of the Report.

Excise,  
Sir,  
I have to acknowledge your letter of the 10th April, and to acquaint you that your Petition stands recorded in the exact order of its date; and that this is the case with every Petition, whether for Promotion or Removal, provided there be no official objection.

If you are desirous that your claims to promotion should have precedence of those whose Petitions are prior to your own, you can only obtain that advantage by entitling yourself to the special approval of the Board, or to such favourable notice of your Collector or other Superior Officer as to induce him to report you in the terms of the within General Order of 10th April 1839; to which as well as to that of the 4th August 1831, and to the Board's Minute of 29th November 1841, I direct your attention.

I am, Sir,  
Your's respectfully,

GENERAL ORDER.  
Excise Office, London, 10th April, 1839.

The Board having had under their consideration that part of the Instructions, furnished for the guidance of the Surveying General Examiners, which requires them on their Return from Survey and Inspection in the Country, to state in their General Report, whether they met with any Officers who appeared to be particularly eminent in abilities, knowledge, and qualifications for the Service of the Revenue, mentioning what they are, in what they excel, and what are their general character and conduct:

Ordered, That all Collectors as well as Surveying General Examiners on Survey, &c., specially report to the Board the Names of any Supervisors or Officers whom they may at any time consider *eminent for ability, activity, and general good conduct*, specifying the grounds of such favourable opinions and the several instances in which such special merit has been shown.

It is further ordered, That the Names of all such Supervisors and Officers as shall be thus specially brought before the Board, be registered in a Book prepared for the purpose, and, with the Papers relating thereto, be brought by the Secretary under the consideration of the Board at such periods as may be selected for such purpose.

GENERAL ORDER.

*Excise Office, London, 4th August, 1831.*

It having been found that, notwithstanding former Orders of the Board prohibiting Officers of every rank in their Service from applying in any other manner than by their own Letter to the Board or an individual Commissioner for Promotion, or for Removal to, or to prevent the Removal from, particular Stations; on pain of dismissal from the Service, applications have frequently been made to individual Commissioners through Gentlemen unconnected with the Service; and that few of these cases have been brought before the Board in consequence of the disinclination of the Commissioner to subject the party to so severe a penalty as dismissal for the Offence:

It is hereby ordered, That all former Orders, as far as they relate to this subject, be revoked; and that any Officer of whatever rank he may be, who shall hereafter apply otherwise than by his own letter to the Board or an individual Commissioner for Promotion, or for Removal to another Station, or to prevent his Removal from that in which he shall then be employed, be punished for a first Offence by Reprimand and Removal; for a second Offence by Reduction to an inferior Station; and for a third by dismissal from the Service.

It is also ordered, That any such application in favour of any such Officer, from any other Person than himself, be deemed as made at his suggestion, unless he shall be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Board that he has had no knowledge of such application directly or indirectly.

And the Board further direct, That this Order be read to the respective Supervisors and Officers at each place of Collection on the 8th Round annually.

MINUTE, 29th November 1841.

*Excise Office, London.*

Mr. R., Officer of Belfast 8th Division, having applied, by letter, to a Gentleman not connected with the Excise Service, requesting the exertion of influence with the Commissioners of

Excise to obtain Promotion for him: having, moreover, expressed himself in his said letter as follows;—

“Interest is the order of the day;

“There are particular Orders issued by the Board of Excise, which go to say that we are not to apply to Members of Parliament to obtain promotion in any Department of the Excise, but these General Orders are generally broken through;”—

And, when called upon to answer for his infraction of the Board's Order, having stated, as a ground for what he had written, that two Officers, in his opinion not more efficient or zealous than himself, namely Mr. M. and Mr. H., Division Officers in Dublin who had applied for Promotion subsequently to himself, were now Supervisors, the former having been promoted in 1838, the latter in 1840:

And it appearing that Mr. M. and Mr. H. are Officers whose names were recorded in the Board's Book of Merit, on the recommendation of their Collector, under the Board's General Order of the 10th April, 1839, annexed; that Mr. M's Books were accordingly ordered under examination, with a view to his Promotion, in the Year 1839 (not in 1838, as stated by Mr. R.) and those of Mr. H. in 1840; these names having thus been taken out of the course in which they would have come under the Board's consideration according to the dates of their application:

That Mr. R.'s own name not having been brought specially under the Board's notice by any recommendation, under the Board's General Order of 10th April 1839, has continued to rise in the List of Recorded Applications for Promotion, by the regular gradation alone; and that, by that gradation, it had risen to within Twenty-six of the top of the List; so that, if not removed from the List under the Board's Regulation through the record of a Censure against the Officer, it would in due course have been speedily brought under the Board's notice, with a view to a consideration of the Officer's fitness for Promotion by means of the usual Examination of his Books:

Ordered, That, in consequence of this Officer's conduct herein referred to, he be reprimanded and removed; and that a Copy of this Minute be communicated to him, through the Collector of Belfast, who will read the same to the Officers of the Collection at the next Round Sitting.

Ordered further, That a Copy be transmitted to the several Collectors in the United Kingdom, who will read the same to the Officers in their several Collections at the next Round Sitting after the receipt of the Minute.

By the Board,

CHAS. BROWNE.

## EXTRACT from MINUTE of the 1st December 1846.

The Chairman laid before the Board letters received by him from Mr. ——— and Mr. ———, principal accountants. Each of these gentlemen expresses disappointment at not having been selected to fill the situation of Accountant General on the vacancy occasioned by the retirement of Mr. ———.

The Board consider this a subject of so much importance, as to induce them to issue the following observations to the department:

It is evident that the writers do not understand the principle on which promotion is regulated. The sole question to be determined is, Who is the best qualified? and it is only where qualifications are equal, or nicely balanced, that seniority is taken into account. Acting strictly in conformity with this principle on the recent vacancy, the talents, acquirements, and business habits of every individual have been carefully examined, and the result has been the appointment of Mr. ——— as Accountant General, and Mr. ——— as his assistant. The Board will not detail the relative degrees of ability, industry, or knowledge which characterize the several individuals composing the establishment; the utmost pains have been taken to arrive at a just conclusion, and the principle acted on ought to be considered as a stimulus to exertion, rather than as implying a censure on those who have been unsuccessful. It is a principle beneficial to the public, as ensuring the best officers for its service, and it acts advantageously to the department, by holding out the hope of reward, and thus exciting emulation.

Mr. ——— advances a special claim, on the ground that he once filled the office of assistant to the Accountant General, but the Board cannot for a moment admit its force; to allow it, would at once establish the doctrine of succession, and be completely at variance with the motive which has just been explained, as solely influencing the choice of the Board.

## EXTRACT from MINUTE of 13th December 1847.

The Board think it necessary on the present occasion, to repeat that it is their determination to investigate strictly all claims to advancement; that seniority alone will not be considered sufficient, but that ability, zeal, and good conduct, will be indispensable in order to the attainment of all promotion. For the highest appointments, such as the two correspondents and the principal clerk to the Secretary, the Board will select from any branch or department of the Service, those persons who may be found to possess the peculiar qualifications requisite for the due discharge of the duties of those important stations.

## QUALIFICATION and INSTRUCTION of CANDIDATES for the SURVEYING BRANCH of the EXCISE.

With the view of ensuring educated men for the Surveying Branch of the Department, it is ordered;

That the Candidate be required to write well, to understand the first four Rules of Vulgar and Decimal Arithmetic, and Book-keeping by double entry.

That he write fluently and correctly from dictation, so that his handwriting, spelling, punctuation, and general fitness, may be thus subjected to an additional test.

That the age of the Candidate must not exceed 25, nor be less than 19 years; and he must, at the period of his entering the service, be unmarried and without family; nor will he be allowed to marry till appointed to a Ride.

That the examination may be impartial and uniform, it shall be conducted by persons of experience, and the Candidates, if more than one, shall go through the examination in each other's presence.

Previously to examination, the age, handwriting, and qualifications of the Candidate shall be reported on, as at present, by a Supervisor.

On these being approved, an order shall issue, directing him to attend at the Chief Office, or on the Collector, at such time and place as shall be appointed.

The Examining Committee in London shall consist of two Surveying General Examiners, the Accountant General, and one of the Secretaries or Correspondents, as may from time to time be decided on by the Board.

The Examining Committee in the Country shall consist, at least, of the Collector, a Supervisor, and the Collector's Clerk.

The Candidates shall be required, to write a sentence from dictation; and to set down, also from dictation, and work out Sums in common Arithmetic, in Decimals and Vulgar Fractions; and shall be examined in their knowledge of Book-keeping.

The identical papers so written shall be transmitted to the Board, signed by every one present at the performance; and, annexed to them, a Report by the Examining Committee in London, or Collector in the Country, stating their opinion on the talents and attainments of each Candidate.

On his performances being approved by the Board, he shall be placed under the instructions of an Officer selected for this duty; and, after he has surveyed for a period of at least six weeks, and the instructing Officer considers him qualified, the Supervisor shall survey with and examine the Pupil; and, if deemed competent, he and the Officer shall certify the same to the Committee or the Collector, who, on being satisfied as to the qualifications of the Pupil, shall forthwith endorse and transmit the Certificate to the Board.

Should he not be so qualified, or be deficient in any other respect, the Committee or Collector shall direct him to be further instructed, or shall report specially to the Board.



One or more Officers of intelligence and general good conduct shall be selected, under the sanction of the Board, by the Surveying General Examiners in London, and by Collectors in the Country, for the very important duty of instructing Pupils; and, if practicable, one such Officer shall be in the residence of the Collector.

Supervisors, on each visit to Stations wherein a Pupil is under instructions, shall examine his performances, and observe his general conduct, for the purpose of ascertaining his progress, and giving him any needful assistance, accounting for this duty in their Diaries, and adding their remarks.

The Surveying General Examiners and Collectors shall also avail themselves of every opportunity of examining the performance of the Pupils, so as to make themselves acquainted with their conduct and proficiency, reporting to the Board as occasion requires.

GEO. BALLARD.

*Excise Office, London, January 1848.*

HERMAN MERIVALE, Esq.,

Under Secretary of State for the Colonial Department.

*Downing Street, November 6, 1854.*

I HAVE to acknowledge your letter of the 14th June last, applying, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to be furnished with my view of the general principles of the report of yourself and Sir Stafford Northcote on the permanent organization of the Civil Service.

I am bound to comply with this application to the best of my power; but I must premise that I have no acquaintance with the present organization of the Civil Service, except in the numerically small department of the Colonial Office: that I was introduced to it only after several years' practice at the bar, which is a body constituted and educated on wholly different principles, and that I do not consider myself qualified to entertain any very decided opinion on the subject.

The general object of your report I understand to be to recommend that candidates for the public service should only be introduced to it by competition: that the test should be examination; and that the most proficient should be appointed, subject to certain regulations as to the mode of partitioning the successful candidates among the different offices in which there may be vacancies. As to the details of these regulations I can say little. There

appears to be some practical difficulty in adopting those proposed by Mr. Jowett, but probably none which might not be overcome by the help of such modifications as greater experience than mine could suggest. I shall therefore confine myself to the general question.

I consider, in the first place, that if your general views be adopted the result will be admission to the public service by "merit" alone, as it is commonly termed; that is, by success in literary examination. The best respondents will be appointed, and no deviation from this principle will be tolerated, except in the rare case of some distinct and patent disqualification of a criminal kind. No dislike or doubt, however well founded, as to the victor's moral fitness for appointment will in the long run warrant the examiners either in selecting candidates for examination or rejecting them after it. For if the examiners were to assume this license, the faith of the public—which could not judge of the examiner's motives, and would certainly not be disposed to trust him implicitly—in the fairness of the examination, would be shaken altogether. I must therefore dismiss, as in my opinion impracticable, all suggestions as to coupling inquiries into moral fitness with the literary test, and I cannot but think that the proposal of Mr. Jowett on this head (p. 24) rather shows the greatness of the difficulty than offers a practical way of solving it.

Appointment would thus wholly depend on successful literary competition. This is altogether a novel principle of selection in this country (except in such small matters as college fellowships and the like), and it seems to me a great mistake to confound it with other principles of selection, with which it has in reality nothing in common.

It has nothing in common with the plan of making it a condition precedent to an appointment that an examination should be passed by way of test. Such a rule (which prevails more or less in many public departments) may or may not be of value, according to the manner of its application and the steadiness with which it is enforced; but admission by test has quite a different object from admission by competition, and must act, if at all, in quite a different way.

It has nothing in common with the mode of admission into open professions, to which I have seen it compared. Any one may be admitted to practise law, or medicine, or engineering, who can command the necessary means and can satisfy the preliminary examination, not competitive,

but simply in the nature of a test, which is required in certain cases. His ultimate success—not his first admission—is decided chiefly by competition.

The proposed scheme for the annual admission of several hundred persons to the Public Service by simple competition must, therefore, be judged of by conjecture only, not by comparison with anything in existence.

It is alleged, in the first place, that it will destroy the abuse of patronage, whereby unfit men are introduced into the Public Service; in the next place, that it will introduce into the Service the "best," that is, the "ablest" men.

On the first point there can, of course, be no doubt. The abuse of patronage would be altogether destroyed. But to what extent patronage really injures the Public Service by introducing inefficient men, is a point on which I, with a knowledge limited to my own small office, am altogether unable to pronounce an opinion.

On the second question I have, also, little doubt. I admit the force of much which I have seen urged against the system of competition; that the criterion thereby afforded is uncertain for many reasons: that youthful proficiency in answering questions is a doubtful test of solid qualities; that aptitude, readiness, a quick and powerful memory, obtain in examinations a much greater share of success than they deserve in proportion to other faculties. But after allowing due weight to these and other objections, I must suppose that, on the whole, literary competition would secure candidates possessed of a greater amount of abilities than any other scheme.

If these considerations exhausted the subject, my conclusion would be decidedly in favour of the plan proposed in your report. But I think there remains a good deal to be weighed.

It must be further inquired, whether the candidates obtained by unrestricted competition would be the best adapted to perform, continuously, the work which they would have to do, under the stimulus of the inducements which the Civil Service has to offer.

In my own department the duties imposed on clerks involve more intellectual exertion than in almost any other of that service. It is, in fact, difficult to over-rate the ability and knowledge required to perform a portion of the functions of its first-class clerks with complete effectiveness. No amount of talent, which the system of com-

petition or any other could bring into the arena, would here be thrown away.

But although this be true, it remains the fact notwithstanding, that the bulk of the labour performed, even in such a department as that to which I belong,—but how far more in the great majority of the public offices, with their enormous mass of routine work,—is of a very ordinary and mechanical character. I say this without being unmindful of the improvement already effected, and which may in my opinion be still more extended, through the scheme originally proposed by yourself, for partially relieving the "establishment," or body of clerks properly so called, in the Colonial and similar offices, of mere copying and work of that order. After all that has been or can be done, it will be found that the ordinary work to be done by clerks for many years after their admission does not require, nor reward, nor stimulate, first-rate talent. The qualities much more frequently called into action are, method, soundness rather than quickness of memory, perseverance, subordination, patience, resolution to endure the tedium of slow advance and uninteresting labour, and contentedness in the sphere of duty, whether this arises, as it often does, from high principle, or merely from conscious unfitness for more exciting and difficult employment.

Whether these qualities are very likely to be developed in men of all classes and every variety of habits and education, brought together simply by triumphant success in youthful literary competition; or, whether such men are likely to submit with ease to the drudgery of years of inferior position, with the distant prospect of having work to perform more suitable to their talents when they reach the highest rank; are questions to be decided according to the judgment we may form of human nature, rather than by any supposed experience; for no similar system, as I have said, has ever yet been tried.

But this is to be considered, as above observed, in connexion with the character of the inducement to exertion which the Public Service holds out; the amount of reward enjoyed or expected.

I cannot but believe that the public is but little aware of the real rate at which it obtains the services of the present Civil Establishment, be they well or ill performed.

In the Colonial Office there are now nineteen clerks, and it will scarcely be alleged that their functions in conducting the correspondence with forty-six colonies are of

a very light and unimportant character. It would appear, from the best comparison I can make of their present salaries, varying from 100*l.* to 1,000*l.*, that 20 years' service is the ordinary time required to attain a salary of 400*l.*

The Colonial Office is not underpaid, that I am aware of, in comparison with others; and such is the nature of the reward for which the ablest youths of the kingdom are by your scheme invited to contend. And do not let it be said in answer, that if the incomes obtained in the Church or Bar, for example, were submitted to an average, they would shew an equally unfavourable result. The reply is as old as Adam Smith: in employments which partake of the nature of a lottery, average wages are always somewhat lower, on account of the sanguine tendencies of the human mind. Besides, in all such estimates of professional gains, allowance must be made for the great number who join the Church or the Bar without the necessity of making a livelihood thereby, and from other motives. Men go into the Civil Service for a livelihood, and from no other motive. They go in to obtain a certain income, rising gradually. There is no lottery—no expectation of prizes. The scanty possibilities of what are called "staff" appointments, or removal to some other and better paid sphere of action, are, as all acquainted with the Civil Service know, hardly admissible into the calculation.

Now the ordinary answer to those who complain of the under-payment of the Civil Service—and an answer of great force—is, that instead of high prizes it offers solid advantages, in the shape of a safe, honourable, and not over-laborious life, to men who are either not of a character calculated for success in more exciting struggles, or contented with a more tranquil position.

But this answer loses all its effect, and can no longer be used, if men both qualified and ambitious (such as those who succeed in examinations) are to be exclusively invited into that service.

Nor let it be said, that if the Civil Service does hold out inferior advantages, then it will only attract (even on the principle of competition) inferior men. If this were so, the main argument of your report would fall to the ground. But it would not be so. Young men do not choose their own avocations. They are determined for them, in the great majority of cases, by the wish, or the necessity, of those on whom they depend. Parents would urge their

sons to a competition which (if successful) would relieve themselves of the necessity of supporting them through several expensive years, whatever the risk of disappointment and *tædium vitæ* which they might entail on those sons. And this would be especially the case with parents of the humbler classes, who would regard that as a high elevation, which others might possibly look down on as an inferior position for children of talent. For which reason, among others, a probable result of the change would be the general filling of the higher departments of the Civil Service from a different rank in society from that which chiefly fills them now,—a probability which many will not deprecate, but which should at all events be borne in mind, among the other considerations which this question raises.

On the whole, and speaking of my own office only and such as may be similarly circumstanced, I think I should prefer a very much modified system of competition. Our real wants, I think, would be met by leaving the patronage as it is now, in the hands of the chief of the department, if the chief himself were to use certain precautions in the admission of candidates. Instead of discouraging applications for clerkships, as he is now tempted to do, he should encourage them. He should get on his books as many creditable and well-recommended names as he could procure; and when a vacancy occurred, it should be filled by fair competition among the candidates then on his list. I think we should thus be supplied with clerks of higher average ability than those whom the present mere chance system secures us, and at the same time free from some of the disadvantages which I have intimated, and cannot but apprehend, were general and unrestricted competition the rule. And I think, were such a plan once adopted, it would not be easily departed from through mere capricious change of purpose.

But how far such a modified plan might suit the exigencies of the great body of the public service, I must confess, as before, my own incompetence to determine; or whether the offices to which I allude might not be dealt with separately. I have only to add, with reference to your report, that if any general system of examinations be adopted, either by way of competition or mere test, I fully agree in your view, that such examinations should be conducted by some extraneous and independent body, and not in the offices themselves, and in your reasons for it (p. 10.)

With regard to the system of exclusive promotion by merit, the particular regulations under which this is proposed to be effected (p. 20 of your Report) are obviously not applicable to the circumstances of a department so small in numbers as mine, and I suppose they were not so intended. But speaking generally, I am not at all sure that it is practicable. In the Colonial Office, admission to the class of senior clerks has long been and must be determined by merit alone; their duties, as I have before said, are of such an important nature that no Secretary of State would run the risk of promoting incompetent men to perform them, either through seniority or favour. But with regard to steps from one class to another below the highest, I am not sure that the rule of seniority, subject to exceptional disqualification for misconduct or incapacity, can be much improved upon. Where several men are engaged on duties of a like description, involving no great exercise or ability, it is by no means easy to place them strictly in order of merit; any attempt to do so will certainly be exposed to the charge of favouritism, which even if unmerited may be sufficient to reduce materially the value of the "moral lesson" which the system is meant to convey. If on the other hand, when men are "bracketed together as equals," to use an university expression, seniority is to decide between them, then the system will soon fall back into one in which the rule is seniority with occasional exceptions. And, lastly, if arrangement by merit could be completely carried out, the result would be the rendering a certain number of officers, perhaps "meritorious," except in respect of natural ability, hopelessly dissatisfied, and reduced to the lowest level of efficiency, from despair of promotion. I think it will generally be found that in schools and other institutions where attempts have been made to introduce in all its rigour classification by order of merit, these difficulties have sooner or later made themselves felt, and the experiment has subsided into a kind of rough practical compromise between merit and seniority; and I have noticed, in some instances, the repeated attempts, and repeated failures, of improvers, with the best intentions, in disturbing this mixed arrangement.

The Right Honourable

SIR THOMAS FRANCIS FREMANTLE, BART.,

Chairman of the Board of Customs.

November 24, 1854.

IN compliance with the desire of Her Majesty's Government, I have the honor to submit my observations on the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, on the re-organization of the Civil Service.

The Commissioners commence their remarks with the following statement:—"That the Permanent Civil Service, with all its defects, essentially contributes to the proper discharge of the functions of government, has repeatedly been admitted by those who have successively been responsible for the conduct of our affairs." Page 3.

But whilst making this admission, the Report proceeds to assume that the officers composing that service are inefficient, and that the system under which they are appointed, promoted, and regulated, is so replete with defects and abuse that a re-organization of the whole service is necessary.

With great submission, however, I feel called upon, so far as my own experience goes, to deny the accuracy of these conclusions. I believe that the clerks and officers of the Civil departments generally are faithful, diligent, and competent; that the public business of those departments is well conducted; and that their efficiency would not suffer by comparison with that of the army, the navy, or any other service in the state; or with public companies or large establishments, under the management of private individuals.

The Commissioners observe that the Civil Service does not "attract the ablest men;" but they have not drawn attention to the important fact, that the inducements held out by that service, either in present emoluments or prospective advantages, are not such as to make it the interest of the "ablest men" to devote their time and talents to it. Clever and ambitious youths prefer the chance of a more brilliant or remunerative career in the law and other professions; with second rate men the case is different, they enter the Service willingly; and inferior men, of Page 4.

course, eagerly seek for appointments. The emoluments being so low as to discourage one class, but sufficiently high to invite the other, it should not be stated to the discredit of the Service, that it is not confined to first rate men; for by Mr. Jowett, as well as all others who have offered suggestions on the selection of "Examiners," it is expressly admitted, and emphatically laid down, that unless you give good pay you cannot secure good men.

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The Commissioners go on to say, that "the comparative lightness of the work, and the certainty of provision in case of retirement owing to bodily incapacity, furnish strong inducements to the parents and friends of 'sickly youths' to endeavour to obtain for them employment in the Service of the Government." No doubt they do; but if young men of this description, who are quite unfit for the Service, are admitted under the present system, the fault rests, first, with the Officer of the Government who gives the nomination, and secondly, with the Head or Heads of the department by whom those nominations are to be confirmed or rejected.

If the Heads of departments did their duty honestly, and the regulations at present established for testing the competency and qualifications of officers and clerks were enforced, such persons would not obtain entrance, to the detriment of the public service. I am not prepared to admit that this abuse has been prevalent; but if some improper nominations have been allowed to pass, it by no means follows that it is necessary to depart altogether from the existing mode of appointment of officers, and to adopt a scheme of admission by competition. A strict form of examination more systematically carried out would effectually cure the evil.

I may, however, observe on this head, that many men who have been afflicted with lameness or other bodily infirmity, have proved themselves to be very useful clerks, and although they might not be competent for the duties of the superior offices of a department requiring physical as well as mental activity, they have performed the work assigned to them in the subordinate grades to the satisfaction of their superiors, and with general advantage to the public.

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The Commissioners further announce, that the public is "burthened first with the salaries of officers who are

"obliged to absent themselves from their duties on account of ill health, and afterwards with their pensions, when they retire, on the same plea."

My own experience does not lead me to this conclusion. So far as I am aware, officers are not allowed to receive salaries when absent on account of ill health beyond a reasonable time; nor do I trace such absences, generally, to weakness of constitution or physical defects, implying that they were unfit for the public service when first admitted. Indeed many officers are so unwilling to neglect their duties to the public, and to put their fellow clerks to inconvenience, that they frequently continue their attendance when prudence would require them to lay by and submit to medical treatment. And it must not be forgotten that the continued discharge of monotonous duties, in the same office for months and years together, has a tendency to affect the health, even of those whose strength of constitution is above the average.

In the next place, instead of the privilege of superannuation holding out an inducement to persons to retire prematurely from the Service, the tendency is quite the other way. Under the new scale, the allowances granted, subject to deductions made by the Treasury from the maximum fixed by law (the justice of which deductions no officer is willing to admit) are considered so low, as compared with the amount of salaries received, that officers postpone, as long as possible, applying for superannuation, and often consider they are harshly treated when called upon to retire on the regulated allowances. Indeed, the scale of reduced allowances often operates to the prejudice of the public service in a manner exactly the reverse of that assigned, for it too frequently happens that men worn out by long servitude, are induced, in consideration of the diminution of income they would sustain, to retain their situations when their retirement would be desirable. As to "sickly clerks," improperly admitted, they would never gain, in the department with which I am most intimately acquainted, a retired allowance at all, inasmuch as they must serve ten years before they become entitled to superannuation, and less than ten years of the hard—not the "comparatively light" work—they would have to perform, would be sufficient to compel them to retire from the Service.

The Commissioners state, as the result, "that the public Service suffers."

If that be the case, it arises, not from the causes stated, but from the want of proper regulations, firmly maintained, for the admission to particular departments of persons recommended by the Government.

But it is unnecessary to make further observations on the view taken by the Commissioners upon this part of the subject; and I trust that I shall be pardoned for having so far expressed my dissent from their general remarks on the civil servants of the Crown. As one of those servants myself, and in daily intercourse with a large number of others, I have been induced, in justice to them, to state my opinion. I, of course, unhesitatingly acquit the Commissioners of doing an intentional injustice. And so satisfied am I of the high motives by which they have been actuated, that I shall not apologize for expressing my conviction, that had their inquiries been extended to the larger of the public departments, instead of having been confined to the comparatively small in numbers, though highly important in functions, they would have found no situations so light as to render them a refuge for the indolent; few so well paid as to induce the ablest men to accept them. Indeed, many of the observations I meet with in the Report are so inapplicable to the state of things existing in the department to which I belong, as well with respect to the mode of remuneration, as to the diversified, in fact wholly dissimilar, nature of the duties into which it is necessarily subdivided (a department embracing not only extensive and peculiar classes, but taking the widest range of the merely mechanical, the physical, and purely mental) that I scarcely know how to comment upon them. I can only repeat, and I do so with the greatest sincerity, that the general censure expressed or implied by the Report is undeserved; whilst its exceptional praise falls very far short of the actual merits of the Service.

I would observe, also, that large establishments of all kinds are usually better conducted than small ones; not from greater merit in the individuals who compose them; but from the necessity of the case. A complete organization is absolutely requisite; labour must be economized—every item of expense examined—and discipline strictly enforced—or such establishments would not hold together. By no other means could the mass of current business be conducted. A few hours of general indolence or neglect would throw every thing into a state of inextricable confusion and irretrievable delay.

With these preliminary remarks, I am free to admit, that grave defects do, on the whole, exist in the state and regulations of the Civil Service; and I am ready to give my hearty concurrence in any measures suggested by the Commissioners for applying a remedy to them.

The question then arises,—What is the best remedy to be applied?

The Commissioners lay down the general principle upon which the public Service should be recruited, viz.; "By Page 9.  
" the admission into its lower ranks of a carefully-selected  
" body of young men, who should be employed from the  
" first upon work suited to their capacities and their  
" education, and should be made constantly to feel, that  
" their promotion and future prospects depend entirely  
" on the industry and ability with which they discharge  
" their duties; that, with average abilities and reasonable  
" application, they may look forward confidently to a  
" certain provision for their lives; that, with superior  
" powers, they may rationally hope to attain to the highest  
" prizes in the Service; while, if they prove decidedly  
" incompetent, or incurably indolent, they must expect to  
" be removed from it."

As a first step towards carrying that principle into effect, they propose the establishment of a proper system of examination before appointment, to be followed, as at present, by a short period of probation.

To this proposal I entertain no objection; on the contrary, I deem it most advisable that every precaution should be taken to prevent the admission of incompetent and unqualified persons to the public offices. And I know of no means better calculated to attain that object than to establish a system of examination, so that no person shall be admitted unless he has proved his general capacity and intelligence by a strict and impartial test *adapted to the wants of the several departments.*

The practice of examining clerks and others, as to their competency, previously to their admission to the Service, does exist in the civil departments of the state. The Commissioners enumerate several offices in which an examination now takes place before clerks are admitted. To that list many others might be added. Indeed, I know of no department of any size or importance in which this security is not taken.

In the department of the Customs, the regulations for examination are strictly enforced. The inquiry extends

not only to the literary qualifications of the candidate, and the amount of education which he has received, but to his age, health, and moral conduct; and this inquiry is followed by a probation, and in some cases by a regular course of instruction (according to the nature of the appointment), during the latter of which no pay is allowed to the pupil. Copies of the regulations on these points are annexed, marked A, together with others marked B, C, D, and E, with regard to conduct and promotion. I may also remark that in the Customs, the Inland Revenue, and many other departments, the rejection of the nominees of the Government, for deficiency under one or other of these heads, is by no means a matter of unusual occurrence, as might be inferred from the Report. Nor is it a fact, that in the "large departments, in which numerous candidates have to be examined, want of time prevents the superior officers from giving the subject the attention it deserves."

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It is possible, however, that, in some departments, the mode of examination may be less strict than it ought to be. In those cases, where the head of the office nominates to vacancies, it may happen that the officers charged with the examination are sometimes unwilling to reject a person named by their own superior; and that for that, and other causes, unqualified persons are admitted.

Taken, therefore, as a whole, examinations, conducted as at present, are at best uncertain—there is no uniformity in the system, and I am desirous to see it amended. If it be deemed expedient to incur the trouble and expense, a Board of Examiners, who will perform the functions proposed for them by the Commissioners, may be instituted with advantage; and if this duty be well and honestly discharged, the first great object will be secured, and ample provision made against incompetent persons being admitted to the public service. For these reasons I concur with the Commissioners in recommending the establishment of a proper system of inquiry, and that a Central Board should be constituted for conducting the preliminary examination of all candidates for the Civil Service, whom it is thought right to subject to such a test; that the Board should be composed of men holding an independent position, and capable of commanding general confidence. But whether such a Board should have at its head a Privy Councillor, and of what persons it should consist, must depend upon the extent and precise nature of the functions with which it may be entrusted.

These regulations, accompanied by proper measures for the final admission of officers, after undergoing a term of probation or instruction in the departments to which they may be sent, would, in my judgment, go very far towards remedying the existing defects in the Civil Departments arising from the appointment of incompetent persons. But the Commissioners desire to take still further securities, and are of opinion that the examination which they propose "should in all cases be a competing literary examination," coupled with a careful, previous inquiry into the age, health, and moral fitness of the candidates. Page 11.

Now, if I could believe that men better suited to the public service would be obtained by adopting this plan of competition by a literary test, I would readily recommend it. But I doubt whether such a course would supply men more fitted for their duties than those who would be appointed by the present mode, but under an efficient system of examination and rejection, the standard of qualification being raised to the point necessary to secure the requisite amount of talent and acquirements.

The only measure calculated to attract the services of first-rate men, if that were desirable, would be so to fix the amount of the emoluments of office, present and prospective, as to make it their interest to enter the Civil Service of the Crown, in preference to other professions; but if, on the other hand, the standard of examination and test of abilities were sufficient to exclude those of inferior qualifications, the object would be obtained. The firm rejection of ineligible and inefficient nominees would force the selection of none but good men.

I admit that there is much force in the observations of the Commissioners as applied to the advantage of securing the services of the most promising young men of the day for situations in the superior departments; and if they had proposed to confine this competitive examination to those offices in which higher education and talents are required for the discharge of public duties, I should have offered no objection to making experiment of such a plan, which, if it proved successful and beneficial to the service, might have been extended at a future time.

But the Commissioners, not content with providing for this extreme case, extend their proposal to all cases, and "see no other mode by which (as regards inferior no less than superior offices) the double object can be attained of selecting the fittest person and of avoiding the evils Page 11.

“ of patronage.” It becomes a question, therefore, of grave consideration whether the system of competition is calculated to provide a better and more useful class of officers for the subordinate departments of Government than the present system, with the security, always, of a preliminary examination by an independent Board, and subsequent probation. Seeing, then, that the proposal includes appointments to all the situations in the large and important department with which I am connected, I feel it my duty—having been called upon by the Government to state my views of the general principles of the Report of the Commissioners—to express the doubts which I entertain of the wisdom of that proposal.

I offer no objection to the practicability of conducting an examination of this character. With the unlimited means at the disposal of Government, a sufficient number of able men may, doubtless, be found who will go through the form of examination, and place in a certain order, with reference to marks and questions, any number of candidates; but, this being done, I hesitate to say that such persons when admitted to office will be better servants to the public in the departments of the Civil Service generally, than those obtained by a less theoretical and elaborate process.

In dealing with this part of the subject, I would confine my observations more particularly to the Revenue Departments with which I am best acquainted, and which, constituting as they do more than one-half of the whole Civil Service of the state, contain the largest number of clerks and officers who perform duties of a character not requiring intellectual attainments of the highest order. It is proper, however, at the same time to remark, that many of the situations in those departments afford scope for the exercise of very considerable ability; and that that ability is frequently, though unostentatiously, displayed in matters of great importance.

There are in the Customs (excluding the Coast Guard) nearly 3,000 established Officers in the subordinate grades of Weigher, Tidewaiter, Boatman, Messenger, and Watchman. Such persons, in common with all others, as previously stated, are required, on appointment to office, to produce certificates of character, showing the course of life they have led, and satisfactory proof of their age; they are also subjected to an examination in reading, writing, and the first four rules of arithmetic. (See paper A.) The

duties of these situations are, for the most part, as their designations imply, either mechanical or physically laborious only; and I am satisfied that the persons admitted to them are neither incompetent, nor below the duties they have to perform, whether as respects character or general qualifications. Indeed, under the existing system, too many instances occur of men who have accepted the office of Weigher or Tidewaiter, whose station in life and previous education fitted them for superior situations, and who have consequently found it very irksome to be employed daily in the laborious routine of out-door duty, weighing heavy goods, or watching the deck of a vessel, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and compelled to pass day and night on board ship. The literary acquirements of such persons are thrown away and they become dissatisfied with their position. Now, if all appointments to these offices were made by competition and literary test, we should have, I fear, many such persons admitted to the establishment, and injury and detriment, instead of benefit to the service, would be the result.

I do not mean that the possession of literary or mathematical knowledge would, in these cases, be in itself a disqualification, but if it produced disaffection, it would certainly be so. Such acquirements are the evidence of superior education and station in life, and would lead us rather to discourage their possessors from undertaking laborious offices, for which they were not adapted by previous habits. The qualities absolutely required are physical strength, sound health, honesty, and sobriety, and a docile and contented disposition, with only so much education as will suffice for keeping tallies and books of the simplest character. It is obvious that a youth, even of the middle classes of society, who has passed his time at school, and been chiefly employed in the cultivation of the mind, would not be so efficient in such a capacity as a hardy mariner, or labourer, accustomed to bodily exertion from his youth.

Without, however, pressing this argument beyond its proper limits, I may at least conclude that for the offices above enumerated, it is not necessary to have recourse to competition and literary test to provide men to fill them. Indeed, the more rational conclusion would be, that as robust health, hardihood, bodily activity, and good moral character are the qualifications chiefly required for officers in these grades, it would be proper to select them by



competition in those respects, rather than by a literary test. If the Commissioners are prepared to take these requirements, which are in fact the primary and most essential, "upon the testimony of those to whom the "candidate is well known," deeming it necessary to ascertain by comparative examination who are the "best "qualified," it would seem most superfluous to make their selection or rejection depend on a comparison of their literary qualifications, which are not required in the discharge of their ordinary duties, and are therefore of secondary moment.

The next class in order are the subordinate clerks. And of these many are undoubtedly placed in branches of the Department, in which they may be called upon, within a few years of their appointments, to undertake duties requiring talent and intelligence above the average. Such, for example, as the Secretary's office in the Customs. To fill these vacancies a competing literary examination, open to all candidates, might not be objectionable, but in practice, it is by no means necessary; for, under the present system, no deficiency exists of persons fully qualified for the performance of the superior duties of the respective branches. In fact, by the regulations at present in force, vacancies in the junior clerkships in the Secretary's office are now filled up by the selection of young men from any other clerical branches of the department, either in London or at the outports. An examination takes place of all candidates who may be desirous of competing, and the clerk best qualified is recommended to the Treasury for the vacant situation; but this, though a competitive examination, is not decided by answers to questions alone. The candidates being already in the service, their characters and acquirements are well known, and the Commissioners have no difficulty in selecting, not only the candidate whose answers exhibit the greatest amount of literary talent, as well as of official knowledge, but who is the fittest for the duties, with reference to his known character and previous services. But in this, almost the only case of open competition, the low rate of salary, viz., 80% per annum, tends to counteract the object of the regulation. The prize is scarcely worth having when obtained.

The great majority of the subordinate Clerks (of whom the number in the Customs is between 1,400 and 1,500) are employed in offices of pay and receipt,—record of goods—account and audit. Many are engaged in copying

and keeping registers and books of reference. To fill these situations, no university education, no first-rate talent is required. The work upon which they are employed on their first admission is entirely of a routine character. Their duties subsequently become more important, requiring great care and diligence in their discharge, and strict integrity, but, though responsible, they are not such as to call forth talents of a superior order.

The highest posts in these offices are few, and those few by no means highly rewarded; and it is manifest—the total number of Clerks being very considerable—that the proportion who can hope to attain these posts is exceedingly small. The majority are left to pass through the respective classes of their various branches without special notice or distinction, and conclude a laborious official life without having been required to exhibit any qualities beyond those of industry and integrity. Surely there can be no advantage in seeking to fill such clerkships as these with young men of talents and ambition, or of superior literary attainments, nor in inviting them, by competition, to come into a service which can neither reward them for success nor compensate them for the chances of failure. The performance of routine duties, after the lapse of one or two years, could not fail to "exercise a depressing Page 6.  
"influence upon them;" the work "would become distasteful;" the clerks discontented and seeking to obtain promotion or removal to better situations, and on failure of such promotion (there being, in fact, no offices to which they could be removed), they would be finally induced to retire from the public service with mortification and disappointment.

I would, therefore, submit, in regard to offices which are either entirely offices of account or in which a large portion of account and audit business is combined with the executive functions of the department, that the appointment to clerkships should be made subject only to an examination calculated to test the intelligence of the candidates, their acquaintance with arithmetic and the principles of book-keeping, and other general information and education to a prescribed extent. No advantage can, in my opinion, be gained by making that examination a competing one.

But the Commissioners recommend the indiscriminate adoption of the principle of competition in the selection of all officers of the Civil Service, "not merely to secure the

“appointment of the fittest persons, but to avoid the evils of patronage.” The question of patronage is so intimately connected with political considerations that I should be disposed, in the position in which I am placed, to decline making any reference to it in this paper, but I cannot, in deference to the order I have received, avoid, whilst stating my opinion on the general principles of the Report of the Commissioners, making some observations upon this part of the subject.

That Government patronage has been abused, and that such abuse has led to the appointment of unfit and incompetent persons to the public service, I am ready to admit. But if patronage can be guarded from abuse by regulations which will prevent bad appointments, I am not prepared to recommend its discontinuance in the selection of officers to the Civil Service. I am free to confess that I can see no reason why the Crown should be deprived of the grace and influence which belong to the nomination of its own officers, provided such nominations are controlled by an efficient examination and probation, before the persons nominated are confirmed in the appointments. This privilege of nomination exists without complaint in the military and naval branches of the state; public institutions and joint-stock companies, bankers, merchants, and private persons retain it. There is, doubtless, one exception, viz., the mode of appointing a certain class of the civil servants of the East India Company, under the recent Act of Parliament; but I would submit that the case of those officers is essentially different from that of the ordinary civil servants of the Crown in this country. Young men sent out to India, as writers, are required to have a knowledge of several native languages. Soon after their arrival in India, they are appointed to responsible offices, detached to some distant province, and thrown entirely on their own resources, and they are called upon subsequently to act for the benefit of the Company, as judges, ambassadors, finance ministers, and governors of extensive districts. Few, if any, of these men are required to perform any routine duties, as clerks and copyists, without prospect of advancement. There is therefore good reason for selecting, with the greatest care, the most talented and promising young men who may present themselves for examination for service in India, and the salary and emoluments held out to them are sufficient, I should suppose, to attract candidates of superior attainments.

There is another point to which I would draw particular attention. It frequently happens that special services are rendered to the Crown by individuals not, themselves, in the public employ. It is proper that some reward should be bestowed for those services, and instances are not unfrequent of the appointment of the son or other relative of such persons to office. Who would wish to deprive the Crown of the opportunity of rewarding distinguished service, or exemplary conduct, provided it can be done without admitting an incompetent officer? And who has so good a claim to a public appointment; who is so likely to prove a valuable public servant, as the son of one who has recommended himself by some creditable action or line of conduct?

But there is another class of persons who have a strong claim on the country, and whose interests would be seriously affected by the introduction of a system of close competition in the appointment of Civil Servants—I mean the Civil Servants themselves.

I have maintained, that these persons as a body, are faithful and diligent, and that they perform their duties efficiently; many of them with exemplary zeal. I believe, that as a whole, they are inadequately remunerated for their services. They are compelled to contribute to a Superannuation Fund—at the rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  or 5 per cent. on their salaries—but if they continue to serve till death, they receive no benefit from that fund, and, being unable to make provision for their families, frequently leave them in a destitute condition. Their entire devotion to the duties of office, and their very moderate incomes, prevent them from making or keeping up friendships: and from political connexion, those who serve in the Revenue departments are entirely debarred, by the stern regulations of the Service. To whom, then, can the public Servant look, but to the Government which he serves, for any assistance he may require? And how can such assistance be better bestowed than by the appointment of his son to a post in the public Service? How more gracefully and agreeably than by giving him a Clerkship in the very office in which his father served with diligence and fidelity, and who, perhaps, sacrificed his health and life by his devotion to his duties?

Take the case of any meritorious officer in the service, who has several sons, for whom he can obtain no employment without laying himself under obligations inconsistent

with his position, but who, perhaps, would have experienced no such difficulty in providing for his family, had he devoted himself to some other pursuit; he knows no influential friend, except the head of his department; he possesses claims on no one, save the Government which he serves. Surely it is but just that that Government should have the means of making provision for the son of such an officer, by giving him a nomination to the Civil Service, provided he can pass the prescribed examination, and is equal to the duties. *Cæteris paribus*, such a youth has a better claim than a stranger to any benefit which the public Service can bestow:—and the recognition of the father's merits holds out to others the strongest inducement to good conduct and a zealous discharge of duty.

I rejoice to say, that at no time during my connexion with public affairs, have claims of this nature been more fully recognized than at present. The Government has exercised great liberality, and evinced the kindest consideration, by the frequent nomination of the sons of deserving officers, whether those now in the Service, or those who have lost their lives by their devotion to it. That liberality is gratefully acknowledged by the Service generally, whilst great encouragement has been given to exertion, and the best effects produced by selections so reasonable and judicious. And I do no more than an act of justice, in declaring that the sons of civil servants, from their early habits and training, not only prove to be of an average utility, but that some of them, by their talents and application, have risen to the highest offices, several of which they are at present filling with credit to themselves and the greatest advantage to the public.

If, however, the principle of appointment by competition and literary test is to be fully adopted, the Government will be deprived of this the most legitimate and beneficial mode of rewarding their deserving officers. It may be suggested that pecuniary recompense should be resorted to as a substitute; but I not only entertain an opinion that such a proceeding would be less acceptable to the recipients, but I have some misgiving as to the result in other respects. There are always difficulties in the way of the bestowal of grants of the public money, but no such difficulties arise when the gift can be conferred without loss to the giver. In the Bank of England the practice of appointing the sons of clerks to offices on the

establishment is, I believe, systematically carried out, and it is attended with a two-fold effect; it stimulates to exertion those who are in the service; and it holds out an example and inducement to those who are desirous of entering it. Indeed I am so impressed with the justice as well as policy of this mode of rewarding the really meritorious of our public servants, that I should gladly see it extended and become a recognized system; and the very liberal notions now entertained by the Government with respect to the relinquishment of patronage, induce me to submit for consideration whether a certain proportion of vacancies throughout the several grades of the Civil Service should not be set aside for the purpose suggested. As will be seen by the paper marked E, the Government, with the view of exciting a spirit of emulation, have already given up some of the most valuable appointments at their disposal.

If the plan of competition proposed by the Commissioners would certainly secure the best officers for the public service, I should recommend its adoption, irrespective of the considerations I have mentioned or any others; but if doubts exist on this point (and many very experienced persons closely connected with the Civil Service have expressed such doubts) I submit that the right of selection should remain with the Crown and its responsible ministers, accompanied by such regulations for the admission of nominees as will effectually provide against abuse, and with equal certainty open the door wider to young men of superior qualifications.

In order, however, to take further security against a careless or improper use of patronage in respect of the superior departments of the state, it might be prudent to adopt a modified system of competition, under which a selection might be made, by examination, of the most talented candidates.

The Commissioners propose "that examinations should Page 12.  
 " be held at stated times; that an average having been  
 " taken of the number of situations of the class con-  
 " tended for, which periodically fall vacant, it should be  
 " announced before the commencement of each trial, how  
 " many gentlemen were to be elected for admission to  
 " the public service on that occasion." Having in this  
 manner ascertained the number to be admitted, I would  
 then propose that candidates to the extent of three or  
 four times that number should be put in nomination by

those who are to exercise the privilege, and that a selection should be made, from among the persons who pass the best examination, of the requisite number, to be sent as probationers to the vacant offices requiring to be filled up.

The nominations of these candidates might be made, in fixed proportions, by the Heads of offices who now possess the right of filling up vacancies in their own departments, and who should be required to state their belief that the persons whom they recommend are qualified by character, conduct, and abilities, for the superior posts in the Civil Service; such nominations to be accompanied with certificates of good conduct and moral qualifications from the friends and instructors of the candidates.

Such a plan would effectually secure a wide field of competition for those situations which seem most to require it, with ample security for character and respectability; whilst the selection of its own officers would virtually remain with the Crown and its responsible ministers. If the experiment, thus limited in the first instance to the superior offices, prove successful; and if in the result the officers so selected are not only talented but steady; regular in their habits; docile and contented with their work; and assisting by their moral acquirements to improve the character and efficiency of the service, the principle may easily be extended. If, on the other hand, the persons appointed under these regulations are above their work; without habits of business; unwilling to discharge the uninteresting and routine duties of their offices; dissatisfied with their position and seeking to quit the service in order to embark in more lucrative employments; the step may be retraced, and the vacancies supplied by those who come up to the test which it may be thought fit to establish without reference to comparative merit.

The next subject of importance referred to in the Report, and it is a perfectly distinct one, is that of promotion; and I agree with the Commissioners that in order further to improve the efficiency of the public departments, the promotion of officers on the principle of selection should be extended.

Promotion, by merit alone, has on several occasions been enjoined on public Boards by the Lords of the Treasury; and in theory, all heads of departments possess the

right to make selection of the best qualified officer in every case of advancement; but in practice, it has been found difficult to carry out this principle to its full extent. For although it is undoubtedly the custom in the public departments generally to fill, by the selection of the most competent, all vacancies which occur in the superior offices requiring the exercise of talent and experience; yet, in the more common cases of promotion from class to class, where the duties performed are generally the same, it is usual to advance the senior, if his character is unexceptionable, and he is recommended by the head of his branch as fully competent.

These transfers may, in fact, be considered more as machinery for granting increased emolument for continued service (particularly in those offices where no periodical increase of salary is allowed), than as promotions, in the strict meaning of the term; and I doubt whether it would be attended with beneficial results, if, in such cases, deserving persons of ordinary ability, who perform their duty well, were passed over by younger and more talented men, who, by greater activity, might bring themselves more prominently under the notice of their superiors. In all cases of advancement from class to class certificates of good behaviour and qualification are required; and those who are found to be deficient in the requisite attainments, or irregular in conduct, are passed over, and the next deserving man in the class is promoted.

The practice, however, of promoting by seniority from class to class, may in some cases be productive of injustice to individuals and inconvenience to the service; and I am inclined to recommend that regulations be made for restricting it within narrower limits. There will always prevail a disposition to promote by seniority rather than by selection. It relieves the promoter from much embarrassment and responsibility. Men who have talents and energy are generally supposed to be well able to take care of themselves; whilst sympathy is always excited for those who are to be passed over, especially where their deficiencies involve no moral imputation. Whatever theory may be laid down, this natural feeling will always have a great effect. Its influence should not, however, be allowed to blind the judgment of those upon whom the responsible duty of recommending or confirming promotions devolves; an act of kindness towards one becomes, in such

cases, injustice to another, and establishes a precedent injurious to the whole department.

But, although I am of opinion that in the particular cases to which I have referred, seniority constitutes a *prima facie* claim, it should not be admitted on the bare efficiency of the party to perform the duties that may be more immediately required of him; but it should be satisfactorily ascertained that he would be also competent to fulfil any others which, in the event of the illness or absence of his superior, or other emergencies, would devolve upon him as a necessary consequence of his position. If he is not so qualified, another who possesses the requisite qualifications should be preferred to him; for if it be otherwise, when, in the ordinary course of official business, the emergency arises, the junior will be called upon to discharge the duty, and be thus placed in authority over his senior officer. To avoid this anomaly, the question of promotion should be at once decided by superior competency.

With the reservation, then, of offices, the duties of which are of routine character, I consider that promotion by merit should be the rule of the Service; but I cannot recommend its indiscriminate adoption, far less that the very best man who can be found, without reference to his position, should in all cases be selected. The effects of such a practice would be to pass by, unrewarded, the continued good services of a large proportion of very deserving officers, who are exerting themselves to the utmost in the discharge of their duties; to foment discontent and jealousy; and to encourage complaints of favoritism and undue preference against the Heads of the office, or the superiors of the particular departments under whose advice they may be supposed to be acting, in the promotion of the inferior officers. But I can add nothing to the forcible observations made on this point by the Commissioners, who are fully aware of the difficulties that would attend any attempt to regulate the advancement of all the clerks and officers throughout a large establishment, solely on the principle of promotion by merit. I therefore concur with them, that it ought to be a leading object with the Government so to regulate that principle as to provide every possible security against its abuse; and I see no objection to the regulations which they suggest for this purpose.

It has long been the practice in the Customs, to require the chief officers of each branch to make a report in writing, to the Board of Commissioners, as to the character and qualifications of the officers coming forward for promotion, and to name the persons whom they consider most competent and deserving. It is also usual, in the more important cases, to summon the Surveyors-General and Inspectors-General to the Board Room, and take their opinion separately on the subject. And, as a further security against improper selections, the Board is required to transmit a formal report to the Lords of the Treasury, stating all the circumstances, and requesting their Lordships' confirmation of the appointment. This latter course is not, however, taken in cases of advancement of clerks and officers in their respective classes. It would cause unnecessary trouble and expense in so large a department as the Customs, to report in every case; but the circumstances of all promotions stand recorded in the official books, and may be referred to in the event of any complaint or inquiry being made into the matter.

My observations have run to so great a length that I abstain from adverting to many other proposals made by the Commissioners, as I cannot venture to hope that my opinions will assist the Government in coming to a decision on this subject. If my views are correct, some of those experienced persons whose opinions have been sought by the Treasury, will, I doubt not, have already brought them forward; if my views are unsound they will be quickly put aside. Indeed, I would willingly, for these and other reasons, have declined to offer any observations on the subject, but I could not disobey the directions of the Government, still less could I allow it to be supposed that I did not feel a warm interest in the welfare of the Civil Service of the country; and I must conclude by saying, that I shall be ready at all times to use my best endeavours to give practical effect to those measures for the improvement of the public service which the Government may finally determine to adopt.

APPENDIX.

(A.)

By the Customs Consolidation Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 107, sect. 1, the appointment of persons for the management and collection of the Customs is vested in the Lords of the Treasury, who also fix the salaries and allowances to be assigned to the several situations. This having been done, the performance of all duties connected with the department is placed, by the same Act, under the control of the Commissioners, to whom authority is given to require such security from the officers, for their good conduct, as they shall deem necessary. The Commissioners are also specifically empowered by their Letters Patent from the Queen, to "suspend, remove, and displace" any person under their control, when "necessary or expedient."

Qualifications,  
 &c.  
 Preliminary  
 Inquiries.  
 G. O. 14 April  
 1853. No. 21.

Qualifications, Instruction, and Admission.

THE following are the rules to be observed on the appointment of persons to the service of the Customs:—

1. Persons nominated to out-door offices,\* and to the situations of Housekeeper, Doorkeeper, Messenger, and Watchman, must have completed twenty-one years of age, and persons nominated to clerkships must have completed sixteen years of age, before they can be admitted to the establishment; and no persons will be admitted thereto, who may have attained the age of thirty years before the date of their nomination, except Housekeepers, Doorkeepers, and Messengers, who will be admitted up to the age of thirty-five years.

2. They must be free from debt, healthy and active, and without any bodily infirmity.

3. Persons nominated to be Searchers, Landing Waiters, Coast Officers, or Gaugers, and to clerkships, must be fully acquainted with the principal rules of arithmetic, and the first four rules of decimal and vulgar fractions; and be able to write a good clear hand, and write fluently from dictation without errors of orthography.

Housekeepers, Doorkeepers, Messengers, Tidewaiters, Boatmen, Weighers, and Watchmen, must be able to read and write, and be acquainted with the first four rules of arithmetic.

4. Upon their nomination, they will be required to produce certificates of character, shewing the course of life they have led, and a certificate of baptism, or other satisfactory proof of their age; and they will be subjected to an examination as to their

\* Including Mariners in the Quarantine service. (T. O. 27 Oct. 1848).

qualifications as provided in rule 3. If upon this examination there should appear to be reasonable ground to believe that they will be in every respect qualified for the situations to which they have been nominated, after undergoing instruction or a probation, they will be placed under instruction or on probation, as follows, viz.:—

Qualifications,  
 &c.

SEARCHERS, LANDING-WAITERS, and GAUGERS, under a course of instruction for three months, without pay.

Instructions.

COAST OFFICERS.—Do. for six weeks, without pay.

CLERKS will be placed on duty on probation for three months; and if at the expiration of that period they shall be certified to be duly qualified, and shall have performed the duty of Clerks during that time, they will be admitted to office, and take rank, and be paid the salaries of their situations from the date of their commencing probation.

HOUSEKEEPERS, DOORKEEPERS, MESSENGERS, TIDEWAITERS, BOATMEN, WEIGHERS, and WATCHMEN, will be placed on duty on probation for a month, and will, in like manner, be allowed the pay of the office to which they have been nominated.

Disqualifica-  
 tion.

—: but in cases where persons are found not to be qualified at the expiration of the period of their instruction or probation, their nominations will be cancelled, and the salary of the office will in no instance be paid to them for the period during which they have been on probation; but should their conduct have been in all respects satisfactory, the Board will consider whether half the usual pay should not be allowed.

5. No person will be admitted to the service who shall have been guilty of an offence against the revenue laws, or who shall have been dismissed from any department of the public service.

6. Persons nominated as Extra-clerks must be eighteen and under forty years of age; they must produce certificates of age and character; and will be subject to examination in writing and arithmetic; and should it appear from such examination that they will be qualified after a probation, they will be placed on duty for a month; if not qualified at the end of that time, their appointments will be cancelled, and in that case they will not be paid the usual allowance for the time they were on probation; but should their conduct have been in all respects satisfactory, the Board will consider whether half the pay of an Extra-clerk should not be allowed.

Age and quali-  
 fication of ex-  
 tra-clerks.

7. The preliminary examination of persons appointed to offices in London, to be conducted as follows:—

Examiners in  
 London.

Persons nominated to Clerkships, or to be Housekeeper or Doorkeeper: } To be examined by a Clerk in the Secretary's office, selected for that purpose.

Persons nominated to be Searchers, Landing Waiters, and Gaugers: } To be examined by the Surveyors General.

Qualifications,  
&c.

Persons nominated to be }  
Weighers or Messengers : } To be examined by the Land-  
ing Surveyors.  
Persons nominated to be }  
Tidewaiters, Boatmen, } To be examined by the In-  
and Watchmen : } spectors of the River.

At Out-ports.

—: the preliminary examination at the out-ports to be by the Collectors and Controllers, (and the Inspector-General, when persons are appointed to out-door offices at Liverpool,) the persons nominated being also subjected, under the direction of the Collector and Controller, to such further examination as may be advisable, by the Landing Surveyor, Inspector of the River, or Tide Surveyor at the port; and in all cases the principal officers are to satisfy themselves, as far as practicable, that the parties are proper persons to be admitted into the service, and to state their own opinion as to the age of the parties, when reporting to the Board the result of their preliminary inquiries, in cases where they have reason to believe that the parties are either over or under the ages specified in rules 1 and 6. Should a party nominated have been previously employed in the public service, a certificate, from the heads of the department in which he has served, is to be produced and forwarded to the Board.

G. O. 2 April  
1836. No. 34.

Instructions  
and probation  
not intended  
to supply want  
of elementary  
education.  
G. O. 23 Nov.  
1841.

8. It is to be distinctly understood, that the above inquiries are preliminary, and have for their object, to ascertain whether (amongst other requisite qualifications) the party has been sufficiently instructed in the ordinary elements of education, to warrant his being placed under probation; and that the purpose of such probation is not to supply any deficiency or want of acquirement in spelling, writing, or arithmetic, but by actual trial in the business of the department to which he may be nominated, to test his fitness, previous to admission, for the due and efficient performance of the several duties which may be required of him.

Certificate of  
qualification.  
G. O. 13 April  
1836.

9. When a party shall have obtained a certificate or qualification from the officers under whom he has been instructed, he is to be finally examined by the Surveyors General in London, or the Collector and Controller at an out-port, as the case may be; and the report of such officers, with the papers showing the instruction and examination which the party shall have undergone, are to be submitted to the Board for their directions; and should it at any time be found that a certificate of qualification has been improperly or negligently granted, the certifying officers will be answerable for it as a serious offence.

Instruction on  
promotion.  
G. O. 13 April  
1826.

10. With regard to persons already in the service, who may be promoted to other offices, the Board will determine whether any, and if so what, instruction may be required, and will give such directions as may be necessary in each case.

(B.)

Attendance.

Attendance.

With the view of ensuring the punctual attendance of officers and clerks the following regulations are to be observed, viz. :—

Regulations to  
ensure punc-  
tuality.

1. An appearance sheet is to be kept in the custody of the Principal officer of each department; to be produced for the signature of the several officers and clerks at the appointed hour of arrival, to be then withdrawn, and again produced at the appointed hour of departure for the entry of their initials, which entry is not to be deferred until the following morning; and the Principal of each office is to affix his initials at the foot of the columns for arrival and departure, as well as against any special entry made by him therein; the Principals of departments are also, if they quit before the legal hour, to note the fact in the column of "observations."

G. O. 23 June  
1836.  
London.

Appearance  
sheets to be  
kept, and how  
to be signed.  
M. 17 March  
1843.  
M. 21 Dec.  
1844.

2. In the event of the absence of any officer or clerk at the hour of arrival or departure, or during the official hours of attendance, the same is to be noted by the Principal in red ink, in the proper column, with an explanation of the cause, together with the exact time at which the party appeared after the appointed hour of arrival, or the time at which his absence commenced and terminated during the official hours. In cases where the absence of the party may continue from a period preceding the Monday in any week, the date when such absence commenced is to be always stated; and when the absence has taken place by leave, the termination of the leave is also to be stated.

All absences  
to be noted.  
G. O. 23 June  
1836.

3. The following fines are to be strictly levied for non-attendance (except in the cases hereafter mentioned).

Scale of fines  
for non-attend-  
ance.  
G. O. 23 June  
1836.

	For absence at the appointed hour of arrival or departure, or during the hours of attendance.			For absence during the whole day.		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Where the annual official income of the party shall not exceed - -	100	-	2 0	0	4	0
Exceeding 100l. and not exceeding -	150	-	2 6	0	5	0
"    150    "    "    -	200	-	3 0	0	6	0
"    200    "    "    -	300	-	4 0	0	8	0
"    300    "    "    -	400	-	5 0	0	10	0
"    400    "    "    -	500	-	7 6	0	15	0
"    500    "    "    -	-	-	10 0	1	0	0

4. The only cases of exemption from fine shall be those of absence by leave or sickness duly authenticated by medical certificate or otherwise.

Exemption  
from fines.

5. All officers and clerks who may be prevented from attending their duty by sickness or other unavoidable cause, are to signify the same by a written communication to the Principals of their

Written com-  
munications  
required for  
non-attendance.

Attendance.

respective departments, specifying their residence and the nature of the illness or other circumstances by which their absence is occasioned, and taking care that such communication be forwarded in sufficient time to be received at the proper hour of arrival. And the Principals of the several departments, under the supervision of the Inspectors General of the waterside and warehousing branches are to make the like communication to those officers. No verbal message is to be received in excuse for non-attendance unless under very special circumstances which may render a compliance with the regulations impracticable, and such cases must be submitted to the Board for their direction.

M. 21 Dec.  
1844.

Principals to state if explanation be satisfactory.

G. O. 23 June  
1836.

Account of fines.

G. O. 5 May

1854. No. 59.

How to be disposed of.

G. O. 26 May  
1842.

Non-payment to be reported.

G. O. 22 April  
1846. No. 42.

And salary stopped.

G. O. 23 June  
1836.

Payment of fines not to excuse irregular attendance.

Appearance sheets to be laid before the Board weekly. At out-ports.

Out-port fines, how to be disposed of.

G. O. 10 June  
1843. No. 66.

31 May 1844.  
No. 54.

28 May 1847,  
No. 81, and

5 May 1854.  
No. 59.

6. The Principals of departments are in all cases to note against the names of the officers in the appearance sheet whether the explanation offered, and the medical certificate (if any) be satisfactory, and if not, they are to proceed at once to impose the fines.

7. The fines are to be received by the Principal in the department to which the officer may belong, and entered in a book kept for that purpose; the amount to be paid at the end of each quarter to the Receiver General; and an account (whether nil or otherwise) of fines imposed, rendered by the Heads of departments to the Receiver and Controller General on the last day of the 3rd, 6th, 9th, and 12th months in each year.

8. The amount of fines so levied to remain deposited with the Receiver General, for the disposal of the Board, in benevolent grants, to the widows and children of officers who may die in the service, or in such other cases of great distress as may be brought under the Board's notice.

9. Any instance of an officer or clerk failing to pay the amount of fines levied on him, within the time prescribed, is to be reported to the Board.

10. And no salary or other allowance is to be paid to any such officer or clerk until the fines incurred by him in the preceding quarter shall have been fully paid.

11. It is to be distinctly understood that notwithstanding the payment of fines a failure in regular and punctual attendance will also be visited by such censure or punishment as the nature of the case may deserve.

12. The several appearance sheets to be laid before the Board on the Monday next after the expiration of each week.

13. Similar regulations are to be observed at the out-ports in regard to the attendance of the officers and clerks, and (as far as the same are applicable) to the mode of keeping the appearance books, which are to be inspected weekly by the Collector and Controller.

14. The fines levied at the out-ports are to be disposed of in benevolent grants in like manner as in London, and remitted for that purpose by the Collectors and Controllers at the close of each half year, viz.: the 5th January and 5th July, to the Receiver General; the Controller General being apprised of each remittance according to form prescribed: and the money is to be applied to the general fund.

(C.)

Conduct.

1. There is no part of the duty of the Principals of departments in London, and Collectors and Controllers at the out-ports, of more importance than a frequent personal supervision of the conduct of all the officers and clerks under their inspection; the Board, therefore, rely upon their zeal and discretion in taking every necessary means for ascertaining not merely the official conduct and character, but the habits and pursuits of every individual over whom they exercise control; and whilst they are impartially to bring under the notice of the Board those who merit approbation, they are also to represent the conduct of others who deserve punishment; specially referring to any circumstances which may affect their integrity or respectability. To promote these objects the following regulations are to be observed, viz.:

2. A return of the ages and capacities of all the officers and clerks in the service is to be laid before the Board for each year ending, and immediately after, the 5th of January.

3. The return is to show, not only the date of each officer's appointment to the office he holds, but also the date of his original appointment in the service and of his appointment to any and every office he may have held between his original appointment and that which he may fill at the period of the account, so as to show his total length of service, together with the particulars of any allowances received by him in addition to his established salary; and in the event of the removal of an officer, from one port to another, the Collector and Controller of the port, to which the officer is removed, are to be furnished with the same particulars up to the period of his removal.

4. It is also to contain a detailed and impartial statement of the capacity and general character and conduct of each officer and clerk; and the manner in which they have performed their duty; and to point out those who have distinguished themselves by superior zeal, ability, and attention; and those, on the other hand, who may either from incapacity or misconduct have been remiss or inefficient.

5. The return is to be made in London by the Principal of each department, and at the out-ports by the Collector and Controller personally; but at those ports where the office of Controller is united with an out-door office, the Collector is to make, in addition, a separate report as to the conduct, character, &c., of the former officer; and a copy of the general return is to be preserved in a book in the immediate custody of the respective Collectors and Controllers, which will be called for and examined by any member of the Board, or any Surveyor General who may visit the port, in order that the fidelity thereof may be ascertained by personal examination of the officers themselves, and of their books and accounts.

6. The heads of departments in London, and the Collectors and Controllers at the out-ports, are to state also at the foot of the

Conduct.

Supervision by Principals.  
G. O. 18 July  
1823.  
G. O. 8 Aug.  
1828.  
G. O. 14 March  
1836.  
Characters.

Annual return of ages and capacities.  
G. O. 20 May  
1834.

To show dates of appointments and length of services.  
G. O. 2 Jan.  
1824.  
G. O. 19 Dec.  
1838.

Official capacity and conduct.  
G. O. 31 March  
1813.  
G. O. 18 July  
1823.

Return, by whom to be made.  
G. O. 25 June  
1847, No. 89.  
Copy to be kept.  
G. O. 18 July  
1823.

Fines imposed to be stated.  
G. O. 23 June  
1836.



*Conduct.* return the names of the officers who have failed to give due attendance, and the amount of fines imposed during the year.

7. The return is to be forwarded from the out-ports, direct to the Board.

How forwarded from out-ports. G. O. 28 Dec. 1836.

## (D.)

*Promotion.*

*Promotion.* Private applications interdicted.

G. O. 28 May 1825, 27 May 1826, and 23 Jan. 1847, No. 10.

1. The Chairman states to the Board, that since his appointment he has received numerous applications from noblemen and gentlemen soliciting the promotion of officers and clerks in the service; and it appears that other members of the Board have frequently received similar applications.

There can be no doubt that in most, if not in all, of these cases, the applications have been made at the instance of the respective officers and clerks in direct contravention of their instructions and the Board's General Orders upon the subject.

The Board are determined that promotion in the department shall be governed solely by good conduct, efficiency, and length of service, and that they will not allow their recommendations to the Treasury to be influenced in any degree by any applications or representations which may be made to them by persons unconnected with the department. Such applications are therefore not only irregular and in violation of the recorded orders and regulations of the service, but useless for their object; they tend also to embarrass the discretion of the Board, inasmuch as in any case in which an officer would be entitled to promotion on his own merits, application made in his favour by influential persons affords ground for suspicion that the selection of the officer has been influenced in some degree by private considerations, and that without the exercise of such interest, the claims of the officer would have been passed over; a suspicion which, however unjust and unfounded it may be, cannot fail to weaken, in the minds of the officers of the department, that confidence in the justice and fair dealing of the Board, which the Commissioners are most desirous to possess. The Commissioners will at all times be ready to receive and take into consideration representations from officers in the department addressed to the Board officially; but they think it right to apprise the officers and clerks throughout the service, once more, and in the most formal manner, that private applications from officers themselves, or from other persons on their behalf, addressed to individual members of the Board, are expressly interdicted; and that the same will not only have the effect of retarding the promotion of the parties, but subject them to the Board's severe displeasure.

The Board have further to acquaint the officers that they will consider any private application for promotion to have emanated from the party in whose behalf the same shall be made; and he will be held answerable for a breach of this regulation, unless he can satisfy the Board that he had no knowledge thereof, directly or indirectly.

2. In submitting the names of officers and clerks for promotion, it is the duty of the Principals to bring prominently under the notice of the Board all the circumstances affecting the character and conduct of the parties, whether such circumstances are recorded in the return of ages and capacities or not; and it is to be understood throughout the service, that any transaction of a discreditable nature, pecuniary embarrassment, neglect of duty, or other misconduct, will be held by the Board sufficient to justify them in withholding promotion from officers or clerks, even in the lower grades of the service, in which promotion has usually proceeded by seniority; unless it shall appear that the parties have, by continued good conduct and increased zeal and activity in the discharge of their duties, subsequently entitled themselves to favourable consideration.

*Promotion.* Misconduct, bar to promotion. G. O. 30 July 1846, No. 82.

## (E.)

3. The Lords of the Treasury, at the suggestion of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Customs' inquiry, authorize the promotion to the office of Landing Waiter of officers from the classes of Tide Surveyor and Superintending Locker; and at ports where no such situation as Superintending Locker exists, from the class of Lockers. To carry this measure into effect, two-fifths of the vacancies of Landing Waiters will be set apart, viz.:

*Promotion of Tide Surveyors and Lockers to office of Landing Waiter.* T. O. 6 Dec. and G. O. 31 Dec. 1853, No. 123.

Two in every five vacancies in London,

Two in every five vacancies in Liverpool, and

Two in every five at the other ports of the United Kingdom jointly:—

the selection of the officers to be left at the discretion and responsibility of the Board; who, provided they can find suitable and deserving persons capable of filling the higher position, are to promote them accordingly, giving the benefit of advancement to Landing Waiters from a minor to a superior port when practicable. In giving effect to this measure, the Lords of the Treasury regard the same as an experiment, the results of which, whether beneficial or otherwise, must be tested by subsequent experience; and they are of opinion that, by throwing open the appointment to the office of Landing Waiter, in the proportion mentioned, ample opportunities will be afforded for testing the operation of the system, and for rewarding those officers who, on account of peculiar qualifications and extraordinary merit, may be selected as worthy of the distinction.\*

And Landing Waiters from a minor to a larger port.

\* Vacancies of junior clerkships in the Secretary's office are supplied by selection of the most competent clerks from other branches of the service in London and the out-ports.—M. 5 Sept. 1849.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE H. U. ADDINGTON,

Late Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

*London, November 28, 1854.*

In the letter which you addressed to me on the 14th of June last you informed me that Her Majesty's Government desired to have my assistance in framing measures for the improvement of the Civil Service; and that you were directed to request that I would state my views of the general principles of the Report on the Civil Service drawn up by Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself, which had been laid before Parliament; and that I would also state whether I considered the existing arrangements for making first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and, if any, to what improvements.

I have accordingly read the Report with great attention, and, agreeably to the desire of Her Majesty's Government, I proceed, with some diffidence, to submit for their consideration the following observations relative to the points on which my opinion is called for. I must, however, premise that I am unable to form a correct opinion of the "general principles" of the Report without first sifting the grounds on which those general principles are based, in order to judge for myself how far those grounds are sound. I will also at once say that I do not profess to speak with any confidence on the merits or requirements of departments with the detailed organization and conduct of which I have but a general acquaintance. Such are the departments of the Customs, Excise, and others of a similar class. And with regard to those of the higher class, such as the Home and Colonial Offices, Treasury, Board of Trade, &c., I judge them by their analogy to the Foreign Office, with which I was so long personally connected.

In the Report to which my attention is called it is, I perceive, assumed that the present organization and conduct of the Civil Service is notoriously and radically defective; that the mode of appointing to situations in the various departments is vicious both in principle and practice, and requires fundamental revision; that the present system of promotion is equally faulty; that a large proportion of those who enter the Civil Service enter it from low motives, and not from a love of the

service, nor with a view of endeavouring to raise themselves to eminence in it; that they are generally men of inferior ability and energy, and not unfrequently infirm in mind and body; and that, consequently, the public service suffers both in internal efficiency and in public estimation. This sweeping assumption is fortified by a discouraging picture which is drawn of the entrance into, and progress through, the Government Departments of young men who are admitted into the Civil Service. And after some observations on what is termed the "fragmentary" character of the Civil Service as compared with the Naval, Military, and other Services, certain remedial measures for the correction of these evils are proposed. Those measures may be described in general terms, as,—

1st. The establishment of a proper system of examination, namely, a "competing" examination, to which should be subjected all candidates for the Civil Service before their appointment.

2dly. A fixed term of probation before the final admission of candidates.

3dly. The establishment of a Central Board of Examiners, to which should be committed the duty of examining all candidates whatever for the Civil Service.

4thly. The transfer from the Heads of departments to the Central Board of Examiners of the power of appointing to situations in the Civil Service.

From these remedial measures are, I apprehend, to be gathered the "general principles" on which my views are required.

Now, in considering this comprehensive matter I ask myself, first, what is meant by the term "Civil Service" as employed in the Report. The higher and the lower, the intellectual and the mechanical, departments are equally branches of the Civil Service. The Foreign Office and the Excise Office, for instance, are equally component parts of the Civil Service; and yet they are so totally dissimilar in all essential points that the same rules touching qualifications, and consequently touching examinations, cannot possibly apply to both. I am therefore quite at a loss to conceive how the various and heterogeneous classes of the Civil Service can well be included in one general category and scheme of treatment; and it seems consequently to me that at the very outset the reasoning and observations employed in the Report are, in this essential point, based in error, since, according to my

conception, the term "Civil Service" is but a term popularly used for general convenience, but that it represents a thing heterogeneous in its nature, and, as such, requiring in its practical treatment the application of separate rules and principles suitable to its separate parts.

I ask myself, secondly, whether the statements of defects alleged in the Report against the so-termed Civil Service are accurate.

And, thirdly, I ask myself whether the remedies proposed are practically fitting and likely to produce good results.

I do not hesitate to say at once that I cannot but regard the statements of defects presented in the Report as very much overcharged, and that I entertain great doubts as to the practical fitness of most of the remedies proposed.

I fully admit the existence of partial blots in several of the Government Departments, and I have no reason to doubt that even in the best offices there is room for amendment; but having myself been for twelve years personally connected with the Foreign Office, and having seen day after day an incredible amount of work done in that Office with a degree of dispatch and accuracy not easily to be surpassed; having also witnessed in the same office a demeanour and a spirit of which it would be difficult to speak too highly, it is impossible for me to conceive that a system of Civil Service can be flagrantly and fundamentally bad under which such an office has grown up and such working power is daily exhibited. For in the organization of the Foreign Office there is no peculiar feature to distinguish it from the other Offices of State of the higher class. The clerks have always been appointed by the Head of the Department; there has been no examination, "competing" or simple, either prior to admission or to subsequent promotion; neither has there been any fixed period of probation. Furthermore, there has been no distinction between intellectual clerks and manual clerks, a distinction impossible in the Foreign Office, where the business is of so confidential a nature, and is indiscriminately confided to all the clerks alike. Every clerk has, on the contrary, entered as a mere copying clerk, and has worked his way upwards, *improving and educating himself as he went on from one stage to another*; and the result is an office of unsurpassed, if not of unequalled, working power and good conduct.

I do not mean to affirm that no defect exists in this office; on the contrary, I am conscious that there are points in it which are susceptible of amendment. But I confidently maintain that the general scheme of the office, judged by its works, must be, and is, good; and that the system under which such an office has been formed cannot well be radically bad.

I am therefore induced to ask why, when you have an office of proved merit, you cannot take that office, *in all its good points*, as a model, and, so far as may be suitable, assimilate others to it, instead of assuming the general demerit of the whole existing system of the Civil Service—the Foreign Office included—and substituting for the scheme hitherto acted upon a theoretic scheme of an entirely different, not to say subversive, character.

Proportion the number of hands to the work in each department so as to keep, so far as possible, all the clerks in each department in full, but not immoderate, daily employment; and establish, where it does not already exist, a proper subordination of the juniors to their respective senior clerks, making at the same time the seniors responsible to a due extent for the conduct of their respective juniors, and it will, I suspect, be found that the correction of misbehaviour in offices will have already been to a great degree attained, without resorting to the doubtful expedient of discipline records and day books.

I conscientiously believe, that by applying a very moderate amount of correction here and there to departments *in which defects are found to exist*, at least as much good work may be obtained under the present system from those employed in the Civil Service,—I speak of the higher departments,—as from any Civil Servants in the world; and, moreover, as much as can justly be expected by the Government or public from its Civil Servants. But we must not expect too much, and we must especially remember that a Civil Servant has his rights and his feelings as well as his duties; and this is a point of which, at the present day, we are a little apt to lose sight. I hope I may be pardoned this digression.

But to return to the Report. It is therein alleged that the motives which at present induce young men to enter the Civil Service are low; and also that the advantages which are held out to them under the existing system are not sufficient to stimulate them to exertion, or to entice into the Civil Service men of eminent talent and high mental culture.

Now, to look at this matter with a cold practical eye, discarding all imaginative theory, and rejecting as equally unworthy and unfounded all sweeping assumptions of corruption on the part of Heads of Departments, parents, and candidates, it is, I apprehend, a mistake to expect that under any circumstances first-rate talent and cultivation will ever be brought to look with favour on a necessarily dry and plodding description of service like the Civil Service, even in its highest departments, where the scale of compensation is at the outset low, the labour dull and unattractive, and the progress upwards tedious. The remoter prospects also, although sure, are yet far from brilliant.

Genius and intellectual culture will naturally seek the professions in which they may have a chance of working out their own fortune, and in which if, on the one hand, the exertion and the hazard are great, the prizes are, on the other hand, vast and dazzling. A first-class Oxford man, or a senior wrangler, would throw himself with ardour into the Law or the Church, but he would scarcely think of soliciting a clerkship at 100*l.* a year in a Secretary of State's Department as a fitting start in life.

It is, in fact, to the general nature of the Civil Service rather than to the defects of any special system that the little ardour of intellectual aspirants should be ascribed. And whatever amendments might be introduced into it, the nature of the service would remain essentially the same; and every candidate must still begin with the beginning, which is, and must be, mainly mechanical.

But it is suggested in the Report that the standard of the Civil Service may be so raised by means of "competing" examinations, probation, a systematic scheme of transfer from one department to another, and the general opening of high posts to merit, as to hold out to its candidates prizes which may compete with those offered by any other profession.

I assume, of course, that by the term "Civil Service," as used in the Report with reference to this branch of the subject, must be meant the Civil Service in its higher departments, since it cannot be intended to maintain that in the lower departments a superior degree of literary or scientific attainment can be required.

Now, to view this part of the subject also with a practical eye, it appears to me that the scale of intellectual cultivation and power which is assumed in the Report as

needed in the Civil Service is greatly overrated, and also that by over estimating the requirements of the Civil Service we shall be liable to contract unnecessarily and injuriously the circle of candidates.

However paradoxical, or perhaps even grovelling, such an opinion may appear, I apprehend that, excepting in the Heads, or the highest officers, of departments, no transcendent degree of talent, or of literary or scientific cultivation, will be found necessary to fit a man for performing properly the duties assigned to him. I do not say that a Civil Servant is better without eminent talent or cultivation, but simply that, without either the one or the other, a man may be, and many a man is, a most meritorious and excellent Civil Servant.

What, let us ask, constitutes a first-rate clerk in a Government Department of the highest class? Assuming general intelligence and average education, a first-rate clerk becomes so by practice *in the office in which he serves*. Industry, accuracy, trained memory, and judgment, coupled with that independence of character which rejects the puerilities of routine while it admits its solid advantages, will necessarily constitute a good clerk, although genius and high scholastic attainment may be absent. A good Departmental Clerk is, in fact, mainly an aggregation of cumulative daily experience and tradition, combined with that readiness of mind and pen which practice gives, and which enables a man to come to the assistance of his superiors at the right moment and in the right manner. But it is the dry and hard discipline and drudgery of the desk which, however wearisome they may have been, have mainly contributed to lay the foundation of those qualities which in after years shine forth so eminently in the accomplished Departmental Clerk, and which render him one of the most useful and valuable members of the body politic.

But it by no means follows that a first-rate clerk, however excellent as such, should be, although he certainly *may* be, fit to fill a post of high command himself. Still less does it follow that, although eminent in his own department, he should be equally eminent in another. The local knowledge and experience would be wanting, and the transfer might, therefore, be rather injurious than beneficial to the public service.

Different acquirements are needed in different, and even in cognate, offices, although certain standard every-day

qualifications are equally required in all. The Home, the Foreign, and the Colonial, Offices, for instance, although in many respects similar, require nevertheless, in several essential points, very different qualifications; and I doubt whether a transfer could be made without serious inconvenience from even one of these offices to the other.

Speaking from my own personal experience, I should say that the frequent shifting of the clerks from even one division of an office to another, however good in theory, much deranges the rapid and correct dispatch of business. The transferred clerk is unacquainted with the local business in which he finds himself suddenly engaged; and the Senior Clerk, or his first assistant, has, in addition to his own already severe labour, the further trouble of teaching and directing the new-comer. I found, in fact, that the system of transfer *would not work*—to use a Foreign Office expression—and after a sufficient trial, I was obliged to give it up. If, then, the limited transfer of clerks in the same office is, as I have found it, undesirable, I am led to believe that, *à fortiori*, the systematic transfer of clerks from the Government Department to another would not answer in practice.

Far, however, be it from me to discourage the employment or the promotion of men of talent, wherever they may be found. There are undoubtedly men of such superior qualities and attainments as to be fit, intellectually, for any situation to which they might be called. But such men are few; and, moreover, it must be remembered that intellectual ability is worth comparatively little in the sedentary and laborious Civil Service, unless it be coupled with industry and accuracy; and that in the more elevated posts the additional qualities of sound judgment and discretion, self-command, firmness, and courtesy of manner, are equally needed with intellectual superiority.

I now come to the remedial measures proposed in the Report, as correctives of the alleged defects in the Civil Service. And first, with regard to the proposed scheme of "competing" examinations.

I have never yet seen any practical plan of general examination for Civil Service candidates sketched out in a feasible shape; nor can I, by the light, such as it is, of my own unassisted intellect, shape to myself such a plan. I am therefore unable to seize the full scope of the object intended in the Report. Examination, if practicable, would be *pro tanto* useful, as shewing the extent of capacity and attainment of the examinee. But no examina-

tion could test his moral qualities. Even, however, if some general scheme of examination were found to be practicable, I entertain great doubts whether the examination ought to be one of competition.

"Competition" presents a brilliant idea, and seems *primâ facie* to promise bright results. But having in view the peculiar nature and wants of the Civil Service, will those results turn out solid and beneficial? Competition tends, without doubt, to bring out readiness of intellect; and it must be admitted that men of high mental powers usually possess such readiness. But how often is the same readiness possessed by men of inferior mental powers? And how often, *per contra*, are men of sound sense, good acquirements, industry, and integrity, deficient in a greater or less degree, either in quickness of intellect, or in readiness of speech.

In schools, competition is eminently useful; for while the faculties are flexible and the temper ardent, competition creates the mental activity which may be wanting, and the boy who has been jostled to-day in the race by a school-fellow of readier wit may, to-morrow, under the stimulus of emulation, come up with his competitor and recover his lost ground. But that which rouses the boy in his strife of the hour tends to depress and discourage the grown man in the struggle which is to determine his position in life; and the hard-working but less brilliant candidate for a clerkship, being conscious of his comparative slowness of mind *or tongue*, would be discouraged and rendered still less capable at the thought of a contest with readier competitors. And there would be a constant risk of sacrificing the more sterling to the more superficial candidate; and yet application and steadiness of conduct and mind are among the most valuable qualities to be sought for in an office clerk.

If examinations, therefore, be resorted to, I should be led to advocate the *Detur digno* in preference to the *Detur digniori* principle.

I entertain, however, a strong conviction that a simple system of probation, *if inflexibly carried out*, and coupled with the rigorous exaction of sufficient certificates or proofs of good conduct and scholastic proficiency on the part of every candidate for the Civil Service—which certificates might be varied according to the requirements of each Department—would be found sufficient, without any examination at all, to answer every useful purpose. Such

a scheme would also have the advantage of great economy, as well as of great simplicity in the application, for, in the first place, it would supersede the necessity of paid examiners, whether general or separate; and, secondly, it would be equally applicable to all offices and to all candidates, of whatever grade. It might, moreover, be applied to promotions, as well as to final admissions of candidates.

I will, with permission, sketch such a plan of probation as I think might be found to work well in practice. It is but the expansion of the plan of probation suggested in the Report.

1. No candidate should be admitted to probation except between the ages of 18 and 21, at which the scholastic education may be considered as sufficiently completed.

2. No candidate should be finally admitted into *any* office except after a year's probation; and every candidate should be required to produce a certificate (or letter) shewing that he has been educated at a college, or school of good repute, and that, while there, his conduct was good, and his proficiency satisfactory in the branches of knowledge taught thereat. (The scale of knowledge to be varied according to circumstances.)

Before the close of the year's probation the Chief Clerk (or other officer of equivalent station) should be required to present to the permanent Under Secretary of State (or second Officer of the Department) a written report of the probationer's conduct and capacity, founded on information obtained from the Senior Clerk under whom the probationer had been placed; and the permanent Under Secretary of State should be bound to submit that report to the Secretary of State or Head of the Department, accompanied by such observations, favourable or otherwise, as the case might warrant; and upon such report the Head of the Department would decide on the final admission or rejection of the candidate.

3. A sum sufficient for the reasonable expenses of the probationer should be allowed him during his year's probation (say 50*l.* to 80*l.*, *pro re rata*); and, if he be finally admitted, that year should count for a regular year of service.

4. From the period of final admission to that of the approaching promotion into the class of Senior Clerks (or of Assistant Senior Clerks, if at any time that valuable class were admitted as a separate class), no further probation or examination would, in my opinion, be necessary; nor

do I think that any day book or conduct book, shewing the daily behaviour of the clerks, would be desirable, even if practicable, at least in any of the higher Departments. Gentlemen, whether by birth or education, should be won, not coerced, into good behaviour. Each clerk may very well be left to work his way freely onwards under the hourly observation of his colleagues and of his superiors; practice will gradually form him to business, and self-interest, if not right feeling, will probably lead him to educate himself, so as to fit him, when his turn comes, for entering on the duties of the higher stations in the Department.

But, as an extra stimulus to his exertions, it would be well that at every stage of promotion from class to class the names of the three clerks next in order of seniority for promotion should be submitted by the Chief Clerk, accompanied by observations, to the permanent Under Secretary of State, and by him, accompanied also by observations, to the Head of the Department. And the Head of the Department would, thus informed, appoint or reject the senior candidate for promotion. The principles of seniority and of merit would thus be fairly balanced.

In the case of promotion, however, to a senior clerkship (or equivalent station), as no shadow of doubt ought to exist as to the entire fitness of so important an officer, a year's probation alone would, I think, satisfactorily test that point. Such a probation ought therefore to be rigorously enforced; and if, at the end of the year, the probationer were not found thoroughly fit in every essential point, he ought to be inflexibly rejected for the time being, and another candidate put on probation in his place.

Without going into further detail, it appears to me that such a scheme as is thus described would at least be worthy of a trial. If, as I confidently anticipate, it were found to succeed, the complicated and expensive process of examination, whether general or special, might be dispensed with; if otherwise, examination might still be resorted to. Under any circumstances I hold probation, prior to admission, to be absolutely indispensable. In this point, therefore, I go entirely along with the Report.

Having thus ventured freely to express my opinion on the inexpediency of examinations of candidates for the Civil Service, I may abstain from entering in detail on

the question of the Central Board of General Examiners, which in the Report it is proposed to establish; I will merely say that even were such a scheme of central examination practicable, which I greatly doubt, I think it would be inexpedient, since, in my conception, it would be preferable to leave to each Department the examination of its own candidates, as each Department must be better able to judge of its own wants than any Central Board, however constituted. And I should also be apprehensive that an external Board would be too liable to be guided rather by some general theory than by a proper appreciation of the individual requirements of the several Departments of the Civil Service. My own personal experience of the honour and rectitude of Departmental Public Servants forbids me to harbour for a moment a doubt of the conscientiousness with which they would discharge the duties of examiners if intrusted to them.

But it is proposed in the Report that the Central Board of Examiners should not act as such only, but that the power of appointing to situations in the Civil Service, which from time immemorial has resided in the several Heads of Departments, should be withdrawn from them and made over to the Central Board; and not only that, but it is further suggested that the recommendation to superannuation allowances as well as to good service pensions and honorary distinctions might also, under certain conditions, be beneficially placed in the hands of the Central Board.

This would indeed be the very essence of centralization.

This scheme professes to have for its object to put a stop to the assumed evils and abuses of official patronage. But I would ask, with deference, whether those evils and abuses are not very much over-rated in the Report, and, even if not, whether the proposed arrangement is likely to put a stop to them.

I fear that the tendency to favouritism, and what is vulgarly termed "jobbing," must be looked upon as inherent in every system of Government; as, in truth, the ineradicable vice of all Governments: and that, if the former is the blot of despotic, the latter is the blot of constitutional, Governments. "Jobbing" is a part, though an ugly part, of the price which a free people pay for their constitutional liberty. So long as there are parliamentary constituents they will ask favours of Members of Parliament, and Members of Parliament of Ministers; and

Ministers will, on their part, have a tendency to satisfy such solicitants if in their power. But it is not that a "job" is always, or even generally, intended as such; on the contrary, in the majority of cases, the perpetration of a "job," or, in other words, the granting of a favour, is merely a mode of escape from a difficulty. A Member of Parliament is pressed by a constituent to get a place in a Government Office for a relation or a friend, and the Member of Parliament, in order to escape from a difficulty, applies to the (politically) friendly Head of some Department to assist him in satisfying his constituent. The Head of Department, on his part, wishing to gratify a parliamentary supporter, accedes, perhaps, to the request, and, possibly without sufficient consideration, appoints the candidate to the place requested. He thus, on his part, escapes also from a difficulty.

I apprehend that such a case has occurred, in his time, to the purest patriot among members of Parliament, and to the most virtuous of Ministers. But is there any deadly sin in such a proceeding? Is the conduct of such a Member of Parliament, or of such a Minister, to be held up to public reprobation as if they had committed a heinous crime? Or is the whole system under which such a lapsus can take place to be looked upon as a common nuisance, utterly vicious and abominable, and calling for root and branch extirpation? Surely such a conclusion is quite unphilosophical, not to say puerile; and, in my opinion, instead of exaggerating the evil, and proposing, as the only corrective, to upset the whole scheme of Government appointments which has prevailed from remote times, it would be better to devise some feasible mode of sheltering both Members of Parliament and heads of Departments from the almost irresistible attacks of constituents and supporters with which they often unwillingly, and from necessity, comply.

Such a shelter against the importunity of solicitants would, I conceive, not be in any way afforded by the proposed transfer of appointments from the Heads of Departments to the Central Board of Examiners; for a Central Board, or its President, is equally open, with a Minister of State, to external influences; and the same storm of importunity would assail the one as the other.

I do not believe, therefore, that any benefit whatever would result to the public from the proposed transfer, while, on the other hand, I am satisfied that in addition to

the injury to be apprehended from the sweeping subversion, on theoretic grounds, of a system of appointments nationalized by time and custom, serious evils would accrue to each Department from the inevitable diminution of influence and authority which would result to its Head by the withdrawal from him of the power of appointing to the clerkships and other subordinate officers in his Department. The eyes of all those employed in Government Departments ought always to be turned towards the Head, and not towards any external authority, as the fountain of favour and power.

The remedy, however, which is desired against the evils resulting from the importunity of solicitants, and the too great facility of Heads of Departments may, I apprehend, be found in the rigorous application of the system of probation, of which the germ is contained in the Report, and which is further developed in this paper.

The tendency to importunity and to abuse of patronage would doubtless still continue; but the one would be indirectly diminished and the other effectually defeated, by the bar thus placed in the way of indiscriminate appointment of unknown and untried Candidates for the Civil Service. And if, contrary to expectation, the scheme of probation were found, after a fair trial, insufficient of itself, it might be strengthened by a well-devised plan of Departmental examination.

I have thus, in conformity with the call made upon me on the part of Her Majesty's Government, stated my views on the principles and points on which they were required. I regret that, with the exception of the scheme of probation, I should have been unable to concur in the general principles and views set forth in the Report, or in the conclusions therein arrived at.

I am very far from insisting on the superior soundness of my own opinions; but, having been called upon for a statement of them, I have thought it my duty to make that statement without reserve, as I hope I have made it without presumption.

As the Civil Service is alone treated of in the Report I have accordingly confined my observations to that Branch of the Public Service.

BENJAMIN HAWES, Esq.,

Deputy Secretary at War.

*December, 1854.*

Your letter of the 14th informs me, that it is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that I should state my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir Stafford Northcote and yourself on the organization of the permanent Civil Service, which has been laid before Parliament; and that I should also state whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and, if any, what improvements. I beg, therefore, that you will do me the favour to submit the following observations for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I should have abstained from all reference to the very unfavourable, not to say injurious view, which is taken, in the opening passages of the Report, of the existing Civil Service; but that it appears to me to be the explanation of the principal recommendations now made for its reform and amendment.

If the Civil Service really deserved the character there given, then indeed severe and active measures could not be too quickly adopted and applied, totally to alter its constitution and condition.

My own knowledge and experience, however, of the Civil Service, such as it is, would not lead me to concur in the conclusion arrived at—viz., "that the public service suffers both in internal efficiency and public estimation," in consequence of the existing system of appointment to offices in public departments. And though it is admitted that there are "numerous honourable exceptions," and that "the trustworthiness of the entire body is unimpeached," I must nevertheless demur to the general character of the Service which is given in the Report. Indeed, if such were the state of the Civil Service, such its inefficiency, and consequently its reputation in public estimation, it is not consistent with what is previously stated, that "the government of the country could not be carried on without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers, occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the ministers, who are directly



“ responsible to the Crown and to Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, character, ability, and experience, to be able to advise, assist, and, to some extent, influence those who are from time to time set over them;” and “ that the permanent Civil Service, with all its defects, essentially contributes to the proper discharge of the functions of government, has been repeatedly admitted by those who have successively been responsible for the conduct of our affairs.”

It is not, however, with a view to criticise, or in any spirit of mere controversy, that I notice this portion of the Report; but simply because I think its most prominent recommendation is in a great degree founded upon too exclusively observing the effects of the existing system of patronage, upon departments more immediately in connexion with and under the control of the Treasury; and that hence arises the principal recommendation, viz., that the patronage hitherto exercised must be abolished; and that future appointments to the Civil Service should be exclusively made through the instrumentality of a central board of examiners, as the only mode “ by which (in the case of inferior, no less than of superior officers) the double object can be attained of selecting the fittest person, and of avoiding the evils of patronage.”

It is possible that the evil of patronage, as it has hitherto been exercised, may have been felt more in some departments than in others; that the pressure of political or parliamentary interest may have pressed upon them injuriously. But if this be the case, which I infer from the report, I am not satisfied that the remedy proposed is either the best, or the only mode of redressing the evils complained of.

Before, however, so extensive and novel, and in some respects so objectionable, a recommendation as I shall endeavour to show, was made, it would have been more satisfactory to have examined and compared the existing system of patronage, unchecked and uncontrolled as it is, and against which the measures recommended in the report are mainly directed, with the system recently adopted and successfully acted upon in some departments, and which the report proposes to extend to all—viz., preliminary examination, and a period of probation, before an appointment is made permanent. If, upon a careful consideration of the two plans, both had been shown to be incapable of amendment, and equally deficient

in the means of providing for the appointment of competent men to the public service, then perhaps the experiment of a central board of examiners might be justified. And, had this been clearly shown, I should, however reluctantly, have yielded to the establishment of such a body, rather than make no attempt to improve the present system.

But I am strongly of opinion, that the more recent system to which I have referred has worked well; and that it may be both improved and extended with advantage. Nor can any reasonable doubt be entertained, that it may be made perfectly effective to secure the appointment of well educated and competent civil servants, without being open to the objections that may be urged against a central board; which would be a peculiarly irresponsible body from the very nature of its duties, and would become, with its staff of officers and subordinates, and its proposed circuits of examination in the country, an unnecessarily expensive one.

This, however, is the principal recommendation of the Report, and is considered the only mode of effectually carrying its main object into practice—viz., a perfectly impartial, efficient, and independent examination of candidates for public employment.

From this recommendation I am compelled, after much consideration, to dissent.

The powers proposed to be given to this Board of presenting lists of qualified candidates to the heads of public departments, from which they are to fill up the vacancies in their offices, or of recommending “ particular men to particular departments,” though subject to a discretion on the part of the heads of departments to accept them or not, are, I think, open to objection. Such a board, if formed at all, should, in my opinion, be perfectly passive, and its powers should be strictly limited to granting certificates of sufficiency of education and ability to the candidate nominated for the office actually vacant.

I should, therefore, reverse the recommendation of the report, and confine the duty of Examiners to determining who is not to be admitted to the public service, not who is to be employed; in fact, to putting simply a negative upon the appointment of incompetent candidates. Patronage, thus guarded, would at least be free from the objections taken to it in the report, whilst the public would obtain a security that it could only be exercised in favour of those whose character, education, and ability entitled

them to public employment. The first nomination of candidates I should, therefore, still leave to the heads of departments, who have better means of ascertaining the true character of the individual nominated than a public board.

This part of the scheme, too, appears imperfect; and its consequences do not seem to have been fully considered. If this required proof, it is only necessary to turn to that portion of the report which relates to the proposed examination of candidates, and their ultimate distribution amongst public offices.

For instance, neither the numbers to be examined, nor the probable number of vacancies to be annually filled, are even conjectured.

But if a board is to be appointed, some idea should be formed of the probable amount of labour and the nature of the duty to be cast upon it. It is said that there are 16,000 appointments which might come under the consideration of the board in the course of time. Of this number, probably three-fourths, or more, are appointments requiring but a very limited amount of education, and into the qualifications of candidates for which it would hardly appear necessary that a board should be employed to examine. How far the annual vacancies in the remaining fourth would justify the formation of, or give occupation to, a board, I have no means of forming an opinion.

The mode of distributing the successful candidates amongst the offices to which appointments are to be made, is left for consideration; but in the words of the Report, "there will be no difficulty in it which may not be easily overcome." It appears to me, however, to be one which is greatly underrated; and the several suggestions made with a view to meet, as it would seem, various anticipated objections, strengthen this opinion. For instance, it is suggested that the heads of offices might select clerks from lists sent them by the board of examiners; or the board might recommend "particular men to particular departments;" or "the choice might be given to the candidates themselves," under restrictions. And again, if "more have been elected than there is immediate demand for, they should be sent as supernumerary clerks to the offices in which the work happens to be the heaviest," or "they might wait to take their turn;" and, if there should be found too many candidates who had passed their examination on the lists of the board,

then the number of applicants for examination is to be proportionately diminished.

None of these suggestions are free from serious objections.

The candidate who may have prepared himself for examination, and devoted much time to the purpose, and even have incurred no inconsiderable expense, would, under this plan, never be certain of obtaining the employment he seeks, even if he pass his examination. His previous studies, tastes, connexions, may peculiarly qualify him for a particular branch of the public service; and yet, though he may have obtained his certificate from the board with credit, he may find himself possibly allotted to the Inland Revenue or Customs Department, instead of the Foreign or Colonial Office, for either of which he might be better qualified. Again, others may offer themselves for examination, and find it unavoidably postponed *sine die*, till the list of supernumeraries has been exhausted.

Further, the examiners, according to the plan proposed, have duties imposed upon them which may impair their usefulness, and lead to their impartiality being doubted.

They ought, in my opinion, to have no interest whatever in the future destination or employment of the candidates. Once allow a board to exercise patronage, which practically this board would exercise on an enormous scale; make it a part of its duty to prepare lists, to recommend individuals to particular offices, and to "prevent any from choosing offices for which" in the opinion of the Board "their peculiar education had not fitted them:" and the usual consequences of such extensive powers may be predicted, when they are entrusted to a public board,—suspicion, distrust, discredit, and consequently ultimate failure.

I quite concur in the opinion that the examiner should be independent of the office—that is, that he should not be a member of it—and should have no other duty in connexion with it than that of examining the candidates, and granting or withholding the certificates of qualification; but I think notwithstanding, that the nomination of the examiner should be entrusted to the heads of departments. In many, probably in most departments, his duties would be extremely light, and his services would be only occasionally required.

But being specially appointed, he would soon acquire a knowledge of the peculiar duties and requirements of the

office of which he was the appointed examiner; and as a candidate should, in my opinion, be required to pass two examinations—the first simply to qualify him for admission to an office, and the second, after a year's probation, to qualify him for a permanent appointment—a departmental Examiner would have the means of testing both the intellectual powers of a candidate, and his general character in the office during the probationary year; and his decision would be governed not only by superiority of ability and extent of education, but by the evidence before him of that combination of qualities which gives the best ground to expect that the probationer would make a useful and efficient clerk.

Something more than a high standard of education and varied information is needed in a junior clerk, and that is,

“Sense,  
Good sense, which only is the gift of Heaven;  
And though no science, is fairly worth the seven;”

and no readiness in answering questions in history, jurisprudence, and political economy,” &c., can compensate for its absence.

Upon the general qualifications of a probationer, a departmental examiner would have ample means of obtaining the best information. A precis of papers relating to a case more or less complicated, would not only test the acuteness of a candidate, but also his knowledge of office regulations and precedents, and the justice of their application to the case before him; and the examiner could ascertain the value of such a precis by immediate and personal communication with the heads of the department.

Whilst these are some of the objections which strike me to this part of the scheme proposed for the organization of the permanent Civil Service, I readily acknowledge the value of the general principle laid down in the report, “that the public service should be carried on by the admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected body of young men, who should be employed from the first upon work suited to their capacities and their education, and should be made constantly to feel that their promotion and future prospects depend entirely on the industry and ability with which they discharge their duties; that with average abilities and reasonable application, they may look forward confidently to a certain provision for their lives; that with superior powers they may rationally hope to attain to the highest prizes in the

“service; while if they prove decidedly incompetent, or incurably indolent, they must expect to be removed from it.” To the principle thus stated, few, I apprehend, will be found to object; and for my own part, I consider the practical adoption of it likely to benefit the public service, as well as the individuals engaged in it.

There are likewise many of the recommendations of the Report which are well deserving of consideration, and are founded alike on experience and large and liberal views of what is fairly due to the Civil Service, and I should regret to find them fruitless.

Whilst, therefore, objecting to the principal part of the scheme proposed, acknowledging at the same time the soundness of the principle on which it rests, and in order that it may not be said that I take upon myself only the comparatively easy and invidious task of objecting to what is proposed, whilst I abstain from proposing anything myself, and thus escape the criticism which I have taken the liberty freely to exercise upon the recommendations of others, I now venture to submit, with all due deference, my own suggestions for the improvement of the Civil Service.

It is of great importance to increase the efficiency of the Civil Service as far as possible, and to secure promotion as the reward of industry, ability, and well ascertained and known official merit. Upon these two points there ought to be no doubt or insecurity in the mind of the humblest member of the service.

First, then, as regards efficiency:—

If the appointment to offices under the Government remains in the hands in which by time and long usage it has been placed, and in which I think it may best and most safely be allowed to remain, I think the public has a right to know that the patronage thus exercised by responsible public officers is well and truly exercised for the public benefit alone.

It would be sufficient for this purpose, if after nomination for a particular office, every candidate, before he was allowed to enter upon his duties, were subjected to a preliminary literary examination. That examination, in my opinion, would be most advantageously conducted under the authority and by the direction of the head of the department to which the candidate was nominated. The Examiner should be publicly nominated for this duty, and should not be a member of the depart-

ment. A curriculum explanatory of the nature and extent of the examination the candidate would have to undergo, but not containing the questions he would have to answer, should be given to every candidate. The Examiner should acquaint himself generally with the duties and requirements of a clerk in the particular department the candidate was about to enter, should examine him as to his educational sufficiency for the duties of that department, and according to the qualifications required, grant or withhold his certificate, and report the result to the head of the department. If the candidate fail to obtain a certificate, the nomination would of course revert to the head of the office.

As I consider competing examinations far the most effectual mode of testing the knowledge and ability of candidates, it would be desirable that two or more should always be nominated for each vacancy as it occurs.

I have no apprehension of the departmental examination proving less efficient than examinations conducted by a Board.

My opinion is, from their being more special and less uniform and formal, they would be, if not more severe, more effective and useful.

That departmental examinations may be perfectly effective and thoroughly impartial, I know from my experience in the War Office, where an examination preliminary to appointment has been introduced, and where competing examinations have been successfully conducted by an Examiner, not being a member of the Office, and nominated by the Secretary-at-War.

It does not appear to me, if this rule were made universal, that there would be any necessity for any general nomination of Examiners. The public nomination of an Examiner by the head of a department is all that is required, and it can scarcely be doubted that the services of competent and independent Examiners could readily be obtained. Another reason which weighs with me in favour of departmental examination is, that the final admission into a department ought not to take place upon passing the first examination.

The Report contemplates a continuance of the system of a year's probation, and therefore under the plan proposed, until the expiration of that time, the confirmation of the candidate in his appointment must necessarily be uncertain.

In the papers relating to the examination of candidates

for places in the War Office, which I annex, it is prescribed that a second examination should be undergone, strictly upon subjects within the range of the business of the department only.

This second examination ought to be considered, as it is really, the more important of the two. By that time the moral as well as the intellectual qualities of the probationer are in a great degree known; and such an examination can only be conducted by parties thoroughly conversant with the business of the office, and within the office in conjunction with the departmental Examiner.

Such a plan has, at least, the advantage of bringing before an Examiner all the elements of a sound decision; whilst the intellectual or educational test merely, in the first instance, upon which the authors of the report rely, affords no guarantee whatever that the certificated candidate will make an efficient clerk.

The qualities required to insure this object are as much moral as intellectual. It is for this reason, in the plan adopted at the War Office, that the final examination of candidates after the probationary year is proposed.

It does not appear to me, that any system of extra-departmental examination, by a formally appointed board of examiners, could successfully conduct this examination.

To assign the examination of a probationary clerk to a Board, which ought to turn chiefly upon his knowledge of the business of the office in which he has served, and to be combined with an inquiry into his general conduct, zeal, and ability, would be to demand, on the part of a Board of Examiners, a knowledge of the peculiar and detailed business of every department, which it could not be expected to possess, and could hardly be expected to acquire.

Whatever the system of examination, however, may be, which shall be hereafter established, it should embrace more than merely educational acquirements. Because, however high a board may fix the standard of education, however successfully a candidate may pass his examination, no guarantee, I repeat, is thereby obtained for his future efficiency as a clerk in a public department.

Indeed, very considerable intellectual attainments, unless combined with steadiness, industry, and zeal, may be useless, or only occasionally useful to an office, and the source of much disappointment to the individual.

It is the office education which is the most important to the public, and though that may be facilitated by requiring, in the first instance, sufficient proofs of a good general education, it is that upon which the efficiency of a clerk will ultimately rest. And of that I do not think any Board could have the means of forming a sound and satisfactory judgment.

I come, therefore, to these conclusions, fully admitting the value and necessity of a preliminary literary examination to test the qualification of a candidate, that his permanent appointment ought to depend upon the result of his year's probation, his knowledge of official business, so far as his opportunities have enabled him to acquire it, and his zeal and industry. And it appears to me, that these qualifications can be ascertained best by the Head of the department, and the appointed Examiner of the department, in which the candidate has been a probationer.

Some important recommendations of the report remain to be considered, and the first in order is the "choice of subjects to be comprehended in the examination."

The report appears to contemplate a very high standard of education to qualify for admission to the public service. The passage in the report to which I refer is as follows:—

"Besides, an opportunity would be afforded for judging in what kind of situation each is likely to be most useful; and we need hardly allude to the important effect which would be produced upon the general education of the country, if proficiency in history, jurisprudence, political economy, modern languages, political and physical geography, and other matters, besides the staple of classics and mathematics, were made directly conducive to the success of young men desirous of entering into the public service."

In expressing this opinion, it appears to me, the duties and the remuneration of a junior clerk, on first appointment, have been overlooked. And though, in the course of time, much higher and more important duties devolve upon a clerk, it must not be forgotten, that promotion can scarcely be otherwise than slow; and that until the superior places in a department are attained, the remuneration is far below what a candidate possessing such high qualifications would have a right to expect.

I take for illustration the pay on first admission, and the probable salary thereafter of a clerk in this Office,

who has won his own promotion by ability and zeal, and not seniority, and which has been as rapid as vacancies have permitted.

A.B. entered the War Office in 1807, at 90*l.* a year; was promoted to the second class at 300*l.* in 1822; was promoted to the first class at 500*l.* a year in 1836, after 29 years' service; and, unless appointed chief examiner or chief clerk in the interval, could not attain the maximum salary of 800*l.* until after 44 years service.

C.D. entered in 1820 in the 4th class; promoted to the third class at 200*l.* in 1828; promoted to the second class at 300*l.* in 1840; promoted to the first class at 500*l.* in 1853, having then served 33 years; the maximum of 800*l.* cannot be obtained until after 48 years' service, unless appointed chief examiner or chief clerk.

E.F. entered in 1833; promoted to the second class at 300*l.* in 1845; promoted to the first class at 500*l.* in 1853, after 20 years' service; will obtain the maximum of 800*l.* after 37 years' service.

It will thus be seen how slow and toilsome, under the most favourable circumstances, is the progress upwards from a junior's salary to one which, after all, is inferior to what a young man of ability and energy might hope to attain in many other professions or occupations. Undoubtedly, the superannuation allowance must not be overlooked. On the other hand, it will be recollected that this fund is created alone by annual deductions from the salary of each member of the Civil Service appointed since 1829. It stands on the same footing as his life insurance, except that, in the latter case, his prudence and forethought is voluntary; whereas, in the former, it is made compulsory upon him. But there is this further and very injurious difference, that if he die in the service, no portion of the fund subscribed is available for his family; and if, even after 20 or 30 years' deduction from his salary, he retire, and obtain the maximum allowance attainable under the Act, it ceases upon his death, without his family benefiting by his long contribution in the slightest degree.

It is unworthy of a government to levy a contribution upon the whole service, and then to dole it out under their own officers, so as to make it profitable to the State. The subject is noticed in the report, but with great reserve; but it is one, upon the commonest principles of justice, demanding amendment. The Government affects to provide liberally for public servants, whose length of service, ability, and integrity deserve it; but it exacts this

fund from the salaries of the very men who are to be provided for.

If, however, so high a standard of qualification as that to which I have referred is to be required, then the rewards and prospects of such men as in future are to be admitted into the public service must be revised and improved. But, there is no suggestion to this effect, except in one respect—viz., that promotion is to be hereafter obtained by merit only, and that they are “to expect the highest prizes in the service, if they can qualify themselves for them.”

Such a prospect is, no doubt, calculated to have some effect; but in almost all cases, it must be a long deferred reward, ill adapted to meet the expectations of the class of candidates I am referring to, and ill requiring such men for the thirty or forty years of steady, constant labour, and responsibility. In my opinion, therefore, the standard of education indicated is too high, and would lead to the introduction of a class of men into our public departments, who would remain only till they could find more beneficial employment, and thereby subject a department to frequent changes; or failing in this very legitimate object, they would become disappointed and indifferent to a service, which neither gave them opportunities to test their abilities, nor adequately rewarded them.

In the suggestions of the report, with a view to secure “promotion by merit,” I generally concur. The course recommended is very nearly that which is followed in this Office.

There are other recommendations in the report, more particularly with regard to promotion, which I think of doubtful value.

1st. With regard to the transfer of clerks from one department to another. This recommendation would appear to include the removal of senior as well as junior clerks. The removal, however, of senior clerks is always attended with the greatest inconvenience, and it is very rarely necessary. Junior clerks undoubtedly should be removed occasionally from branch to branch, in order that they may gain a complete knowledge of the business of an office.\*

\* The suggestion in the Report is confined to the younger clerks. “Another point to which the attention of the chiefs of offices should be called is the importance of transferring the clerks from one department to another, so that each may have an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the business before he is called upon, in due course of time, to take a leading position.—Page 18.”

A senior clerk may be assumed to have attained this, and when appointed to the head of his subdivision, his services are far more valuable to an office and the public, by being thenceforth devoted to that branch. Moreover, if the heads of subdivisions were subjected to change, their superintendence over their juniors would be less effective.

2d. With regard to the proposal, “to open the way to promotion of public officers to staff appointments in other departments than their own,” there are several considerations which deserve to be well weighed, before this is assented to as a general rule.

It follows from the age at which the senior clerkships are attained, that a full and complete knowledge of the business of a department has been acquired. To remove an able and experienced senior clerk to another department, is to dispense with all his experience and special knowledge, and to place him where he has everything to learn. Such a reward may be of doubtful value, even as regards the individual, but scarcely doubtful as regards the public interest, which must be subject to some disadvantage thereby, from the loss one office at least will sustain by being deprived of able, experienced, and valuable services. I should doubt whether this recommendation would be confirmed by those whose knowledge of the service is the greatest.

The proposed annual certificate also, which it is proposed that each clerk should obtain from his immediate superior, previous to the ordinary annual increase of salary, would in a large department gradually become a mere form, and, if otherwise, would throw a very invidious duty upon senior clerks. Neither do I think a measure of such suspicious vigilance well calculated to improve the service.

The Report adverts to the want of good service pensions and honorary distinctions; and adds that the “proposed board of examiners might be turned to good account in supplying these defects.”

The value of the first would wholly depend upon the rules and regulations under which they were awarded, and these are not indicated.

With regard to the second, I apprehend that it is not intended to suggest that honorary distinctions should originate from, or even be suggested by, the Board of Examiners. This implied recommendation, to make this board in any way parties to the distribution of honorary rewards, I cannot concur in. They must, in my opinion,

spring from the grace and favour of the Crown, as heretofore, if they are to have any effect upon, or value in, the eyes of the Civil Servants of the Crown.\* Perhaps I may misinterpret this portion of the report, more especially as the part which the Board is to take in remedying the "defect" complained of is not distinctly explained. But whether the Board is to be consulted before an honorary distinction is to be bestowed, or whether it is to set forth the character and services of the individual, as recorded in the "good or ill behaviour book" which the Board is to keep for reference, in either or in any case I think the agency of the proposed Board in matters of this kind objectionable. It is quite impossible, for instance, that any Board could have known, or that any official record could convey any correct idea of the value of the services rendered to their departments by many of those eminent members of the permanent Civil Service who have retired, and who have been most justly rewarded by honorary distinctions.

It would not be difficult to point to many who have rendered great and valuable services to the public, and whose labours, if traced out, would be found recorded in the Statute Book, or in an appendix to a report of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, or in the still less known records of public departments, and of the value of which no public board could be a competent judge. Such services can only be appreciated by Heads of departments past or for the time being; and who therefore, in my opinion, should remain wholly responsible, as heretofore, for the selection of those who are thought to deserve this mark of favour from the Crown.\*

The report concludes by recommending that an Act of Parliament should be passed to give effect to the scheme propounded in the report. It does not appear to me that legislative interference is necessary for this purpose. It would be extremely difficult to frame an Act of Parliament to meet the various details of such a scheme; and, failing satisfactorily to accomplish this, recourse would be had to the alternative of placing large discretionary powers in the hands of the First Lord of the Treasury, or the

\* The mode of recording the services of members of the Civil Establishments described at pages 20-22 of the Report was suggested for the purpose of assisting, and not of superseding, the decisions of the proper authorities, in respect to promotions, pensions, and honorary distinctions.

Lord President of the Council, or some other principal officer of state, which I should not consider a satisfactory arrangement.

In such a case the usual proceeding by an Order in Council would, I think, be the better course, and be more consistent with precedent. The constitution, salaries, &c., of several departments are now regulated by Orders in Council; and, if the great experiment recommended is to be tried, an Act of Parliament would be found too inflexible; and if obscurities or ambiguities in the wording of the clauses should occur, an amending Act would be necessary, which might be extremely inconvenient. I think, therefore, an Act of Parliament should not be resorted to.

#### EXAMINATION OF CANDIDATES

##### FOR ADMISSION INTO THE WAR OFFICE.

Candidates will be examined in English Grammar and Composition—English History, and the British Constitution—Geography—and Arithmetic.

A few questions under each head are annexed as specimens of the nature of the Questions to be asked of each Candidate, who will also be required to write correctly from dictation, and in a clear good hand.

The greatest importance will be attached to superiority in English Grammar, English Composition, and Writing correctly from dictation, and in Arithmetic, to the extent of a practical acquaintance with the Rule of Three, Practice, Interest, and Vulgar and Decimal Fractions.

A Candidate will be allowed to indicate any book or subject upon which he may desire to be specially examined.

Against the name of each Candidate marks will be placed, showing the number of questions answered correctly and incorrectly.

A Candidate having passed his first examination, will be admitted as a Member of the War-Office for one year, on probation, when he may be again examined upon the War-Office Regulations, the Army Estimates, and the details of a Pay-List. And upon passing this latter examination, if his conduct, diligence, and general attention to his duty, have been such as to obtain the approbation of the Principals of the rooms in which he has been placed, he will be admitted a Permanent Member of the Department.

## EXAMINATION QUESTIONS,

IN THE NATURE OF THOSE TO BE PROPOSED TO CANDIDATES FOR  
ADMISSION INTO THE WAR-OFFICE.

*English Grammar and Composition.*

1. Accent each of the following words in two ways, and construct sentences which shall contain these words—*refuse, desert, protest, compound.*
2. Correct, if necessary, the spelling of the following words, and give the reasons for your corrections:—*moveable, truely, skillful, blissful, lodgement.*
3. Correct, if necessary, the following, and give reasons for your corrections:—

Divide this among the two.

The man has come, him who you saw.

These books are theirs, those are yours.

The captain, with his men, were taken.

We laid our money upon camels, concealed in bales of cheap goods, and travelled to the shore of the Red Sea.

&c. &c.

*English History and British Constitution.*

1. At what period, and under what circumstances, did the Saxons become masters of a large part of Britain?
2. Describe the most important of the Saxon institutions.
3. Name the sovereigns of the House of Stuart, and specify the principal events in the reign of James II.

&c. &c.

*Geography.*

1. Name the rivers upon which the following cities and towns are situated:—Paris, &c.
2. Name the chief commercial ports of Great Britain.

&c. &c.

*Arithmetic.*

1. Define the following terms:—Quotient, Ratio, Fraction, Proportion, Multiple.
2. Divide 675*l.* 18*s.* 7*d.* by 35*½*.
3. What sum of money will be required per week of seven days to pay eight companies of soldiers, each consisting of 95 men, at 1*s.* 1*½d.* a day for such man.
4. Add together  $\frac{2}{3}$  of 3 guineas,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of 5*s.* 6*d.* and  $\frac{1}{2}$  of  $\frac{5}{8}$  of 5*d.*
5. Required the value of .8756 of a pound sterling.
6. What decimal of 8*s.* 5*d.* is 8*s.* 4*d.*
7. The population of a place at one period was 4780, at another 5002: required the increase per cent.

&c. &c.

DR. LYON PLAYFAIR, C.B.,

Joint Secretary to the Department of Science and Art.

I PROCEED, in compliance with the wish expressed to me on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to state my views on the subject of obtaining the most efficient men for employment in the Civil Service; but in doing so, I place myself rather in the position of a promoter of education than of a departmental public officer, the limited amount of my experience in the latter capacity scarcely justifying the request with which I have been honoured.

While agreeing generally with the principles enunciated in the report on this subject by Sir C. Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote, I do not conceal from myself that there are serious, though not insuperable, difficulties to contend with, in framing a system which shall at the same time secure the most efficient men for the service of the State, and prevent an undue expectation of Government employment. When the most worthy can, by their own merits and without reliance on special patronage, enter the public service, a great incentive will be given to education, which should not, however, be directed into such specific or special channels as to unfit the aspirants for official employment from obtaining livelihoods in the ordinary occupations of commercial or productive industry.

There are some subjects common to all occupations in this country, and so essential to every man that many advantages would result from their being at once declared *sine quâ non* conditions for employment in the Civil Service of the Crown. From the head of the Government department down to its messenger, the elements of knowledge are common, and essential; every public servant should be able to read and spell English correctly, to write accurately from dictation, and to know the first three or four rules of arithmetic, and a certain amount of geography.

Various foreign States require by law such elementary knowledge to be possessed by their subjects before they are allowed to accept responsible employment of any kind. In Denmark it is called the "Confirmation Examination," and a certificate of having passed it must be pre-



sented before a private employer can engage a servant into permanent occupation. In Germany it is termed the "Maturity" Examination, and for want of a better term to express my meaning, I use the latter expression.

Such a maturity examination in this country, even among the higher class of aspirants for Government employment, would be no form, but would at once exclude a large number of unfit and badly educated people, and would give an immense impulse to a future improved elementary education throughout the country. It would be no exercise of despotic power for the State to insist upon the possession of a small, but still far from general, amount of elementary knowledge, by those who wish it to employ their services. The imposition of such acquirements would not prejudice the question of whether there should be compulsory education throughout England, but it might go far to render the resolution of this difficult question unnecessary, by probably leading our population to the Icelandic system of universal voluntary education. I propose, then, that the government should make this "maturity" examination a *sine quâ non* condition, before any individual could ask for State employment in the Civil Service, a condition compulsory on all without exception—the gentleman's birth, or his training at any of our greatest schools or colleges, not excepting him from the necessity of passing it in order to obtain the possibility of future employment by the State.

I will illustrate the necessity of making the test universal by taking as an example the condition of candidates for direct appointments as officers of the army in India, who are generally sons of gentlemen in excellent social positions, and form a fair test as to how far such a maturity examination is required by the upper classes. I am indebted to one of the East India directors for obtaining for me a return as to the power of those candidates to read and spell their mother tongue, and to do the common rules of arithmetic. In the years 1851 to 1854, both inclusive, 437 gentlemen were examined for direct commissions in the Indian army; of this number, 132 failed in English, and 234 in arithmetic. The return requires no comment. I cannot conceive how any greater impulse could be given by the State to a general, and improved education among the people, than by laying down the simple condition that for the future, all those who enter the Civil Service of the

State shall show a "maturity" certificate, to the effect that they can read, write, spell, and do the common rules of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and proportion, and know somewhat of geography.

As no man would like to be disqualified for future State employment, the effect of such a rule would be to induce even those who have no immediate intention of entering the Government service to pass the maturity examination. This simple and perfectly justifiable condition would also go far to check the enormous evil in this country, of children leaving school too young. They do not do so because they are all required for early employment, for we know that there are 62,000 boys, and about 90,000 girls of 12 years of age, in this country, who are not at school, and yet have no employment; and that there are 2,000,000 children who might be at school and are not. There could scarcely be a more effectual check to this monstrous evil than the imposition of the proposed condition for State employment, coupled with a further rule, that before a person can present himself for a "maturity" examination, he must be at least 14 years of age. The reason for the latter limitation obviously is, that the elementary knowledge should be retained in the possession of the individual at a period when he begins to enter the duties of active life. The Government condition would inevitably extend to private employers of labour, and the maturity examination would voluntarily become nearly as common and essential to the employed as the compulsory confirmation law of Denmark. The young trees of knowledge planted in our schools would thus become tended until they were fruit-bearing, instead of, as now, being plucked up by the roots just as they begin to blossom.

There really appear to be no practical difficulties of a serious character to the attainment of such an object. A comparatively small addition to the staff of examiners in the Committee of Privy Council for education would suffice to ensure the working of a system of maturity examinations for those who desire to be qualified for State employment. The training colleges might be the places in which the examinations were periodically held, if they had room (which at present they have not); and failing these, the board rooms of the boards of guardians are often unoccupied for three months in the year, and might be made available. The examiners should be paid by Parliamentary grant, but the persons examined should pay a fee into the

Exchequer, which would, I believe, in the course of a few years, make the system perfectly self-supporting. This, however, is not the place to enter into the details of such a scheme, but having examined them with a view of seeing if the suggestion were surrounded with practical difficulties, I am of opinion that, neither as regards expenditure nor means, are there serious obstacles to the efficient carrying out of such a proposal, even on the supposition that it was successful enough to lead to a voluntary demand for a maturity certificate on the part of every boy who leaves school. The mode of conducting such examinations is now understood in the Council Office, and the action of the latter is becoming so general and popular in the country, that it naturally suggests itself as the proper office for ascertaining that the candidates for public employment have the *locus standi* for being registered as such.

The Government is now supposed to deal only with men who can read, write, and cipher tolerably, but although this examination might perhaps suffice for a class of inferior employments, such as messengers, porters, &c., it has not yet really tested the fitness of candidates for the higher offices of the public service. At this point arises the danger to which I first alluded, a danger less likely to occur in this country than on the Continent, but which it is well to know and to avoid. The evils of the Continental system of stimulating what has been called a "bureaucracy," I have pointed out in a pamphlet entitled "Industrial Instruction on the Continent," and therefore only allude to it cursorily here. With the abstract idea that the State and the public would be better served by the educated than the ignorant, the foreign Governments gave much encouragement to general education in gymnasia, or classical schools. The pupils there educated in polite literature, pressed for employment on the State, which had induced their education, because its character was not such as to make them immediately available for the ordinary paths of industry. The State, unwilling to allow educated and discontented men to remain unemployed in the country, enlarged its bureaus for their reception, and the governing classes and the governed soon acquired an undue proportion. To rectify this evil, the Continental States have been encouraging a greater attention to an industrial education, and thus manufactures and commerce have opened new channels for the educated, and drawn off their pressure upon the State.

These evils cannot arise in this country if the general demands for acquirements for State employment are not of such an especial and exclusive character as to unfit the possessor for obtaining employment in other quarters should the State not retain him. Generally, indeed, the very reverse condition might be attained, by making the educational requirements of that practical character which would ensure to the possessor a better chance of commercial or manufacturing employment if he did not enter into the service of the State.

It would not be difficult to draw out a scheme in which the basis for examination implied conditions required by all Government offices, branching however into subjects evolving talents that would indicate their employment in a special direction.

To illustrate my meaning,—all clerks who are expected to rise to a higher position than mere copying machines, should be able to write well and accurately from dictation; to show some facility for expression, by enlarging answers to letters from heads of reply; to understand how to register correspondence, and keep books; and to possess an acquaintance with one language in addition to English. Such proofs of an adaptation for official life might be common to all offices. Beyond these, however, there might be optional subjects of examination, which would indicate the aptitude of the candidate for particular branches of the public service, or for departments having a similar character and like requirements. These optional and higher subjects of examination are necessary to eliminate talent, and to indicate its order out of a mass of candidates. By this I mean that certain departments might be grouped or encircled by acquirements common to them, though differing from those in another group; and the candidates passing within the circle by a voluntary selection of examination would give the best indications of their most appropriate destination.

Having thus obtained a standard by which candidates can measure themselves and indicate their relative fitness for official life, I will presume that the competition has sifted out the fittest men to fill the average vacancies in the public offices. If now the necessity for intellectual development cease, and promotions are made by seniority, without any stimulus being given for an increasing fitness for the higher requirements of the department to which the successful candidate is appointed, I fear that the result

would scarcely justify the expectations of his future usefulness. Experience in examinations shows that although there are numerous instances in which men who have taken high class honours continue to develop their talents for the good of society, there are still more numerous instances where, resting on the original reputation which they have acquired, they cease to strive for a continual improvement in the same direction.

In the department of the Board of Trade, in which I am joint secretary, we have endeavoured to follow a somewhat similar plan to that originally proposed by the Committee of Council on Education, and which has had such an excellent effect on the schoolmasters of the country. The essence of the plan consists in holding out to those engaged with us a continual inducement to further improvements. A special case will illustrate my meaning. One duty assigned to this department, in conjunction with the Marine Department, is to promote the formation of Schools of Navigation for the outports, and with this view teachers are trained. Before one of these is appointed to a school, he has to pass an examination in Navigation, and in the skilful handling and adjustment of nautical instruments, as a *sine qua non* condition of appointment; and having a certificate for this, a certain small sum per annum is paid him for his qualification as long as he continues to teach his school effectively. But this forms the lowest condition for admission as a teacher, and inducements to continued improvement in the sciences relating to Navigation are held out. The same plan has been successfully in operation for some time with regard to teachers in art, a certain money value being attached to each group of acquirements which the teacher, by examination and future inspection, shall prove that he is able to communicate to his pupils. Thus a continual inducement to new acquirements is held out; and the value of these obviously depends upon the strictness of the examinations, and upon the security which the public attach to the possession of the professed acquirements, by the fact of a certificate being held.

Somewhat of a similar plan I would submit as desirable for imitation in a general scheme for the reorganisation of the public service of the State,—a small money augmentation of the salary, in respect to special acquirements, being given, although these may not be brought into the constant or immediate service of the State. The justification of

the State for a small increase of salary, according to certificated acquirements, would be in the power to render them available in case of exigencies. To illustrate this, an actual instance may be quoted. There is in Liverpool an intelligent officer of the Customs, who fills, however, a comparatively subordinate situation. He has acquired a correct knowledge of botany, especially in its economic applications, and this knowledge enables him to be useful to the public, on many occasions, beyond the sphere of the office for which he is paid. To him was owing the case of Liverpool imports which attracted so much attention in the Exhibition of 1851. In the important question of new supplies of raw material for the manufacture of paper, he has been useful in examining into the fibres occasionally imported which might be applicable to this purpose; and he has supplied valuable information on this subject. In such a case it is obvious that the public derives the advantage in many ways of a special acquirement, bearing in a particular direction, and its advantages may constantly be made available to the public service, although not immediately required for the special office filled. This availability in cases of emergency would be the return to the State for the proposed slight augmentation of salaries according to the extent of acquirements. As a further illustration, we may take a possible case in the Commissariat Department: suppose some of its members had taken certificates of having passed examinations in the Turkish or Russian languages, a small augmentation of salary for these acquirements would have been amply repaid to the State when the exigencies of the public service led to the selection of these men for special service in the present war.

The departmental requirements being indicated, and a money value being attached to their acquisition, they should always be open to an official to pass, during any period of his engagement. This would lead to that continued cultivation of the intellectual developments which is obviously desirable to give life to a service depending upon merit, not only for admission to it, but for success in progressing to its staff appointments; and it would always secure for the higher duties of the department a body of men fit to render useful aid in emergencies, at a small cost to the Exchequer. The principle of the plan proposed might be legitimately applied by the Government in raising the standard of

secondary education throughout the country, and of thus continuing the beneficial pressure which it is supposed to have made on elementary education, by fixing a minimum standard of knowledge in the case of all candidates for public employment.

It may be asked, in what manner the higher special requirements of a department are to be communicated, either to candidates for office, or to those who have already entered into official life. Is Government to charge itself with this education, as in Dresden, or Carlsruhe, where there are special schools for Government engineers, foresters, and post-office clerks? My own impression is, that this may be safely left to the usual operation of demand and supply. In proof of this, no sooner was the fact announced that Government had under consideration the question of testing the intellectual fitness of its servants, than King's College added to itself a "Department of Civil Service and Commerce;" and I understand that in this already about 20 students have enrolled themselves. This action on the part of an important body like King's College, not only indicates a valuable recognition of the justice of the proposal, but it also shows that we may safely rely on the educational bodies of the country for a supply of the knowledge, if there be a demand for it; and this demand will be secured if the Government make increased knowledge in the duties of a department, not only an honour and a stepping-stone to promotion, but also give to it a direct *money value*. Of course every educational institution will not give aptitude for official business, but this quality might be tested by probation in the office, a condition which I presume would in all cases be attached before an officer was permanently fixed in his employment.

I have only indicated the general principles which appear to me to be advisable in ascertaining the qualifications of the candidates for Civil employment under the Crown, and for promoting their fitness for the higher requirements of the service after they have been appointed to it. I have not entered into the detail of how these principles may be made effective in their application, because I understand that the request made to me did not justify more than a general expression of my views on the proposal submitted to the Government by the authors of the report on which the request was made.

To be inserted in the

H. WADDINGTON, Esq.,

Under Secretary of State for the Home Department.

I HAVE to acknowledge Sir C. Trevelyan's letter of the 14th June, written by direction of Her Majesty's Government, in which they do me the honour to request that I will favour them with my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir S. Northcote and Sir C. Trevelyan; and further, that I will state whether I think the existing arrangements for making the first appointments in the Civil Service, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and if any to what, improvement.

Upon the first point my answer is, that I do not agree with the general principles of the Report in question, but, on the contrary, entertain a very strong opinion that they are mistaken and erroneous. My reasons for so doing are the following:—

It is with regret that I am compelled to observe, at the outset, upon what appears to me a very serious defect; the inefficiency of the Civil Service as at present organized is most enormously exaggerated. This exaggeration is injurious to the whole Report, giving it the appearance of a case dressed up by an advocate for the purposes of prejudice, rather than of a fair and impartial statement prepared for the guidance and information of Parliament and the public.

The assertions that a large proportion of the Civil servants of this country are men unambitious, indolent, or incapable; men whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed in the open professions; men whose indolence of temperament or physical infirmities unfit them for active exertions; sickly youths who retire upon pensions, owing to bodily incapacity, or absent themselves from their duties upon the ground of ill-health, so as to burden the public to an extent hardly to be credited — are, as far as my experience and information extend, entirely without foundation. In order that there may be no mistake as to the wide range of these imputations, it is

stated with much caution that they are not intended to be universal; not all enter the public service because they are, and their friends know them to be, the helpless subjects before described, but a large proportion find their way there under the influence of such motives. Presently, indeed, we are told that there are numerous honourable exceptions to these observations; and then we are somewhat inconsistently informed that they, that is, the Civil servants generally, are much better than we have any right to expect from the system under which they are appointed and promoted. This praise, such as it is, will be accepted with gratitude by the Civil servants. To be better than the system under which they live, argues great merit in the individuals, and leads us to hope that they cannot, generally speaking, be the unambitious, the indolent, the incapable persons held up to public scorn in the Report; on the contrary, if, under a system so strongly condemned by the authors of the Report, they have shown themselves worthy of something better, what might we not expect from these same individuals under rational and intelligent management? We are told in the Report that "the present state of things engenders a feeling of security which tends to encourage indolence and depress the character of the service;" that "the quiet and generally secluded nature of the duties is such that they are unable to acquire the experience of life necessary for the due development of their characters;" and after a long enumeration of heavy blows and great discouragements, that they are so treated in matters of promotion as "to strengthen in them the injurious conviction that their success does not depend upon their own exertions, and that if they work hard it will not advance them—if they waste their time in idleness it will not keep them back." Who would not exclaim, after this, "*Ipsa si cupiat salus, servare prorsus non potest hanc familiam?*" It is not so, however; the result is not, even in the opinion of the reporters, so disastrous as might have been expected. Men almost as bad as could be found have been selected to work under a system worse than themselves, and yet, notwithstanding "the great and increasing accumulation of public business," the Government has been carried on; a process which, according to the Report, is impossible "without the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers."

I will now dismiss this part of the subject, after performing the pleasing duty of expressing my own opinion

upon it. I am perfectly satisfied that the Civil Service contains, in every department, many men of excellent capacity, of untiring industry, and, surprising as it may appear to the reporters, of vigorous and sound constitutions. These men are the *élite* of the office to which they belong, and are of incalculable service to the public, both by their own exertions, and by their influence and example, acting upon those less able or experienced than themselves. There are others, second in merit to those whom I have described, but still more useful, industrious, and painstaking men; and others undoubtedly of still inferior qualifications. But I venture to assert that the hopeless incompetency described in the Report is rare indeed; and that competency is the general rule, the exceptions being not the honourable ones, as stated in the Report, but the dishonourable, and not being numerous, but few. It is true that their ranks are not recruited from "the ablest and most ambitious youth of the country;" and I cannot agree with the reporters that it would be natural to expect such a process to take place. It would be a strange ambition for a young man who had just obtained the highest honours at Oxford or Cambridge, to aspire to a clerkship in a public office at a scanty salary, augmenting by slow degrees until it reaches possibly 800*l.* or 1,000*l.*—the maximum value of the services of a senior wrangler, should he be insane enough to take them to such a market. A strange ambition indeed for a double first-class man to aspire to be a subordinate for life, upon pay which might, with rigid and unrelenting economy, enable him to bring up a numerous family, but which no power of self-denial or self-torture could stretch so as to enable him to make a provision for them after his death; and this to attain, if greatly favoured by fortune, the dignity of Chief Clerk, possibly on the very day upon which his friend who stood by his side in the list of honours is made a Bishop or a Judge. The reporters cannot, I think, have been acquainted with many "of the ablest and most ambitious of the youth of the country." If they had, they would have known that they are not, and never will be, the stuff of which clerks in public offices are made. It has been my great good fortune to be the friend of several of them: some of them are now occupying high positions; I have had to deplore the early fate of others; but I can assure the reporters that they all duly appreciated their own merits, that they knew their own value, and were not

disposed to barter the golden days of their prime for an abject pittance, less than the earnings of the clerk of a barrister in respectable practice. These distinguished youths had read the "Iliad" with the eyes of Horace, and, like him, extracted from it lessons of practical utility; and they remembered that Jupiter deprived Glaucus of his wits before that hero consented to exchange the rich and rare for the poor and ordinary—*χρῦσα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι ἐννεαβόλων.*

This strange notion of the immense attractions of the Civil Service, when thrown open to general competition, would surprise me much in such able men as the reporters, did I not trace it clearly to the same spirit of advocacy which caused them involuntarily to do injustice to the existing Civil servants. They have to bespeak the public favour for a great scheme of their own, which they most conscientiously, I doubt not, believe to be a most admirable discovery, but which must necessarily occasion an enormous expense. How then is the public (not very fond of new Boards of eight members appointed for life with liberal salaries, and requiring, in order to relieve them as much as possible from the details of business, several clerks and a secretary\*) to be reconciled to this? Any advocate will answer the question, by making out the actual state of things to be as deplorable as possible, and that which is to replace it as nearly as possible approaching to perfection. No reasonable man could grudge salaries, however liberal, or clerks and secretaries, however numerous, or a presiding Privy Councillor, to a College of Examiners who, instead of the puny, lazy, unambitious drones now selected by the responsible heads of the great public offices, should give us the ablest and most ambitious youth of the country, with spotless characters and robust constitutions. Once convince the world that a magical influence has been discovered, by which the most promising young men of the day can be made to abandon all hopes of the bar and the bench, the pulpit and the mitre, the senate, the army and the navy, and to rush into desperate competition for Government clerkships, and no difficulties will arise on the score of expense, particularly as it is not suggested that these admirable youths are to receive either at first, or at any future period, one single farthing more than the pitiable object of the reporters'

\* See Letter of Mr. Jowett, p. 26 of Report.

contempt, who now slumber on the posts so soon to become the envied prizes of a mighty intellectual conflict.

It is curious to observe how the two exaggerations fit in with and assist each other; the melancholy gloom of the past and present is a good preparation for the dazzling brightness of the future. When that arrives, England will exclaim, "Nothing but desperation could have given me the courage and strength necessary to achieve such splendid success; to rise triumphantly high, it was necessary to fall disastrously low — 'periissem, nisi 'periissem.'"

I will now, however, dismiss these extreme views, and assuming that the Civil Service, though by no means in an efficient or discreditable state, is, like most other institutions, capable of receiving a certain degree of improvement, proceed to consider whether that result can be reasonably expected from the plan before us. The plan, as I understand it, is this: A Board of Examiners is to be appointed, to which alone is to be confided, without appeal, the selection of the persons who are to fill all Government offices which may hereafter become vacant, except in certain special cases. The principle of selection, however, is to be one as to which the examiners are to exercise no discretion, and is to be one and the same for all departments of the public service. Periodical literary examinations, of the widest and most comprehensive character, and open to all Her Majesty's male subjects between certain ages who can produce certificates of good character and good health, are to take place, and the vacancies are to be filled up, exactly as if they were so many college fellowships, by those who obtain the greatest number of marks. The vacancies to be filled up are not to correspond with the number of places actually vacant, but with an average previously ascertained, in order to make the number of prizes to be awarded upon each occasion as nearly as may be the same. No one is to enter the public service hereafter, unless he obtains a prize at one of these examinations. The examiners perform the functions of St. Peter, and hold the keys of the official paradise; but there is much confusion in the report as to the mode in which those who have passed the gate are to be afterwards distributed—the arrangement which the reporters appear to favour being that of sending a list of the successful candidates to each office, in order, I suppose, that the

head may select those whose names appear to him to have the most promising sound. As this does not provide for the case of two or more chiefs becoming enamoured of the same name, and as the others appear to me not altogether worthy of so great a scheme, I should recommend that the names of the elect should be placed in a ballot-box (*omnium versetur urnâ serius, ocyus, sors exitura*) and drawn out as they are wanted. Something is also said about probation; but it is quite obvious that if the probation were to be serious, and were often to be followed by the rejection of one of the conquerors, it would be considered an appeal from the examiners to the head of the department, and would tend to destroy all public confidence in the examination itself. There are also some hints in parts of the Report as to other examinations, with the view of appropriating special talents to special departments of the public service, and it is said that such a proposal is not inconsistent with the general plan. I cannot agree with that assertion; the plan is that all the candidates for all Government appointments of the same class are to compete with each other in one general examination upon literary subjects: if this is to be frittered away by taking the vacancies, first of this and then of that department out of the general mass, and making them the prizes of other and different examinations, the horse's tail will soon be bare. "*Caudæque pilos ut equinæ paulatim vello, et demo unum demo etiam unum.*" Besides the instances given in the Report, the heads of other offices will call loudly for an examination on their own particular account, somewhat less literary, perhaps, but more closely embracing those subjects the knowledge of which is essential to their business. If granted to some, this could not well be refused to others, and when the day of the great literary tournament arrived, the presiding Privy Councillor would find the lists deserted.

I confess that I am somewhat disquieted by this suggestion of special examinations, to which no limit is or can be assigned; and this probation, by which the despotism of the examiners is to be tempered, as that of Russia is said to be, by occasional assassination. What need of probation for a victor in the Olympic games which are to draw together athletes from every part of the British dominions? Surely it is not intended to deprive us of this grand spectacle after all, or to insinuate that its heroes cannot be

trusted without the probation now required from men who have passed through no such ordeal, or what is yet more humiliating, without a probation still more efficient.\*

I will not, however, yield to these misgivings; but will proceed to the task imposed upon me—the consideration of the merits of the grand scheme itself, neither mutilated by special examinations, nor discredited by a species of new trial under the name of probation. I will assume the examination to be the general, and also the final and decisive test.

Let us suppose then as follows:—We have established a College of Examiners, worthy of their immense responsibility, full of zeal and knowledge, strong in numbers, animated by large salaries, supported by a powerful band of assistants, clerks, and secretaries, and, what is equally necessary, raised by their reputation for justice and impartiality above the reach of calumny. A mighty and a motley crowd of candidates has been gathered together from the extreme corners of the empire, speaking every variety of its language, and burning to show "their proficiency in history, jurisprudence, political economy, modern languages, political and physical geography, and other matters, besides the staple of classics and mathematics." The opportunity is given them; their acquirements in these various branches of knowledge are thoroughly sifted. The "*Græculus esuriens*" of Juvenal, with his motto of "*omnia novit*," could not have asked for more. It used formerly to be a matter of complaint that "life was short and art was long." Considering that the candidates in our examination are between the ages of 17 and 25, that doctrine must be considered to be exploded, and the converse established. It is difficult to guess the time that will be required for the due extraction of these varied treasures; but the end comes at last: the jaded examiners sum up their marks, and balance, as they best can, languages against jurisprudence, geography against political economy, history against "other matters," and classics and mathematics against all and each of the rest and against each other. Then comes the fight between jurisprudence and geography, languages and political economy, and so on, making permutations almost innumerable, to say nothing of the struggle between the various modern languages (including of course Irish and Welsh)

\* See for the description of the plan, pp. 11 to 15 (inclusive) of the Report.

for supremacy, and the fierce contest between dead and living tongues. The examiners fortunately have absolute authority to decide these points, and decide them. The successful candidates are named, and the unsuccessful sent empty away, grumbling and complaining, it is true, but without any disturbance of the public peace. The heroes of the day are then allotted, by some process yet to be invented, amongst the various public offices, where they take their seats with all the pride of conscious merit, and anxious to display their now unquestionable talents. What is to be done? Is the intellectual part of the business, the headwork of the department, to be rudely torn from the elder clerks, who, able, trustworthy, and experienced as they are, have never gone through the ordeal of a competing examination, and to be handed over to the literary conquerors? Or are the latter to look on and copy, copy and look on, for months, perhaps for years? Fortunately something is said in the Report (page 9) upon this very awkward subject, and it is boldly laid down "that these carefully selected young men should be employed from the first upon work suited to their capacities and education." Excellent indeed! it is impossible to applaud such a proposal too highly; but how is this to be accomplished? Alas! when we come to the point, and when upon the subject of the employment of the clerks, this very question arises, how a distinction between mechanical and intellectual labour is to be made and maintained, our oracles are silent. Instead of informing us how it is to be done, they say that it must be left to the management and discretion of the chiefs of offices, and of those immediately below them. This, when coming from the reporters, is a clear intimation that in their opinion the matter is hopeless. We may take this beating about the bush as a sure indication that the reporters have nothing plausible to suggest: if they give us no advice upon this difficult and important point, we have a fair right to assume that they have none to give.\*

We have got, then, some learned clerks, but know not how to turn their learning to account. It is true that we do not know its exact nature; we cannot tell in what branch or branches of the monster examination, "*de omnibus rebus, et quibusdam aliis*," their superiority was shown: still they have more learning than we want, and as far as our purpose is concerned, Grote and Macaulay could have

\* See p. 17 of the Report.

no more. It may be instructive, as well as amusing, to inquire what would be the effect were my two immortal friends to descend from the clouds, and assume for a few days the humble disguise of Home Office clerks. I very much fear the public would not discover the change. The most exact knowledge of the composition of the Spartan "*mora*," or the Macedonian phalanx, would not peep out in a letter fixing the permanent staff of a regiment of militia; the eloquence of the great historian of our constitutional liberties would not be recognized in a letter pointing out to a country magistrate that he had strained the provisions of the Vagrant Act. The Gods would return to Olympus undetected, leaving no *θεῖστος ὄδμη* behind.

What, then, it will be said, are literary studies and acquirements of no value? Have all the fine things which have been written and spoken in their praise, from the days of Cicero to those of Brougham, been mere empty declamation? Not so; the value of literary taste and knowledge to the possessor is incalculable. The eloquence of such orators as I have named, even when warmed by a theme so congenial to their generous and enlightened spirits, cannot exaggerate it; but I never yet heard or read that it could be transferred in consideration of a salary from the possessor to his employer, when his vocation is not of a literary character. If the wisdom of Parliament should enact that no person should exercise the trade of a tailor or a shoemaker, or follow the profession of a dancing-master, without reaping laurels in a competing literary examination, it cannot be disputed that the studies rendered necessary by such an enactment, however irksome at first, would ultimately form a source of pleasure and comfort and consolation both to the artisans and the professors; but it will hardly be contended that they would elevate the character of boots and trowsers, or give new aplomb and elasticity to pirouettes and entrechats.

This, however, is not much insisted on by the authors of the scheme themselves, who say (p. 14) "that the great advantage of the examinations would be, that they would elicit young men of general ability, which is a matter of more moment than their being possessed of any special acquirements." The literary acquirements are of little moment in themselves, but only as affording a proof that the possessor "would probably make himself useful wherever he might be placed." Probably he might; and this I think is the fair and reasonable way of putting the



case: in truth, this probability is all that will be gained by this mighty plan, and I have already stated my opinion of what it is worth. I cannot help thinking that the stakes at the new races which we are advised to establish are too poor and meagre to afford us any real sport. There will be a large field, I dare say, but the horses will be a rough lot, the pace slow, and the running indifferent and unsatisfactory.

The only remaining question, then, is this—Is the probability of usefulness furnished by the examination worth the price that we are called upon to pay for it? Is it worth the unquestionable disadvantage of creating a large body of placemen, new themselves, and exercising functions new to the English Constitution? Is it worth the enormous annual expense of maintaining them, with a host of subordinates? Is it worth the strife and turmoil of the periodical struggle, the false hopes excited in the breasts of thousands, the sighs of the vanquished, and the tears of their mothers and sisters? Is it worth the suspicions and charges of partiality, the perpetual questions and calls for papers relating to the examinations, the motions for a committee to inquire why Terence O'Flanagan was passed over in favour of Cornelius Stubbs, so notoriously his inferior? Is it worth the evil of taking from the heads of offices all personal interest in their new clerks, and relieving them at the same time from all responsibility in respect of them? Is it worth the inconvenience of giving to those young men from the first a feeling of independence, injurious to discipline—a *locus standi* upon their own merits, ascertained by a tribunal without appeal, and enabling them, when put upon their trial for ignorance or indolence, to decline the ordinary official jurisdiction, to claim the benefit of clergy, and to point with a supercilious sneer in the direction of the Examiner's Office over the way? In my opinion it is not worth all this, and I feel not the slightest hesitation in advising the Government to reject the proffered bargain as improvident and disadvantageous to the public.

The next question upon which the Government has done me the honour to ask for my opinion is, "whether I consider the existing arrangements for making the first appointments in the Civil Service open to any, and if any to what, improvements?" The expression "existing arrangements" is not very explicit, and introduces some little difficulty. If it simply means the existing system, by virtue of which, as a general rule, all appointments in

each public office are made by the head of that office, I reply that I do not consider that system capable of improvement, but think it better than any other that has been suggested, or that I am able to suggest. If, on the other hand, it includes the mode in which that system has hitherto been carried out and administered, I must answer with hesitation—with doubt, to say the least of it. The authors of the Report (in p. 6) make very serious charges against the heads of departments in describing the discretion which they exercise in the performance of this highly important, this almost sacred duty. I am not able from any knowledge or experience of my own to controvert their statements upon this subject as I have ventured to do those respecting the extreme general inefficiency of the present Civil servants.

I will make a few observations upon both these points.

Why are the heads of offices the proper, the only proper persons to appoint the clerks in those offices? Because they are responsible for the mode in which the business of their office is conducted—to the Crown on the one side, to Parliament and the public on the other. Because they know best the nature of the work to be done, and the peculiar sort of knowledge and ability which is required for it. Because they are generally themselves men of long experience, sound judgment, great penetration, and keen insight into character, and therefore the most unlikely persons to be imposed upon by unfounded pretensions, and the most likely to discover real merit lurking under a timid or an uncouth exterior. Because they have unlimited means of requiring and obtaining information as to the birth, parentage, education, morals, manners, and antecedents of the candidates. Because, in addition to all these advantages, they have able and experienced men under them, whom they can call to their assistance in making the selection, and who are almost as much interested as themselves that the selection should be a good one. Will it be seriously contended that persons in so eminently favourable a position cannot make a proper choice if they will take the pains and exercise the diligence and caution which so important a trust demands, and steadily avert their eyes from all personal and political considerations? If those are allowed to interfere, all the rest, I admit, goes for little or nothing. Justice Shallow supposed, when Falstaff preferred Wart to Bullcalf, that the Knight did not know how to choose a recruit; but Bardolph was in the secret, and knew better.

I have nothing to add upon this painful subject. If the statement in p. 6. of the Report, "that the chief of the department is naturally led to regard the selection of a new junior clerk as a matter of small moment, and will probably bestow the office upon the son or dependent of some one having personal or political claims upon him," &c., is correct, no one, I think, will hesitate to pronounce this part of the existing system to be open to improvement—no one will deem it necessary to ask or to answer the question what that improvement ought to be.

I have very little to say upon the suggestions contained in the Report for the improvement of the efficiency of the clerks when appointed. I have already observed that, though its authors state the separation of intellectual from mechanical labour to be desirable, they do not appear to be able to devise any mode of accomplishing that object, and I confess myself to be in the same predicament. I quite agree that the occasional transfer of clerks from one department of an office to another may be very useful, and even necessary, as the business of the different departments fluctuates; whether it would be advisable to do so systematically, I feel some doubt.

With respect to the very delicate and difficult question of promotion by merit, every one, I presume, would agree in the principle to this extent, that a person who zealously performs his duty to the best of his ability should rise more certainly and more rapidly than one who is negligent and careless; that a man of superior abilities should emerge before a dunce, and so on in extreme cases. This however already happens to a great extent, the real difficulty lying in the intermediate degrees of merit, where the difference is not so marked as to prevent favouritism from operating. The plan proposed in page 20 of the Report does not appear to me to afford a solution of this difficulty. The whole is to turn upon reports, remarks, and certificates of superiors relative to the abilities and conduct of their inferiors, to which of course the former can give what colour they please. I should be extremely happy if any scheme occurred to me by which pure, simple, unadulterated merit, without the slightest admixture of other ingredients, could be made the sole criterion of advancement. If such a discovery should ever be made, it would probably be founded upon some new view of human nature, and would certainly not be confined in its operation to the Civil Service, but would extend its benign influence over all services, trades, and professions.

As to the suggestions in pp. 21 and 22, for giving encouragement to meritorious public servants, by ample superannuation allowances, good service pensions, honorary distinctions, and promotions to all important situations, for which they have shown themselves to be qualified, they have my entire concurrence. There is quite merit enough among the existing members of the Civil Service to give a full and fair trial to these just and generous recommendations, and, what is in my judgment a great advantage, no Board of Examiners is required to carry them out.

SIR A. Y. SPEARMAN, BART.,

Lately Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, and now Secretary and Comptroller General of the National Debt Office.

It appears to me to be impossible to reply to the reference which has been made to me, and by which I am desired to state "my view of the general principles of the Report of Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote, which has been laid before Parliament, and whether I consider the existing arrangements for making first appointments, and for promoting the subsequent efficiency of the persons appointed, open to any, and, if any, to what improvement," without first adverting to that part of the Report in which Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Stafford Northcote point out what they deem the mischievous effects of the present system of appointment and promotion, and what they suppose to be the condition of the Civil Service as it now exists, since it is to provide a remedy against, and to put an end to the great evils they describe, that the changes proposed by them are recommended.

It is stated, that while "it would be natural to expect that so important a profession would attract into its ranks the ablest and most ambitious youth of the country, that the keenest emulation would prevail among those who had entered it, and that such as were endowed with superior qualifications would rapidly rise to distinction and public eminence, such is by no means the case; that admission into the Civil Service is indeed eagerly sought after, but that it is for the unambitious, the indolent, or incapable, that it is chiefly desired; that those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that they will succeed

“ in the open professions, where they must encounter the  
 “ competition of their contemporaries, and those whom  
 “ indolence of temperament or physical infirmities unfit  
 “ for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where  
 “ they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little la-  
 “ bour and with no risk, where their success depends upon  
 “ their simply avoiding any flagrant misconduct and at-  
 “ tending with moderate regularity to routine duties, the  
 “ comparative lightness of the work, and the certainty of  
 “ provision in case of retirement owing to bodily incapacity,  
 “ furnishing strong inducements to the parents and friends  
 “ of sickly youths to obtain them employment in the ser-  
 “ vice of the Government; that the extent to which the  
 “ public are consequently burdened, first with the salaries  
 “ of officers who are obliged to absent themselves from  
 “ their duties on account of ill health, and afterwards with  
 “ their pensions when they retire on the same plea, being  
 “ what would hardly be credited by those who have not  
 “ had opportunities of observing the operation of the  
 “ system.”

It is admitted, indeed, that it is not intended “ to suggest  
 “ that all public servants entered the employment with  
 “ such views as these,—that there are numerous honourable  
 “ exceptions, the trustworthiness of the entire body being  
 “ unimpeachable, much better, indeed, than could have  
 “ been expected from the system under which they are  
 “ promoted and appointed; but, as regards a large pro-  
 “ portion of them, the motives above referred to more or  
 “ less influenced those who acted for them in the choice  
 “ of a profession, the result being, naturally, that the  
 “ public service suffers both in internal efficiency and in  
 “ public estimation.”

The inference to be drawn from these observations,  
 coming from such authority, undoubtedly appears to be  
 that, as a general rule, the appointments are bestowed  
 upon the incapable, the indolent, and the sickly; that  
 such persons are not only received, but are promoted by  
 the heads of departments, and that the proper remedy for  
 the deplorable state of the Civil Service, consequent upon  
 such a system of appointment and promotion, is only to  
 be found in the plan proposed, by which an end would be  
 put to the patronage of the Crown, and all admissions to  
 the Civil Service made to depend upon the fiat of a board  
 of examiners, independent, by its tenure of office, of the  
 authority of the Crown.

My own clear conviction is, however, that the state and  
 condition of the Civil Service is not such as is described  
 in those parts of the Report I have adverted to. I do not  
 think that it is composed, *in a large proportion*, of the  
 indolent, the incapable, and the sickly; for, I believe, on  
 the contrary, that it contains within its ranks, men of  
 good education, of great knowledge and ability, capable  
 of discharging, with honour to themselves and advantage  
 to the public, any duties which may be entrusted to them,  
 in numbers as considerable as will be found in any other  
 profession, with reference to the mass, and to the duties to  
 be performed; although there, no doubt, are, as in all  
 other professions, others of inferior capacity, and some  
 of infirm health. I believe, in fact, that what is the  
 exception has been taken as the rule, while that which is  
 the rule has been adverted to as the exception.

I do not mean to say that there are not to be found  
 offices badly organized, into which unqualified persons  
 may have been received, and in which undeserved pro-  
 motions may have been made, and where the efficiency  
 of the service has consequently been injured; but wherever  
 that has been the case, I think the evil more attributable  
 to those at the head of the department than to the system  
 on which the Civil Service is really constituted, as I  
 understand it; because, it appears to me, that public  
 duty requires, first, that no person nominated to a vacancy  
 should be accepted unless he be found fit; and, secondly,  
 that no person should be advanced to a higher seat if unfit  
 to discharge properly the duties of it.

And, I believe, that where the heads of departments  
 are governed by these principles, they are sure of support  
 from the superior authorities; and that, in point of fact, it  
 would be difficult, if not impossible, for the superior  
 authorities to resist the official reports and recommenda-  
 tions of the immediate heads of departments, even were  
 they disposed to attempt it, which I am very far from  
 supposing.

In speaking of the Civil Service, however, as a pro-  
 fession, we must never forget what that service really is,  
 or what is expected from its members. We should only  
 deceive ourselves if we entertained an expectation that it  
 can be made attractive to young men of high ability,  
 commanding talent, and great intellectual attainments, in  
 considerable numbers, even with such an entire change as  
 that recommended, which would, in my opinion, risk its  
 efficiency as a whole.

“The ablest and most ambitious youth of the country” will naturally go where the prizes are really worth the struggle. There can be no such prizes, and no such opportunities of distinction in the Civil Service of the Crown, *out of Parliament*, as are open in the other lines and professions. But a seat in Parliament is absolutely prohibited to the civil servant of the Crown of whom we are speaking:—He is excluded from it by his position as a civil servant, and can only attain that distinction and honour by a sacrifice which can scarcely be expected even from those who feel most strongly their own power, because he must surrender his permanent position with no hope of returning to it, and with the chance of entire failure. This is not the case in any other profession.

In the Civil Service of the Crown no man can, therefore, however great his talents or extensive his acquirements, look to such prizes in income or in rank, as are open in the Church, in the medical profession, and through the bar, or to any of those high and honourable rewards which attend great services in the military profession.

His place is more humble, but it is useful; and, accordingly, what is expected from him does not require those talents and acquirements which lead to success in other professions. You want integrity, diligence, patience, application, entire trustworthiness, and a fair amount of education, gentlemanlike habits, and good moral conduct. You may now and then find a brilliant man, who will patiently and diligently labour at the technical and dry details which form so large a part of the duty of the public officer; but if you expect it as a rule, you will be disappointed, even if you make the ultimate reward far greater than it now is. You may undoubtedly work with too fine an instrument, and where you do you will assuredly find that it will become useless.

The most important situations under the Government, those which would attract the highest ambition, are, and must necessarily, as I have said, be held by members of the Legislature; and, supposing all others were thrown open to those in the service whose merit and capacity are most conspicuous, the highest promotion to which even then they could attain, however commanding the talent, would be a seat in a commission, the chair at a board, the office of Under Secretary of State, or Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. And how small a number, after all, would those prizes be—how small in number the annual vacancies

to be filled up—only one or two, perhaps, in several years. And would they call in great ambition and vast ability in masses? I do not think they would; nor do I think it would be an advantage to the public service if they did; because I feel sure that that disappointment would certainly follow, which would end in disgust, from failure of rapid advancement.

There can, however, be no doubt, that if it be understood in the Civil Service that such offices as those above referred to would always be filled by selection from the ranks, if persons properly qualified were there to be found, a great additional stimulus would be given to exertion; but any such arrangement must undoubtedly be so framed as to reserve to the Crown the right of selecting the proper man, whether in or out of the public service. Some few such appointments have been made before, and it would be a good extension of the practice. Within my own recollection, two gentlemen have been selected from the ranks of the Foreign Office to fill the station of Under Secretary of State, and two of your own immediate predecessors were appointed from the ranks of the Treasury.

It would not be difficult to point out others, if it were necessary; and very lately, as we all know, a gentleman of high qualifications and great knowledge has been transferred from the Pay Office, after a considerable public service, to fill an office of very great importance in the Treasury,—on which establishment there happened to be at the time no person fully qualified for that particular promotion,—being himself replaced at the Pay Office by promotion from the Audit Office. Arrangements such as these, and good selections, will really improve the public service, and secure great efforts, in the hope they may lead to such promotion.

To split the Civil Service, however, as might be apprehended to be in contemplation, into two parts,—a lower and far larger class to be occupied about one description of business, an upper and far smaller class to be employed in business of a somewhat higher character,—the one to be decidedly inferior in rank and prospects to the other, and to be directed and controlled by it, although not possessing that knowledge which is best, and can indeed be alone gained by working right through,—would, it seems to me, greatly impair its efficiency as a whole, and would, besides, be unjust to those who enter into the lower class.

The object sought to be attained will never, I think, be

reached in that way. In the lower class many will always be found full of ability, full of knowledge, thoroughly capable of discharging the duties of the higher class, entirely deserving of promotion from merit, knowledge, and good conduct; and is it possible to expect that such men will be content to see themselves kept in a position out of which they have no chance or but little chance of advancement, while younger men, their inferiors in that knowledge which is really useful, but somewhat better educated, perhaps, are introduced above them, and are, as a class, kept above them? I do not see how such a system is to work beneficially, although it may, in some very few cases, be possible; but I should be sorry to see it introduced as a system. It would be to create a great class of clerks of an inferior grade, and a smaller body privileged for promotion; the smaller class depending, at all events during the earlier part of its service, upon the first, for all that traditional and practical knowledge without which the cleverest and best informed men on general subjects must be dependent, in a considerable degree, on those below them; a system I have ever thought full of injustice to the individual, and very injurious to the service.

It is upwards of forty-six years since I first entered the Civil Service of the Crown in its humblest rank; and I speak from practical experience and personal knowledge, when I express my opinion, that such a system would be injurious as well as unjust.

I by no means think that the Civil Service is in a perfect state, or that it cannot be improved,—that the system of first appointment and subsequent promotion cannot be amended in practice; but I think such amendment would not best come from adopting the leading recommendations in the Report.

That no person should be appointed unless he is well qualified, admits of no dispute; but I do not think that a competing examination will necessarily produce the best man for the particular duties to be discharged. No examination will be worth anything unless it be in a special manner devoted to the duties of the particular office to which the appointment is to be made. Very different qualifications are required to make a good clerk in the Foreign Office from those which will make an excellent clerk in the Customs; although, no doubt, the latter will not be qualified at all unless sufficiently educated.

And, while I think that such a competing examination as has been suggested would not produce the clerks best fitted for the requirements of the public service, I certainly do not at all concur in the recommendation that the examination should be open to all comers; that it should be imperative to elect the persons certified by the examiners; that the patronage of the Crown should, in fact, be taken away, and the right of determining who is and who is not to be appointed delegated to a board of examiners. For, in the first place, it appears to me, that such a board as that proposed would not be the most competent for determining the question; and next, to deprive the Crown of the right of first nomination, exercised through its executive officers, in addition to the other evils which are obvious, would take away from it the power of rewarding merit and service, which is often the strongest inducement to exertion, and the most graceful reward for long and good service,—the right of nominating a son on account of the claims and merits of the father.

I think, therefore, that as to first appointment, the right of nomination should continue where it is now vested; that it should be exercised subject to the responsibility of the person making the nomination, and subject to such an examination, to be conducted by those who are responsible for the good management of their department and best know what is required, as will ensure the rejection of all persons not duly qualified; that when appointed, the appointment should be on probation for twelve months, and that no person on probation should be confirmed, unless, during the twelve months, he has shown, by his whole conduct, to the satisfaction of the superior authorities of the department, that there is every reason to believe he will be capable of fully discharging all his duties, and give fair promise that he will thereafter be qualified for advancement.

With respect to promotion, it is impossible to deny that there is a failure in public duty whenever a person is advanced into a station, the duties of which he cannot properly discharge. I doubt however, the possibility of carrying out a stringent rule that the *fittest* person shall always be selected from a whole establishment. The latitude of choice thus given, not only opens the door to the suspicion of favouritism,—and such suspicion seriously injures the service,—but makes it almost impossible to avoid it. It is, besides, pretty sure, unless a whole establishment

admits the justice of the selection, to break down the spirit of those who are passed over, and are deserving, from good conduct, capacity, and ability of promotion, although perhaps in some things inferior to the selected party.

Except in very rare cases, and for the higher ranks, it appears to me that seniority, combined with good conduct, merit, and fitness, should ensure the promotion; but on no account should seniority alone prevail. What is really required in promotion is, that the services of a thoroughly qualified person are secured; and when the senior possesses such qualities, I think he is entitled to expect it. I am sure the public is best served by officers and clerks entirely disposed to believe that in their several departments they are treated with fairness and justice, and I fear the duty of selecting the *most fit*, in the opinion of the presiding officer alone, would be calculated to shake that confidence it is so necessary to secure and to maintain, unless such selection shall be for posts requiring extraordinary qualifications, or out of the immediate line.

To the occasional transfer, however, of officers highly qualified and distinguished, to other offices where such strength may be really wanting, there can, in my opinion, as I have already said, not only be no objection, but, I confess it seems to me, that very great advantage has actually been derived from the exercise of such a power. But such a system of interchange will never work well if adopted as a rule, or unless it be clearly apparent that the establishment reinforced is absolutely in need of it. I do not think any one in any office has any right to promotion when he is not qualified for it, and no wrong is done where, on public grounds and for the public advantage, an efficient man already in the service is placed in an office in which there appears to be at the time no one duly qualified to discharge the duties of the vacant place. Unless, however, it shall be quite clear that there is no duly qualified person upon the establishment, I think the advantage of the public service will be best consulted by promotion running through the establishment whenever properly qualified persons are found within it.

G. ARBUTHNOT, Esq., Auditor of the Civil List,

To the Lords of H.M. Treasury.

Treasury Chambers, March 6, 1854.

A REPORT by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, having been recently presented to Parliament, has become a public document, and is open to public comment.

In that Report there are expressions which appear to me to reflect strongly on the character of the individuals of whom the Civil Service is composed. It admits that "the Permanent Civil Service, with all its defects, contributes to the proper discharge of the functions of Government;" but it proceeds to state that admission into that Service is chiefly sought after "for the un-ambitious, the indolent, or incapable;" that "those whose abilities do not warrant that they will succeed in the open professions, where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries, and those whom indolence of temperament and physical infirmities unfit for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour and no risk."

Such language, employed by gentlemen who had a solemn and responsible duty imposed on them by your Lordships, is calculated to convey a very unfavourable impression regarding the general characteristics of the Civil Service, and to create a very painful feeling in the minds of an honourable class of men, whose labours are little known, and who, from their position, have no opportunity of coming forward to justify themselves before the public.

It may appear irregular to refer, in connexion with this question, to observations in a public journal; but I cannot avoid allusion to an article in the *Times* newspaper, which appeared a short time previously to the presentation of the Report, and in which the same opinions were conveyed in expressions still more severe and offensive. It is impossible