

admits the justice of the selection, to break down the spirit of those who are passed over, and are deserving, from good conduct, capacity, and ability of promotion, although perhaps in some things inferior to the selected party.

Except in very rare cases, and for the higher ranks, it appears to me that seniority, combined with good conduct, merit, and fitness, should ensure the promotion; but on no account should seniority alone prevail. What is really required in promotion is, that the services of a thoroughly qualified person are secured; and when the senior possesses such qualities, I think he is entitled to expect it. I am sure the public is best served by officers and clerks entirely disposed to believe that in their several departments they are treated with fairness and justice, and I fear the duty of selecting the *most fit*, in the opinion of the presiding officer alone, would be calculated to shake that confidence it is so necessary to secure and to maintain, unless such selection shall be for posts requiring extraordinary qualifications, or out of the immediate line.

To the occasional transfer, however, of officers highly qualified and distinguished, to other offices where such strength may be really wanting, there can, in my opinion, as I have already said, not only be no objection, but, I confess it seems to me, that very great advantage has actually been derived from the exercise of such a power. But such a system of interchange will never work well if adopted as a rule, or unless it be clearly apparent that the establishment reinforced is absolutely in need of it. I do not think any one in any office has any right to promotion when he is not qualified for it, and no wrong is done where, on public grounds and for the public advantage, an efficient man already in the service is placed in an office in which there appears to be at the time no one duly qualified to discharge the duties of the vacant place. Unless, however, it shall be quite clear that there is no duly qualified person upon the establishment, I think the advantage of the public service will be best consulted by promotion running through the establishment whenever properly qualified persons are found within it.

G. ARBUTHNOT, Esq., Auditor of the Civil List,

To the Lords of H.M. Treasury.

Treasury Chambers, March 6, 1854.

A REPORT by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan, on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service, having been recently presented to Parliament, has become a public document, and is open to public comment.

In that Report there are expressions which appear to me to reflect strongly on the character of the individuals of whom the Civil Service is composed. It admits that "the Permanent Civil Service, with all its defects, contributes to the proper discharge of the functions of Government;" but it proceeds to state that admission into that Service is chiefly sought after "for the un-ambitious, the indolent, or incapable;" that "those whose abilities do not warrant that they will succeed in the open professions, where they must encounter the competition of their contemporaries, and those whom indolence of temperament and physical infirmities unfit for active exertions, are placed in the Civil Service, where they may obtain an honourable livelihood with little labour and no risk."

Such language, employed by gentlemen who had a solemn and responsible duty imposed on them by your Lordships, is calculated to convey a very unfavourable impression regarding the general characteristics of the Civil Service, and to create a very painful feeling in the minds of an honourable class of men, whose labours are little known, and who, from their position, have no opportunity of coming forward to justify themselves before the public.

It may appear irregular to refer, in connexion with this question, to observations in a public journal; but I cannot avoid allusion to an article in the *Times* newspaper, which appeared a short time previously to the presentation of the Report, and in which the same opinions were conveyed in expressions still more severe and offensive. It is impossible

to disconnect the Report altogether from the article in the *Times*, because it was evident that the writer had access to information not then before the public; and I may refer to that article in proof of the impression which this journalist derived from the information communicated to him. I cannot conceal from your Lordships that the attack upon the Public Service, published in an influential journal, and bearing the appearance of authority, created a strong feeling of indignation in the minds of the Civil Servants, which has been confirmed and strengthened since they found the same opinions reiterated in a public and formal document.

I submit, my Lords, that charges so serious against the general body of the Public Servants ought not to be lightly put forth; and, as I trust that I shall be able to satisfy your Lordships that the imputations cast against that body are undeserved, I presume, as the senior in rank, or at any rate the nearest to your Board of the class of officers which is aggrieved, to approach you on their behalf, with an humble but most earnest remonstrance against the publication of such aspersions in the authentic form of a State Paper.

It is not easy to understand how a Service, if composed of the materials described in the Report, should deserve even the meed of praise which is accorded to it of "contributing essentially to the proper discharge of the functions of Government;" nor, if the motives which are said to influence those who seek admission to the Service should generally prevail, how "the trustworthiness of the entire body" should yet be "unimpeached."

These contradictions are so palpable that I should almost hope that the Report, though dated the 23d November 1853, and not presented to Parliament until nearly the end of February 1854, had been composed in haste, and that its writers were hardly aware of the force of the expressions which they have used. Yet that those expressions amount to a general charge against the body of Civil Servants cannot be denied. It is asserted distinctly that "the Public Service suffers both in internal efficiency and in public estimation" from the causes assigned; that "the character of the individuals influences the mass, and that it is thus that we often hear complaints of official delays, official evasions of difficulty, and official indisposition to improvement."

My Lords, I aver that these are unjust imputations.

They are unfounded both in respect of alleged causes and effects. Even if the complaints alleged had a substantial existence, they could not be attributed to the causes from which they are said to proceed. I appeal from the authors of this Report to statesmen, high in the estimation of the public, who have had ample opportunities of ascertaining the qualities of the Civil Service, and who, though differing in political opinions, have agreed in their testimony to the general uprightness, the zeal and efficiency of the officers of whom it is composed, and to the willing and useful aid which is rendered by them to all administrations without reference to politics. I appeal from this Report to Sir Charles Trevelyan himself, if he still recollects the time when he first came to the Treasury, an entire stranger to the Service, and necessarily unacquainted with the forms of procedure, and even the principles which govern the routine of a public office in England. He once owned that at that period he found among the gentlemen of this office intelligence, activity, and that willing aid and co-operation, without which he could not have mastered the ordinary details of his duty. He has, on later occasions, when circumstances called forth some public acknowledgment of the merits of those officers, expressed a feeling of pride at being a member of that Service, which he now condemns as largely composed of "the unambitious, the indolent, and the incapable."

I should rest our cause with confidence on a reference to the authorities to whom I have alluded; but I will cite some examples within the immediate cognizance of your Lordships, in proof that whatever faults may be attributable to the Public Service, cannot with justice be assigned to the causes stated in the Report.

I will refer to the case of the three officers of your Lordships' Board, acting immediately under the Secretaries, viz., myself and the two principal clerks. We were all selected from the ordinary class of clerks. We obtained our appointments to the Public Service, originally, by the favour of the First Lord of the Treasury for the time being. None of us were distinguished in any respect by extraordinary educational attainments; and we had no other recommendation for the preference shown to us in our promotion, than that knowledge of the business of the office which we had opportunities of acquiring in the course of a long and faithful service. We have a right to conclude, from the confidence which is reposed in us, that our

duties are efficiently performed. And, my Lords, even you yourselves can hardly appreciate the extent of that confidence. When you see the result of our labours in the papers which are laid before you, you can hardly be aware of the extent to which the public interests might suffer, if our attention to our duties was less careful and less conscientious. I do not say this from any feeling of self-commendation, but when the order to which we belong is disparaged before the public, we are forced to allude to these circumstances in self-defence, and I feel that we may do so with honest pride.

But it may be said that the Report does not refer to officers in our position, and that it admits that "there are numerous honourable exceptions to the observations" contained in it. My Lords, we cannot consent to accept an apology at the expense of others, who, if they had equal opportunities afforded them, would be equally deserving of your approbation. There are younger officers in the department who are already favourably known to your Lordships; there are many others who, if they have failed hitherto to distinguish themselves, have failed only because their talents have not been called forth. Zealous and efficient service has seldom been wanting when it has been required. Whatever defects are attributable (and I admit there are many) to this and some other departments of State, are attributable more to defective organization than to the individuals composing them. The fault is not generally in the materials, but in the bad use which is made of them, and this is a fault which lies at the door of the heads of the offices, not of the clerks who are admitted into them.

Though I have confined these observations chiefly by way of illustration to the Treasury, they will apply with equal force to other departments; and, in proof of the correctness of this assertion, I refer your Lordships to offices which are well organized, and which, in consequence of such organization, are distinguished for zeal and energy. Examples of these results are not wanting among the great departments of State; but the subject will be even more strongly illustrated by a reference to the Revenue departments.

It was my fortune to enter the Public Service about the period (1820) when Lord Liverpool, with a patriotism for which he never received due credit, voluntarily surrendered the influence obtained by the power of making direct

appointments to the superior offices in the Customs department, for the purpose of improving the efficiency of that service. From that period, all collectorships and other offices of importance were filled by the advancement of officers already in the Service, instead of by the appointment of strangers to it on political recommendations; and in the year 1827 the principle was organized by the establishment of a graduated system of promotion throughout the Service, proceeding partly according to seniority, but, as respects the superior offices, entirely by selection. I have watched the commencement and development of this system. It has been found to work well; and in the late investigations into the department, conducted with critical severity, no imputations were raised, amidst all the outcry in regard to forms of procedure, against the general efficiency of the establishment. Proofs of the estimation in which this extended system of promotion is held by the public has been afforded by a clause in the recent Customs Act, by which two-fifths of vacant landing-waiterships are required to be filled by the promotion of officers of an inferior grade, thus further enlarging the area of promotion, and opening to officers of the lowest rank the opportunity for eventual advancement to the highest offices in the Service—a measure which, it may be observed, is in a contrary direction from the recommendations contained in this Report.

The department of Inland Revenue is regulated on the same principle, and successful efforts have been made recently to improve the general character of the Service, by requiring a higher standard of qualification for admission, and by the education of the most promising young officers of Excise in those branches of chemistry the knowledge of which is useful in the business of the Service.

In both these departments, the secretaryships have been filled, in successive appointments for many years past, by the advancement of officers who had acquired experience in the routine work of the Service; and I believe every one will admit that they are ably filled.

These results have been obtained by attention to the detailed organization of the establishments, and afford an answer to the allegations in the Report regarding the assumed inaptitude of the Civil Servants.

There is one other statement in the Report to which I must request the attention of your Lordships, connected

with the imputations of inefficiency in the Civil Service. I allude to the following paragraph:

“It may be noticed in particular that the comparative lightness of the work, and the certainty of provision in case of retirement owing to bodily incapacity, furnish strong inducements to the parents and friends of sickly youths to endeavour to obtain for them employment in the service of the Government; and the extent to which the public are consequently burdened, first with the salaries of officers who are obliged to absent themselves from their duties on account of ill health, and afterwards with their pensions when they retire on the same plea, would hardly be credited by those who have not had opportunities of observing the operation of the system.”

If this be a correct statement, it would convey a grave imputation, not so much on the administrators of patronage, as upon the heads of departments who retain such men in the Public Service beyond the usual term of probation, and upon your Lordships, for sanctioning the grant of pensions under such circumstances. But it is evident that there must be some great misapprehension on the subject. I need hardly point out to your Lordships that, as under the Superannuation Act, no retired allowances can be granted until after ten years' service, and then only upon certificates of regular attendance and diligent service, such cases as those referred to could only have occurred by an evasion of the regulations, and of the vigilant scrutiny which all claims of this nature undergo in the Superannuation Committee of your Board.

I do not know what isolated cases may be adduced in support of the assertion in the Report, but if such cases were of frequent occurrence, as is inferred, the obvious effect would be that the retired list would be burdened with a large number of persons, who obtained pensions after short terms of service. This, however, is far from being the case. I find on reference to the record of retired allowances granted in the last three years, which may be taken as affording a fair average, that the allowances granted to officers holding the rank of clerks, who retired on account of bodily infirmity, after a service of less than fifteen years, were as follows, viz:—

In 1851, six persons, whose aggregate allowances amount to 208*l*.

In 1852, eight persons, whose aggregate allowances amount to 241*l*.

In 1853, two persons, whose aggregate allowances amount to 76*l*.

With such results in a service so numerous, and in which the constitutions of many suffer from the change at early life to a sedentary occupation, it may indeed be well observed that “the extent to which the public are burdened,” on this account, “would hardly be credited by those who have not had opportunities of observing the operation of the system;” but the wonder excited will be in the opposite direction of that indicated in the Report.

In the Customs Department there is already, although it is a fact with which the framers of this Report do not appear to have acquainted themselves, a very strict medical examination regarding the health of persons nominated to the Service, and the recommendation by which a similar system of medical inspection would be extended to other departments is a good one; but it is to be regretted that it should have been suggested in a manner to convey the unfounded inference that, among other alleged defects, the sickly find in large numbers a refuge in the Civil Service.

I trust that I have now satisfied your Lordships that the wholesale imputations in this Report against the officers of the Permanent Civil Service are not borne out. It is not to be denied that there are many defects in our system. I am sure that none would more zealously co-operate in removing them than the superior officers who belong to, or have risen from, the class which is so gravely censured; and I respectfully submit that the object of reformation will be more effectually promoted by inviting such co-operation, than by exciting the feeling of resentment which must arise from a false and injurious cry.

I have troubled your Lordships at great length on a subject in which I feel a deep interest, less on my own account, personally, than from a regard to that respectable body of public servants to which I belong, the members of which are acutely sensible of unmerited imputations, in proportion as their services are removed from the immediate cognizance of Government, and are therefore comparatively unknown; and I earnestly demand at the hands of your Lordships that this vindication of their character, which I have presumed to address to you on behalf of the whole class of permanent Civil Servants, may be per-

mitted to have equal currency with the Report to which it refers.

I have thus far confined my observations to those passages in the Report which cast censure upon the officers of the Civil Service; but I will venture to add some remarks upon the general scheme which it proposes for the organization of the Civil Service.

I do not understand that the recommendations contained in the Report have yet received the final sanction of your Lordships, and as the measure, which was announced from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, on the subject of the administration of the civil patronage, is not necessarily dependent on the details of the scheme proposed by Sir S. Northcote and Sir C. Trevelyan, I trust that in offering some comments upon that scheme, I shall not be considered as putting myself forward in the light of an opponent to the declared intentions of Her Majesty's Government. I trust, also, that I shall not be presuming too much on the confidence with which I have always been treated by your Lordships, in offering these comments unasked; but, in truth, it appears to me that I should fail in my duty to your Board if I omitted to bring before you considerations, founded on the experience of a long service, in respect to proposals which, as they involve a great change of system in departmental administration, may, if they are not well sifted, lead to consequences highly injurious.

Although I have contended earnestly in behalf of the general body of the officers of that Service against imputations which, as applied to the class, are unmerited, I am far from denying that there is much that requires amendment, and that some of the measures proposed in the Report may have a beneficial effect. Those especially which refer to a strict probationary course, to promotion by merit, and to the extension of rewards for exertion, would, if duly guarded, be conducive to emulation, and tend to advance the character of the Service. But there are other proposals in the Report which I regard with great apprehension, and which I believe that most men of long experience in the Public Service concur with me in considering as at least involving changes of doubtful expediency.

I refer especially to the imputed defect of "the fragmentary character" of the Civil Service, and the recommendations founded upon that notion for introducing into it what are termed "elements of unity."

Coupled with this branch of the subject, may be considered that part of the Report which suggests a separation of intellectual from mechanical labour.

I conceive that the suggestions on these points proceed from a misapprehension of the functions which the permanent Civil Officers of the Crown are required to discharge.

They cannot be compared with the officers of the Indian Service, who are trained for the administration of subjected provinces, and rise to the dignity of legislators; nor will their position be illustrated by a reference to the case of civil functionaries of continental states.

Our Constitution vests the legislation in Members of Parliament, and the Ministers of the Crown are necessarily selected from that order. The officers of our Civil Service cannot in ordinary cases aspire to become statesmen, and to carry out systems of policy. Their humble but useful duty is, by becoming depositaries of departmental traditions, and by their practical acquaintance with the working of those laws, by which constitutional jealousy has guarded the Civil administration, as they affect their own departments, to keep the current business in its due course; to warn Ministers of the consequences of irregular proceedings into which they might inadvertently fall; to aid in preparing subjects for legislation; and possibly to assist by their suggestions the development of a course of reform. To fulfil these duties with efficiency, it is necessary that, as a general rule, each man's experience should be confined to the special branch of the Service in which he is himself engaged. Such is the complicated character of our institutions, that, without such division of labour, no man could obtain that intimate acquaintance with details, and the bearing of those details upon general principles, which constitute the distinction between the permanent executive officers and the members of Government who are charged with the duty of administration.

Occasionally the transfer of officers from one department to another of a cognate character, may be attended with advantage, and infuse new life into a waning office; but, as a general rule, promotion within each department is preferable, and forms an essential feature in the system of organization which has been attended with so much success in the establishments to which I have above referred. A good Treasury officer would make a very

inefficient head of a department in the Foreign Office, and *vice versa*.

The effect of this "fragmental" division is not, I believe, "to encourage the growth of narrow views and departmental prejudices," or "to limit the acquisition of experience," to an extent injurious to the Service. If such prejudices are sometimes engendered, the reproach is not peculiar to the Civil Service. Learned and scientific bodies, the Law, the Church, the Legislature, are all open to a similar charge. Prejudice is, in fact, but the exaggeration of that safeguard against rash innovation which is afforded by peculiar knowledge or experience.

The proposal for the separation of the intellectual from mechanical labour is to some extent mixed up with the views stated in the Report condemnatory of the departmental system. It is true that in most offices there is a large amount of mere copying work, which when not of a confidential character may be entrusted with advantage to an inferior class of clerks. It is a matter of discretion to what extent recourse ought to be had to this description of assistance. In some few departments, also, the duties of the administrative or directing functionaries are so distinct from those of the clerks who carry into effect the routine duties, that the line of demarcation is easily drawn. But in the great mass of the Revenue departments a thorough acquaintance with forms is so essential to a full comprehension of the business to be carried on, that to fulfil the superior offices satisfactorily a previous apprenticeship in the inferior classes is essential. In order to direct details effectively, an officer ought to know how to do them himself. In order to become acquainted with technical or legal phraseology, the young clerk must begin by copying documents. As in professional pursuits, the efficient Civil Servant is formed by making him in the first instance a good workman. The most distinguished officers of this class commenced early in life at the drudgery of the desk. It is upon this principle that the system of promotion which has worked so well in the Customs has been established, and the value of the theory which would disturb that system has yet to be tested.

I have avoided all reference to the plan proposed for recruiting the Civil Service by the system of a competing literary examination, but I cannot refrain from impressing upon your Lordships the fact, upon which I apprehend there can be little dispute, that the real practical education

of an official man must be within the office; and that there will be danger lest, in case a supplementary class of clerks are introduced, as proposed, into the lower ranks—those men, by acquiring a superior mastery of the details of an office, may become its most efficient servants, and be really more eligible for promotion (from which they will yet be debarred) than the class who are to be admitted with the recommendation of superior mental cultivation.

In all the public departments there is a vast amount of mere routine work, which yet requires attention, ability, and, above all, integrity. A very large majority of the Public Servants must be engaged in such occupation, and few can emerge from it to superior situations. The few prizes may be a great stimulus to the mass, when all are contending for them; but it cannot be pretended that the immediate work requires a high order of intellectual attainment. There will be, on the one hand, danger lest persons having high claims on the ground of intellectual attainment, and stimulated by the expectation of a prize, find themselves condemned among the mass to a life of hopeless drudgery. On the other hand, if to avoid this result the best appointments are reserved for an intellectual class, the general body of the Civil Servants will be disheartened and degraded in character.

I have ventured to bring these points under your Lordships' notice, as deserving of consideration in connexion with that part of the Report which appears to contemplate a complete separation of classes, and an uniformity of system in the scheme for the organization of the Civil Service; because, if I understand the project aright, its integrity depends on the adoption of this principle, and I apprehend much difficulty in applying it to the varying requirements of the public departments. There are many other details, not yet clearly developed, which will doubtless engage the serious attention of your Lordships' Board.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE and SIR C. TREVELYAN

To the Lords of H.M. Treasury.

Treasury, April 10, 1854.

Your Lordships having been pleased to communicate to us some remarks addressed to your Honourable Board by the Auditor of the Civil List on the Report which we

presented to your Lordships in November 1853, on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service, and having invited us to offer any observations thereon, we beg leave to tender to your Lordships our thanks for the opportunity thus afforded to us of explaining ourselves on points upon which our meaning appears to have been misunderstood, and of removing, as we trust we shall be able to do, some of the objections which have been urged against the proposals which we have made.

The remarks of Mr. Arbuthnot relate first, to the statements which we have made as to the actual state of the Permanent Civil Service; and secondly, to the plan which we have proposed for its re-organization. We will, therefore, address ourselves to these points in the same order.

In the first place, we beg leave to express our sincere regret that the language of any portion of our Report should have been such as to create a painful feeling in the minds of the able and honourable body of men composing the Service to which we ourselves belong, and with which we cannot but feel it an honour to be connected. We gladly take this opportunity of adding our own testimony to that of the more eminent persons to whom Mr. Arbuthnot refers, with respect to "the general uprightness, the zeal and efficiency of the officers of which it is composed, and to the willing and useful aid which is rendered by them to all administrations, without reference to politics;" and Sir Charles Trevelyan particularly desires, in answer to the appeal especially made to him, to repeat in the most emphatic manner his acknowledgments of the kind, hearty, and able co-operation for which he has long been and still is so largely indebted to the officers with whom he has the honour of being connected in the department over which your Lordships preside.

We admit that, looking to the effect which the publication of our remarks was likely to have upon the minds of persons less well acquainted with the Civil Service than your Lordships, it was an error on our part that we did not more distinctly express the sense we entertain of its merits; and we regret that we failed to do so; although we cannot but observe that it was in strictness unnecessary for us to enter into any other questions than those which your Lordships had proposed to us, viz., "the best mode of obtaining full security for the public that none but qualified persons would be appointed, and

"that they would afterwards have every practicable inducement to the active discharge of their duties." In the fulfilment of the task thus assigned to us, it became necessary for us to speak freely of the defects which we had observed in both these respects—defects which, as appears from the terms of the Minute which we have quoted, had already attracted your Lordships' attention, and the existence of which seems to us to be fully admitted in the remarks of Mr. Arbuthnot. The necessity thus imposed upon us was an irksome one; but a sense of duty forbade us to shrink from stating what we believed to be the truth. We endeavoured to make our remarks as little offensive as possible, and, before presenting our Report to your Lordships, we took the precaution of showing the draft of it to several eminent members of the Permanent Civil Service, who were kind enough to offer many valuable suggestions upon various points which we had dealt with.

With regard to the allusion which Mr. Arbuthnot has made to an article which appeared in the *Times* newspaper some time before the presentation of our Report to Parliament, we have only to say that we are in no way responsible for the language employed by the newspaper in question, that we are wholly ignorant of the authorship of the article which has been complained of, and that we are not aware that the writer possessed any other information on the subject than such as was to be obtained from a perusal of the Report, which, though not yet presented to Parliament, had been long since laid before your Lordships, and had been shown in a printed form to a considerable number of persons.

Turning now from these collateral questions to the substance of the Report itself, we have to observe, that its purport is to show that an important improvement may be effected in the Civil Service by raising the standard of admission into its ranks, by giving promotion according to merit, and by opening the highest situations in it to men who have distinguished themselves in subordinate positions.

In stating our reasons for these recommendations we have been compelled to call attention to the fact that a service in which the first admissions depend upon interest and not merit—in which promotion is generally regulated by seniority rather than by the services performed—and in which the most valuable appointments are systematically conferred upon strangers drawn from other pro-

fessions, cannot be expected, as a general rule, to attract men of ability and ambition if more promising careers are open to them; while, on the other hand, it possesses great attractions for such as cannot hope for success in other walks of life, or are unwilling to undergo the labour by which alone such success is to be attained.

We cannot admit that this statement of an indisputable fact is fairly to be treated as a "serious charge against the general body of Public Servants." It is against the system, and not against the individuals that we raise our objection: and, if we rightly understand Mr. Arbuthnot's views, he is as ready to condemn that system as we are ourselves.

Page 405.

Mr. Arbuthnot states, in page 3 of his printed letter, that he is about to cite to your Lordships some examples "in proof that whatever faults may be attributable to the public service, cannot with justice be assigned to the causes stated in the Report." Instead of doing this, however, he adduces examples drawn from three important public offices, which show that whatever peculiar merits there are in any branches of the Civil Service, may be attributed to the more or less perfect application of the principles of the Report.

In the first place, Mr. Arbuthnot refers, in terms of just commendation, to the officers of the Treasury, and especially to the three who act immediately under the Secretaries. These three officers, as your Lordships are aware, and as Mr. Arbuthnot himself shows, have been promoted to the situations which they respectively hold, not in order of seniority, but on the ground of their superior merit; and if an argument were wanting to show the advantage of the system of promotion by merit over that of promotion by seniority, the case of these gentlemen would supply an irresistible one.

The next department to which Mr. Arbuthnot refers is that of the Customs, the superior efficiency of which he attributes,—

1. To Lord Liverpool's abandonment of the system of appointing strangers to the superior offices, over the heads of those who have served long and faithfully in the lower ranks;

2. To the introduction of a qualified system of promotion by merit; and,

3. To the opening to officers of the lowest rank the opportunity for eventual advancement to the highest offices in the Service.

In other words, a system has been introduced into the department of Customs very similar, so far as the regulation of promotion is concerned, to that which we propose for the whole Public Service. It is most gratifying to us to find that Mr. Arbuthnot, who states that he has watched the commencement and the development of that system, bears testimony to its having worked well; and we trust that the experience of its success in one quarter will lead to its adoption in others also.

We observe that Mr. Arbuthnot describes the recent measure for opening a certain proportion of the higher appointments in the Customs to officers of an inferior grade, as "a measure which is in a contrary direction from the recommendations" of our Report. We are unable to account for so striking a misconception of the spirit of our recommendations. The systematic promotion of meritorious officers from the lower to the higher grades of the Service, is the object to which our whole plan is more distinctly directed than to any other; and the measure to which Mr. Arbuthnot refers, for promoting tide-waiters to landing-waiterships, in the event of their showing themselves to be fit for such promotion, is most strictly in accordance with the tenor of our scheme.

The last department to which Mr. Arbuthnot refers is that of Inland Revenue, a department which, as he says, is not only regulated on the same principle of promotion according to merit as the Office of Customs, but has also been distinguished by the "successful efforts which have been recently made to improve the general character of the Service, by requiring a higher standard of qualification for admission, and by the education of the most promising young officers of Excise" in certain branches of chemistry.

It will be perceived that in these remarks Mr. Arbuthnot completes the case which we have endeavoured to establish in our Report. The experience of the excellent working of the system of examinations upon the first admission of young men to the department of Inland Revenue has supplied us with a powerful argument for extending the same principle to other departments, as will be seen by a reference to our Report.

It appears, therefore, that in all the departments to which Mr. Arbuthnot has drawn the attention of your Lordships, the points which he considers worthy of especial commendation are those in which the principles of our

Report have been most nearly adopted. We consider that this fact is in itself sufficiently significant, and we shall spare ourselves the invidious task of particularising the offices in which a less satisfactory state of things prevails than in those to which allusion has been made. It cannot but be within the knowledge of every one who is acquainted with the Civil Service, that there are many departments to which young men are appointed, either absolutely without examination, or after one which is merely nominal; in which promotion is strictly regulated by seniority; and in which the secretaryships and other high appointments are seldom or never "filled by the advancement of officers who have acquired experience in the routine work of the Service."

With reference to the observations of Mr. Arbuthnot upon that portion of the Report in which we speak of the burden cast upon the public by the appointment of young men who are first obliged to absent themselves from their duties in consequence of ill-health, and afterwards to retire from the Service on the same ground, we have to remark that Mr. Arbuthnot has altogether refrained from noticing the first part of our statement, and has confined himself to showing that the number of cases in which retiring allowances have been granted to officers holding the rank of clerks leaving the Service between their tenth and fifteenth years, on the ground of ill-health, are not numerous.

The purport of our remark was to show that a considerable number of young men were appointed to the Civil Service, not because they were peculiarly suited to it, but because it was peculiarly suited to them. We might easily cite a number of cases in which men have been induced to enter it simply on account of its being a profession in which their health would be less likely to break down than in any other; and though amongst them we could mention some persons of great merit, we could also name others whose services are far less efficient than the public has a right to expect from men receiving the rates of salary which are assigned to them.

It was not our intention, in the passage which Mr. Arbuthnot quotes, to intimate that a large number of Civil servants retired on pensions as soon as they had completed the ten years' service which is necessary to obtain one. Men who have been appointed in an infirm state of health too often acquire in the course of those

ten years the habit of performing their daily work in a listless and inefficient manner, or else of absenting themselves frequently for short periods, by which means they contrive to retain their places in the service. When the ten years have expired, they become capable of receiving a small retiring allowance; but they know that the longer they remain the larger that allowance will be, and they have every inducement to endeavour to continue in the service as long as possible. Indeed, it sometimes happens that the chiefs of offices find it extremely difficult to induce men to retire on the ground of ill-health, though they are conscious that they are not efficient officers, because they are waiting for the completion of another period of service which is to entitle them to a somewhat higher scale of retiring allowance. We contend that the public are unduly burdened, both by having to pay the salaries of men who are not doing full work, and by having afterwards to pay their retiring allowances at whatever period of their service those allowances may be claimed; and so far are we from thinking it an answer to this argument, to say that comparatively few men retire immediately after completing the service of ten years, that we consider that the public loses much less by those who do so retire, than by those who remain for longer periods.

We are aware that it is difficult for us to state our case properly in this matter without entering into invidious details, which we desire to avoid. In order, however, to show that we have not made these remarks without foundation, we beg leave to call the attention of your Lordships to the correspondence between your Lordships' Board and the Master of the Rolls in the beginning of the year 1853, and to the illustration which that correspondence affords of the evil to which we have thought it right to draw attention.

From this correspondence it appears that between July 1840 and December 1852, eight junior clerks and one messenger belonging to the Public Record Establishment had been obliged to obtain leave of absence varying from three to six months, on the ground of ill-health. Three of these clerks died within a very few years after their appointments.

From a return prepared under the direction of Sir F. Palgrave, the Deputy-Keeper of the Records, it appeared

that in the year 1848, out of the twenty-one junior clerks the absences from illness were as follows :

1	-	-	-	222	working days.
1	-	-	-	156	"
1	-	-	-	79	"
1	-	-	-	78	"
1	-	-	-	54	"
10	-	-	-	varying from 2 to 13	days.

In the year 1849 the absences were :

1	-	-	-	156	days.
1	-	-	-	62	"
1	-	-	-	24	"
1	-	-	-	23	"
10	-	-	-	varying from 1 to 10	"

In the year 1850 the absences were :

1	-	-	-	61	days.
1	-	-	-	36	"
1	-	-	-	31	"
10	-	-	-	varying from 1 to 13	"

In the year 1851 the absences were :

1	-	-	-	147	days.
1	-	-	-	105	"
1	-	-	-	74	"
1	-	-	-	23	"
10	-	-	-	varying from 1 to 17	"

In the year 1852 the absences were :

1	-	-	-	56	days.
1	-	-	-	46	"
1	-	-	-	43	"
1	-	-	-	28	"
10	-	-	-	varying from 1 to 14	"

The total number of working days (not reckoning parts of days) which were thus lost to the Public Service in five years, by absences of junior clerks, occasioned by ill-health, was about 1799, or considerably more than the work of one clerk. Deductions were in some cases made from the salaries, and in some from the vacations allowed to the absentees; but the amount is nevertheless very serious, and very significant.

Sir Francis Palgrave remarks, that "in no private establishment, *e.g.*, a bank or solicitor's office, would clerks be permitted to absent themselves habitually as frequently

"as they do in this department; an individual so absenting himself would be simply told that his state of health incapacitated him for the employment." We restrict ourselves to this single instance, in pursuance of the course we have prescribed to ourselves of confining our allusions to personal details within the narrowest limits consistent with justice to this important question.

We have next to deal with the objections which Mr. Arbuthnot urges against the scheme which we have proposed, and which appear to resolve themselves into two.

In the first place, he objects to our observations upon the fragmentary character of the Service, and to our "recommendations for introducing into it what are termed "elements of unity."

In the second place he objects to our proposals for the separation of mechanical from intellectual labour.

With respect to the first of these objections, we apprehend that Mr. Arbuthnot has misunderstood the scope of our observations on what we have called the "fragmentary character" of the Service. Although we certainly take a somewhat higher view of the functions of the Permanent Civil Servants than Mr. Arbuthnot appears to do, we agree with him in considering that a proper division of labour between them, and the devotion of each man's energies to a few special branches of the Service, are essential conditions of their usefulness. We have nowhere suggested or even hinted at the idea of transferring men from one office to another in cases where the business is not of a cognate character; but any person who is acquainted with the connexion which subsists between large classes of departments must be aware that opportunities are frequently to be found for rendering useful in one department the experience which has been acquired in another. We may be permitted to refer to the interchange of officers which has recently taken place between the Account department of the Admiralty, the Audit Office, the Paymaster-General's Office, and the Treasury, as a case in point.

We agree with Mr. Arbuthnot in thinking that the regular course of promotion should be within each department; and we have not proposed that clerks (except such as may be employed upon purely mechanical duties) should be transferred from one office to another. We have limited our recommendation to the case of staff appointments, of which a large proportion are now

bestowed upon men drawn from other professions; and we cannot see any reason why a Civil Servant who has distinguished himself in one department should not be considered as eligible to an important appointment in another, as a barrister, or a military man, who has had no experience of the Civil Service at all.

With respect to the separation of intellectual from mechanical labour, we freely admit that there is much difficulty in drawing a proper line between them, so as to avoid the inconveniences which Mr. Arbuthnot points out as likely to arise from a system such as he supposes us to contemplate. We are also by no means insensible to the value of a certain amount of mechanical labour, and of practical acquaintance with the formal business of an office, to a young man who wishes to qualify himself for rising to its higher situations. It cannot, however, be advantageous to him to be kept to mere copying, or other equally mechanical duties, for ten or fifteen of the best years of his life.

We have said that the proper maintenance of the distinction we propose "must depend more upon the discretion and management of the chiefs of offices and those immediately below them than upon any general regulations that could be made by a central authority." We cannot doubt that the chiefs of offices will give due weight to the important considerations suggested by Mr. Arbuthnot, and that they will especially take care not to throw upon the supplementary clerks such duties as are likely to make them the most efficient members of the office, and at the same time to debar them from promotion.

We have now only to add that, although the separation of intellectual from mechanical labour, and the occasional transfer of officers from one department to another, are undoubtedly important parts of the plan which we have had the honour to lay before your Lordships, its integrity does not, as Mr. Arbuthnot supposes, depend upon their adoption. The cardinal points of our scheme are the substitution of competing examinations for appointments by patronage, and the establishment of a system of promotion according to merit. We believe that such a scheme would be far more easily worked if our suggestions on the two points above adverted to were accepted; but we do not consider those suggestions to be essential to its integrity.

MEMORANDA by SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE and SIR C. TREVELYAN on the Division of Labour in Public Offices between Intellectual and Mechanical Work.

SIR STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE.

It is argued that the separation of intellectual from mechanical labour is inexpedient,—

1. Because a practical acquaintance with the details of official work is the best or the only good preparation for situations of command; and,

2. Because if young men are tempted to enter an office by the expectation that they will be employed upon intellectual work alone, they will necessarily be disappointed, inasmuch as there will not be intellectual work enough to supply them with, and they will consequently become discontented.

With regard to the first of these objections, I readily admit that young men ought to make themselves practically acquainted with the details of official work, with a view to becoming fit for the higher situations; and that they ought for that purpose to go through a certain amount of drudgery, on the principle on which a law student copies out with his own hand a number of common forms and precedents, and on which a young subaltern goes through the exercises of the drill sergeant. What we contend for is, that the clerk should also from the first be employed upon intellectual work, suited to the education he has received, as well as upon a certain quantity of mechanical work; that he should take the mechanical work which he does take, not for its own sake, but for the sake of educating himself by means of it; and that the due performance of the mechanical work of the office should depend, not wholly or even principally, upon the highly-educated clerks, but upon the mechanical labourers. This would not prevent the clerk from going through a large amount of routine work, but it would make what he does go through profitable to him, which at present it is not. Of course it may happen that a clerk whose first ten or fifteen years are spent in copying letters and doing nothing else, may take notice of what he is copying, investigate the subjects upon which the papers bear, and acquire a good deal of useful information; but it is at least equally likely that he may take to his routine work in a routine spirit, look only to the correctness of his transcripts and the neatness of his handwriting, and derive as little profit from the State Papers which he copies as

the postman does from the letters which he carries. To a man who is employed upon nothing but routine work, the routine work on which he is employed is far less profitable than it would be if he was also employed upon intellectual work, because the meaning of a great part of the routine is lost to him.

Secondly, the apprehension that men of superior education and abilities would be disappointed at finding that there was not work enough of an intellectual character for them to do, seems to me to be groundless. Of course if the proper separation between intellectual and mechanical labour is effected, care must be taken to appoint only such number of clerks for the former as can be supplied with suitable work. If an office now consists of thirty clerks, and there is only intellectual work enough for ten of them, the consequence of a division of labour will be that only ten highly educated and highly paid men will be appointed, together with a sufficient number of less highly qualified persons to take the mechanical duties. This will lead to economy, and it is one of the great recommendations of the system that it does so. Besides, I feel convinced that it would be found possible largely to increase the amount of intellectual labour that might be demanded of the clerks if they were relieved of their mechanical duties. How little is done in the way of collecting information, keeping up an acquaintance with the laws, the literature, or the sciences connected with each department! How seldom, when a sudden demand arises for information on a subject which has been but recently brought under notice, is such information forthcoming in the office which ought to be familiar with it!* The chiefs of the office are so fully occupied with the multiplicity of business which they must attend to that they have little time to study even those subjects which are immediately pressing. The clerks, on the other hand, have to conduct the routine, and are so wholly taken up therewith that they are equally neglectful of matters which are not forced upon their notice. Again, the effect of the present system is to throw upon the heads of departments a great deal more work than they can satisfactorily get through, but which they are at present unable to turn over to any one

* In reference to this, I beg to call attention to the remarks made by me from page 2 to 4 of the accompanying paper, written in April 1850.
—C. E. T.

else. If they had under them a few intelligent clerks, with sufficient time at their disposal, they might get a great deal of work digested and brought to them in a convenient shape for decision.

I cannot think there is much weight in either of the objections which have been taken.

STAFFORD H. NORTHCOTE.

February 28, 1854.

SIR C. E. TREVELYAN.

THE division of labour in public departments between work which is mostly of an intellectual kind, and work the prevailing character of which is that it is mechanical, must be carried out with a careful attention to the circumstances of each department. As a general rule, this principle is most applicable to those offices which are in an especial manner Government Offices; that is, offices which are charged with the superintendence of other offices or branches of administration, and to which the business, therefore, comes in a great degree prepared and ready for a final decision to be passed upon it; at the same time that there are large masses of accounts and returns sent up for the purpose of enabling the superintending office to exercise a current check, and which only require to be properly arranged and digested for the consideration of those who have to decide upon them.

But even in the departments which are most purely executive, if, on the one hand, a mass of formal routine work be found to exist, requiring, perhaps, less real exercise of mind than bricklaying or carpentering, and on the other, responsible functions have to be performed which call for a high degree of vigilance and judgment, a proper division of labour ought to be established, always taking care that those who will be called to the performance of the higher class of duties obtain a sufficient acquaintance with the details of the machinery of the department.

In order that young men of liberal education may be familiarized with the forms of office, it is not necessary that they should drudge at them till they grow grey-headed, according to the present practice. The Registrar-General's department is generally considered one of the

most homogeneous and least intellectual of our public establishments; yet he assures me that, by making a proper distinction between that portion of his establishment which is required for purely mechanical work, and that which is employed in superintending the mechanical workmen, and in digesting and applying the result of their labour, both descriptions of work would be better done.

This principle of the division of labour is the key to the improvement of many Public Offices. Without it they cannot be efficiently or economically conducted. Neither can the cheapest and most suitable description of agency be applied to each description of work, nor can the appropriate motives be brought to bear upon the respective classes of persons employed. The practical effect of the present rude, chaotic mode of proceeding upon some Government Offices is described in the Report upon the Colonial Office, at pages 49 and 50 of the Reports of Committees of Enquiry into Public Offices, Parliamentary Paper No. [1715], Session 1854, under the heads "Unimproving nature of the duties upon which the younger clerks are ordinarily employed," and "Absence of the usual motives for professional exertion;" and the effect of the same system at the Treasury is well known. A remedy was recommended in the first draft of the Report upon the Treasury, but the proposal was opposed on what seemed to me insufficient grounds, and the recommendation was diluted to what appears at pages 12 and 13 of the Reports, under the heads "The clerks on the general establishment should be less employed in copying," and "their number should be regulated by the extent of the business requiring agency of a superior order;" and "Salary and mode of appointment of permanent extra clerks." A practical illustration of the advantages of the system advocated by us will be found in the experience of the India House, at pages 54 and 55 of the Reports, although even there it has not been fully carried out.

It is indispensable to the proper application of the principle, that the first appointments should be made with a due reference to the description of work which has to be done. In the Army and Navy the line is drawn in the clearest manner, both as to the kinds of work to be done and the kinds of agency employed to do it; and the

result is that the main body of our Army and Navy is cheap and efficient in a high degree. In the Treasury the subordinate agency employed in working up the mass of our accounts and statistical documents is excellent of its kind, because it has for many years been selected by my predecessors in the office of Assistant-Secretary, and myself, by the result of a competing examination of candidates sent up from the same class of persons employed in the Revenue Departments and the Post Office. (See Treasury Minute of the 24th March 1840, referred to at page 13 of the Reports.)

What is required to complete the reform of the office is that a great deal of copying work, which is still done by the clerks on the superior establishment, should be given to the supplementary, or, as they are here called, the permanent extra clerks, to do; that the members of the superior establishment should be gradually reduced, by not filling up vacancies, to the number required for doing the superior description of work; and that when the time arrives for filling up vacancies on the superior establishment, it should be done by selecting the best men from the junior ranks of the departments subordinate to the Treasury. This office would then be in a condition effectually to perform its high function of exercising a controlling and revising influence over the great establishments employed in the receipt and expenditure of the revenue, and over all other departments in their relation to finance.

As the Treasury is eminently a superintending office, it is right that it should draw its strength and experience from the offices superintended by it; but in general both classes of Public Servants will have to be replenished by first appointments made directly to the offices in which the vacancies take place. It is therefore very important, that when the first appointments are made by open competing examination, the line should be carefully drawn between the superior and inferior class of appointments. There should be two distinct classes of appointments to be contended for, and two distinct classes of candidates to contend for them. The subjects of examination should also be different. In respect to the higher class of appointments, the candidates should be examined in whatever branches of knowledge, constituting a liberal education, happen to have been cultivated by them. In respect to the lower class, quick and legible handwriting, facility of deciphering, familiarity with all the ordinary arith-

metrical processes, and knowledge of bookkeeping, should be the principal subjects of examination; and other acquirements should be brought into competition only when a further trial is wanted to turn the balance between candidates who are equally proficient in the above-mentioned indispensable requisites. Above all, there should be a careful preliminary inquiry into character, and no person should be admitted to be a candidate whose antecedents have not been fully ascertained, and his integrity and general respectability vouched for by one or more persons of known trustworthiness. When it is remembered that a salary rising from 80*l.* to 180*l.* a-year, with a possible further progression in cases of long service and more than usual merit to 250*l.* (the rates which have been already fixed in several offices for supplementary clerks), is a greater object to persons of this class than a much higher salary is to persons who have been expensively educated; and that at present, with occasional exceptions, little or no previous scrutiny takes place into the character of the persons appointed to situations of this description, it may be expected that, although this class of subordinate clerks is even now remarkable for its trustworthiness, a still more respectable and useful class will be obtained under the new mode of appointment. They are at present a solid ground of strength and credit to the Treasury, and there is no reason why they should not be the same to other offices.

The other places where the class of supplementary clerks are adverted to in the Reports upon Public Offices, are as follows:—

Board of Trade.

- “ Duties of Clerks,” pp. 139, 140.
- “ Copying Department,” p. 140.
- “ Examination of Copyists,” p. 140.
- “ Proposed Establishment,” p. 143.

Poor Law Board.

- “ Two Classes of Clerks on the Establishment,” p. 200.
- “ Supplementary Clerks,” pp. 200, 201.
- Ditto ditto, p. 202.
- “ Examinations Recommended,” p. 203.

Privy Council Office.

- “ Supplementary Clerks,” p. 227.

Education Committee.

- “ Clerkships not to be filled up,” p. 232.
- “ Duties of Supplementary Clerks,” p. 234.

Copyhold, Inclosure, and Tithe Commission.

- “ Copying Clerks to be employed,” p. 254.

Colonial Land and Emigration Office.

- “ Establishment,” p. 266.
- “ Supplementary Clerks,” p. 269.
- “ Additional Extra Clerks,” p. 270.

Office of Works.

- “ Suggested Constitution of the Office,” p. 320.
- “ Application of the Constitution to the existing number of Officers,” pp. 320, 321.
- “ Principles of Economy of Labour in an Office,” pp. 321, 322.

Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service.

- “ Routine Character of their Duties,” p. 338: p. 6 of the separate copy.
- “ Principle on which the Public Service should be recruited,” p. 341: p. 9 of the separate copy.
- “ Separation of Intellectual from Mechanical Labour,” p. 349: p. 17 of the separate copy.
- “ Question of a Copying Office. Measure not recommended,” pp. 349, 350: pp. 17, 18, of the separate copy.

February 28, 1854.

C. E. TREVELYAN.

Note.—A similar arrangement has since been made in the Secretary's Department of the Post Office, the details of which are described in the following extract from the Report of the Committee for inquiring into the Establishment of the Post Office, dated the 30th May 1854:—

“ The permanent establishment of the Secretary's Office should consist of a single Secretary, at a salary of 1,500*l.*, rising in five years to 2,000*l.*; two Assistant Secretaries, at salaries rising from 700*l.* to 1,000*l.*, by an annual progression of 50*l.*; and a sufficient number of Clerks, who should be divided, we think, into three classes, and should be charged with the execution of all such duties of the department as require the exercise of superior intelligence. The more mechanical operations of copying, registering, and so forth, may, to a considerable extent, be assigned to a distinct class of Clerks, selected with an especial reference to the quickness and excellence of their handwriting, and their familiarity with the first rules of arithmetic. The salaries of these Clerks should commence at 80*l.*, and rise by 5*l.* a year to 150*l.* We consider that this arrangement will not only place the Secretary's Office itself on a more satisfactory footing than at present, but will materially conduce to the harmonious adjustment of the other departments of the Post Office.” Page 5, 6.

MEMORANDA on some Branches of the Business of the Treasury, dated in March and April, 1850.

Memorandum referring to the Financial Division of the Treasury.

March 16, 1850

THE Treasury should be officially and fully cognizant of every thing relating to the Revenue, and prepared to afford information respecting it. For example, as regards Customs, Excise, Stamps, Taxes, Post Office, Land Revenue, Fees of Office, Fees of Courts of Justice, Police and other Rates, (excepting such as are levied by and at the disposal of municipal bodies for special objects), and Miscellaneous Receipts, the Treasury should be able to show—

- Every specific tax or due.
- The authority under which it is levied.
- To what it may apply.
- The mode of collection and the produce. Also,
- What taxes are direct and what indirect.
- What are protective or differential.
- What are on raw materials or otherwise affecting manufactures.
- What may be held to be levied on necessaries, on comforts, or luxuries.
- What attach to the exercise of any trade or profession, &c., &c.

The Treasury should also have on record all transactions relating to the National Debt, and all arrangements relating to Exchequer bills, or to loans, either to or from the public, &c.

As regards expenditure, the Treasury should always be able to show, not only the amounts and Exchequer issues of grants, as at present, but also the expenditure of each grant for each year, and the amount of any surplus or deficiency of the provision for the year; and likewise,

All expenditure incurred without specific parliamentary vote or grant, such as the payments at present made by revenue departments for expenses of collection or control, incidental charges, drawbacks, or returns of duty, &c.

Expenses of Courts of Justice or other establishments, defrayed from fees or other receipts in addition to parliamentary provision.

Expenditure from rates for specific objects, when under the control of Government, &c.; in short, everything relating to payments from the general revenue of the United Kingdom, or from special sources of revenue in any way under the direct control of Government.

Votes for Army, Navy, and Ordnance Services, being at the disposal of those respective departments, it rests with them to regulate and check the appropriations in detail; and they must be looked to for any requisite information as to the state of their grants. But as respects all Miscellaneous Service grants, the Treasury should exercise a much more regular and effectual check.

than at present over the appropriation of them. This check has hitherto been very imperfect and insufficient, and expenditure is consequently continually liable to be in excess of the grants, which duly regulated control ought to prevent.

All the objects above adverted to ought, as I conceive, to be carried out through the Financial Division of the Treasury; and in such manner as to place them upon record in some available form.

G. W. BRANDE.

Remarks on the above.

No alteration of system takes place in the Customs and Inland Revenue, no new salary is created or old one increased, without the sanction of the Treasury, and the contingent expenditure is submitted to and receives the sanction of the Treasury after it has been incurred. The Treasury is, however, dependent on the Revenue Departments themselves for the information required for the exercise of this control over them, the rule being that every proposal for an alteration of the existing status should be supported by a complete explanation, *ab initio*, of the facts of the case, as if nothing were known about them at the Treasury. In the same way, when any complaint or suggestion relating to the revenue is received at the Treasury, it is referred to the department concerned for a report, which in like manner ought, according to the existing rule, to contain a complete history of the subject so as to render it unnecessary to have recourse to any other means of information.

It is, no doubt, right that a full explanation should be furnished by the department immediately concerned, of the reasons for or against any measure proposed in reference to the branch of the revenue entrusted to it; but it would nevertheless be a great advantage if the Treasury also possessed independent means of information. The statements furnished by the departments may be incomplete, either from defective knowledge or from an erroneous view of what is required for a full consideration of the subject. The Departmental Reports, also, being always prepared with reference to a foregone conclusion, and being intended to enforce the view taken of the subject by the heads of the department, are written with a strong bias, and must be taken rather as the arguments of an advocate than as the decisions of a judge; and as it seldom happens that the Treasury has before it an equally complete statement of the arguments on the other side, there is a constant tendency towards a one-sided view* of the revenue questions submitted to it; and the power of deciding in

* Appeals are made to the Treasury from the decisions of the Revenue Boards. The decisions of the Treasury on these appeals are generally made in conformity with the Reports of the Revenue Boards. The advantage of the appeal is therefore in a great measure lost, although the decision of the Revenue Board is generally correct.—S. M. Leake.

the last resort, and of controlling the executive departments, is to a great extent weakened and nullified by the absence of any independent fund of information upon which the exercise of these high functions might be based.

But much the greatest public inconvenience arising from the fact stated by Mr. Brande, that the Treasury is not "officially and fully cognizant of everything relating to the revenue, and prepared to afford information respecting it," is, that it is impossible that under these circumstances the Treasury can properly exercise that constant revision of the great revenue establishments which was so justly insisted upon in the following answer, made by Mr. Baring to a question of the Select Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates:—"Those revisions have been periodical; in my opinion they ought to be constant. I think the Board should be constantly employed in going through the different departments and the different branches of expenditure. I do not think the Treasury should wait to be so entirely acted upon by feeling out of doors; I think they ought to be constantly employed in revising the expenditure." I alluded to the same subject in my evidence before the Committee, in the following words:—"There are many branches of business which belong to the Treasury which are not properly attended to. The business of the Treasury is of the most multifarious description. The old definition of it is, that the Lords of the Treasury have to provide for and take care of the King's profit; everything, in short that concerns the pecuniary interests of the public. And there are many things, such as the periodical revision of the Revenue Establishments; the revision of the system of income and expenditure in different offices, such as the Board of Works and the Commission of Education in Ireland; the Board of Woods and Forests in England; the expenditure of the prisons and hulks, and many other matters of that sort, which ought from time to time to be looked into and revised by the Treasury.* For business of that sort I conceive we have not sufficient strength in the working department† of the Treasury; we have only got strength enough to get through

* To these should be added the supervision of the Expenditure of all the Public Departments from the commencement to the termination, viz., the Army, Navy, Ordnance, Colonies, Foreign, &c., &c., from the first preparation of the Estimates to the details of the Expenditure, and the final accounting before the Auditors, and not only the supervision of each separate Department, but the general supervision of the whole; it being the duty of the Treasury to see that there are no inconsistencies or anomalies in the management of the Expenditure in the different Departments of Government, and that the general decisions of the House of Commons are carried out.—S. M. L.

† This refers to those branches of the Establishment in which the business is done, as distinguished from those in which it is recorded in the various forms into which it afterwards passes.

"the ordinary current business. If we had more strength in that department of the Treasury, a great deal of business, for which Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees are now appointed, would be done in the ordinary course of business at the Treasury."

At present we possess, in the manner described in the early part of this paper, the means of transacting the current business connected with the revenue; but the means do not exist of making, from time to time, as part of the ordinary functions of the Treasury, those alterations and adjustments in the great revenue establishments, and in the rules under which the different revenue offices are conducted, which are called for by the ever-varying circumstances of trade and navigation, and of the mode in which the mercantile business of the country is transacted. What takes place in the absence of this constantly-adjusting and regulating power, is that, while everything else is changing, the revenue establishments, and the rules and forms of proceeding connected with them, remain the same, until they become, by their unnecessary expensiveness on some points, their insufficiency on others, and their unsuitableness to the actual state of business on nearly all, a subject of general complaint. The Treasury is then forced by Parliament and by public opinion to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, upon whose recommendation certain remedial steps are taken; after which everything relapses into its former state of inaction, until a new clamour and pressure from without arise, and a new Commission is appointed.

It is needless to point out how much the efficiency and economy of the revenue establishments, and the public convenience, would be promoted, if these revisions were constant and systematic, instead of occasional and exceptional.* It would be found that the Superintending Department having taken this duty upon itself and entered upon the full exercise of its office, would have, in the influence which naturally belongs to it, in its habitual intercourse with the departmental officers, and in the knowledge of passing transactions, progressive changes and prevailing wants which the transaction of the current business supplies, advantages which could not belong to any Commission. The working of these great establishments would be watched by the Treasury as a master-manufacturer watches his machinery: every redundancy would be reduced, and every defect would be supplied as soon as it was brought to light; and the inconvenience, waste, and loss

* The Financial Division of the Treasury keeps an account of the revenue, and of the disposal of it. This business, though important, is not the same business as that of the Revenue Boards, who have to manage the immense and complicated machines required for raising the Revenue; and if the Treasury performed its duty of superintending the working of these great machines, and everything connected with them, that part of its duty would be of much greater importance than the keeping of the Revenue Accounts.—S. M. L.

of power which at present arise from long periods of neglect would be avoided.

The same remarks apply to the control exercised at the Treasury over the Woods and Forests, the Post Office, and some other departments, and also, but subject to some important exceptions and qualifications, to the financial establishments and arrangements.

In exercising their high and important function of revising the taxation of the country, the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are at present dependent upon the Board of Trade and the heads of the Revenue Departments; and whatever occasional aid they may have received from their private secretaries or from Mr. Brooksbank, they have never been accustomed to look to their own office for assistance. The Treasury, however, has advantages in dealing with this great subject which are not possessed by any other office or department. The superintendence of every branch of the public revenue centres at the Treasury, and the practical working of the taxation of the country is to be learned there in the daily transaction of the business of the office. The attention of the Board of Trade is confined to particular branches of taxation, and even of these it has no practical knowledge; while each of the Revenue Departments is concerned with its own portion of the revenue. At the Treasury alone a comprehensive view can be taken of the taxation of the country, united with every facility for the formation of correct opinions; and if full use were made of these advantages, and the subject were investigated and studied in the manner recommended by Mr. Brande, and memoranda were prepared for the use of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, furnishing a well-digested statement of the facts relating to each tax, of the objections to which it is open in principle and practice, and of the most suitable remedies, the public service would be greatly benefited, and the character of the office, and of every person connected with it, would be raised in general estimation.

Mr. Brande observes that the Treasury should also have on record all transactions relating to the National Debt, and all arrangements relating to Exchequer Bills, or to loans, either to or from the public.

The *results* of all past proceedings relative to the raising of new loans, the reduction of the rate of interest on particular descriptions of stock, the alterations which are made from time to time in the interest on Exchequer Bills, &c., are, of course, duly recorded; but no connected statement exists of the circumstances under which these important financial operations took place, and of the reasons which influenced the decision in each case. This description of business is transacted by the Chief Clerk of the financial division, in personal communication with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and it has not been usual to place it on record in the same detailed manner as the rest of the Treasury business. Mr. Brooksbank possessed a large store of

information relating to the financial transactions of past years; and, foreseeing how much would die with him if measures were not taken to preserve it, I several times suggested to him that it might be productive of much public benefit hereafter, if he could be induced to commit to writing the leading points of his long and extensive experience. He told me that memoranda would be found among his papers explanatory of most of the transactions in which he had been engaged; and now that the lamented event of his decease has taken place, it remains to be seen to what extent this serious blank in our records can be supplied from this source. I would suggest that, as regards the past, Mr. Brooksbank's papers should be carefully arranged, and, where necessary, digested and copied into books; and that, as regards the future, the circumstances under which, and the reasons for which, each financial operation may be determined on, should be noted at the time by the Chief Clerk of the financial division, and that this should form a separate confidential series of the Treasury Records, under the personal charge of that officer.

The observations contained in the four next paragraphs of Mr. Brande's paper have reference to defects of system, as well as to deficient information. A simple, easily-understood annual balance-sheet of the miscellaneous grants, and a comprehensive balance-sheet of all the grants for the year, including those for the Army, Navy, and Ordnance, shewing the surplus and deficit on each vote and grant, as they are now shown on the separate balance-sheets for the Army and Navy services, have yet to be formed. The expense of collecting the revenue, and that portion of the expense of the courts of justice which is defrayed from fees, are neither voted by Parliament, nor included in the accounts of the public revenue and expenditure prepared in the financial division. It has hitherto been observed as a principle in that division, that no notice is taken in it of any expenditure which has not been regularly issued from the Exchequer on the authority of Votes or Acts of Parliament; and the accounts of the expense of collecting the revenue, which is paid out of the gross or accruing revenue, and of the expense of certain legal establishments, which is defrayed from fees, are therefore included in the Finance Accounts and laid before Parliament, not by the financial division, but by the Clerk of Parliamentary Accounts at the Treasury, who obtains the Returns from the departments by which the money is disbursed.* The expenditure from rates under the control of the Government, is now confined to the expense of the Police in London and Dublin; but

* These subjects also come strictly within the duty of the Finance Department of the Treasury, including the Clerk of Parliamentary Accounts. Though of great importance, they chiefly relate to Forms of Account, and have only an indirect bearing on the *general control of the*

there is a large and very important class of expenditure formerly defrayed from county rates, which, since the local check was removed, has shown a great tendency to increase, and calls for strenuous and unremitting exertions on the part of the Treasury, to keep it within due bounds. The largest items of this class are the expense of the Irish constabulary, and of criminal prosecutions in England and Scotland.

The last desideratum pointed out by Mr. Brande, refers to the check exercised in the financial division over the appropriation of the grants for miscellaneous services. It has long been felt that something is wanting in this respect, and it has been proposed to open a new account of the appropriation of these grants, showing the object for which each issue is made; this information, although recorded in detail in the papers upon which the orders for the issues are given, not being at present collected in a form immediately available for comparison and reference. Mr. Crafer will give his early attention to this important subject.

April 2, 1850.

C. E. TREVELYAN.

Observations by Mr. Crafer.

The greater part of Mr. Brande's suggestions are very valuable, and may be carried into effect without much difficulty; but some of them appear to proceed upon the supposition that the financial department of the Treasury, as at present arranged, is capable of affording little or no information upon various subjects connected with the income and expenditure of the country.

Undoubtedly no machinery for statistical record now exists in the office, nor is it necessary that it should. The statistical department of the Board of Trade was created with the object of recording and furnishing information upon every subject of this description, and if their published tables be defective, it will not be difficult for them to make such alterations as may be considered useful.

So far as regards what is really the business of the Treasury, much of the information that Mr. Brande proposes to record is already to be found in the finance accounts which are annually

Treasury over the general receipt and expenditure of all departments of Government, which, I submit, is the substantial and most important duty of the Treasury, but which appears to have been overlooked by Mr. Brande, probably because, from neglect, it has not held that prominent place in the Treasury business which it ought to have possessed.

April 18, 1850.

S. M. L.

laid before Parliament, and in the periodical accounts rendered by the revenue departments.

The produce of the revenue upon every article subject to duty is already shown in those accounts, and there will be little difficulty in keeping a record of the rates of duty upon every article, and of all alterations in the rates of duty, as well as of the regulations of the several revenue departments affecting them, and abstracts of the Acts of Parliament or other authorities by which their practice is governed. These should be corrected from time to time, to meet any alterations in law or practice, and might sometimes assist in guiding the decisions upon many doubtful points which come before the Treasury.

Records of this description have little relation to the present business of the financial department, but might (if it be considered desirable) be made an appendage to the library which it is proposed to form, and which should be placed in charge of a librarian, whose duty it should be to make himself thoroughly acquainted with these subjects, and to see that all useful works bearing upon them are added to the collection, subject, of course, to the approval of the Assistant-Secretary, for any expense to be incurred.

It must, however, be borne in mind that the revenue departments are intrusted by the State with the management of all the details connected with their respective branches, and with them must rest the furnishing not merely accounts, but also the information that may be required, either by the Treasury or by Parliament, with respect to the practical working of their several laws and regulations.

There is no doubt that the records of the Treasury are at present very deficient in the details of expenditure. So long as the Pay Office for Civil Services formed part of the Treasury, the necessity for detailed accounts was less apparent; but since the abolition of that department, and the transfer of all payments to the Paymaster-General, it is very desirable that the former system, or rather an improvement upon it, should be resorted to, and that correct accounts should be kept of all sums authorized to be issued, and of the specific purposes for which those issues are made.

The sums voted by Parliament, and the expenditure upon each grant, for the several branches of the Civil Service, are shown in the annual financial accounts, although not in a convenient form. The present form may no doubt be much improved, but it must be recollected that all the present forms of these accounts were prescribed by a Committee of the House of Commons in 1822, and that any alteration may be regarded by the House with some degree of jealousy.

The expenditure by the revenue departments for expenses of collection, and indeed for every other purpose, is shown in the annual finance accounts, and a statement of the expenditure under each head is also furnished to the Finance Department of the Treasury, with the weekly accounts of receipt. It is proposed during the pre-

sent session to introduce a bill for the removal from the revenue departments of several charges which are not properly expenses of collection, and for transferring some of these to the Consolidated Fund. Other charges now defrayed from the Consolidated Fund will be defrayed from annual votes in supply. This arrangement will assist in simplifying the accounts.

My experience in the Financial Department is not sufficient to allow of my proceeding further with these subjects at present; but my present impression is, as I have before stated, that much information is already furnished which may, with little additional trouble, be converted to useful purposes; and I shall not fail, in conformity with Sir Charles Trevelyan's direction, to pay every possible attention to this branch. For the present session I cannot be relieved entirely from the business connected with the Parliamentary Department, and must request to be allowed a reasonable time to make myself acquainted with the subject in all its bearings before I can pretend to give a correct opinion upon the alterations or improvements that may be required to give effect to the several proposals contained in these papers. I may, however, observe, that the expenditure connected with County Rates requires control by a person conversant with professional details, and is, I believe, in very good hands with Mr. Hankins.

The fees received in courts of justice cannot, according to the present system, be brought under the control of the Treasury. A Committee of the House of Commons has been recently appointed to inquire into this subject; and ultimately the power of interfering with these fees, which the Treasury does not at present possess, may be conferred upon this or some other efficient department of the Government; but this also would require the superintendence of a person well acquainted with the details of the profession, and cannot properly form part of the ordinary business of the Financial Department.

The expense of criminal prosecutions in Scotland is very strictly and efficiently controlled by the Queen's Remembrancer in Scotland; indeed, far better than it could be by any person at this office, who would have less accurate means of information upon the details of the several charges; and similar observations will probably apply to other branches of the public expenditure.

April 13, 1850.

C. L. CRAFER.

A P P E N D I X.

APPENDIX, No. 1.

CENSUS 1851.—SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES.

CIVIL SERVICE.

TABLES RELATING TO THE PRINCIPAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN
(From Returns furnished by the respective Offices, &c.)*
PERSONS serving in PUBLIC DEPARTMENTS on March 31st 1851.

	Persons (exclusive of Females).	Persons (exclusive of Females).
Heads of Public Departments	105	17815
Secretaries and Chief Clerks	180	
Officers employed in Special Capacities, Inspectors, Professional Advisers, &c.	378	
Heads of Subordinate Divisions or Branches of Establishments, Accountants, Librarians, &c.	1863	
Clerks, on the Establishment	3476	
—, Extra or Temporary	506	
Others, not being Clerks, employed on some Special Duty	11907	
	17815	
Brought forward		17815
Office-keepers, Messengers, and Porters		3807
Inferior Revenue Officers, Postmen, and Letter-carriers		17405
Artificers and Labourers in the Dockyards, Naval Armaments, &c.		39147
		14531
		53078†
Returned as Superannuated, or on the Retired List of the same Departments		10540

* Returns were obtained only from the Departments with Boards or head quarters in London; several public offices in Edinburgh, containing a small number of Civil Servants, are therefore omitted. In some instances the returns of the Revenue and other Departments include officers serving in Ireland; but as their precise numbers are not stated, it has been thought better to give the statements as furnished. Functionaries of the Law and Ecclesiastical Courts, and persons employed in the offices connected with them, are not comprised in the Table.
† This number includes officers of the Revenue and Post Office serving in Ireland; viz. in the Customs, 2,341 persons; in the Excise branch of the Inland Revenue, 1,246 persons (Revenue Police Force), besides others whose number is not specified; and in the Dublin Post Office 376 persons. Females acting as Housekeepers and Charwomen were returned by several of the Departments, but they are not here included. 454 are noticed in the Returns.